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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XLVIII

LECTURES AND ARTICLES

	PART	PAGE
Afternoon Party	iii	219
Annual Meeting	ii	274
The Army Training Expedition to the Karakoram, 1959	i	67
Central Asian Youth Grows Up	iii	221
The Federation of Malaya	ii	173
Françoise de Grunne	iii	306
India and Pakistan Today	iii	238
Iraq's "Claim to Kuwait"	iii	309
Israel After Suez	ii	160
Japan in 1960	i	29
The King of the Weaving Mountain	iii	229
Leland Buxton in the Yemen, 1905	ii	168
Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R.	i ii iii	56 149 253
Nepal	i	75
The North-West Frontier, Old and New	ii	289
Persian Society under the Qājārs	ii	123
Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda in Asia	iii	264
A Recent Visit to Turkey	ii	140
Russia and Asia in 1960	i	17
The Sikhs	iii	299
Thailand Today	iii	282
Unrest in Northern India, 1869-72	i	37
A Visit to the Maldiv Islands	i	83

AUTHORS OF LECTURES AND ARTICLES

	PART	PAGE
<i>Bentwich, Professor Norman, O.B.E., M.C.</i>	ii	160
<i>Caroe, Sir Olaf, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.</i>	ii	289
<i>Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford</i>	i	56
	ii	149
	iii	253
<i>Fox Holmes, Lt.-Col., F.R.G.S.</i>	iii	221
<i>Griffiths, Sir Percival, C.I.E., I.C.S.(Retd.)</i>	iii	238
<i>Hambley, G. R. G.</i>		
	i	37
<i>Horley, J.</i>	iii	306
<i>H.R.H. Prince Chula of Thailand, G.C.V.O.</i>	iii	282
<i>Hyde, Professor H. Montgomery, M.A., D.Litt., F.R.Hist.S., M.R.I.A.</i>	i	75
<i>Lambton, Professor Ann, O.B.E., B.A., Ph.D., D.Litt.</i>	ii	123
<i>Leech, W. S. C.</i>	ii	173
<i>Longrigg, Brig. Stephen, O.B.E.</i>	iii	309
<i>Macro, Wing Cmdr. Eric, R.A.F.</i>	ii	168
<i>Mendelson, E. Michael, M.A., Ph.D.</i>	iii	229
<i>Morris, Dr. Ivan, B.A., Ph.D.</i>	i	29
<i>Price, M. Phillips, M.A., J.P., F.R.G.S.</i>	ii	140
<i>Short, Major J. McL.</i>	iii	299
<i>Smallwood, Group Captain H. St. C., O.B.E.</i>	i	83
<i>Streather, Major H. R. A.</i>		
	i	67
<i>Wheeler, Lt.-Col. G. E., C.I.E., C.B.E.</i>	iii	264
	i	17

IN MEMORIAM

<i>Buss, Air Commodore K. C., O.B.E.</i>	By H. St. C. S.	ii	122
--	-----------------	----	-----

		PART	PAGE
<i>Farrell, Captain W. J.,</i>	By Sir Patrick Coghill	i	14
<i>C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.</i>			
<i>Fitzmaurice, Nicholas,</i>	By L. H. L.	i	14
<i>C.I.E.</i>			
<i>French, Miss Evangeline</i>	By Ethel John Lindgren	i	4
<i>French, Miss Francesca Law</i>	By Ethel John Lindgren	i	4
<i>Gastrell, Lt.-Col. E. H.,</i>	By C. P. S.	i	5
<i>O.B.E.</i>			
<i>Gull, E. M.</i>	By H. St. C. S.	iii	220
<i>Holt, Captain Sir Vyvyan,</i>	By A. S. H.	i	12
<i>K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.</i>			
<i>Houston-Boswell, Sir Wil-</i>	By A. S. H.	i	12
<i>liam, K.C.M.G., M.C.</i>			
<i>Lorraine, Sir Percy. Bt., P.C.,</i>	By H. St. C. S.	iii	220
<i>G.C.M.G.</i>			
<i>Philby, H. St. John B.,</i>	By Douglas Carruthers	i	6
<i>C.I.E.</i>			
<i>Zetland, The Marquess of,</i>		ii	121
<i>K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.</i>			

CORRESPONDENCE

Letter <i>re</i> article Muslim Republics	By F. L. Long	ii	159
of the U.S.S.R.			
Reply to Squadron Leader Long	By G. E. Wheeler	iii	263

PRESENTATION

Mrs. Violet Dickson, M.B.E.			
(Presentation of the Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal)		iii	219

REVIEWS

	<i>Reviewed by</i>		
Afghanistan Between East and West.			
By Peter G. Franck	G. E. W.	iii	338
Anthill, The.			
By Suzanne Labin	P. H. B. Kent	iii	347
Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism.			
By John Marlowe	Charles Belgrave	iii	316
Arabs of the Middle East, The.			
By Gabriel Baer	Emile Marmorstein	i	91
Balfour Declaration, The.			
By Leonard Stein	J. M. T.	iii	318
Ballads and Stories from Tun-Huang.			
By Arthur Waley	H. St. C. S.	ii	209
Bases of Islamic Culture.			
By Syed Abdul Latif	A. S. Tritton	i	98
Bayonets to Lhasa.			
By Peter Fleming	F. M. B.	iii	339
Bedouin Tribes of the Negev, The.			
By Dr. Touvia Askenazi	Norman Bentwich	iii	320

	<i>Reviewed by</i>	PART	PAGE
Book of Government, The.	<i>Reviewed by</i>		
The Siyasat-nama of Nizam al-Mulk	P. W. A.	i	97
Both Sides of the Hill.			
By Jon and David Kimche	J. M. T.	i	92
Britain and Chinese Central Asia.			
By Alastair Lamb	C. H. Ellis	ii	196
Britain in India.			
By R. P. Masani	J. C. Curry	iii	333
Bunch of Old Letters, A.			
By Jawaharlal Nehru <i>et al.</i>	A. H. B.	i	100
Camels Must Go, The.			
By Sir Reader Bullard	P. W. Avery	iii	326
Ceylon.			
By Argus John Tresidder	G. M. Routh	i	105
Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation.			
By W. Howard Wriggins	B. H. Farmer	iii	343
China's Entrance into the Family of Nations.			
By Immanuel C. Y. Hsü	A. G. N. O.	iii	346
Chronicles of Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz.	C. J. F. Dowsett	ii	187
Trans. and annotated by C. O. Minasian			
Crossroads. Land and Life in South-west Asia.			
By George B. Cressey	D. C.	ii	186
Curse of Blossom, A.			
By Quentin Crewe		iii	350
Curzon: The End of an Epoch.	A. H. B.	iii	312
Daughters of Allah.			
By Henny Harald Hansen	C. J. Edmonds	ii	185
Divide and Lose.			
By Michael Ionides	J. M. T.	ii	181
Eastern Windows.			
By F. D. Ommaney	A. H. B.	iii	343
Economic Development of Communist China 1949-58.			
By T. J. Hughes and D. E. Luard	A. H. S. Candlin	ii	207
Englishmen in Tibet from Bogle to Gould.			
By Sir Olaf Caroe	Francis N. Beaufort-Palmer	ii	195
Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the U.S.S.R.			
By Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay	C. G. Simpson	iii	315
Flight of the Dalai Lama, The.			
By Noel Barber	A. H. B.	iii	341
Han Fei-Tzu. Works from the Chinese.			
By W. K. Liao	L. H. L.	ii	208
Himalayan Pilgrimage.			
By David Snellgrove	F. S. T.	iii	335
Holy Sword, The.			
By Robert Payne	J. M. C.	iii	324
Hussein of Jordan.			
By Gerald Sparrow		iii	313
Independent Iraq, 1932-58.			
By Majid Khadduri	J. M. T.	i	95
India and the United States.			
Ed. by Selig S. Harrison	Lord Birdwood	iii	335
India: Mirage and Reality.			
By Peter Schmid	L. F. Rushbrook Williams	iii	332
India: The Most Dangerous Decades.			
By Selig S. Harrison	A. H. B.	i	99
India Today.			
By Frank Moraes	John Biggs-Davison	i	102
Indian-Chinese Boundary Dispute, The.			
Report	Olaf Caroe	iii	336

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XLVIII

vii

	<i>Reviewed by</i>	PART	PAGE
Indian Heritage, The. By Himayan Kabir	G. M. Routh	i	103
Indus Civilization, The. By Sir Mortimer Wheeler	C. K.	iii	330
Introduction to the Turkmen Language, An. By G. K. Dulling	Karl H. Menges	ii	206
Iran: Past and Present. By Donald N. Wilber	P. W. A.	i	96
Islam and the Integration of Society. By W. Montgomery Watt	A. S. Tritton	iii	322
Islands of the Marigold Sun. By Suresh Vaidya	A. H. B.	ii	193
Israel—A Blessing and a Curse. By Hedley V. Cooke	A. L. Tibawi	i	93
Israel Resurgent. By Norman Bentwich	A. S. Kirkbride	ii	184
Japan. By Sir Esler Dening	Fosco Maraini	iii	349
Karachi Through a Hundred Years. By Herbert Feldman	Martin Moynihan	ii	191
Lords of Life. By H.R.H. Prince Chula Chakrabongse	E. D.	i	109
March Arabesque. By Emile Bustani	Stewart Perowne	iii	319
Marco Polo's Asia. By Leonard Olschki	H. St. C. S.	iii	344
Memoirs of Lord Ismay, The. By Parwananda Sharma	Gilbert Laithwaite	ii	190
Men and Mules on a Mission of Democracy. By Parwananda Sharma	Olaf Caroc	i	104
Mind of Mr. Nehru, The. By R. K. Karanjia	A. H. B.	ii	193
Mission for My Country. By H.I.M. the Shahanshah of Iran	P. W. A.	iii	314
Mouvements Nationaux chez les Musalmans de Russie, Les. By Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay	G. E. Wheeler	ii	201
Muhammad, Prophet and Statesman. By W. Montgomery Watt	A. S. Tritton	iii	322
Nasser's New Egypt. By Keith Wheelock	Tom Little	ii	182
Nehru: The Years of Power. By Vincent Sheean	A. H. B.	i	100
New-Old Land of Israel, The. By Norman Bentwich	F. F. B.	i	93
Neither War nor Peace. By Hugh Seton-Watson	Paul B. Henze	ii	202
North from Kabul. By Andrew Wilson	C. H. S.	iii	337
Orta Dogu. No. 1 of <i>The Middle East</i> (Turkish Review)	C. F. Beckingham	iii	329
Personal Column. By Sir Charles Belgrave	Rupert Hay	ii	183
Pilgrimage for Plants. By Frank Kingdon-Ward	A. C. Western	ii	194
Poet and the Spae-Wife, The. By W. E. D. Allen	E. B. H.	iii	324
Politics of the Developing Areas. Ed. by Gabriel A. Almand and James S. Coleman	A. H. S. Candlin	ii	189

	<i>Reviewed by</i>	PART	PAGE
Power Struggle in Iraq, The. By Benjamin Shwadran	C. J. E.	i	95
Punjabi Village in Pakistan, A. By Zekiye Eglar	G. M. Routh	ii	192
Record of an Ascent. By P. L-S.	Gilbert Laithwaite	iii	313
Russia and China. By J. V. Davidson-Houston	C. H. Ellis	ii	199
Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age. By George Vernadsky	C. H. Ellis	i	106
Sabres of Paradise, The. By Lesly Blanch	C. H. Ellis	ii	188
Short Political Guide to the Arab World, A. By Peter Partner	Eric Macro	iii	318
Silent War in Tibet, The. By Lowell Thomas, Jr.	A. H. B.	iii	340
Sinai Campaign, The. By Edgar O'Ballance	J. B. G.	i	91
Slaves of Timbuktu. By Robin Maugham	G. W. Furlonge	iii	321
Sources of Chinese Tradition. By Wm. Theodore de Bary	P. H. B. Kent	iii	344
Soviet Deportation of Nationalities. By R. Conquest	C. H. Ellis	i	107
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-41. By George F. Kennan	Paul B. Henze	ii	203
Struggle for Arab Independence, The. By Zeine N. Zeine	Harold Ingrams	iii	317
Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953. By Ping-ti Ho	P. H. B. Kent	i	111
Study of History, A (abridgment by D. C. Somervell). By Arnold Toynbee	A. H. S. Candlin	iii	351
Thailand. By Noël F. Busch	Gerald Sparrow	i	110
Three Kings in Baghdad. By Gerald de Gaury	C. J. Edmonds	iii	328
Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic. Report to the International Commission of Jurists	Olaf Caroe	i	90
Tibet Disappears. By Chanakya Sen	Olaf Caroe	i	104
Tibet in Revolt. By George N. Patterson	A. H. B.	ii	195
Tibet is My Country. By Thubten Norbu	A. H. B.	iii	342
Tiger Trails in Assam. By Patrick Hanley	E. H. C.	iii	342
Towards Universal Man. By Rabindranath Tagore	L. F. Rushbrook Williams	iii	330
Uzbek-Russian Dictionary. Chief Editor, Professor A. K. Borovkov	Paul B. Henze	ii	204
War in the Desert. By Lieut.-General Sir John Glubb	Lord Birdwood	iii	321
Way and the Mountain, The. By Marco Pallis	O. C.	ii	197
Women and the New East. By Ruth Frances Woodsmall	M. R.	ii	184
Yellow Scarf, The. By General Sir Francis Taker	John Coatman	iii	331



JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

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PART I

CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL	2
ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NOTICES	3
IN MEMORIAM	4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	15
RUSSIA AND ASIA IN 1960	17
JAPAN IN 1960	29
UNREST IN NORTHERN INDIA, 1869-72	37
THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.	56
THE ARMY TRAINING EXPEDITION TO THE KARAKORAM, 1959	67
NEPAL	75
A VISIT TO THE MALDIVE ISLANDS	83
REPORT: Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic	90
New Books added to the Library	113
REVIEWS:	
The Arabs of the Middle East, 91 The Sinai Campaign, 91 Both Sides of the Hill—Britain and the Palestine War, 92 The New-Old Land of Israel, 93 Israel—A Blessing and a Curse, 93 The Power Struggle in Iraq, 95 Independent Iraq, 1932-58, 95 Iran: Past and Present, 96 The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, 97 Basis of Islamic Culture, 98 India: The Most Dangerous Decades, 99 A Bunch of Old Letters, 100	Nehru: The Years of Power, 100 India Today, 102 India, 1947-50, 103 The Indian Heritage, 103 Men and Mules on a Mission of Democracy, 104 Tibet Disappears, 104 Ceylon, 105 Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age, 106 The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, 107 Lords of Life, 109 Thailand, 110 Bamboo Doctor, 110 Studies on the Population of China, 1369-1953, 111

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Chairman of Council, Sir Philip Southwell, finds that owing to his appointment as Director-General of St. John's Ambulance Association, he is unable to devote the necessary time to Council affairs. He has therefore asked to be relieved of the Chairmanship early in 1961, but remains ready and willing to serve the Society as a member of its Council.

The Council are glad to announce that General Sir Richard Gale, who was their unanimous choice to succeed Sir Philip, has accepted the nomination and will take over as Chairman of the Society on January 1, 1961.

NOTICES

REVISED MEMBERS LIST. A revised List of Members of the Royal Central Asian Society is due to appear in 1961. This list will include all Members whose subscriptions have been paid up to and including 1960. Members are asked to ensure that the Secretary is in possession of their correct designations and current addresses.

NOTICE TO JOURNAL SUBSCRIBERS

The Council regret to announce that owing to high cost of production, it will be necessary to increase the price of the Journal from 25/- per annum to 45/- per annum, this increase commencing from January, 1962.

It is desired to improve the amenities in the Society's offices and Library. If members have any small tables, carpets, rugs or bookcases they would be willing to present, or to lend, to the Society, these would be gratefully accepted by the Secretary. Gifts of books on Asian countries would also be welcomed for the Library.

IN MEMORIAM

MISS FRANCESCA LAW FRENCH AND MISS EVANGELINE FRENCH

TWO Central Asian explorers of unsurpassed courage and enterprise died last summer: Miss Evangeline French on July 8 at the age of 91 and her sister Francesca on August 2, aged 88. For years they had been living quietly at The Willow Cottage, Stour Row, Shaftesbury. With Miss Mildred Cable, the tireless organizer who predeceased them in 1952, they had crossed and recrossed the Gobi, observing and talking with many scarcely-known peoples in their own tongues and in their own homes, following their trails by the traditional methods of travel—often the acutely uncomfortable Chinese wooden cart. Of these studies they leave records, in meticulous and scholarly detail, which enrich knowledge of a vast area; but they went as members of the China Inland Mission and between them gave 98 years to “the business of the Kingdom of God” in the Far East.

Evangeline French had worked in N.W. China for 15 years when Francesca joined her, after their widowed mother's death. *Through Jade Gate and Central Asia: An Account of Journeys in Kansu, Turkestan and the Gobi Desert*, published by Mildred Cable and Francesca French in 1927, established them at once in the first rank of explorers whose chief concern is not stones but human beings. *A Desert Journal*, based on letters written by all three from June, 1928 (Srinagar) to June, 1932 (Urumchi), was compared by Alan Brodrick “with the story of a Shackleton, a Grenfell, a Livingstone.” *The Gobi Desert*, a major work by Miss Cable and Francesca French, appeared in the darkest period of the Second World War (1942), sold out and was reprinted for the sixth time in December, 1943. It contains much wisdom which airborne post-war travellers should try to absorb before taking off, and which readers of current reports might use as a touchstone in judging credibility. The Prologue gives a key to the strange freemasonry of Central Asia:

“We found the desert to be unlike anything that we had pictured. . . . The oasis dwellers were poor but responsive; the caravan men were rugged but full of native wit; the outstanding personalities of the oases were men of character and distinction; the towns were highly individualistic and each small water-stage had some unique feature. Even the monotonous outlines of the desert, when better known, wore a subtly changing aspect. . . . Once the spirit of the desert had caught us it lured us on and we became learners in its severe school. The solitudes provoked reflection . . . the silences forbade triviality. . . .”

The religious mainspring of the long pilgrimage is found in other works: *Something Happened*, *Ambassadors for Christ*, *Towards Spiritual Maturity*, *A Parable of Jade*. There were biographical tributes to fellow pilgrims in *George Hunter, Apostle of Turkestan* and an account of his



MISS FRANCESCA LAW FRENCH

To face p.4

disciple, *The Making of a Pioneer: The Life of Percy Mather* (1935). The sisters' practical concern for the weak is seen in *Grace, Child of the Gobi* and *The Story of Topsy: Little Lonely of Central Asia*. Friends of the Misses French would wish to record their gratitude to Ai Lien ("Topsy"), the deaf and dumb but gifted Mongol-Tibetan girl who is now Miss Eileen Guy, British subject, and rewarded her guardians' kindness by a lifetime of devotion and care.

Evangeline and Francesca French are not in *Who's Who*, and apparently eluded most forms of public recognition. It also seems to have been forgotten that they were younger sisters of Field-Marshal Lord French, first Earl of Ypres. On retirement from the mission field Francesca did voluntary work for the British and Foreign Bible Society, becoming an honorary life governor in 1945.

The "trio" (as they were called) toured Australia, New Zealand and India for the Society after the war, as told in *Journey with a Purpose*. Francesca perhaps revealed most of herself in *Miss Brown's Hospital* (1954), the book she wrote alone after Mildred Cable's death. Discussing a crucial interview by the future Dame Edith Brown with the Surgeon-General of India, Francesca describes pioneers (p. 29) as "formidable people" equipped with a "tenacity of purpose which enables them to overcome opposition and all the difficulties of circumstance. If they do not walk in step with their fellows it is because they listen to a drum tap heard only by themselves. . . ." She could not have written a more revealing epitaph for herself and her two companions.

ETHEL JOHN LINDGREN.

LIEUT.-COLONEL E. H. GASTRELL, O.B.E.,
late Indian Political Service

LIEUT.-COLONEL E. H. GASTRELL'S sudden death from a coronary thrombosis on September 21, while on a holiday in Wales, was a grievous blow to his many friends in the Society, of which he had been a member since 1932. He joined the Council in 1954 and became a Vice-President in 1957. A keen student of Central Asian affairs, he took an active part in the Council's deliberations and seldom missed a meeting.

"Evvie" Gastrell was a third-generation servant of India, for his grandfather served the East India Company and his father was for years Adviser to Indian Ruling Princes. He was commissioned in 1916 at the age of 18 and fought with Hodson's Horse in France and afterwards in the East Persia Cordon Field Force. Here he had his first taste of political work as Vice-Consul at Qain and fell under the spell of Persia. He joined the Indian Political Service in 1922 and for the next twelve years served mostly in Persia and the Gulf, holding among others the posts of Vice Consul at Ahwaz, Secretary to the Political Resident at Bushire, and Consul at

Zahedan. In 1927 he married Delicia Crampton, an enthusiastic traveller like himself, and when at Bushire in 1934 a chance came to officiate for a year as Consul-General at Meshed they motored happily the length and breadth of Persia *via* Tehran to get there. The following year Gastrell joined the Baluchistan Administration as Quetta Earthquake Claims Commissioner; this was followed by strenuous years as Political Agent Quetta-Pishin, Political Agent for Kalat and the Bolan Pass, and (in 1939) Census Commissioner. From 1941 to 1943 he did outstanding work as the Viceroy's representative in the French possessions, Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahé and the rest.

In 1944 Gastrell was summoned to Tehran to succeed the late Sir Giles Squire as Additional Counsellor at the British Embassy. Here his intimate knowledge of provincial affairs in the east and south were of great assistance to the Ambassador, Sir Reader Bullard. In 1947 he went to Meshed again as Consul-General and in 1949, no longer a servant of India, he retired.

Not many British married couples have travelled further in the Middle East than the Gastrells did, nor to more interesting places. Not content with the immense distances normally covered by "Politicals" on tour and transfer during their careers, they spent their short leaves trekking too. They visited as tourists practically every historic spot in the Indian Empire and Persia that they did not see on duty. One "casual" leave they spent at Gangtok, another at Kabul, and they twice motored to England on furlough by different routes.

After retirement they settled in Wimbledon and took up social work, especially Marriage Guidance for which (being themselves an ideally happy couple) they were admirably fitted; Gastrell served on the Wimbledon Marriage Guidance Council for ten years, first as honorary secretary and later as chairman. His widow's consolation is the knowledge that he was happy and in full possession of his faculties up to the hour of his death and that he is mourned by an exceptionally wide circle of friends and admirers, Asian as well as British.

C. P. S.

H. St. JOHN B. PHILBY, C.I.E.

(Died 30 September, 1960. He was a member of the R.C.A.S. since 1919)

Douglas Carruthers writes :

MY acquaintance with the late H. St. J. B. Philby dates back to 1917, when he first entered Arabia, which he was to make his home for the rest of his life, and where he established a position almost unique in the annals of East and West.

Our collaboration was entirely geographical and zoological. At that time I was trying to unravel the hydrography of Northern Arabia, and to make some sort of reliable map, on a big scale, of what was then a vast white patch. By 1918-19, poor maps, but the best possible, were emerging.

just in time for the Peace Conference in Paris to use, when carving up that area, and drawing the frontiers between three Kingdoms—Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Northern Arabia, as far south as Riyadh, came within the scope of my operations, so my contact with Philby was essential and we worked together harmoniously.

In 1917, recently appointed Political Advisor to Ibn Saud, he crossed Arabia from the Gulf to Jidda—the first European to do so, since Sadlier, 100 years before, and the very first to survey his route accurately, checked as his was by sun meridian latitudes taken with a sextant, and artificial horizon. The accuracy of this 800-mile prismatic compass traverse needed little adjustment. I think I am right in saying that Philby was self-taught in the matter of surveying, and if so, his maps of wide areas of completely unknown regions, do him great credit. All his survey work, often carried out under austere conditions, was first class, and, of course, his Arabic nomenclature perfect.

After an excursion into Northern Najd, he made his first attempt into the unknown south, to the borders of the Empty Quarter, which was, of course, his lodestar. This journey resulted in a bundle of invaluable sheets of survey over completely new country. No one had penetrated the region beyond Jabrin, and explored the hypothetical Dawasir. He covered some 800 miles of new ground, and mapped it in detail. I well remember unpacking a box of specimens at the British Museum and finding a note inside: "Gut the fox and take them to the War Office." I opened up the skin of a desert fox and found it stuffed with the original surveys which eventually adorned his *The Heart of Arabia*, 2 Vols., London, 1922.

I claim some credit for kindling in Philby an interest in zoology and ornithology. He responded by collecting for himself on his numerous journeys, and inaugurating the valuable work done by George Latimer Bates on the birds in the vicinity of Jidda. "All my new birds are certainly due to *his* example and teaching," he wrote. Had it not been for Philby's hospitality and patronage, the four articles on the "Birds of Jidda and Central Arabia," which appeared in the *Ibis* in 1936, would never have seen the light of day. These articles were the foundation stone of the work which culminated 18 years later in Colonel R. Meinertzhagen's monumental *Birds of Arabia*. Philby's outstanding discoveries at that date were the new Rock Partridge from the mountains around Taif, and the new, and only, Woodpecker in Arabia.

He also paid attention to the mammals, and amongst the specimens he sent home to the British Museum (Natural History) was a Gazelle, which I was able to name, in collaboration with E. Schwarz, after the Wahabi King—*Gazella*, *gazella saudiya*, a new sub-species from the Dhalm district, 150 miles N.E. of Mecca. (See *Proc. Zoo. Soc. London*. Part 1. 1935). This particular specimen was actually shot by His Majesty. A detailed description of their range came with these specimens, with the remark, "it is high time you got out your study of these animals before they become extinct"—the shooting trip on this occasion bagged about 1,200 gazelle!

He took infinite trouble to help me to elucidate some of the problems in North Arabian topography, especially in the little-known triangle be-

tween Khaibar, Taima and Hail. There were several doubtful oases, which I "placed" on the authority of Guarmani, Doughty and Huber, but were eliminated on more recent maps. Philby took the trouble to fly over the region in question, and settled the matter by locating the lost oases.

Philby did the same with the one-time discredited wanderings of that Italian horse-coper of 1864, Carlo Guarmani. He upheld my vindications of his travels, and identified some of the more controversial place names on his crude map. He was even complimentary enough to remark on my analysis of various travellers in Najd that "it is impossible to believe that Carruthers has not been there," I had *not*.

An erstwhile Indian Civil Servant, turned Moslem, Philby was trader, explorer, and eventually the confidant, and adviser, to the King Ibn Saud, and resided at his Court. An office almost as strange as that of the Scotsman, Keith, who became Governor of the Holy City of Madina. He was the author of no less than *fifteen* books on Arabia, all of which rank as standard works; his style remarkably unemotional for a traveller in a country which is notorious for its stimulating effect on the human mind and body.

Fanatical in politics, therefore difficult in debate, he remains nevertheless an explorer of the most efficient type; painstaking to a degree, correct in detail; absolutely devoid of any tendency to exaggeration in his writings: he bequeaths to us a vast store of knowledge about Arabia in general, which is not to be found anywhere else.

Colonel Gerald de Gaury writes:

For Britishers who went to the Arab world between the two Great Wars, Philby was a giant.

We waited for new books by him (somewhat heavy in style for the general reader) with impatience and learnt his views with respect.

If there were not wanting account of his difficult and cantankerous nature, it was attributed by us to trying himself overhard in great endeavour. The conditions of travel in Arabia for a European were often appalling. Except by reading Charles Doughty, no one today can understand the dangers and rigours of travel then.

I met him first, I think, in Jedda or maybe, I cannot now be sure, I went out from there to welcome him in the Wadi Fatima on return from one of his expeditions. From time to time he would be disputatious though never, happily, with me.

Some years later, in Riyadh, I heard from the King, that Philby was arriving. I had not much hope of lastingly warm relations, but I determined for my part to make an especial effort toward them. For a time all went very well socially. Then, to my pleasure, he invited me to a luncheon (in, of course, the Arab style) and when the day and hour came I found that he had left Riyadh the night before. Ibn Saud rocked with laughter. "Do you not know your Philby yet?" he asked between gusts

Another day the King said to me, "One thing I can never understand is that a man change the religion to which he is born. We think that our religion is the best and right one, praised be the Prophet, but not

man should change the religion of his people in which he is brought up. I prefer men who do not do so." He was at pains to explain that his friendship for Philby was owed to knowing him for many years, since days when Philby had helped him in the First War. What Ibn Saud found difficult to understand, it must be hard for his countrymen to approve.

Philby's work of exploration was unrivalled and will remain so for ever now. It was the longest, most painstaking and industrious undertaken by any man in Arabia. And his range was wide; cartography, zoology, ornithology, history, topography, archæology, etc., were all covered and each with success in its own field.

In the Second World War his wish to reach Arabia and overcome obstacles put in his way led him into propounding a grandiose though unwise plan. The result was an unhappy one for him and his waspish outspokenness ended in serious trouble for him.

What led him on? What drove him so hard? Why was he often so querulous? His background, his youthful success as a scholar, his physique all seemed very sound. To a large extent it was, of course, a desire to triumph over his fellow men, for distinction at all costs. Only some three Europeans, Pelly, Palgrave, whose account Philby doubted, and Colonel Hamilton had ever been to Riyadh when Philby reached it. Much of Arabia was still Wahhabi and wildly puritanical, so that to travel there and come back was itself a triumph. But why the constant querulousness. It is a mystery for some biographer to solve.

Sometimes, in the end, he showed signs of mellowness. Once, after the War, he came almost humbly to parry an accusation of which I had not heard. And his criticism of mistakes of detail in the play "Ross," which he saw a few weeks before his death, was, I was told, almost benign, whereas earlier it would surely have been sharp.

He received little or no formal recognition from British societies or Government institutions, but with or without it, Philby will go down to history as the supreme explorer of Arabia. He was also one of the first among the few and great travellers in old Arabia.

Owing to his persistence, to the times in which he lived and to a faithful friend, the great Ibn Saud, he achieved, moreover, absolute singularity and almost complete independence. Philby, as he wished, was unmatchably Philby.

Mr. Harold Ingrams writes :

One day in September I found myself imprisoned in a lift with an unusual door-catch. As I wrestled futilely with it, a gentle voice on the other side said, "May I help you, Sir?" The door opened and Philby and I recognized each other. It was some time since we had met and we lunched together the following week.

We parted after two and half hours of talking, of which he did most. The years were bridged while he told me of conditions in Saudi Arabia, of his home life in Riyadh, of his visit to Moscow and of how he had spent his time in England. He spoke of his journey back *via* Beirut and

invited me to Riyadh. I walked away very happily, warmly conscious of the friendship of which he gave so readily. It was a great shock little more than a week later to read of his death.

I did not actually meet Philby until 1944 though my activities in the Hadhramaut had received his attention in some articles and letters to the press since 1938. He had made generous remarks about some minor exploring I had done, but strongly criticized what he considered the imperialist activities of the British Government which had, he asserted, annexed a large part of South Arabia and was busily engaged in bringing it under British rule by violent means.

True, the British Government was at least indirectly responsible for my presence in the Hadhramaut but it was I who had taken the initiative in peace-making, and the responsibility also, since I was making the essential contacts direct with the tribes, contrary to policy and the orders I had been given. Since Philby's charges were a travesty of what was happening I felt hurt! However, I was asked to give some lectures when I came home in 1944. These Philby attended and, in the discussions which followed, paid more than generous tributes to what we and our Arab friends had done, realizing entirely that there had been no hidden imperialism either in my motives or in those of my masters. He referred reminiscently to these things at our last meeting and hoped I had borne no ill-will. Indeed I never had.

That I think illustrates much of Philby's character. There was a certain impetuosity in making judgements without full knowledge, especially when he had strong feelings, as he had on many things. Probably it is not too much to say that in his earlier days he believed in his own infallibility and he was no respecter of persons in speaking his mind. This got him into trouble with the British Government and, much later, with the present King of Saudi Arabia, but I do not think he was ever malicious and his sense of humour never forsook him. Moreover, he never failed to mention what he thought good of those he attacked and was often on terms of close personal friendship with them.

His kindness to me when we met, and I saw a good deal of him for a few years, made me feel he must be a good deal more mellow than he had been, and advancing age mellowed him more and more. I found him tolerant and easy to talk with and enjoyed every meeting we had, besides profiting from his conversation and vast knowledge of things Arabian. His impetuosity must often have prevented people seeing how often he was right, and it should not be overlooked that he was the first to recognize the seeds of future greatness in Ibn Saud.

The history of Arabian exploration will perforce remain dominated by the name of Philby. Though not quite the last of the explorers he was the seal of them and added more to our knowledge of that land than any of them. If he could criticize others on insufficient knowledge, his own work was distinguished by a meticulous attention to detail which has ensured that it has never been faulted. In so far as I had occasion to follow paths he had trodden in the south I can testify to that, as others have done elsewhere. His explorations began when Blunt and Doughty were still alive. He saw the Arabia they knew and he watched with sorrow its life

being changed by the internal combustion engine and the discovery of oil. Though he clung to the old ways himself, he told me at our last meeting of how the new Arabia was coming to terms with the modern age as something which had to be accepted.

All the great Arabian explorers have been individualists and eccentrics, but Philby had the virtues which the best of English and Arabs share. He was kind and courteous, generous and gentle. In London, and especially in the Athenaeum, he was the distinguished scholar and traveller, well-liked by all who knew him. In Riyadh he was Haj Abdulla, the Arabian elder statesman, respected by all, the friend of the old King.

Peace be upon him!

Wing-Commander Eric Macro writes :

In 1929 a prep-school boy staggered his English master by choosing Philby as his subject for an essay on "The Greatest Man of Our Time." When taxed by his master, after the essay had received good marks, on how it was that he came to know so much about an unknown man, the boy produced from his tuck-box a copy of *Southern Najd* and a whole scrap-book full of book reviews, photographs and pencilled notes relating to the author of that small treasure from the Cairo Government Press.

Harry Philby was never the schoolboy hero, never the great Empire man in spite of his being inspired, in his Westminster days, by Warren Hastings—"impeachment and all." And this perhaps provides the key to his personality. Was the inborn rebel too strong for the Empire builder? I do not think that he would ever have wished his life to take a different turn. As head boy at Westminster and in his last year at Trinity he was ever a champion of the established order of things. Here was a great scholar and personality who chose to devote his life to the Arabian Peninsula when so many smoother and conventional courses were open to him. Why did he do this? The answer is not hard to find. He did it because he wanted to and because he was prepared to take the risk of failure. More than that, he had the courage of his own convictions. He was gentle and ruthless, kind and unassailably dogmatic. He could not suffer sensationalism and amateurism in exploration but he would go out of his way to encourage the younger generation bent on entering his own precious preserves where his authority had been paramount for over a quarter of a century. He was at equal ease in the bosom of his family in Maida Vale, Camberley, or the Welsh mountains as he was discussing business with Rolls-Royce at the Farnborough air show, conferring with friends at the Athenaeum, stirring up the social circle in Jeddah or discussing state finance with the King in the palace at Riyadh.

If we can single out one attribute in particular it was his ability to combine scholarship with his vast pioneer explorations. He might well concede, as he did some years ago, his laurels to another, but history will show that St. John Philby has secured his place as the master of Arabian exploration of all time.

SIR WILLIAM HOUSTOUN-BOSWALL, K.C.M.G., M.C.

THE death of Sir William Houstoun-Boswall at the age of 67 is a sad blow to his friends all over the world.

William Evelyn Houstoun-Boswall was born in 1892. After an education at Wellington and New College, Oxford, he served in the First World War in the Black Watch. He was mentioned in despatches and was awarded the M.C. and the Croix de Guerre. Like so many of his contemporaries, the peace found him with no occupation, a wealth of human experience and no particular ambitions. Fortunately someone suggested the Diplomatic Service to him and in 1921 he entered under the "reconstruction examination" of the time. The Service cannot have regretted his selection. He was appointed C.M.G. in 1942 and created K.C.M.G. in 1949.

"Houstie-Boo," as he was always known to his friends, saw a wide range of posts—Madrid, Paris, The Hague, Lisbon, Budapest, Oslo, Baghdad and Tokyo. As a Second Secretary he was seconded to the Dominions Office and served from 1929 to 1932 on the staff of the High Commissioner at Pretoria (which, he always maintained, was the happiest time of his life) and later, in 1944, he served under the Resident Minister in West Africa. His greatest years, however, were as political representative in Bulgaria from 1944 to 1946 and as Minister at Beirut from 1947 to 1951, when he retired. It is not too much to say that only someone with his particular qualities could have survived in post-war Sofia. In conditions of considerable physical discomfort, if not of physical danger, only the indomitable spirit of a Houstoun-Boswall could meet the challenge of the Soviet military authorities and their zealous Bulgarian protégés. By contrast, the Legation at Beirut was the calm sunset evening of a long and useful career. The newly independent republic of the Lebanon had its problems, of course, but these were not such as to daunt a veteran of Houstie-Boo's stamp. As his country's representative he almost tangibly radiated good humour, imperturbability and commonsense. He was never what used to be called an "intellectual," but he was a shrewd judge of men and his boisterous, country-gentleman manner was a cover for great resources—insight, political "know-how" and hardly-won experience. His human sympathy, spiced with a characteristically military sense of discipline, made him not only respected, but loved, by all who had the luck to serve with him.

A. S. H.

 CAPTAIN SIR VYVYAN HOLT, K.B.E., C.M.G., M.V.O.

(Died July 2, 1960. He was a member of the Society since 1922)

IN *Beyond Euphrates* Miss Freya Stark wrote of Vyvyan Holt some ten years ago "He was the most modest man I have ever known, with a fund of natural and unselfish goodness. . . ." It is almost impossible in an obituary notice to improve on that short, but sincere, tribute. Those

of us who had the privilege of working with Vyvyan Holt had wide and constant experience of its truth. So far as I know, he never even contemplated writing a book about the Middle East. Perhaps the incessant drafting of official despatches, telegrams and memoranda in that large, sprawling hand of his, inhibited him from private composition. But I am sure that even the pale publicity which authorship confers would have embarrassed him and he would never have believed that his own personal experiences and opinions could have the slightest interest for anyone else. It was entirely characteristic of him that when, after more than two years' detention in North Korea, he arrived in West Berlin and was besieged by journalists for a story, he was genuinely surprised that he was in the news at all and, far from taking the opportunity to enjoy the sympathetic plaudits of the Free World, declined to say anything then, since it would be improper to do so before reporting to the Secretary of State!

Vyvyan Holt was born in 1896. He was swept into the 1914-18 war (he served with the 9th Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment and later with the Indian Signals and the North-West Frontier Intelligence Corps) and this was to be decisive for the rest of his life. As a reserve officer, he always cherished his link with the Army. When I first met him in the summer of 1939 he was in uniform and secretly hoping that he would be allowed to take part in the coming war as a soldier. 1919 found him with the Political Service in Iraq and to Iraq he was to give the best years of his life as A.D.C. and P.S. in the High Commission, and Oriental Secretary and Counsellor in the Embassy. He served in Baghdad until 1946 when he should have got to Tabriz as Consul-General, but the war in Azerbaijan frustrated this move and he was soon back at his old work as Oriental Counsellor, but this time in Tehran. He had been little more than a year in Seoul (his first independent post) when he was marched away into captivity in the North. From 1954 he served as Minister in El Salvador until he retired from the Foreign Service in 1956. He became M.V.O. in 1933, C.M.G. in 1939 and was created K.B.E. in 1956.

Vyvyan Holt's knowledge of the Middle East can only be described as stupendous. He had the most extraordinary ability in acquiring foreign languages and learnt them as a hobby, though some of us used to feel that it was more a kind of penance. (In Seoul, at the age of 53, he at once tackled the complexities of Korean.) But more important than his skill in talking Arabic, Persian, Kurdish, Turkish or Russian was his intimate knowledge of all the people who had made the history of the Middle East from 1919 onwards. This bottomless well of knowledge and experience was invaluable to his juniors and his superiors alike. His single-minded devotion to his chosen work left him little time for mundane pleasures. His spartan asceticism was of a terrifying gauntness. He worked sixteen hours a day. His only relaxation was polo which he played with passionate enthusiasm. His physical courage was monolithic; there was an episode with Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan (the elder brother of the now notorious Mulla Mustafa) in 1932 which for cold-blooded bravery could hardly be bettered. During his last years in Baghdad, Vyvyan lived in the Embassy in self-imposed conditions of austerity which were a constant reminder of the sternness of the world conflict which was raging about us. But through

it all flowed that vein of "natural and unselfish goodness" of which Miss Stark speaks and which suffused with a rich humanity his awe-inspiring manner and appearance. His death, so soon after retirement from active service, is a sad loss to all those who knew him in the Middle East and counted on his help and advice for a long time to come.

A. S. H.

NICHOLAS FITZMAURICE, C.I.E.

MR. NICHOLAS FITZMAURICE, C.I.E., a member of the Society since 1931, died in Fleet, Hampshire, on July 7, 1960. Born in 1887, he was appointed a Student Interpreter at Peking in 1908. In the course of extensive service in H.M. Consular Service in China he was twice stationed in Sinkiang, actually at Kashgar, in a junior capacity from 1919 to 1922, and with the rank of Consul-General from 1931 to 1934. In the latter year, his valuable experience of Chinese Turkestan, particularly in connection with the interests of the Government of India, was recognized by the award of the C.I.E. He retired on pension in 1943.

L. H. L.

CAPTAIN W. J. FARRELL, C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.

Sir Patrick Coghill writes:

CAAPTAIN W. J. FARRELL, C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C., late of "Tibar," Castle Townshend, Co. Cork, Ireland, died on July 2, 1960. He was a member since 1922.

Classical scholar and Research Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, he was an Assistant Master at Rugby and Haileybury until he joined the Royal Field Artillery in 1915. After a brief period in France, he served with the Intelligence Corps in Egypt, Iraq and Trans-Caucasia, where he was awarded the M.C.

From 1919-1922 he was employed in the Education Department of the Iraq Government. Thence he went to the Education Department of the Government of Palestine, where he remained until he retired in 1946. He was Director of Education for the last ten years of his service there. He received the O.B.E. in 1936 and the C.M.G. in 1946.

His work in the Education Department of Palestine can justly be said to be the most enduring legacy of the Mandate, as the influence of his methods of teaching has spread throughout the Arab world through the work of teachers trained under him.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Council acknowledges with gratitude the following:

The voluntary work of Mrs. Ruth Hanner and Miss Mary Rowlatt in the library.

The gift of a three-tier Globe-Wernecke bookcase from Miss Marr Johnson.

The gift of a regency walnut bookcase from Major R. Mayer.

The gift of books for the library from Mrs. B. Campbell, Miss Mary Rowlatt and Judge Amir Ali.

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Taiwan University Bulletin. November, 1959.

Tropical Diseases Bulletin. Vol. 57. No. 10. September-December, 1960.

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RUSSIA AND ASIA IN 1960

The Moscow Congress of Orientalists and a Visit to Central Asia

By COLONEL G. E. WHEELER, C.I.E., C.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, October 12, 1960, Sir Esler Denning in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, the clock has gone half-past one, and the more time we can have the better. Our Chairman, unfortunately, is unable to be present and he has asked me to take his place. I do not feel that Colonel Wheeler really needs a chairman, except that it is a time-honoured custom, as he is so well known as a Vice-President of the Society, as a speaker and as a contributor to the Society's *Journal*.

He has recently been to the Congress of Orientalists in Moscow, and from there on a journey into Central Asia. I am sure you would like to hear what he has to say: Colonel Wheeler.

IN August I had the honour of representing the Society at the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists held in Moscow. After the Congress I took part in a tour of Central Asia, organized by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. This afternoon I propose to give you some account both of the Congress and of the tour, which, as I shall try to make clear, were closely interrelated.

My account of the Congress must necessarily be very brief. As most of you probably know, the International Congress of Orientalists takes place every three years, each time a different country acting as host. In 1957 it was held in Munich and in 1954 in Cambridge. It is attended by orientalists from all over the world, mainly from the West. It lasts six days and consists of opening and closing plenary sessions, the interval being taken up by the presentation of papers to the various sections concerned with such subjects as Egyptology, the Middle East, Indology, Sinology, Central Asia, Turkey, and so on. This year there were twenty sections, including one on Africa, and over 700 papers were presented. At these Congresses an international Committee decides, among other things, the venue for the next Congress.

The decision to hold the XXVth International Congress in the U.S.S.R. was taken at Munich in 1957 and thereafter a number of articles began to appear in the Soviet press which showed clearly that the Soviet Government intended to make the most of the opportunity thus afforded to them of demonstrating what they regard as their new and enlightened concept of oriental studies. Now, like every other branch of learning in the Soviet Union, oriental studies are financed by the State and controlled by the Communist Party. This means in effect that they are primarily designed to promote Soviet policy and are conditioned by Communist

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| 1921 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4. | 1941 Parts 1, 3 & 4. |
| 1922 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4. | 1942 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4. |
| 1923 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4. | 1944 Parts 2, 3 & 4. |
| 1924 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4. | 1945 Part 1. |
| 1925 Parts 1, 2 & 3. | 1946 Parts 3 & 4. |
| 1926 Parts 3 & 4. | 1947 Parts 1, 3 & 4. |
| 1927 Parts 1, 3 & 4. | 1948 Parts 1 & 2. |
| 1928 Parts 1 & 3. | 1949 Part 4. |
| 1929 Part 1. | 1950 Part 2. |
| 1930 Part 1. | 1951 Parts 2 & 3. |
| 1931 Parts 3 & 4. | 1952 Part 2. |
| 1932 Parts 1, 2 & 3. | 1957 Part 1. |

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RUSSIA AND ASIA IN 1960

The Moscow Congress of Orientalists and a Visit to Central Asia

By COLONEL G. E. WHEELER, C.I.E., C.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, October 12, 1960, Sir Esler Dening in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, the clock has gone half-past one, and the more time we can have the better. Our Chairman, unfortunately, is unable to be present and he has asked me to take his place. I do not feel that Colonel Wheeler really needs a chairman, except that it is a time-honoured custom, as he is so well known as a Vice-President of the Society, as a speaker and as a contributor to the Society's *Journal*.

He has recently been to the Congress of Orientalists in Moscow, and from there on a journey into Central Asia. I am sure you would like to hear what he has to say: Colonel Wheeler.

IN August I had the honour of representing the Society at the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists held in Moscow. After the Congress I took part in a tour of Central Asia, organized by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. This afternoon I propose to give you some account both of the Congress and of the tour, which, as I shall try to make clear, were closely interrelated.

My account of the Congress must necessarily be very brief. As most of you probably know, the International Congress of Orientalists takes place every three years, each time a different country acting as host. In 1957 it was held in Munich and in 1954 in Cambridge. It is attended by orientalists from all over the world, mainly from the West. It lasts six days and consists of opening and closing plenary sessions, the interval being taken up by the presentation of papers to the various sections concerned with such subjects as Egyptology, the Middle East, Indology, Sinology, Central Asia, Turkey, and so on. This year there were twenty sections, including one on Africa, and over 700 papers were presented. At these Congresses an international Committee decides, among other things, the venue for the next Congress.

The decision to hold the XXVth International Congress in the U.S.S.R. was taken at Munich in 1957 and thereafter a number of articles began to appear in the Soviet press which showed clearly that the Soviet Government intended to make the most of the opportunity thus afforded to them of demonstrating what they regard as their new and enlightened concept of oriental studies. Now, like every other branch of learning in the Soviet Union, oriental studies are financed by the State and controlled by the Communist Party. This means in effect that they are primarily designed to promote Soviet policy and are conditioned by Communist

theory and methods. It does not mean, however, that they consist simply of propaganda, as some people suppose, or are devoid of scholarship. Soviet publications on Eastern problems include such material of a very high standard indeed, particularly in such fields as ethnography, and the modern forms of Eastern languages; their treatment of oriental history, on the other hand, is open to a great deal of criticism, as it is always seen through Marxist eyes. Apart from their political angle, oriental studies in the Soviet Union differ from those conducted in the West, in the great importance they attach to modern problems; and the study of these problems is generally given precedence in the Soviet Union over the study of the past.

These features of Soviet oriental studies are familiar to anyone with a knowledge of Russian who has studied Soviet writing on Eastern affairs published since the Revolution and particularly since 1955, when Soviet Eastern policies underwent a drastic revision and oriental studies were enormously expanded. In writing designed for home consumption the Soviet authorities have never made any concealment of the fact that they regard oriental studies as primarily directed towards political ends. Western scholars, on the other hand, are seldom themselves concerned with politics and even more seldom have any knowledge of Russian. They are, therefore, largely ignorant of the nature and scope of Soviet oriental studies and when they give any consideration to the matter many are inclined to resent the suggestion that in the U.S.S.R. oriental studies are pursued with motives different from those obtaining in Western countries. The fact is, however, that whereas Western scholars are able to pursue any type of research which they wish, and are also free to criticize as violently as they please, their governments' Eastern policies—and they very often do please—Soviet orientalist enjoy no such freedom. This does not, I repeat, mean that their work is devoid of scholarship, or that they themselves are necessarily politically-minded people; but it does mean in the words of Gafurov, the Director of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, in an article published just before the Congress, that "Soviet orientalist do not conceal and do not intend to conceal the fact that in all their research work and in their very approach to the various problems of orientalism, they are governed by marxist-leninist methodology and consider this methodology to be the only correct one."

The Moscow Congress certainly served to clear up a good deal of misunderstanding in the minds of Western scholars. From the opening plenary session held in the vast auditorium of Moscow University it was clear that the Russians did intend to give the Congress a political setting. As if to drive the point home, the audience at this opening session, which included many hundreds of people other than the actual delegates to the Congress, was confronted with the following inscription, put up over the rostrum. I do not know how many people noticed it but I copied down the Russian and this is a translation of it: "A Leninist cannot simply be a specialist in his favourite branch of science. He must be at the same time a political and social scientist with a lively interest in the destiny of his country. He must be familiar with the laws of social development and be able to use these laws; he must be an active participant in the political

leadership of his country." In its report on the opening session, *Pravda* made the point that unlike previous Congresses, the XXVth was not going to be merely academic. In Mikoyan's and subsequent speeches there was abundant mention of Western colonialism and imperialism and of Soviet altruism. The contrast between these two attitudes was, indeed, intended to be the keynote of the Congress.

From the point of view of international scholarship the value of the Moscow Congress was probably about the same as that of previous Congresses. It provided an equally good meeting ground for scholars of many nations; and the average standard of scholarship was probably about the same. The fine buildings of Moscow University provided very good facilities for the plenary sessions and for the work of the various sections. The Soviet contribution of papers was by far the largest, and included some very interesting ones. Two criticisms could, in my opinion, be fairly made of it: many of the Soviet papers were unoriginal, being merely a rehash of previously published articles; and some of them—not perhaps very many—were the most flagrant positive or negative propaganda. The worst example of the latter class which I encountered was a paper entitled "The 1919 Afghan War for Independence." The paper was delivered by a man called A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, an Uzbek member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, and author of several strongly anti-British publications. The audience of about seventy people consisted mostly of Russians with about six or seven Afghans, some of whom, I noticed, were not Pushtu speakers. Babakhodzhayev delivered his paper in Russian, and it was translated sentence by sentence into Pushtu. This was quite a *tour de force* and very well done by the Russian. Obviously, the procedure had been rehearsed very carefully and so far as I know, it was not followed on any other occasion. The paper, as one expected, was violently anti-British and pro-Afghan in tone, and the theme of Soviet-Afghan friendship was constantly emphasized. Its aim was clearly to make as much bad blood as possible between the Afghan and British peoples. This, of course, is a cardinal point of Soviet policy, but it seems quite inappropriate to air such a policy at an academic Congress. The inclusion of political papers of this kind—I do not think there were very many—was one of the features which distinguished the Moscow Congress from its predecessors. Another was that the scripts of all papers to be read by foreign participants had been submitted to Moscow beforehand. I think that is the general rule, but in this case the scripts had apparently been made available to Soviet scholars. This meant that these scholars had been able to prepare in advance detailed comments on the foreign contributions, and these often took the form of Marxist refutation of what they contained. The effect of this technique was somewhat marred by the fact that in many instances foreign contributors had, in the meanwhile, made alterations in their scripts, and the Soviet comments not infrequently consisted of pointed attacks on statements which were not in fact made at all. This was particularly evident in the Chinese section.

A matter in which the Soviet contribution contrasted favourably, in my opinion, with those of other delegations, was the fairly equal treatment which they gave to the classical and modern periods. Of the 190-odd

papers which they presented, half were on the pre-sixteenth century subjects, and of the remaining 94, 36 ranged from the sixteenth century to the Revolution, the majority being concerned with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 29 were concerned with post-Revolution affairs, and 29 with purely philological subjects. It may well be that the study of current events and politics does not properly fall within the scope of oriental studies, but I hardly think that this restriction should be extended to the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, during which the countries of the East underwent profound cultural and political changes. It is noteworthy, and not perhaps altogether satisfactory, that of the 40-odd papers presented by scholars from the United Kingdom, apart from a few papers on linguistic subjects, only three dealt with post-sixteenth century subjects, and none with present-day problems.

It is difficult to speak with any degree of precision on the impact of the Congress on its various participants. According to the list of members produced towards the end of the Congress, the total attendance was 1,446. Of these, about 500 were from the U.S.S.R. (115 from the eastern republics), about 660 from the West (including satellite countries in eastern Europe), and 230 only from Asian and African countries. Most of the older Western scholars to whom I spoke or whose opinions I heard quoted expressed views on the conduct of the Congress and on the Intourist arrangements associated with it which varied from disappointment to disillusionment. Many of the younger ones, or at any rate some of them, took a rather different view. Perhaps they did not worry as much about the discomforts, which were rather considerable, and looked more on the rosy side. Some scholars, and here again I speak of the older ones, whom I had in the past twitted with their failure to learn Russian, told me that they were now more than ever determined not to do so. That meant, of course, they did not see much purpose in examining Soviet publications and in this I think they are quite wrong. Western criticism of many of the Soviet papers as unoriginal or elementary may be justified, but Western scholars were perhaps too ready to judge the depth of Soviet orientalism on the basis of the papers presented, rather than on that of the vast mass of printed Soviet literature, which most of them are still unable to read. They are also apt to forget that the great Soviet drive in oriental studies only began five years ago, and that Soviet scholars have incentives and facilities which are lacking in the West and which may result in the West being left behind in many fields of practical scholarship.

There were many reports circulating among Western orientalists that Asian and African delegates had not been favourably impressed by the Congress. I think it would be unwise to be too sure of this. They must have been impressed by the size and modernity of the University, by the special attention and flattery meted out to them, and by the two concerts given in the course of the Congress, both of which I attended. The first of these was a kind of streamlined travesty of oriental songs and dances, not really typical but nevertheless highly flattering. The second consisted mainly of recitations of traditional oral epics by genuine old-timers who had been carefully, but not too ostentatiously, groomed for their parts. I also think that although Western scholars were inclined to speak slight-

ingly of the Soviet contribution in the way of papers, it seems likely that the Asians and Africans were favourably impressed by their range and versatility, by the relative modernity of many of the subjects chosen, and by the competence which Soviet orientalists displayed in the modern forms of Asian and, I think, to some extent, African languages.

From the Soviet political point of view the success of the Congress must be regarded as uncertain. From the voluminous advance publicity given to the Congress it was clear that the Russians hoped that there would be more orientals present than orientalists. The absence of the expected Chinese delegation of 400 destroyed this hope. But in the present state of Sino-Soviet relations the Russians may have felt more comfortable without the Chinese than they would have felt with them. No doubt that opinion was shared by some of the Asian delegations. How the Russians assessed the reaction of the Congress on the Western and on the Asian and African delegations is a matter for speculation.

As you may have heard, the next Congress in 1963 is to be held in India. This decision was not reached without considerable controversy and some bitterness. Invitations were also extended by the United States and by the United Arab Republic, the Soviet member voting for the latter.

I will now go on to a very brief description of the tour which I made after the Congress. As you know, the Russians constantly claim that whereas the whole of the Middle East and South Asia is still struggling to free itself from the bonds of colonialism and imperialism, the Asian peoples of the U.S.S.R. enjoy full freedom and the right of self-government. There have been endless books, articles, speeches on this theme in the Soviet Union, and it was fully stressed in the opening and closing speeches at the Congress and in many of the papers and discussions. These Soviet claims have no foundation whatever and the Russians are quite right in supposing that the West does not accept them. But for many years, informed opinion in the West has known that the material development which the Soviet régime has brought to the Asian part of the empire is very considerable indeed. The Soviet Government, however, still seems to think that the West does not appreciate what has been done on the material side, and it is this side that they are most anxious to show off. From their point of view, therefore, it was quite natural that they should want to follow the Congress by an ocular demonstration of their material achievements in the Asian republics.

The tour in which I took part was necessarily a short one. It took only five days and only included the republic of Uzbekistan and only three towns there, Tashkent, the capital, Bukhara, and Samarkand. A limited number of other towns can be and have been visited, but so far as I know, no foreigner has ever been able to tour freely in the rural areas. Still, I think that these three towns with a total population of over 1½ millions are fairly representative of the republic of Uzbekistan, and very likely of the other republics as well.

In the short time at my disposal I cannot give you more than my general impressions. These may perhaps be of some interest because although the tour was so short I was able to see things against a background

of many years' continuous study of Soviet publications on the area, and was also able to make comparisons with the various so-called colonial and semi-colonial countries in which I have lived outside the Soviet Union. It may interest you to know that nothing I saw during this tour caused me to revise the conclusions which I had previously derived from my academic studies. This confirms my view that it is possible to construct an accurate picture of the situation in Soviet Central Asia by a discriminating and cumulative study of Soviet publications.

The flight from Moscow to Tashkent by jet TU-104 now takes little over $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours, and the contrast between Tashkent and Moscow is most striking. Moscow is at any time a drab and dreary city, somewhat lacking now in character and individuality. One's first impression on arrival in Tashkent is that one is in a much more real and human and individualistic atmosphere, and this impression stayed with me throughout the tour. All three cities present a generally prosperous appearance and the people are well-clothed and look reasonably healthy and well-fed. I should say that the standard of hygiene and cleanliness is considerably above similar towns in most of the Middle East and South Asia.

Tashkent is a relatively modern city and its population is more than half Russian; but even there, and much more so in Bukhara and Samarkand, there is a distinctly Muslim atmosphere, more so than in say Tehran or Istanbul. The Russians, so far as I know, have never discouraged the wearing of national dress, and most of the women do in fact wear it or something resembling it. I did not personally see any veiled women, though one or two members of the party said they did. The great majority of the men wear European clothes, but almost all of them wear the characteristic skull cap or *tyubetyka* as the Russians call it. There has been a great deal of building on modern lines, and some of it is quite handsome, if not beautiful. Public transport is obviously very well organized. The police are certainly not obtrusive and extremely polite when spoken to, at any rate to foreigners. I understood from Uzbeks that about half the police force in Tashkent is Uzbek and half Russian, but I did not myself see any Russian policemen in the streets. This, I think, may have been deliberately arranged in order to create a good impression on people who were supposed to be experts on colonial régimes.

The shops were, I thought, much brighter than in Moscow and better arranged, although the quality of the goods except for fruit was generally very poor indeed. The many bookshops, in which I was much interested, seemed to be much patronized by Uzbeks, a testimony to the great advance in education. There were relatively few books in Uzbek and although there are many Uzbek translations of Russian classics and modern literature and Russian translations of Western literature, I was told that there was no such thing as Uzbek translations of Western literature. The ancient monuments, of which there are virtually none in Tashkent but a very great many in Samarkand and Bukhara, are in a pretty poor state of repair; but a good deal of restoration has been going on since I believe about 1954.

If you recall, Lord Curzon commented very unfavourably on the way the Tsarist régime treated ancient monuments. In the early days of the

Soviet régime there was a tendency to let these monuments fall still further into disrepair, but this has since been corrected. There was also a tendency to desecrate ancient monuments with modern statues of Soviet leaders, Soviet youth, etc. Although this practice has now been discontinued, there are some of these statues still in evidence.

A matter in which I was particularly interested was the relations existing between the Russians and the local population. As you know, there is a very large white, non-Asian settler population in Central Asia, the present proportion being about one white to two Central Asians. This is higher than the proportion of whites in any other Muslim country in the world, not excluding North Africa. The Russians like to represent the relationship between themselves and Central Asians as one of close friendship, mutual admiration and mutual interest in each other's cultures. I must say I saw no evidence whatever of this. The attitude of the Uzbeks towards the Russians is not hostile, but it is withdrawn and indifferent. I base this statement on conversations which I had with Uzbeks. There seems to be practically no social intermingling of the two peoples. In two evenings which I spent in the magnificent Park of Rest and Culture in Samarkand, I never saw Russians and Uzbeks sitting or walking together. Although Russian is a compulsory subject in Uzbek schools and a very large proportion of Uzbeks speak good Russian, the Russians seem rarely to learn Uzbek. Some of those whom I asked about this had lived in Uzbekistan all their lives and still only knew a few words of the language. All the notices are in Russian and Uzbek, even in Bukhara, where the language most spoken is Tadjik, a form of Persian closely resembling that spoken in Afghanistan.

One often hears it said that all administrative posts of any importance in Central Asia are held by Russians. I am sure that this is no more true than it would have been to say that such posts were all held by the British in the British period in India. All the same, I think that on this occasion considerable efforts were made to give us the impression that Russians played no part in public affairs. During our visit to the Academy of Sciences in Tashkent, for instance, I did not meet any Russians although a large proportion of the staff is undoubtedly Russian. But the Uzbek Directress of the Oriental Institute in the Academy was unquestionably in charge of it and seemed to be a fine scholar into the bargain.

I have always held the opinion and have expressed it on several occasions in this hall that the Soviet achievement in the field of education in Central Asia is remarkable. Everything I saw during my visit bore this out. People in quite lowly walks of life seemed to be astonishingly well-informed on a variety of subjects, which do not, however, include the outside world. One small incident struck me. I was riding in a taxi with a very talkative Uzbek driver. He spoke good Russian and we talked in Russian. He suddenly said, "How do you do" in English. "Where did you learn that?" I said. He replied, "My sister is a student of English at the University. She occasionally teaches me phrases, but"—and I mention this, too, because he used the proper grammatical term in Russian—"I was not sure where the tonic accent fell." You might find that sort of thing in the U.S. but I do not think you would find it in England.

So far as the outside world goes, the standard of knowledge is very low. While we were looking at Ulug Beg's observatory in Samarkand, I noticed a young woman with an old man, evidently her father, looking at us with great curiosity. Presently I went up and addressed her. She immediately asked who we were and where we had come from. When I told her she said, "I suppose you are all capitalists." I was a little taken aback. I said, "No, hardly that, we all work for our living." "Then you are workers?" she said. She turned out to be not an Uzbek but a Turkmen, who had come from Chardzhou, where she worked in a kolkhoz (collective farm), so we were probably the first westerners she had ever seen. She was highly intelligent and spoke good Russian. She questioned me closely about the position of workers in England, their salaries, educational facilities and so on, but I doubt very much if she believed what I told her.

A very full programme was arranged by the Intourist officials accompanying us. It included not only the ancient monuments but textile factories and other modern institutions. Some of the party objected, foolishly and rather rudely, I thought, to seeing anything but the picturesque and old. As a result of their objections I missed seeing the textile factory in Tashkent which I believe to be a remarkable enterprise. No objection was made if we went off on our own. For instance, I and one or two others went to the Old City of Tashkent at night, and visited an old-time *chai- \dot{q} hane*, or tea house, which might have been there for 500 years. So far as I could see, no attempt was made to follow us, either on this or any other occasion. On the other hand, some of the local people, including some Crimean Tatars, of whom there are a large number in Uzbekistan, who attempted to get touch with members of the party were told to sheer off by Intourist officials and security men, and did so at once.

During such a short visit it was, of course, impossible to form any firm opinion on such subjects as nationalist feeling, the Uzbek attitude towards Communism and the like. Soviet Communists make great play with the word "nationality." They claim to have extracted nationalities, as it were, out of a *mélange* of peoples created by centuries of exploitation by feudal and imperial masters. The present so-called nationalities of Central Asia—Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Tajiks, and Karakalpaks—did not apply these names to themselves before the Revolution in any collective sense. Nor were they ever independent in any sense which would have any meaning nowadays, with the possible exception of the Uzbek Empire of the sixteenth century.

The impression which a visitor to Central Asia gets of a well-disciplined and reasonably well-fed, well-clothed and well-educated population is to my mind an accurate one. The people are materially much better off than they have ever been in their lives or than their ancestors were. They are also probably better off in a material sense than the great majority of peoples living outside the Soviet Union—in the Middle East and South Asia. There are, of course, some exceptions. But the same impression of material well-being might be gained in a concentration camp where there is a well-balanced diet, reasonable heating and lighting, and well organized, and even profitable, work for all. And whatever the state of their material well-being, the Muslim peoples of the U.S.S.R. have no con-

trol over their destinies in the sense that the independent peoples of Asia and Africa have. Do they themselves know this? Are they striving for freedom? Is there a spirit of nationalism abroad in the sense that this word is understood outside the U.S.S.R.? I simply do not know the answers to these questions. There are certainly no overt nationalist movements, no nationalist leaders, no nationalist press or literature. And yet the Communist Party authorities not infrequently issue stern reproofs about the continuance of nationalism, or as they nowadays prefer to call it, localism or particularism. The French writer and politician Buchez once defined nationalism and nationality as "something in virtue of which a nation continues to exist even when it has lost its autonomy." But the Muslim peoples of Central Asia and elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. have never had any autonomy beyond that enjoyed by nomad tribes and their transformation into nations has been artificially and arbitrarily contrived by the Soviet paramount power. There are, of course, other nation states in the Middle East and elsewhere which have been similarly created and which had not known independence before. But the paramount power has always withdrawn its armed forces from those countries and in many instances there are few or no white settlers there. The continued presence in the Muslim lands of the Soviet Union of the predominantly white Soviet army and of a vast mass of white officials, technicians and settlers is not, of course, conducive to contentment, but it may—I say *may*—make nationalism altogether out of the question. If, however, it is, as some people maintain, only lying dormant, it is possible to visualize certain circumstances which might bring it to life. One is some great upheaval such as another world war; another development, which we may hope is nearer and more likely, would be the continued grant of independence to colonial territories outside the U.S.S.R. to a point not very far distant when the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union, and perhaps even their rulers, would realize that only they of all the Muslim peoples of the world have been denied self-determination and freedom.

The CHAIRMAN: We have fifteen minutes left for questions. I ask members of the audience to keep their questions short so as to allow as many questions as possible.

Brigadier LONGRIGG: The speaker several times referred to the Muslim peoples, as indeed they are, and he roused my curiosity as to the extent to which there is still an operative and self-conscious Islam in these new Soviet territories, whether privately in the hearts of the people or publicly in the ordinary institutions of Islam—mosque staffs, petty officials and so forth. Is Soviet policy at present smiling or frowning on Islam?

Colonel WHEELER: This is a complicated question which it would take a long time to answer fully. The Soviet Union and the Communist Party continues to frown on Islam, first, in the way they frown on all religious beliefs, and, secondly, on the Moslem way of life as incompatible with productivity and modern civilization.

The attitude of the people towards Islam is very difficult to get at, certainly in a short tour like the one I did. I did speak to people about it, I mean of course Uzbeks. They were inclined to scoff at congregational prayers and other religious observances, but they were obviously proud of

belonging to a Muslim civilization and regarded it as something exclusive and better than any other civilization. There are very few mosques now but I believe they have a fair Friday attendance.

We went to a Muslim seminary at Bukhara, actually, I think, the only active one in the Soviet Union, but as it was closed for the vacation we were unable to see how it was functioning. We went into a so-called *madrasah* at Tashkent which struck me as being of a very different kind. The mufti of Tashkent himself was an impressive figure speaking good Arabic, but we were greeted there by a number of very old men who reminded me of walkers-on in a film. They may have been theological students, forty or fifty years ago, but they certainly were not now. One who claimed to be teaching Arabic only knew a few words of it. One must, I think, draw a distinction between the Muslim way of life and genuine belief in Islamic dogma. Of the latter there is, I should say, no more than in Turkey or Persia. But there is still a great respect for and adherence to the former.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: May I offer a small comment? It seems that the attitude of the Russians towards the Muslims in the Central Asian countries our lecturer has visited is similar to the attitude of the Mongols, which is largely Russian influenced, to those Lamas who still exist.

May I ask also whether the old industry of carpets still exists in Bukhara?

Colonel WHEELER: The answer is, no, it does not. They make a few carpets, but these usually bear portraits of Soviet leaders. I do not think there is any of the old traditional carpet industry. The making of what are called Bukhara carpets is now virtually confined to Persia.

Doctor LINDGREN: Colonel Wheeler referred to the Soviet work in ethnography. I should be grateful if he would say what types of ethnography they specialize in.

Colonel WHEELER: Ethnography is a very wide term. There have been good ethnographical surveys of Persia and Afghanistan over the years. They have also done what I am told is a good one on China.

Regarding sociological surveys, there have been several by a particular man called Abramzon—to all intents and purposes a Russian, although it is not a Russian name—on family life on the collective farms and in various districts in the Central Asian republics. These, to my mind, are very interesting and do not appear to be tinged by political considerations. This work is good by any standard. On the other hand, there is much other work of a more superficial kind which is primarily concerned with politics and ideology.

Major BURTON: What is the attitude of the Russian orientalists towards the so-called Turkic languages spoken in Central Asia.

Colonel WHEELER: This is a field in which they have done much more work than any other country and "much more" is a mild way of putting it. The general object is to systematize and elaborate these broadly similar languages, making them as different from each other and as much like Russian as possible. To achieve the latter end they have introduced the cyrillic alphabet and a large Russian and international loan vocabulary.

A vast amount of literature has been produced on the subject. That on lexicography and grammar is quite outstanding and far too little attention has been paid to it in the West.

Mr. BYRT: Since India has attained independence one of the difficulties which have arisen there is the development of specious local enthusiasms and provincialisms, and in different parts of India these have become a considerable trouble. The fact of their existence was confirmed in the Address to the People issued by the President of India on August 15, the annual Independence Day, warning them against these separatist tendencies, which have largely sprung from the demand for linguistic divisions. It is said that Communist agitators have with alacrity taken advantage of these agitations, to utilize them for their own purposes. The Kerala disorder a short time ago was an illustration of that. Can the lecturer, as a result of his experiences, make any comment on the problem?

Colonel WHEELER: This question of the emphasis on local differences of customs and opinions, and so on, has troubled the Soviet Union in the same way as it may now trouble the central Government in India. The Russians have only themselves to blame. It was they who invented the nationalities and persuaded or ordered the various Turkic peoples to emphasize the differences. Now they are confronted with something of a dilemma, because whereas their original object was the simple one of divide and rule—to make these people as different from each other as possible in order to prevent their “ganging up”—they are now confronted, or think they are, with new nationalisms which they themselves have created. I suppose India is afraid of something of the same sort, though the difference there between peoples can be far more pronounced than in Central Asia. The Russians have in the past written a great deal about linguistic policies in India, but they do so far less now, possibly because they find it a delicate subject. The linguistic state is having some vogue in India. There it has little or nothing to do with Communism.

Sir GERARD CLAUSEN: Would Colonel Wheeler agree with the impression I got that the new orientalism is centred on Moscow and controlled by Professor Gafurov, who owes his position of authority there more to his political status than to his reputation as an orientalist. It seemed to me that this emphasis on modern studies was all coming from Moscow. I spent a good bit of time in the Leningrad Institute with pen-friends that I was meeting for the first time. My impression is that Leningrad is still as much the home of pure scholarship as ever it was. The subjects studied there are the classical oriental languages and literature. They do not seem to be concerned with the modern history of southern and South East Asia or Africa on which attention is concentrated in Moscow.

The other impression I got was that the Russians are trying hard to turn selected members of the Soviet minorities into good scholars. They are certainly arousing the interest of these scholars in their own past. For example, I received an offprint from one of them—I had better not mention her nationality—which was headed “About my national literary heritage.” But my impression is that they are having difficulty in making these selected members of minorities into really good scholars. It seemed to me that it was much easier for such a scholar to become a professor than it

would be for a Russian with comparable qualifications. I do not know whether you agree.

Colonel WHEELER: Yes, I would agree. So far as I can tell, the atmosphere in the Leningrad University is from a scholarly point of view far ahead of Moscow. That was one reason why the Congress was not held in Leningrad as originally decided. Moscow is the fountain head of political direction and, as you say, Gafurov's is a political appointment rather than an academic one.

So far as minority scholars are concerned, again I agree. I think they are themselves not anxious to be drawn into the vortex of Moscow. This point about their national heritage is becoming troublesome to Soviet authorities, particularly in Azerbaijan. My impression of the minority scholars in Moscow was that they were very subdued. In Tashkent I got a different impression. They seemed much more free and I think they are doing some good work in fields they select for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid our time is up. I am sure you will join with me in thanking Colonel Wheeler for his extremely interesting talk, in the usual manner. (*Applause*).

JAPAN IN 1960

By DR. IVAN MORRIS, B.A., Ph.D.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, May 25, 1960, Sir Esler Denning, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Philip Southwell, our Chairman, is unfortunately not able to be present today, and he has therefore asked me to take the chair and to introduce Dr. Ivan Morris, who is to talk to us on "Japan in 1960."

Dr. Morris worked for some years in the Research Department of the Foreign Office. He went out to Japan not long ago, and came back only last November, on a grant from the Royal Institute of International Relations, and has recently published a book, under the auspices of Chatham House, entitled *Nationalism and the Right Wing of Japan*. I am sure you would rather listen to Dr. Morris than to me, so I will confine my introduction to that. At the end of his talk there will be a film and, if time, there will be questions following the film.

YOU can reach Japan from London by regular commercial air service in about thirty hours; before long the time will no doubt be reduced to twenty hours or even less. Before the war the same journey required about two months. With the increasing speed and decreasing cost of air travel, Japan may soon become more accessible to the English visitor than Italy was in the last century.

Yet for the average educated Westerner the country remains exceedingly remote—more remote, perhaps, than any other major civilization in the world today. This is partly because the Japanese language constitutes one of the most effective barriers to mutual understanding that the mind of man has devised. The remoteness is also due to the total difference in cultural traditions and to the fact that for some two hundred years of her relatively recent history, Japan deliberately cut herself off from the outside world.

Since her opening to the West about one hundred years ago, Japan has become the most industrialized and westernized nation in the Orient. It is this very westernization, however, that makes the discerning visitor realize how extremely alien Japan remains in many ways, particularly in patterns of thought and culture.

It would be foolhardy to attempt in the space of some thirty minutes to paint a systematic picture of Japan in 1960. Instead I shall try to suggest a few points that are essential for an understanding of the country.

My first point, and my main one, concerns the westernization, or more specifically the Americanization, of Japan. Most people when they take their first trip to Japan are struck first of all by the westernization of the country. Despite all that has been written on the subject, they often expect to find a country of rickshaws, cherry-blossoms and quaint Oriental charm. Instead, of course, they arrive in Tokyo or Yokohama and are confronted by the largest, and probably the ugliest, urban conglomeration in the world, full of rattling trams and overhead wires, in which the occasional kimono-

clad geisha and the even more occasional rickshaw appear as out-of-place anachronisms, and in which garish Western-style bars with names like Lucky Joe's or Harry's Hideout are far more conspicuous than traditional Japanese tea-houses. For people who have arrived to sample the mysteries of the "inscrutable Orient" the drive from Haneda airport to the centre of Tokyo with its mile upon mile of smoky factories and sooty warehouses can be a disappointing experience indeed. Often they come to the conclusion that Japan has lost such charm or originality as it possessed and is becoming a thoroughly westernized nation.

Fortunately for the visitor who cares to explore a little further, this is far from being true. In the first place there is the rich traditional culture that has been carefully fostered through all the vicissitudes of Japan's recent history—traditional theatre, dancing, music, painting, as well as the lesser arts such as flower-arrangement, garden design and tea ceremony. These have not, as one might expect, become fossilized arts preserved through the centuries like museum pieces for the enjoyment of a select coterie of aesthetes or for the satisfaction of culture-hungry tourists. Japanese Nō plays (dating from the fourteenth century) and traditional folk dancing, to take two examples, are not like our own Miracle Plays and Morris Dances but belong to a living culture. For this we can partly thank the much-maligned geisha; for the geisha have done as much as anyone to keep alive old cultural traditions. The cultural past is in many ways still vigorous in Japan and provides a valuable counterweight to the steady Americanization of the country.

Most visitors to Japan, of course, see only the big westernized cities and occasional snatches of countryside shooting past at sixty miles an hour outside a train window. The cities are important, tremendously so, but they are by no means the whole picture. Almost half the population still lives in the country and is engaged in agricultural pursuits. Here we find relatively little westernization. Despite the great changes in peasant conditions brought about by the post-war land reform, social patterns and cultural pursuits have been little influenced by the West. Although material conditions have improved, people in the villages still think and behave in many ways just as they did before the West came to Japan.

It is not only in the villages that Japan remains very Japanese. In the cities, too, social relations have to a remarkable extent withstood the impact of the Occupation and of Americanization. The family system, though it is being questioned in many quarters, is still strong; and marriages, even among urban university graduates, still tend to be arranged by the family rather than decided independently by the partners.

Japanese industry also is by no means as westernized as one might imagine. The country still suffers from what has been described as an "elephants and fleas" economy. On the one hand are large-scale, well-capitalized modern enterprises; these are the ones most visitors from the West are likely to be shown. Cheek by jowl, however, are hundreds of small, often precarious, household concerns with vastly inferior conditions of employment, in which relations between employers and employees reflect the traditional Japanese family system. These small concerns account for fifty per cent. of the country's non-agricultural employees; cheap

labour and unfair trade practices, such as copying, which have been the bane of British industry for such a long time, are nowadays mainly associated with such concerns. Just as in Japanese culture ancient traditional forms like Nō theatre and Sumō wrestling (which dates from the first century B.C.) flourish side by side with strip-tease and baseball, so in industry we find a situation in which the productive forces of different historical ages exist side by side. The present does not displace the past but coexists with it.

It is often suggested—in fact it has become something of a cliché—that Japan has been peculiarly successful in absorbing foreign influences, first from China, then from Europe and America, and in making them an integral part of her own culture. I very much doubt whether this is true. It would seem to me, on the contrary, that Japan has so far failed to integrate Western imports into the traditional pattern. Mr. Arthur Koestler describes the import of western culture into Japan as a “skin graft that never took.” In general I am inclined to agree with him that the Japanese have failed to assimilate or to discard western cultural imports. Juxtaposition has almost invariably taken the place of integration. What must be pointed out, however, is that Japan is not alone in this failure: no other country with a culture as alien from Europe as that of Japan has so far achieved a successful integration of its own cultural pattern with that of the West. (What is now happening in China appears to be a case of replacement rather than of integration.) Given a long period of stability it is possible that Japan may eventually succeed in reconciling the two planes of her existence; but for the moment they tend to remain apart. For those who value the persistence of cultural diversity and contrast in the modern world this, of course, is a cause for satisfaction.

While I am still on the subject of the westernization of Japan I should like to make one more rather important point. A trend that impressed me greatly during my recent years in the country was the gradual swing of the pendulum back towards more characteristically Japanese ways of thinking and of doing things. This does not mean that Japanese men are about to abandon their western clothes for the kimono and the topknot, or that modern motor-cars will soon give way to rickshaws and palanquins. It does mean that the wholesale adoption of western methods and approaches which went on during the seven years of foreign occupation is being replaced by a more critical attitude towards the West and by a tendency to return in many spheres to the Japanese way of doing things.

In politics this takes the form of a trend that has become known as the Reverse Course. This trend has been continuing now for some years. It has involved, among other things, the return to power of people—or of the type of people—who were influential before Japan's defeat. These people were thoroughly discredited during the occupation period and in a general sort of way were considered responsible for Japan's disaster. In addition, the occupation “purge” debarred them from public office. Now a great many of them are back on the scene.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many of the government's policies during the past ten years should have represented a return to the past. In one field after another the bold reforms of the occupation period are

being undone or emasculated. This is part of a nationalist reaction to excessive foreign influence—a type of reaction that has occurred before in Japanese history, sometimes with disastrous results. There is, of course, nothing sinister about a country's reassertion of its national values; far from it. The danger is that it might go too far in the wrong direction. Much will undoubtedly remain from the noble efforts of the occupation, notably the land reform; but any hopes that seven years of foreign rule might in themselves transform Japan into a modern democratic state have already been belied.

I turn now to my second point: over-population. There are few countries where an abstract economic term like "population problem" has so concrete a significance as in Japan. You are aware of it the minute you step off the boat or aeroplane. In the cities the crowds pack the streets day and night, so that it is often quite impossible to find a place to walk on the pavement. The trains, trams, buses, theatres and department stores are packed to bursting point. Even in remote rural districts you can never get away from people: the fields and villages and country roads are full of them. And almost every time you visit a shrine or temple you have to compete with huge school excursions—hundreds of little pink-faced children in black uniforms who, when they grow up, are somehow going to have to make a living in their four small islands.

Let us look briefly at the statistics. In terms of population per arable acre, Japan has the densest population in the world, and probably the greatest of any important country in history. The birth rate is now surprisingly low, but given the age structure of the population Japan will increase by a million a year for a considerable time to come. Tokyo alone, already the largest city in the world with nine million people, will soon exceed twelve million. Before long the Japanese population will be twice that of Great Britain, and unless there is a war it is bound to reach at least 120 million—all these packed into a country only two-thirds the size of France—a country of which only about sixteen per cent. is arable, of which some two-thirds is mountain and forest, and which is hopelessly deficient in raw materials. Having lost all her overseas investments and territory, Japan has to import twenty per cent. of her food requirements and eighty per cent. of the raw materials she most needs for her industry.

Though he may not know these statistics, almost every Japanese person is keenly aware that he lives in a poor country. But poverty is relative, and it is only in comparison with the West that Japan is poor. The average annual income per person in Japan has been calculated as being £80—not a princely sum on which to live, especially when we consider that an evening at a good Japanese restaurant costs one about £10 a head. Compared to the average Indian, however, the Japanese is doing very well indeed—four times as well, in fact. The average in India is £20 a year, and in the rest of Asia and Africa between £25 and £30. Japan becomes poor only when we look at the average for the world (£135) and particularly for the NATO countries (£500). The reasons for Japan's relative prosperity are not far to seek. The smoky factories, the high-tension wires, the grimy warehouses that we passed on our drive from Haneda Airport to Tokyo are the marks of a hundred years of intensive industrialization

which, despite the disastrous war, has made Japan a very rich country by Asian or by Latin American standards. The standard of living in Japan is steadily improving (there has been a twenty-five per cent. increase in real purchasing power since before the war), but it is still lamentably low for a large part of the population, and besides it is constantly threatened by the growing number of people.

Over-population in Japan has numerous effects. In fact, it could be argued that almost every problem in Japan can be related to this phenomenon. Over-population helps to preserve the backward *status quo* in labour relations, farming methods, women's position and other spheres of life. It is one of the major obstacles of the development of individualism. It produces an enormous reserve of unemployed and semi-employed workers. It reduces the average size of farms to a pocket handkerchief of two and a half acres and causes a steady flow of people from the overcrowded country districts into the already swollen cities. It makes the entire economic structure of the country precarious and completely dependent on world trading conditions.

For world trade is, of course, the only possible solution to the population problem. Emigration is no answer at all, overseas expansion is out of the question, and birth control can alleviate, but certainly not solve, the problem. Japan's dependence on the conditions of world trade is absolute; any serious and prolonged decline in exports is bound to result in unemployment, falling living standards, social unrest, political turmoil and some sort of explosion. This is something that we cannot afford to forget.

I come now to a third point, namely, the continued isolation of Japan. I referred briefly to this in my opening remarks, but I should like to say a little more about it now. Although Japan is so dependent on the rest of the world, she is, paradoxically, a very isolated country. In the first place she is geographically isolated. Of course, it is not very far in miles from the west of Japan to southern Korea, and by jet airliner it takes only a matter of hours to reach the most distant parts of the world. Yet the number of Japanese people who can remotely envisage ever seeing a foreign country, or even meeting someone who has been abroad, is very small indeed. For all intents and purposes it is just as hard for the average Japanese to go abroad now as it was eighty years ago, when the country had emerged from 250 years of deliberate seclusion. And then, even if they should meet foreigners, the peculiar language difficulty usually makes it hard for them to communicate on any but the most banal level. All this results in a form of insularity which is all the more remarkable because of the superficial westernization. With insularity comes national sensitivity, a keen awareness of being Japanese, of being very different; and as a corollary, a suspicion of foreigners, which in time of crisis can easily be whipped up into xenophobia.

Japan's position is frequently compared to that of this country. Both are islands with energetic, sea-faring people; both have huge oceans on one side and on the other large land masses, whose inhabitants they have often fought and defeated; both are largely dependent on trade; both have ancient monarchies and a great respect for tradition. Yet to note the

similarities is to be aware of the enormous differences in the situations (to say nothing of the characters) of the two peoples. Largely as a result of over-population, inadequate resources and the total loss of her overseas investments, Japan has most of Britain's difficulties magnified a hundred-fold. Apart from this, Japan emerged from the war into a world that had little friendship or respect for her and many bitter feelings.

The Japanese are very aware of being isolated in Asia and, especially in left-wing circles, one often hears the phrase, "the orphan of Asia." At the moment Japan is confronted with the open antagonism of Communist China (which severed all relations two years ago) and with the hostility of her nearest neighbours, North and South Korea, and to a lesser extent the Philippines. Relations with Russia are very poor and a peace treaty has still not been signed. In other words, the countries that should be closest to Japan for reasons of cultural tradition or geographical propinquity are in fact her greatest antagonists.

In the remaining Eastern countries, attitudes towards Japan vary between suspicion and indifference. It is true that painful war-time memories are fading faster than I, for one, would have expected. The fact remains that Japan can look in vain throughout the Far East, South-east Asia and Australasia for a country that regards her with anything approaching friendship or sympathy. One consequence of this is that the so called Kishi Plan to set up an Asian Development Fund, whereby Japan would use her technical expertise to help modernize the economies of various South-east Asian countries has met with a very cool response. Not surprisingly, many Asians were uncomfortably reminded of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which Mr. Kishi and his fellow ministers tried to ram down their throats during the war. The trouble is that Japan, denuded now of all her former possessions and spheres of influence, lacks any fund of good will on which she can draw—a good will of the type that Great Britain enjoys in so many countries of the world, including parts of the former Empire.

Ironically enough, the country with which Japan has succeeded in building up the closest ties is the former enemy that not long ago brought her to utter ruin. The American decision to build up Japan as a friend and ally was, of course, a direct result of the Cold War and particularly of the war in Korea. Since about 1950 western policy has aimed at making Japan a strong and reliable ally in the anti-communist camp. Our objectives in this are quite clear and require no elaboration. Japan is the most advanced industrialized country in Asia. Her adherence to the western cause is an immense asset; if she should become neutral or turn to the other side, the West would suffer an incalculable setback. So far as Japan herself is concerned, the alliance with the West remains the cornerstone of official conservative policy.

This brings me to my final point. Not so many years ago, when we were fighting the Japanese on the Asian continent and in the Pacific, we should have found it rather hard to imagine that this ruthless totalitarian state, with its brutal militarist tradition and its hysterical opposition to the democratic West, was soon to become—as it is now—the only large country in the Far East with a really democratic form of government and

that she should also become by far the most important ally of the western democracies in that part of the world. Our war-time ally (China) has become a fierce, aggressive, self-righteous dictatorship and our greatest potential enemy in the Far East—and vice versa. These dramatic reversals should teach us at least one thing—not to take anything for granted, at least where the Far East is concerned.

At present Japan enjoys a democratic, parliamentary system of government in which the main political power belongs to the leader of the party that obtains a majority in free general elections; the Emperor remains as a symbol of national unity, but has no powers that can be abused by people claiming to act in his name; the fundamental democratic freedoms are guaranteed by law and are, on the whole, respected. This vigorous, highly industrialized country, though situated close to the huge Communist land mass, is on the side of the West, and a great majority of its voters continues to oppose any trend towards neutralism.

This is a satisfying position, but we should not become complacent about it. In the first place, the democratic structure in Japan is far from stable. Democracy never took strong root in Japan before the war, although western political institutions were carefully copied. In the crises of the 1930's, democracy collapsed entirely, and was succeeded by a form of nationalist totalitarianism that led Japan into a disastrous war. After the defeat of 1945, democracy was reintroduced into Japan as the basis of the occupation reforms. It is, therefore, not an indigenous system that has developed over the centuries through the struggles and aspirations of the people, but an exotic product that was imposed from above and from outside. In Japan, as in Germany, the democratic system in many ways runs counter to national traditions of authoritarianism and obedience. If all goes well it is possible that in both countries democracy may in time become a firmly rooted force regulating the daily life of the people. In a time of crisis, however, it is quite possible that the still frail democratic structure may be swept away in a new wave of anti-western nationalism. It is worth while to recall that during the past year or so no less than five Asian countries have abandoned democratic processes in favour of a strong central government. The failure of democracy in so many Asian countries should remind us that we must not overestimate its power of survival.

Nor should we take for granted Japan's adherence to the western cause. For the moment a continuation of the alliance clearly serves Japan's best interests. The time may come, however, for instance in the case of an economic crisis which we in the West seemed unable or unwilling to alleviate, when these interests will change or appear to change. The advantages of preserving close ties with the West may then seem less valuable than the benefits to be derived from friendly relations with the Communist powers or from some type of neutralist policy. We must remember that Japan is paying a fairly heavy price for pursuing her close ties with the West. It is largely as a result of these ties that China has cut off all relations with Japan.

On balance the great majority of Japanese consider that the benefit of their close western connections outweigh the disadvantages of being psy-

chologically isolated in neutralist-Communist Asia. We in the West should do what we can to make it advantageous for the Japanese to maintain and even strengthen these ties. This is surely not a matter of sentiment but of sheer self interest.

In the last analysis everything seems to depend on a continuation of the present favourable economic conditions. If Japan enjoys good trading conditions during the coming years and can absorb her growing population into an expanding industrial system, I think that we may look forward to a steady strengthening of her democratic structure and to her continued adherence to the democratic nations of the West. If, on the contrary, there should be a severe and prolonged economic setback, Japan is quite likely to swing to one extreme or the other and to abandon her present close connection with the West. In view of the immense potential strength of Communist China, this would be a loss that we could ill afford.

The lecture was followed by a film describing a railway journey through Japan, kindly lent by the Japanese Embassy.

The CHAIRMAN: The film has left us virtually no time for questions; we have finished punctually at half-past two. It only remains for me to express the thanks of the Society to Dr. Morris for the very interesting lecture he has given, which, from my own experience, one can say is the correct representation of present-day Japan. We have also had a tour of Japan shown by the film, which at least shows what Japan is like if you travel in its best and fastest train.

I would ask you all to express your thanks to Dr. Morris in the usual way.

The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation, and the meeting then ended.

UNREST IN NORTHERN INDIA DURING THE VICEROYALTY OF LORD MAYO, 1869-72; THE BACKGROUND TO LORD NORTHBROOK'S POLICY OF INACTIVITY

By G. R. G. HAMBLY

THE principles which had guided Indian administration during the Viceroyalties of Sir John Lawrence and Lord Mayo, the staunch belief in the need for the rapid westernization and material development of India, came to an abrupt end after the interregnum of Lord Napier and Ettrick with the arrival of Lord Northbrook in Calcutta in May, 1872. The new Governor-General immediately inaugurated a régime which, in the eyes of opponents, seemed to be characterized by lassitude and reaction. In fact, it was distinguished by much steady progress. Northbrook was one among many, both in India and England, who believed that the administrative pressure in India had been too great in recent years. Shrewd and cautious from long experience of public life and an old-style Whig by inclination, Northbrook's instinctive reaction to the immediate problems of Indian government was conditioned by the peculiar degree of "unrest" which had prevailed during Lord Mayo's administration.

Ever since William Wilson Hunter published his biography of the Earl of Mayo this striking characteristic of the years 1869-72 has been overlooked, yet Mayo's private papers show clearly the extent to which contemporaries in India sensed an undefinable restlessness and uneasiness within the Raj.*

The memory of the Mutiny in 1857 remained hideously vivid. Many who survived that event believed that it had been directly due to the failure on the part of the Company's Government to appreciate the mechanics of Indian society and to a consequent neglect of the natural pillars of English supremacy, the wealthy and landed classes who had an interest in the maintenance of law and order but who had been, immediately prior to the outbreak, the victims of the levelling Utilitarianism of the Marquis of Dalhousie and, in the North-Western Provinces, of the harsh Evangelicalism of James Thomason's school. Hence, despite the contribution of the Punjab authorities to the relief of Delhi in 1857, it was the vigorous, intolerant tradition of the North-West, indissolubly associated in the popular mind with John Lawrence, which incurred the strongest hostility from the post-Mutiny generation. The tide of this "aristocratic reaction," as it was called, reached its fullest extent under Canning and Elgin, and it

* Mayo's Indian papers are in the possession of the University Library, Cambridge.

was strikingly illustrated in the resettlement of Oudh. But it was temporarily stemmed by the return of Sir John Lawrence to India as Governor-General in 1864.

Lawrence's guiding principles were the exacting ideals of duty of the Punjab Tradition, but in practice his principles were modified partly by his feeble health and his personal limitations as Governor-General, partly by his lack of political "connections" at home to strengthen his hand, but, above all, by the sheer strength of the "aristocratic reaction" among Anglo-Indians, which even permeated the Executive Council in the formidable and persistent opposition of the Military Member, Major-General Sir Henry Durand, and of William Grey, later Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

Lawrence's successor in 1869, Lord Mayo, was relatively inexperienced in administration.* A Tory with an almost Radical temperament, he was energetic and masterful, whilst his enthusiasm for his task enabled him to apply a dynamic quality to the policy of "material and moral progress" which had hitherto been denied by the frailty of Lawrence's last years of office. To these personal qualities was added the advantage of an unusually vigorous Council to which much of the success and most of the failure of Mayo's viceroyalty must be ascribed.

Inevitably, in view of his background, the laborious details of Indian administration and the exacting intricacy of its problems eluded him. Although he possessed, like Lord Lytton, an imaginative grasp of principles, he lacked Northbrook's powers of patient application and thus, also like Lytton, he tended to be placed at the mercy of experts. His principal advisers were the Strachey brothers.

Sir John Strachey, in particular, was said to be his *eminence grise*. By 1870 he had become senior Ordinary Member of Council and had charge of the Home Department. He was perhaps the ablest amongst that able generation of civilians which succeeded the Mutiny and blossomed forth in the late Eighteen-sixties. His personality, though rich and complicated, was outwardly harsh, and he was known to be exacting and ruthless, impatient of the failings of the men around him and visibly contemptuous of the mediocrities in the Service. A devoted and conscientious public servant, he felt little affection for Indians or for India. As was natural in such a man, he made enemies swiftly and with carelessness. So did his peppery brother, Colonel Richard Strachey, at that time Inspector-General of Irrigation, Acting Secretary of the Department of Public Works and a member of the Legislative Council. He was an expert on railway construction and thereby came into constant contact with a Governor-General whose principal concern was finance and Public Works.

Durand continued in Council until 1870 as an obstinate but unavailing champion of the "aristocratic reaction", ungraciously wearing the discarded mantle of Sir Henry Lawrence. Thereafter he went to the Punjab as Lieutenant-Governor and was replaced in Council by a more pliable Military Member, Sir Henry Norman. In the Legislative Department, James Stephen brought his massive integrity and energy to bear upon an

* He had been a Conservative M.P. from 1847 to 1867 and Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1852, and again in 1858 and 1866.

immense programme of codification. Finance was in the charge of the most vigorous and colourful of John Lawrence's old lieutenants in the Punjab, Sir Richard Temple.*

These men were able, high-minded and prodigiously industrious. All of them in different ways enhanced the unpopularity of the régime. The character which they gave to the Government was progressive, bustling and inconsiderate. Their intentions were acknowledged to be good in principle but, in the view of articulate public opinion, both Indian and Anglo-Indian, their specific measures were odious. Over-government or "Stracheyism, which had driven the country into discontent and must have ended in rebellion,"† implied excessive legislation and government interference, enhancement of Land Revenue, increased local cesses and imposts, and above all, Income Tax. The latter was resented in equal measure by the European and Indian commercial communities and by the Zamindars of Bengal, who claimed that direct taxation was an infringement of the terms of the Permanent Settlement of 1793. They were supported in this view by their Lieutenant-Governor, Grey.

The appointment in 1871 of Grey's successor, Sir George Campbell, one of the most violent products of the Punjab milieu, stressed the cleavage between the progressive administration and the conservative forces, European and Indian, in opposition to it. Campbell was a man of great executive ability and generous imagination, but when he attempted a radical reconstruction of the Bengal administrative system he seriously underestimated the obstructive powers of the Zamindars, the commercial classes and his own service. His reforming programme, commendable in itself and supported by both Mayo and John Strachey, raised up all the vested interests of the province against him and, through him, against the Supreme Government.

Thus, despite the personal popularity of Mayo, his government enjoyed the concerted hostility of the Press, English and Vernacular, and of the British Indian Association, the vehicle for Zamindari agitation. This hostility crystallized into opposition to the Income Tax. For a time there was even talk of boycotting Viceregal functions, whilst Temple as Finance Minister became the best-hated man in India.‡

The Government reacted very slowly to its growing unpopularity which was clearly expressed in the capital. Neither Temple nor John Strachey, the two most staunch supporters of the tax, cared much for public opinion and both grossly minimized the extent of the discontent.§ On one occasion Strachey wrote with bureaucratic unconcern:

"There have been within the last two or three months public meetings of natives to protest against the Income Tax in several places—Allahabad, Lucknow, Umballa, Delhi, Jubbulpore, etc.—

* The Temple Papers are in the possession of the India Office Library, Commonwealth Relations Office, Whitehall. The Indian correspondence of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen is in the University Library, Cambridge.

† *Friend of India*, November 21, 1873.

‡ J. Routledge: *English Rule and Native Opinion in India*, London, 1878, p. 33.

R. Temple: *The Story of My Life*, London, 1896, Vol. I, pp. 205-10.

§ *Calcutta Review*, 1872, Vol. LIV, No. CVII, "The Income Tax in India."

and I read in a newspaper a few days ago that other meetings were talked of. The case of Calcutta is quite different, but I am sure that in these parts of India no natives would ever think of holding public meetings to protest against measures taken by the Government unless they felt sure that the Local Authorities either sympathised with their objects, or would at least make no objection. There can be no doubt that in all such cases the slightest hint given by the Magistrate of the District would be sufficient to prevent any such demonstrations, without anyone knowing that any interference had taken place. I do not remember any such meetings as these before, and I think they ought to be quietly discouraged.”*

Campbell suspected that much of the discontent arose from genuine grievances resulting from abuses in collection and assessment,† but it was the Government of the North-Western Provinces, then in the charge of the distinguished orientalist, Sir William Muir, which revealed the extent of the abuses and the consequent disaffection towards the Government. To Muir one of his own collectors wrote :

“You can have, I think, no idea Sir William, not having been personally able to watch the working of the Income Tax Act, what a monstrous and disgusting tax it is. And it is no wonder that it has given rise to deep and widespread discontent which we may never perhaps be able to root out. The harm which has been done and is being done by the tax is incalculable.”‡

It was largely the warnings of Muir, for whom Mayo personally had the warmest regard, and of J. F. D. Inglis, the Senior Member of the Board of Revenue of the North-Western Provinces, which forced the Government of India to take heed of the situation so that, by 1871, the Governor-General was writing to Temple :

“I care very little as to whether the Income Tax is permanent or not. I think it unsuited to India and consider that Mr. Wilson made a great mistake in touching it at all.”§

Temple disagreed, but the decision to remove the tax was one of Northbrook's earliest actions in India, though direct taxation was reimposed in a different form by John Strachey in 1877-8 when he became Lytton's Finance Minister.

It would be tempting to link the Income Tax agitation with that forward-looking movement of protest which, gaining strength in the time of Northbrook, Lytton and Ripon, took an institutionalized form in the

* J. Strachey to Lord Mayo, July 24, 1870, Mayo Papers.

† Minute of G. Campbell, August 8, 1871, and Resolution of Revenue Department, Bengal Government, December 20, 1871, in *Accounts and Papers East India*, 1872, Vol. XLIV, Income Tax, pp. 13-14 and 34-7.

‡ E. G. Jenkinson, Magistrate and Collector, Saharunpur, to W. Muir, July 24, 1870, Mayo Papers. See also M. H. Court, Commissioner of Meerut, to W. Muir, July 6, 1870, Mayo Papers.

§ Lord Mayo to R. Temple, March 24, 1871, Temple Papers. James Wilson, the first Financial Member of the Governor-General's Council and an early patron of Temple, had first introduced Income Tax in 1860. It was allowed to expire in 1865 but was revived by Temple in 1869.

Congress Movement after 1885. The two movements cannot be entirely divorced, but to associate them too closely would remove the Income Tax agitation from its rightful place as part of an essentially retrogressive and reactionary protest to excessive government in the form of increased taxation, legislation and State interference. For together with hatred of a form of taxation which, at least in India, then involved a degree of personal enquiry capable of maximum abuse and extortion, went the fear, by no means unjustified, particularly in regions under the Permanent Settlement, that the Government sought to avoid its obligations to the landed classes and to the sanctity of private property. This fear seemed to be confirmed in 1870 by the relations of the Bengal Government with the Maharaja of Susang at a time when a thoroughly "Whig" Lieutenant-Governor, Grey, was at the head of the province.*

As agitation, the discontent engendered by the Income Tax would scarcely have seemed formidable had it not coincided with a recent intensification of Wahabi propaganda and intrigue throughout the Ganges valley and especially in the North-Western Provinces, only twelve years earlier the centre of the Mutiny, though Wahabi missionaries were also active in the Punjab, the Central Provinces and Bengal.† The cause of this intensification must be sought, not in the Wahabi camp at Sitana beyond the North-West Frontier, which had become more a symptom than a cause, but in the reaction of some Indian Muslims both to the increased administrative pressure of the Government, noted above, and to their own declining status. The position of Islam in India had never seemed so precarious as in the two decades following the Mutiny, and it was in the psychological setting created by the realization of this precariousness that the apparently academic argument as to whether or not India had ceased to be *Dar-ul-Islam* and had become *Dar-ul-Harb* came into prominence.

In certain areas it was never difficult for Wahabi preachers to arouse the fanaticism of Muslim agriculturists who already had real or supposed economic grievances against the Government. But in the eighteen-sixties and early eighteen-seventies the Muslim landed, trading and professional classes, deprived of employment in the administration and the army, discontented with the Income Tax and irate at the removal of their own law-officers from the courts, also had good reasons for supporting the movement, and Muslim landowners were certainly willing to express their displeasure with the Government's policies by turning a blind eye to Wahabi activities on their estates. The historical grievances of the Muslim communities in India was a familiar topic among perceptive officials throughout this period. So was the remarkable career of the founder of the Indian "Wahabi" movement, Sayyid Ahmad Shah of Rae Bareilly in Oudh who, having abandoned the life of a Pindari free-booter early in the nineteenth century, became a disciple of Shah Abdul Aziz of Delhi and performed the *Hajj* before returning to India to lead his devoted following of Hindustanis beyond the limits of Sikh power in Hazara, from

* *Accounts and Papers, East India, 1872, Vol. XLIV.* Report exhibiting material and moral progress . . . 1870-1871, pp. 10-11.

† In India the term "Wahabi" was used, inaccurately, to describe the followers of Sayyid Ahmad Shah.

whence, in combination with the Pathan tribesmen, he harassed the local Sikh authorities in the name of Islam and even captured and temporarily occupied Peshawar. He was not a true Wahabi, but a strict reforming Hanufi, though undoubtedly the moral fervour of the Arabian movement stimulated his own moral convictions. He was killed in battle against the Sikhs at Balakot in May, 1831, and his posthumous reputation rapidly attained legendary proportions amongst his followers.*

Two facts in the Sayyid's career are relevant to this discussion of unrest in British India. First, in 1820, during a triumphal procession down the Ganges valley *en route* for Mecca, he formed a permanent colony of his followers at Patna and appointed there four *Khalifas* and an *Imam* to superintend them. The organization which he provided proved efficient and durable. Henceforward Patna became the chief centre of the Wahabis in the Company's territories. Secondly, when he founded his community at Panjtar, west of the Black Mountain and the Indus, in 1827, he was joined by the grandsons of Zamin Shah, a notable *pir* of Sitana. One grandson subsequently became Akhund of Swat, and from 1831 until his death in 1857 was the patron of the *mujahidin* of Panjtar, who by that time had moved to Sitana. Thus the community came under the protection of the rulers of Swat.

The British, as heirs to the Sikh rulers of the Punjab, were brought into frequent contact with the *mujahidin* across the border and their agents in India, whom Anglo-Indians termed "the Hindustani fanatics," and Wahabi activities gave Lord Dalhousie's government considerable anxiety, though he himself believed that the wisest policy would be to leave them undisturbed.† But raids from across the border made such a policy of inactivity intolerable and the British attempted a series of reprisals, costly and ineffective, which reached a disastrous climax in the futile Ambela campaign of 1863 under Neville Chamberlain.‡ Thereafter there was a change of policy. Whilst in India itself there followed a marked intensification of Wahabi propaganda and the preaching of rebellion, which ultimately forced both Shiah and Sunni communities to disavow publicly any connection with the movement, the British authorities began a persecution of known or suspected Wahabis in a series of State Trials extending from 1864 to 1871.

The futility of the Ambela campaign had forced the Government to realize that it was the recruits and the remittances of cash from India

* A brief account of Sayyid Ahmad Shah may be found in Olaf Caroe: *The Pathans*, London, 1958, pp. 301-306. See also W. Hunter: *The Indian Muslims*, London, 1871, and the *Calcutta Review*, 1870, Vols. L and LI, Nos. C, CI and CII. An account of some of the beliefs of Indian Wahabis may be found in Mir Shahamat Ali, Translation of the *Takwiyat-ul-Imam*, preceded by a notice of the author, Maulavi Isma'il Hajji, in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1852, Vol. XIII, pp. 310-72.

† *Accounts and Papers, East India*, 1872, Vol. XLIV; Minutes of Lord Dalhousie, August 26, 1852, September 7, 1852, and November 11, 1852. The early relations of the Government of India with the Indian Wahabis were described by F. D. Chauntrell, Solicitor to the Government of India, in a paper drawn up on May 12, 1871, for the State Trials of that year. See Mayo Papers (Wahabis).

‡ See Mahmud Husain, "The Ambela Campaign, 1863," in the *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, April, 1953, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 105-117.

which constituted the life-blood of Sitana and that the colony on the frontier and the excesses which it provoked would survive so long as it received assistance from inside British territory.* Thus the Wahabi trials were part of a concerted policy to destroy what was held to be a real danger to the security of the Empire. They were the result of a genuine nervousness as to the influence and ramifications of Wahabi intrigues inside India.†

In 1868, the last year of Sir John Lawrence's viceroyalty, the Government believed that a great Wahabi plot was afoot and the proclamation of a *jihad* imminent. A year later, in 1869, arrests were made of some of the suspected ringleaders and their accomplices who were believed to be sending funds up to the frontier,‡ but the Government met with the greatest difficulty in obtaining sufficient proof for conviction. Ashley Eden, the Secretary to the Bengal Government, recommended the erection of a specially constituted tribunal to deal with Wahabi cases, but Mayo considered the proposal improper and it was dropped.§

Nevertheless, in its arrest of suspects under Act III of 1818 and in their subsequent trials, especially those of 1870 and 1871, the Government's actions were, in the words of the Law Member, "muddled and mis-managed."¶ Some of these actions were held to be of dubious legality by members of the legal profession, and tended to bring the Government into disrepute.¶ Chisholm Anstey, one of the leading Counsel for the Defence in the trial of Ameer Khan, went so far as to describe the circumstances of the case as "one of the most tyrannical and oppressive instances of the contest between an illegal prerogative and the liberty of the subject to be found in the books for the last three hundred years."***

Inevitably the policy of the Government was very unpopular and was sharply criticized by Indians, but it is significant that neither Durand, who became Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in 1870, nor Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary, approved of the manner or the number of the arrests.††

Apparently the Bengal Government itself was for a long time quite sceptical of the danger of Wahabi plots,‡‡ but in some departments, and

* E. C. Bayley, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, to O. T. Burne, Private Secretary to Lord Mayo, August 13, 1870, Mayo Papers. See also F. D. Chauntrell's paper noted above.

† It is interesting to note that Alfred Lyall's "A Sermon in Lower Bengal" was written in 1864 and describes a Wahabi preacher. The second part of his poem "Studies in Delhi, 1876," was originally called "The Wahabee." See J. F. Stephen's Papers.

‡ *Accounts and Papers, East India*, 1871, Vol. L, "Statement exhibiting material and moral progress . . . 1869-70," pp. 3-4.

§ Note by Lord Mayo, May 31, 1870, Mayo Papers.

¶ F. J. Stephen to Lord Mayo, May 31, 1870, Mayo Papers.

¶ For example, T. Dunbar Ingram: Two letters on some recent proceedings of the Indian Government, London, 1871; and C. C. Macrae: Report of the Proceedings in the cases of Ameer Khan and Hashmadad Khan, Calcutta, 1870.

*** This was in the Calcutta High Court, August 1, 1870. See C. C. Macrae: Report of the Proceedings, etc., p. 1.

†† C. U. Aitchison to O. T. Burne, August 21, 1870, Mayo Papers.

‡‡ E. C. Bayley to O. T. Burne, June 8, 1870, Mayo Papers.

notably amongst the police, Wahabis were becoming an obsession, and the police officers who specialized in this field kept the Government in a constant state of alarm by their reports. When the communities at Patna and Dinapore were broken up the police reported that they had dispersed into the Ghazipur district and Buxar.* Besides the Patna country, Meerut, Ambala, Amritsar, Lahore and Peshawar were named as Wahabi strongholds.†

Undaunted by criticism and the very partial success of its measures, the Government continued its policy of persecution. In 1871 twenty-six suspected conspirators were tried at Patna. Though their judges were scrupulously fair, it was unfortunate that they happened to be Civilians. Despite an eloquent defence by Chisholm Anstey and some attempted intimidation of the judges, seven of the prisoners were convicted and sentenced to transportation for life with forfeiture of property; one was acquitted; and the rest were discharged conditionally.‡ The seven found guilty appealed to the Calcutta High Court. It was known that the appeals would be heard by the Officiating Chief Justice, Mr. J. P. Norman, who was believed to be hostile to Wahabi suspects. As already stated, the arrests and earlier judicial proceedings had received highly unfavourable comment from Indians and, in particular, from the Muslim community. Then, on September 20, 1871, Norman was stabbed to death by a Pathan as he entered his court.

The murderer was believed to be a native of Kabul. Though his previous history was obscure, his story, as subsequently pieced together by the police, revealed a typical "budmash" drawn to the Wahabi movement. He was said to be a relative of the Akhund of Swat and at one time to have been a sowar of Maharaja Sindhia who had dismissed him from his service for his persistent soliciting of a Hindu widow in Gwalior. The widow fled to Benares to escape her persecutor, who followed her there and assaulted her, for which offence he served a six-month prison sentence. In jail he became surly, silent and pious. After his release he would go out at night and break idols.§ Though no evidence of any value was forthcoming from him prior to his execution, and though it was disputed whether he was a true Wahabi at all, there was little doubt that he was linked with the Wahabi movement and that the murder was intended as a warning to the Government to curtail its persecution of the sect.|| One is reminded of the similar object of the Ismailian Assassins in disrupting Seljuk government in the twelfth century, and, by a remark-

* J. H. Reily, District Superintendent of Police, to Inspector-General of Police, Lower Provinces, July 11, 1870, Mayo Papers. Reily had the reputation of being an expert in Wahabi cases.

† Report on Native Feeling in the Punjab, initialled F. B., October, 1871, Mayo Papers.

‡ *Accounts and Papers, East India*, 1872, Vol. XLIV, "Statement exhibiting material and moral progress . . . 1870-71, p. 14.

§ Memo of A. H. Giles, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Police, November 28, 1871, Mayo Papers (Wahabis).

|| R. Temple: *Men and Events of My Time in India*, London, 1882, pp. 386-7. O. T. Burne: *Memories*, London, 1907, pp. 123-4. Sir George Campbell, however, dissented from this view. See his *Memoirs of My Indian Career*, London, 1893, Vol. II, p. 216.

able coincidence, the *Calcutta Review* made an implicit comparison in a series of articles on the early history of Ismailism published in 1872 and 1873. In fairness to them, it is certainly arguable that if the Wahabis had become by this time a threat to the maintenance of good government, they were merely reacting to continuous persecution by the Government.

Norman's murder horrified Calcutta. "The sad business has made a profound sensation everywhere," wrote Burne,* "and for some time to come we shall all probably have to go through the threatening letter business, panics, and precautions." In fact, for some time the European community in Northern India had been in a suspicious and nervous mood, at times bordering on hysteria. For the last two or three years there had been signs of unrest and whispers of plotting throughout the North-Western Provinces and especially around Aligarh, Allahabad, Benares, Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, and Roorkee. At Allahabad and Roorkee in the summer of 1870 there were cases of extreme panic among Europeans, particularly non-officials. It is significant that both these towns were in the heart of the Mutiny country. These spasmodic panics on the part of Europeans in India indicated the extent to which the events of 1857 were branded on the Anglo-Indian mind. In 1870 it was said that the mysterious chupatties of 1857 were again being carried at night from village to village!

The rumours at Roorkee were based on the report of an Indian Christian who had declared to the magistrate that some intrigue was being concocted, that Muslims of all classes were assembling regularly in a garden outside the city, that there were collections for a secret fund, and that a "fat fakir" was frequenting the district under mysterious circumstances. The Commissioner of Roorkee took prompt and ostentatious precautions which were later deemed to be excessive by the Lieutenant-Governor.

In Allahabad, where there was a large colony of European tradespeople and railway employees, the rumours began with bazaar gossip and the evidence of a frightened Englishwoman against her servants. These quickly swelled and spread until it was said that the 9th Native Infantry Regiment, stationed nearby, was about to mutiny. The situation was greatly exacerbated by the fact that Allahabad was at that time denuded of European troops and that the Commissioner of the Allahabad Division, F. O. Mayne, was up at Naini Tal attending a conference with the Provincial Government. The Joint-Magistrate and Deputy Collector, J. C. Robertson, who knew the district well, took a serious view of the situation. So did the Commanding Officer of the cantonment, Major-General J. L. Vaughan, but both men acted with indiscretion. Two companies of European troops were ordered down from Cawnpore immediately, but in the meantime local orders were given which seriously aggravated the panic: ammunition and gun-spikes were issued to the European garrison, which was ordered to sleep dressed for duty; the non-official Europeans

* O. T. Burne to C. Bernard, Secretary to the Bengal Government, September 28, 1871, Mayo Papers. See also C. Bernard to O. T. Burne, October 5, 1871, Mayo Papers, and W. W. Hunter: *The Indian Musalmans*, London, 2nd edition, 1872, p. 106.

assembled nightly at the railway station; and an emergency rendezvous was appointed for women and children. Most dangerous of all, the sepoy were mustered in the middle of the night without even their own officers receiving previous warning.

Sir William Muir deplored these incidents and refused to be alarmed by will-o'-the-wisps in which he entirely disbelieved. He had been trained in that famous school of Thomason's and the rhythm of his administration, like that of his beloved master's, was smooth and imperturbable. To Mayo he wrote: "The whole thing is most provoking."* But the Governor-General was unwilling to criticize too harshly the actions of officers under such trying circumstances, though he wholly agreed with Muir in disbelieving the rumours of a concerted uprising.† On the other hand, Lord Napier of Magdala, the Commander-in-Chief, believed that Major-General Vaughan had done no more than his plain duty.‡

Perhaps nothing in the whole business irritated Mayo and Muir more than the speed with which the rumours reached the Press in England, where it was said that there was disaffection in the Sepoy regiments.§ The *Spectator* for September 10, 1870, under the heading "The Indian Rumours," attributed the unrest in the North-Western Provinces to the acute dissatisfaction felt by the upper classes with the administration of the Income Tax. If this had been merely the random guess of journalists in London, or even Calcutta, it might have been disregarded, but in fact it was an opinion shared by many District Officers in Northern India. M. H. Court, for example, the Commissioner of Meerut, wrote to Muir regarding the Muslims in his jurisdiction :

"It is very likely that sedition is preached—in fact amongst the faithful it is rarely that it is not.

"The Income Tax last year, as you saw, caused a good deal of disaffection and this showed itself most amongst the Mahomedan population and in the Mahomedan towns."||

Muir himself believed that there would always be some restlessness among Indian Muslims, and he suspected that in the Aligarh district, in particular, there was some sympathy among the Muslim landowners for the Wahabis on the Frontier.¶ Court made a careful tour in that direction, but he returned satisfied that conditions were reasonably normal, though he stressed what many of his colleagues were stressing, the general uneasiness among the Muslim community and the great prevalence of millenium literature.** At the same time, Jenkinson, in Saharunpur, was emphasizing the widening gulf between rulers and ruled, begun by the events of the Mutiny and now, he supposed, greatly extended by the unpopularity of the Income Tax Act.††

* W. Muir to Lord Mayo, September 12, 1870, Mayo Papers.

† Memorandum of Lord Mayo, September 18, 1870, Mayo Papers.

‡ Note of Lord Napier of Magdala, September 11, 1870, Mayo Papers.

§ Considerable energy was employed to discover the origins of the Reuters' telegrams of September 1 and 3, 1870, from Allahabad. See Mayo Papers (Wahabis).

|| M. H. Court to W. Muir, June 5, 1870, Mayo Papers.

¶ W. Muir to M. H. Court, July 8, 1870, Mayo Papers.

** M. H. Court to W. Muir, July 14 and 17, 1870, Mayo Papers.

†† E. G. Jenkinson to W. Muir, July 24, 1870, Mayo Papers.

In that same year of 1870 the proximity of Muslim and Hindu religious festivals threatened to cause serious communal disturbances. These were temporarily averted, but in the following year there was communal rioting with heavy casualties in Bareilly and Pilibhit, and again in 1872 at Moradabad, when the Mohurrum and Holi festivals coincided.* In September, 1871, there was a riot in Bareilly jail, where the Superintendent, Dr. Eades, who, unlike most of his countrymen in India, appears to have been unversed in Mutiny literature, had ordered the removal of the Brahminical threads.† There was some bloodshed, and Muir immediately suspended him. Another furore was created at this time by the discovery of Liakut Ali, who, in 1857, had proclaimed himself the representative of Bahadur Shah II in Allahabad.‡ His trial, together with persistent rumours of the whereabouts of Nana Sahib, helped to keep Mutiny recollections burning brightly.

With the tension mounting throughout 1871 the Government grew more apprehensive and watchful. Bayley, the Home Secretary, proceeded to make enquiries from local officers as to the extent of the unrest. The replies which he received were a revealing indication of the state of Northern India in 1871. The Commissioner of Rohilkhand, for instance, wrote of his area :

“ . . . there is no doubt a great deal of religious excitement throughout the country . . . there is a good deal of preaching going on, and the Moulvees are buzzing about like wasps, and the Hindoos are not much better. The severe orders about Infanticide, though morally right, came at a most unfortunate time. . . .”§

At Etawah a Hindu festival was celebrated in advance of the usual date for no apparent reason, and a Muslim proclamation was circulated announcing the coming of the *Imam Mahdi* and the end of the world amidst much unpleasantness in 1872. This proclamation originated in Bundelkhand in the south and, taken by itself, the Local Government did not view it very seriously. Bayley was informed that “It is a mere *rechauffé* of stale Mahomedan matter which is always more or less in circulation and tends to keep the Mahomedan mind in a ferment.”||

Though this was probably true the proclamation took its place with the other evidence of widespread restlessness and uncertainty. Nor were the Muslims alone affected. From Jhansi, where there was a general uneasiness among the poorer classes, came the report of the birth of a Hindu child under miraculous circumstances who was later spirited away on the banks of the Jumna. Religious almanacs were being consulted by

* *Accounts and Papers, East India, 1873, Vol. L, “Statement concerning material and moral progress . . . 1871-72, pp. 133-4.*

† E. C. Bayley to O. T. Burne, September 13, 1871, Mayo Papers.

‡ J. Routledge: *English Rule and Native Opinion in India*, London, 1878, pp. 76-7.

§ The Hon'ble R. A. J. Drummond, Commissioner, Rohilkhand, to E. C. Bayley, October 6, 1871, Mayo Papers. The reference is to the Infanticide Act of March, 1870.

|| C. A. Elliott, Secretary to the Government, North-Western Provinces, to E. C. Bayley, September 9, 1871, Mayo Papers.

Hindus to an unusual extent.* They originated in Benares and were believed to contain much seditious matter. Reports of the attention with which they were being read extended to Seoni in the Central Provinces.† Seoni itself was a peculiarly restless district which contained many Muslim landowners and many Wahabis. Keatinge, the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, was in agreement with his subordinates that there was an undefinable uneasiness prevalent everywhere, though he believed that the rumours and prophecies would disappear with a good harvest. Inglis, of the Board of Revenue of the North-Western Provinces, thought the same and wrote to Muir of the "expectation of some coming trouble prevalent throughout the country just now."‡ In Bengal, the Santals were the principal cause for apprehension for they were in a state of the greatest excitement over grievances against their Zamindars and *baniyas* and, in fact, they broke out in rioting early in 1872.

In the Punjab the activities of the Wahabis were obscured by intense communal tension and bitter hostility towards the Government.§ The Kukas, a reforming Sikh sect founded in the eighteen-forties, were the chief threat to the peace of the province. So long as the Sikhs had been the ruling minority in the Punjab the Kukas had been concerned solely with religious and social reform, but the reversal of Sikh fortunes and the British annexation of 1849, which had the inevitable result of lowering the status of the Sikhs, had given a political colouring to the movement. The sect had consequently acquired an evil reputation for murders and outrages connected with its agitation against cow-killing, and for a time its leader, Ram Singh, a carpenter from the Ludhiana District, had been under police surveillance. If it was true, as some officials claimed, that he aspired to restore the old Sikh sovereignty in the Punjab, it may have been significant that he claimed to be an incarnation of Guru Govind Singh, but until more precise evidence is forthcoming it may be reasonably assumed that the movement was primarily a religious one whose tenets inevitably led its members into acts of communal violence against Muslims once Sikh political hegemony had ceased. Ram Singh himself was a man of considerable intellectual ability and under his direction the Kukas flourished, making many converts in the army and the police as well as among women and lower-class Muslims. Their numbers in 1871 were estimated at between 300,000 and 400,000.||

Throughout 1870 they had become increasingly aggressive, and in June, 1871, they had raided a slaughter-house near the Golden Temple in

* R. M. Edwards, Officiating Commissioner, Jhansi, to C. A. Elliott, June 16, 1871, Mayo Papers; and E. C. Bayley to W. Muir, July 28, 1871, Mayo Papers.

† Captain Brooke, Deputy Commissioner, Seoni, to R. H. Keatinge, June 13, 1871, Mayo Papers.

‡ J. F. D. Inglis to W. Muir, June 20, 1871, Mayo Papers.

§ Report on Native Feeling in the Punjab, initialled F. B., October, 1871, Mayo Papers (Wahabis).

|| *Ibid.* Short notices of the Kukas may be found in Khuswant Singh, *The Sikhs*, London, 1953, pp. 90-7; in Syad Muhammad Latif, *History of the Panjab*, Calcutta, 1891, pp. 594-5; and in Sir Denzil Ibbotson, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Panjab and North-West Frontier Province*, Lahore, 1911, Vol. II, pp. 560-1.

Amritsar, where they had killed four butchers and wounded three more. A month later, in July, they murdered three butchers and wounded a further thirteen in the small town of Raikot in the Ludhiana district. For this outrage five Kukas were hanged.

Amidst this increasing unrest in Northern India, and in a growing atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty among Europeans, particularly towards the Muslims, Hunter published his *Indian Musalmans*, which, while stressing the wrongs suffered by Indian Muslims under the British Government, described in melodramatic language the past history of the Wahabis and the ambiguous role which he believed Muslims must play in a non-Islamic State.* His views were publicly refuted a year later by Syed Ahmed Khan and Alfred Lyall,† but so infectious had Anglo-Indian apprehensions become that the debate moved to England, where the *Spectator*, reviewing Hunter's book, declared hysterically that in the Wahabis "we have found the most dangerous foes who ever faced us; that our dominion hangs even now, today, by a hair; that at any moment in any year a Mussulman Cromwell may take the field, and the Empire be temporarily overwhelmed in universal massacre."‡

Against this background of mounting racial tension and unrest, the climax to the succession of rumours, plots and violence was reached on February 8, 1872, when the Governor-General was assassinated at Port Blair in the Andamans by a Pathan convict.

The murderer was personally questioned by both Aitchison and Eden, and although a full investigation was made at the time, no conspiracy was revealed and the Government concluded that the crime had no political significance but was a personal act of vengeance, stimulated perhaps by the example of Norman's murder five months earlier.§ Burne, Mayo's secretary, however, always believed that it was the result of Wahabi propaganda,|| and this must have been the popular belief at the time. Certainly the general security arrangements had recently been very lax. Sometime before Lord Mayo's murder a lunatic was discovered in the Throne Room of Government House, and shortly after it Sir George Campbell awoke one night to find an idiot capering in his bedroom.¶

In the event of the death in office of a Governor-General, the Governor of Madras automatically took his place as Acting Governor-General. In the temporary absence of the Governor of Madras, the Government of India was headed by the senior Member of Council, at this time Sir John Strachey. On such an occasion, and in view of the recent disturbances, the lack of a properly constituted Governor-General with the necessary prestige and influence might have been a cause of considerable embarrass-

* W. H. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, London, 1871. A second edition came out in 1872, demand being stimulated by Norman's murder.

† Syed Ahmen Khan, *Review of Dr. Hunter's Indian Musalmans*, Benares, 1872; and A. C. Lyall, "Islam in India," in the *Theological Review*, April, 1872.

‡ *The Spectator*, August 19, 1871.

§ *Accounts and Papers, East India*, 1873, Vol. L, "Statement exhibiting material and moral progress . . . 1871-72, p. 1.

|| O. T. Burne: *Memories*, London, 1907, p. 134.

¶ J. H. Rivett-Carnac, *Many Memories*, Edinburgh, 1910, p. 233; and G. Campbell, *Memoirs*, London, 1893, Vol. II, p. 244.

ment to the Government, but both Strachey and Lord Napier and Ettrick who promptly sailed from Madras to Calcutta, kept a very firm control over events and the late Governor-General's policy of "Stracheyism" continued unabated.*

Nevertheless, despite the customary sang-froid of the Government, there was intense nervousness, coupled with aggressive indignation, amongst the European community throughout the country. The atmosphere in Calcutta in the days immediately following the announcement of Mayo's death is strikingly illustrated in a letter from Stephen, the Law Member, to his wife in England, describing the funeral procession from Prinsep's Ghat to Government House.

"There was nothing at all to have prevented any fanatic there might be from repeating the crime of the other two, upon any of us. I pointed this out in Council, but nobody seemed much to care for what I said, till we got to the place, when Temple began chattering in his usual idiotic way and John Strachey said, with the sort of melancholy indifference you can imagine, 'There is no reason why anyone should not stab us who has a mind. The police are worthless, and have taken no precautions.' As we walked I kept my hand close to the hilt of my dress sword, and kept my eye on the crowd with a firm resolution to run any man through who made a rush."†

The police did not believe that there was any general conspiracy, and neither did Stephen, who considered the two sensational murders pure coincidence, though he felt forced to add, to his wife:

"It is my belief that if they have any more, the whole English community will get one of their sanguinary panics, and if they do there will be no holding them. We might have a massacre or Heaven knows what. . . . We nearly had a scandal with the High Court, which was within an ace of letting off the miserable assassin on a beggarly quibble; however I cobbled it up for them, and he is to be hung in the regular way. We had made up our minds (i.e. Strachey and I had) that he should be hung in an irregular way if the High Court made a fool of itself. We had resolved to run all risks, and take all consequences, rather than let him escape. People are greatly excited and alarmed, as you may suppose. We have rumours (all false) every day, that Sir George Couper has been assassinated at Lucknow, and another officer at Patna, that the Sikh regiments have mutinied, etc., etc."‡

It was in this hysterical atmosphere that the Supreme Government was called upon to decide a case which involved the principles of conduct governing its officers in just such an emergency. This was the so-called "Maler Kotla affair."

* J. Routledge: *English Rule and Native Opinion in India*, London, 1878, p. 112.

† J. F. Stephen to M. R. Stephen, February 21, 1872, Stephen Papers.

‡ *Ibid.*

The activities of the Kukas have already been mentioned. On January 14, 1872, a band of Kukas attacked the small town of Malaudh in the Ludhiana district, but was repulsed by the local Sirdar, a distant relative of the Maharaja of Patiala. On the following morning the gang attacked Maler Kotla, with the object of capturing the treasury there, but was driven off by the Nawab's soldiers and fled into Patiala. The size of the gang was uncertain. At first it was believed to have consisted of between 200 and 500 men, but later 150 was reckoned as the maximum figure. The motive for the attack was also uncertain. The local officers attributed it to the need for arms and cash prior to a larger uprising, but it may have been simply an act of vengeance for the Kuka prosecutions of the previous year or a further attempt to intimidate local butchers. It is interesting to recall, however, that it was in this same area in 1794 that Bedi Sahib Singh, who was a lineal descendant of Baba Nanak, proclaimed a religious war of extirpation against the Afghans of Maler Kotla.

Douglas Forsyth, the Commissioner of the Ambala Division, was at that time in camp at Delhi with the Commander-in-Chief, but Cowan, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana and Forsyth's immediate subordinate, at once proceeded to Maler Kotla. Cowan was an uncovenanted officer of twenty-three years standing in the service who, from long experience of the Ludhiana district, was held to be familiar with Kuka activities, and he had dealt with the Raikot murders of the previous year.

He arrived in Maler Kotla on January 16 and summarily tried seventy Kukas who had surrendered in Patiala on the previous evening. On the 17th, despite orders from Forsyth to reserve the prisoners for further legal proceedings, he ordered forty-nine to be blown away from guns, whilst a fiftieth, breaking loose, was cut down by one of the Nawab's officers. On the 18th Forsyth wrote to Cowan commending him for his vigilance, and on the 19th, having arrived in the district, he hanged a further sixteen. On the 20th he reported to the Punjab Government, "Perfect tranquillity. Cowan's action deserves praise." On the same day Lord Mayo telegraphed Sir Henry Davies, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, "Stop any summary execution of Kukas without your express orders." On the 24th Bayley instructed the Punjab Government to suspend Cowan pending investigation.*

Both Forsyth and Cowan believed that they had saved the province from greater bloodshed by their prompt action. Forsyth wrote to a colleague: ". . . unquestionably we were very nearly in for a great outbreak,"† and Cowan reported that "a rebellion which might have attained large dimensions was nipped in the bud, and a terrible and prompt vengeance was in my opinion absolutely necessary to prevent the recurrence of similar rising."‡

* For the official details of the Maler Kotla affair, see *Accounts and Papers, East India*, 1872. Vol. XLV, Correspondence relating to Kooka Outbreak.

† T. D. Forsyth to G. R. Elsmie, January 21, 1872, quoted in Elsmie's *Thirty-Five Years in the Punjab*, 1858-93, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 163. See also *The Autobiography and Reminiscences of Sir Douglas Forsyth*, London, 1887, pp. 34-5.

‡ L. Cowan to T. D. Forsyth, January 17, 1872, para. 4, in Correspondence relating to Kooka Outbreak.

At the first sign of trouble Forsyth had arrested Ram Singh and sent him secretly to Allahabad with a warrant under Act III of 1818, though two days before the raid Ram Singh had informed the police of his followers' intentions and of his inability to control them.* This action, however, received the approval of the Supreme Government, and the Kuka leader with twelve of his principal lieutenants was sent to Rangoon. Even before the raid Temple had urged Ram Singh's arrest, but, though Mayo supported him, he was overruled in Council.† Whether the severity with which Forsyth and Cowan acted was justified or not, the summary executions and the arrest of the Kuka leaders undoubtedly brought to a close the more violent activities of the sect.

Forsyth was one of those Punjab civilians who found the details of administrative routine irksome and frustrating. As a young Deputy Commissioner of Ambala in 1857 he had acted with speed and vigour and had later been made a Special Commissioner for punishing rebels.‡ He had little love for India or for Indian officialdom, and his true forte lay in exploration and Oriental diplomacy. He had led the 1870 expedition to Yarkand to negotiate with the Amir, Atalik Ghazee, and he later led another mission to Yarkand and Kashgar in 1873-4. Personally he found the Kashgaris and their methods of government admirable for nineteenth century Asia, and far more stimulating than the tedium of the Anglo-Indian bureaucratic machinery! But by the eighteen-seventies such men as Forsyth were becoming anachronistic in the I.C.S.

Forsyth was amazed to find that he and Cowan, instead of being praised for their vigour, were being denounced for their brutality. Sir Henry Davies forgot the Punjab Tradition and failed to support his subordinates.§ Mayo likewise disapproved and thought that the executions had been carried out "in an exceptional and highly objectionable manner."||

Mayo's murder followed close upon the Maler Kotla affair, and it was left to Lord Napier and Etrick's caretaker government to decide what further course should be taken. In view of the panic prevailing at the time it was greatly to the Government's credit that it condemned the incident in unambiguous terms.

"To administer justice with mercy is the fixed and settled policy of the Government of India: but it is absolutely essential to this great object that justice should be administered according to known rules, with due deliberation, and with discrimination between degrees of guilt. . . . His Excellency in Council cannot consent to

* L. Cowan to T. D. Forsyth, January 15, 1872, and T. D. Forsyth to Secretary, Punjab Government, January 20, 1872.

† R. Temple to Lord Northbrook, July 30, 1874, Temple Papers.

‡ It is significant that in his report of the Maler Kotla trials sent to the Secretary, Punjab Government, January 19, 1872, he justified his severity and the method of execution with precedents of 1857. See Correspondence relating to Kooka Outbreak.

§ Davies' prevarication is clearly shown in two letters from Lepel Griffin, Secretary, Punjab Government, to E. C. Bayley, January 19 and 26, 1872, in Correspondence relating to Kooka Outbreak.

|| E. C. Bayley to Secretary, Punjab Government, February 8, 1872, Correspondence relating to Kooka Outbreak.

be forced by the crime of a few fanatics into the sanction of acts repugnant to the whole spirit of British rule.”*

Cowan was removed from the service, though he was allowed to retain his pension on account of his past record. Forsyth was transferred from the Punjab and was forbidden to exercise ever again power of life and death over the subjects of a Native State. The Government's Resolution was written by Stephen, and it was almost his last official task in India.† The principles at stake were by no means new to him, for in 1865 he had been concerned in the notorious case of Governor Eyre of Jamaica.‡ Stephen had been a firm paternalist in Indian affairs and he was proud of his lack of sentimentality, but his reaction to the executions, as expressed in letters to his wife, was humane and practical. He described Cowan's precipitate action as :

“ . . . a needless piece of brutality as ever was. . . . Cowan's performance was both a blunder and a crime, and may do immense harm, though there are excuses of an obvious kind to be made for him . . . there was no cause to have a massacre, especially as the poor brutes were wounded and fugitives, and had committed no specially heinous atrocities, and particularly, above all, as they might have been put to death in a perfectly legal and quiet way in a couple of days or so, at the farthest.”§

After obtaining further information, he returned to the subject in letters home, declaring “ That Kooka business was a frightful piece of butcherly cruelty, and both Cowan and Forsyth are immensely to blame for it.” Forsyth's part in it he found particularly distasteful :

“ He actually hung 16 men, whom there was no particular occasion to hang, for the sake of supporting Cowan, who had blown away from guns 49 men, whom there was no real occasion to blow away.”||

Reaction to the executions in India and England was sharply divided, as it was later to be divided over the Fuller case of 1876 and the so-called Ilbert Bill of 1884. Most Europeans in India, and the Anglo-Indian Press, with the notable exception of the *Calcutta Review*, tended to support what they termed a policy of “ vigour.”¶ The Indian Press and liberals at home warmly supported the Government's Resolution, though Henry Cotton, who rose to be Chief Commissioner of Assam before becoming

* E. C. Bayley to Secretary, Punjab Government, April 30, 1872, Home Department—Judicial, No. 857, paras. 11 and 13, in Correspondence relating to Kooka Outbreak.

† J. F. Stephen to Emily Cunningham, April 20, 1872, Stephen Papers. Emily Cunningham later married Sir Robert Egerton.

‡ Leslie Stephen : *Life of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen*, London, 1895, pp. 227-31.

§ J. F. Stephen to M. R. Stephen, January 22, 1872, Stephen Papers.

|| J. F. Stephen to M. R. Stephen, February 9, 1872, Stephen Papers. Forsyth undoubtedly executed the further sixteen to support Cowan. See T. D. Forsyth to G. R. Elsmic, January 21, 1872, in G. R. Elsmic, *Thirty-Five Years in the Punjab*, p. 163.

¶ *Calcutta Review*, 1872, Vol. LIV, No. CVIII, and Vol. LV, No. CIX, “ Vigorous Government.”

President of the Indian National Congress in 1904, wrote long afterwards in his memoirs :

“For my part I can recall nothing during my service in India more revolting and shocking than these executions, and there were many who thought, as I did and still think, that the final orders of the Government of India were lamentably inadequate.”*

In the Commons, Grant Duff was asked to lay the official correspondence before the House,† whilst at least one retired Anglo-Indian who had known the almost unendurable strain of 1857 wrathfully denounced the conduct of the officers at Maler Kotla. To Temple, in India, Lawrence wrote :

“I quite concur in the view the Government of India appear to have taken of the wholesale destruction of the wretched Kookas. . . . It appears to me that there was no justification for such severity. . . . In the Mutiny the case was quite different. Then ruin was staring us in the face, and we had literally to kill or be killed. . . . I believe that unless a serious example is made of those two officers fresh evils will assuredly arise.”‡

His tone was echoed in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, which condemned the affair on the day the Government resolution was published. Forsyth believed that the article had been written or inspired by a member of the Governor-General's Council, and always maintained that Cowan and he, in doing their duty, had been sacrificed to sentimentalists at home.§

The controversy had subsided by the time Lord Northbrook reached Calcutta, but he found restlessness and suspicion of the Government prevalent over much of India, whilst the Press, both English and vernacular, was critical and cantankerous. Even before he arrived it was believed that he had resolved upon a change of policy, but if this was true, his preconceptions were certainly strengthened by his immediate impressions. Thus, as soon as possible, he abolished the Income Tax, the source of so much discontent, and arbitrarily vetoed Campbell's Bengal Municipalities Bill which, he believed, must inevitably enhance local taxation and thereby increase the resentment of the Zamindars towards the Government.||

His policy of easing the administrative pressure at the summit of the hierarchy was greatly assisted by certain Service changes in personnel over which he had little or no control but which worked in favour of the new policy. He had new Governors in Madras and Bombay. In Council there was a change of Law Members. Stephen had decided to return to England and was replaced by Arthur Hobhouse, a Liberal who was averse to excessive activity in the Legislative Department and who was better suited by temperament than Stephen to work with the new Governor-General. Both Strachey's and Temple's terms of office in Council were

* H. Cotton : *Indian and Home Memories*, London, 1911, p. 113.

† Hansard : February 29, 1872, and May 7, 1872.

‡ J. Lawrence to R. Temple, March 22, 1872, Temple Papers.

§ T. D. Forsyth : *Autobiography and Reminiscences of Sir Douglas Forsyth*, London, 1887, p. 42.

|| G. Campbell : *Memoirs of My Indian Career*, London, 1893, Vol. II, pp. 286-8.

due to expire. Strachey, after furlough, was sent as Lieutenant-Governor to the North-Western Provinces, where his powerful intellect could find less scope for determining Government policy. Muir replaced Temple as Finance Minister. He had no special financial experience, but Northbrook took the actual direction of this vital department into his own experienced hands. Campbell retired prematurely from Bengal on account of failing health. He had been deeply mortified by the tone of the new régime, the antithesis of all his own ideals of Indian government, but he had become a very sick man, which gave him a genuine pretext to depart. He was replaced in Bengal by Temple, who, having restored his tarnished reputation by a brilliant record in the Bihar famine of 1874, proceeded to cultivate a more discreet attitude towards the diverse but vociferous "interests" of his province.

Northbrook was probably more absolute in his Council than either his two immediate predecessors or his two successors. The Members of Council who remained from the previous régime, and the men who gradually replaced them, either lacked the dominant stature of their predecessors like Durand and Strachey, or else took their cue from the Governor-General and exercised a less vigorous superintendence than Mayo's had done.* In contrast to his feeble Council, Northbrook kept a strict personal control over every department. He relied on no experienced Anglo-Indian official for guidance in the way Mayo before him, and Lytton after him, relied on John Strachey. Temple was frequently plied for information, for he was a mine of erudition on all Indian subjects, but he was kept on a very short rein in Bengal. Northbrook's sole confidant and mentor—to the intense jealousy of the Civil Service—was his cousin and private secretary, Captain Evelyn Baring, afterwards Earl of Cromer.

The only real check to his authority came, after February, 1874, from the new Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury. This check was felt increasingly until it became impossible for Northbrook to govern in the way he deemed essential for the peace and well-being of India. But until that point was reached his period of office had a distinctive character reflecting the personality of the man, shrewd, businesslike, firm and unostentatiously thorough. After his departure, many Anglo-Indian officials and many more Indians learnt to regret the reversal, by his successor, of a policy which seemed to suit the mood and instincts of the Indian people so much better than the conscientious over-government of Mayo's time.

* After Stephen, Strachey and Temple retired from the Council, the Councillors, in order of seniority, throughout the viceroyalty were—Lord Napier of Magdala, B. H. Ellis, Sir Henry Norman, Arthur Hobhouse, E. C. Bayley, Sir William Muir, Sir Andrew Clarke and Sir Alexander Arbuthnot.

THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

This is the seventh in a series of reviews of new Soviet literature on the six Muslim republics of the U.S.S.R. and the countries bordering on them. The present article deals with books received between April and the end of July, 1960. It is contributed by the Central Asian Research Centre in collaboration with the Soviet Affairs Study Group of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

I. CENTRAL ASIA

General Ethnography

THE second volume of what is intended to be a review of the ethnography of the peoples of the world has been published, entitled *An Outline of General Ethnography: Asiatic Section* (Ocherki obshchey etnografii—Aziatskaya Chast'. Edited by S. P. Tolstoy, M. G. Levin, and N. N. Cheboksarov. Institute of Ethnography i/n N. N. Miklukho-Maklaya, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1960. 365 pp.). The first volume of this series, published in 1957 under the same title, covered the culture and way of life of the peoples of Australia, Oceania, America and Africa, and subsequent volumes are to be issued on Europe (including Russia) and on the countries of Asia. The comparatively small size of the book, coupled with the large area covered, necessarily limit the scope of such a volume, though it gives some details on the history, geographic origins and culture of the people of (1) the Caucasus, (2) Central (Srednyaya) Asia and Kazakhstan, and (3) Siberia. The bias of the book is avowedly towards comparing changes in these areas in the Soviet period from those existing previously, with special emphasis on their relations with the Russian people. As the editors say, "light is shed upon the fundamental changes in the economy and in the way of life of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. which have occurred under the conditions of the Soviet system." Perhaps the most useful feature of this book is the provision of excellent maps of the three areas covered showing the locations of the various nationalities and including those areas which are either sparsely populated or completely uninhabited.

History of Kazakhstan

A number of new books on the history of Kazakhstan have appeared recently, the majority of which concentrate on the Soviet period, and, more specifically, on the October Revolution, its causes and aftermath. One book dealing with earlier history is *New Material on Ancient and Medieval History of Kazakhstan* (Novyye materialy po drevney i srednevekovoy istorii Kazakhstana. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma Ata, 1960. 224 pp.). This work, under the editorship of V. Shakhmatov, appears as Volume 8 of Works of the Institute of History, Archæology and Ethnography of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, and contains articles trans-

lated from Eastern (Chinese, Arabic and Persian) works, research on historical ethnography, and also a bibliography of Chinese and Manchurian literature on the history of Kazakhstan. The latter is published because of a "strengthening of interest in Eastern (especially Chinese) sources on the history of Kazakhstan, Sinkiang and the Republics of Central Asia." The book is intended for scientific workers, historians (orientologists), teachers and students of this period of Kazakhstan's history. Two of the articles concern the origin of the names "Indzhu" and "Kazakh."

A collection of 508 documents on *The Uprising of 1916 in Central Asia and Kazakhstan* (Vosstaniye 1916 goda v sredney Azii i Kazakhstane. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1960. 793 pp.) has appeared under the general editorship of A. V. Pyaskovskiy, Doctor of Historical Sciences, who also wrote the introduction and commentary to this work. It is interesting to note that, according to the editor, it was in 1953-4, at meetings of historians in Central Asia, that the character of this uprising was correctly delineated. It was defined as basically an anti-imperialist, anti-military uprising, an unco-ordinated and spontaneous movement, without proletarian leadership or, for that matter, without any centralized leadership at all. It was basically a peasant war, against tsarist autocracy. However, the uprising is also tied up with similar movements elsewhere, especially in Russia, and is treated as having its origins in the 1905 revolution, as well as World War I and the agricultural exploitation of the people by the ruling groups. The immediate cause of the revolt is a tsarist ukase of June 25, 1916, concerning the mobilization of the native population for rearguard action. The first section of the book deals with the causes and immediate occasion for the uprising, and the second with general documents about the uprising throughout Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The next seven chapters concern the uprising in different geographic areas (Syr'-Dar'ya, Samarkand, Fergana, Semirechensk, Transcaspia, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Ural' and Turgay). The final chapter is about the methods the tsarist government is supposed to have used in suppressing the uprising, including the "treacherous role of bourgeois-nationalist elements." Within each section, the documents are given in chronological order, and most of them are purported to be published for the first time, though some have appeared in other collections. At the end there are twenty-seven pages of comments and bibliography, a twenty-two page index of the names of all people mentioned in the book, and a twenty-three page index of geographical locations.

Another book on the Civil War is a Party publication, and the second of two volumes—*Kazakhstan in the Fire of Civil War* (Kazakhstan v ogne grazhdanskoy voyny. Institute of Party History attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Kazakh State Publishing House, Alma Ata, 1960. 470 pp.). The first volume, "In the Flame of the Revolution" (V ogne revolyutsii) was published in 1957, in honour of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, and both were edited by S. Beysembaev, Director of the Kazakh Institute of Party History. The second volume treats of the "struggle of the workers of Kazakhstan against foreign intervention and internal counter-revolution," as well as the establishment of the Soviet state. Much of the material

includes personal recollections of participants in the fight (Russians, Kazakhs, Ukrainians and others, in that order), who say that the claims of "foreign reactionary historians" that Kazakh workers did not participate in the October Revolution, and that Soviet power was introduced to Kazakhstan from outside are groundless. As would be expected of a book put out by the Institute of Party History, the Party is repeatedly mentioned as the leading and directing force of the fighting and the establishment of the Soviet state. Particular stress is put on the role of women in the Revolution, in the civil war, and in socialist construction. Ten pages of chronology covering the period from October, 1917, to October, 1922, are given, as well as a forty-three page index of all locations mentioned in both volumes.

The History of the Kazakh S.S.R. (Istoriya Kazakh S.S.R., Institute of History, Archæology and Ethnography, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma Ata, 1959. 735 pp.) is the second of two volumes on the history of Kazakhstan, and is edited by Ts. R. Rozenberg and M. P. Korotovskiy (the latter responsible for the three chapters on cultural questions). Its purpose is to give a history of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic from the time of the October Revolution until 1958, showing how it has developed under the leadership of the Communist Party, with the fraternal help of the Russian and other peoples of the U.S.S.R. There are twelve chapters dealing, chronologically, with the historical, economic and cultural development of Kazakhstan: the Revolution (1917-18); foreign intervention and civil war and the forming of the Kazakh Autonomous S.S.R. (1918-20); the New Economic Policy (1921-5); economic reconstruction and the beginning of industrialization (1926-32); Soviet culture, education, literature and science (1917-32); the "victory of socialism" and founding of the Kazakh S.S.R. (1933-7); continued development (1938-June 1941); cultural development (1933-June 1941); Kazakhstan's role in the war (June 1941-5); post-war construction (1945-53); the continued development of industry and transport, and the virgin lands programme (1953-8); ideological work, education, culture, etc. (1945-58). The thirteenth chapter concerns the Twenty-First Congress of the C.P.S.U. and the new Seven-Year Plan. A fourteen-page chronology appearing at the end of the book contains much that is really not pertinent to Kazakhstan at all, such as Congresses of the Partisans of Peace, All-Union Industrial exhibitions, the Sputnik, and the Tenth Anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic. Much of the last chapter of the book tends to build up N. S. Kruschchev, and clearly identifies him especially as the "initiator and organizer" of the virgin lands programme, as well as the leader of the decisive struggle against the cult of personality of Stalin, and the remains of that cult.

The development of the political system of Kazakhstan from the time of the union of Kazakhstan to Russia until the October Revolution is the subject of Volume I of *Materials on the History of the Political System of Kazakhstan* (Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroya Kazakhstana. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma Ata, 1960. 441 pp.), a collection of documents gathered by Margarita Genrikhovna Masevich, Candidate of Juridical Sciences. The documents come from the State historical archives

of the Kazakh and Uzbek S.S.R.'s, the city of Moscow and Omsk Oblast', as well as basic ukases of the Tsarist government on questions of the state structure of Kazakhstan from the "Full Collection of Laws" of the Russian Empire. This volume concerns mainly the actual process of the union of Kazakhstan with Russia and the basic statutes of state direction. It was a process taking over one hundred years, ending in the 1860's, and was one that proved that the "union had progressive significance for the economic, political and cultural development of the Kazakh people, which flows from the action of the more advanced economy and advanced revolutionary social-political thought and culture of Russia on Kazakhstan and the guarantee of security on her borders." The revolutionary union of Kazakh workers with those of the Russian people was considered of special significance.

The Triumph of Leninist Ideas in Kazakhstan (Torzhestvo Leninskikh idey v Kazakhstane. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma Ata, 1960. 110 pp.) by the Vice-President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, S. B. Baishev (who, by the way, was formerly the Director of the Institute of Party History of the Kazakh Communist Party), is simply a propaganda treatise brought out in honour of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth. Its interest lies mainly in its many quotes from Khrushchev, as the follower of Lenin, and in its description of Stalin as "one of the important Marxist-Leninists, who did much for Party matters, for its development and strengthening." However, it should be noted that Stalin's name is here used in connexion with a speech of his at the XVII Congress of the Communist Party in 1934, in praise of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and it is currently the policy to credit Stalin with his role in the Party until 1934, and to condemn him for his allowing of the "cult of personality" since then.

Industry in Kazakhstan

A new book, *Light Industry of Kazakhstan and Long-range Plans for its Development* (Legkaya Promyshlennost' Kazakhstana i perspektivy ee razvitiya. Institute of Economics, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma Ata, 1960. 246 pp.), gives the present state and the long-range plans for the development of light industry in Kazakhstan. Statistics are given for the textile, tanning, and sewing industries, but the warning is given that "special attention, as previously, will be given to raising the basic branches of heavy industry."

Kirgizia and Russia

The ever-increasing literature on the influence of the Russian people and nation on the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. has been augmented by the publication of B. D. Dzhamgerchinov's *Union of Kirgizia with Russia* (Prisoedineniye Kirgizii k Rossii. Publishing House of Social-Economic Literature, Moscow, 1959. 434 pp.). It is stated in the beginning that pre-revolutionary historiography studied the joining of Central Asia with Russia, but evaluated this historical fact only as a conquest by Tsarist Russia of the Central Asian khanates. However, "two important prob-

lems were not covered: the attitude of the popular masses of Central Asia to the union with Russia, and the significance of the union for the further history of these peoples. It is understandable that Soviet historians could not let these problems pass by." The study of this historical union is thus made within the context of these conditions. The setting in the nineteenth century is depicted as that of a cruel colonial régime, and the strengthening of social oppression of all nationalities and nations under the Tsar had differing effects, depending partly on the degree of *rapprochement* of the workers of the local nationalities with the Russian workers. In Central Asia there was some migration of the poorer workers, but only on a small scale, as "mass movements were hindered by the colonial régime." In this volume there is a study of the historical relations of the Kirgiz and Russians before their union, of the internal structure of Kirgiz society, of the position of the various classes under the Kokand khanate, and of the attitudes of the classes to union with Russia, including their attitudes on international relations. A brief historical background is given, including an extensive list of all the tribes and their locations, pointing out that though they often shared a common language and territory, they were not at all united. A study is made of the establishment of the Kokand khanate, in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The period is described as being very difficult for the working masses of Kirgizia, with no progress "in economic, in cultural, or in political relations." The authorities were not able to end the strife between the various tribes, nor between them and their neighbours (Kazakhs, Kalmyks, etc.). They remained illiterate, and the few schools that existed were only instruments for the propagation of Islam, were taught in the Arabic language, and were attended only by the sons of representatives of the feudal hierarchy.

In the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century the tribes began to accept Russian domination, mainly because of their extremely hard lives. They saw the Russians as appearing "more advanced in cultural and economic attitudes, and more powerful militarily than all their neighbours." They were also interested in trade relations with Russia, though Russia was interested in them as a market and a source of raw materials, which is depicted as a part of the development of Russian capitalism. The history continues with the struggle of Russia with the Kokand khanate, and the strengthening of her position in North Kirgizia, with the acceptance of Russian citizenship by the Chu and Tyan' Shan sections in 1863. Russia then consolidated her sovereignty in Kirgizia, and "despite the reactionary colonial policy of tsarist autocracy," the Kirgiz people were happy to join "the richness of the material and spiritual culture of the great Russian people." At the same time they were exposed to revolutionary influences. Description is made of the progress the area made under Russian influence, and especially since the October Revolution, though it is admitted that while in all of Turkestan on the eve of the Revolution one-third of one per cent. of the local nationalities (even less in Kirgizia) were in the working class, by 1926 93 per cent. of the people were still engaged in agriculture. Four interesting maps appear in the book: (1) the conquest of Kirgizia by the Kokand khanate (showing the routes used from 1819-31); (2) Turkestan at the end of the nine-

teenth century; (3) the administrative divisions of Kirgizia and contiguous areas under Tsarism; and (4) the movement of migrants and the location of settled areas in Kirgizia. The eight-page bibliography is divided into four sections: classics of Marxism-Leninism; material relating to Party Congresses, plenums of the Central Committee, and speeches of Party and Government leaders; general and special literature; and periodicals and collections.

Industry in Kirgizia

In the first of two books appearing on the industrial position of Kirgizia, *Industry of Kirgizia* (Promlyshlennost' Kirgizii. Kirgiz State Publishing House, Frunze, 1957. 164 pp.), N. S. Yesipov studies the origins of the creation of socialist industry in Kirgizia, and its development under the Soviet State. The book covers the basic developments, including the selection of personnel, factors of growth of production, the significance of industry, the geographical distribution of enterprises and their chief branches, and a few pages on the sixth five-year plan. In the preparation of his data, the author strove, in the characterization of various occurrences in industrial development, to give general conclusions of facts "in the light of decisions of the Party and Government, examining the forms of production and its contemporary state from the viewpoint of the development of the demands of objective economic laws of socialism, issuing out of the well-known position of the leading role of large-scale industry in the whole national economy." In interpreting the completion of the construction of socialism and the gradual transition to communism, the author says that there will be a growth in the significance of industry in assuring an uninterrupted growth and perfection of production, and in deciding the basic economic tasks—that is, of catching up with and exceeding the chief capitalistic countries in the volume of *per capita* production, and in overcoming the considerable difference between city and country, and between mental and physical labour. In a brief analysis of Russian capitalism before the Revolution, Yesipov says that despite its negative sides, it played an objective and progressive role, and the bringing together of the Kirgiz and the great Russian people helped the formation of the proletariat. As in the last book reviewed, the author acknowledges that the rate of growth of industrial workers of native origin in proportion to agricultural workers is still far too slow. Whereas before the Revolution only 55 out of 10,000 people (of native origin) were workers, there are still only 12 per cent. in that category. In his presentation of figures on the number of trained specialists in Kirgizia, he admits that "however, the proportion of engineers and technicians of Kirgiz origin, to their (total) number, is still insignificant." Finally, a listing is given of the basic directions of industry in the Sixth Five-Year Plan: the optimum use of mineral wealth; the best utilization of agricultural raw materials in industry (especially in livestock production); the expansion and specialization of machine construction enterprises; the increased development of power by hydro-electric stations; the improvement of the repair base; and a more balanced industry between geographic areas in the use of materials.

A later publication is *Kirgizia in the Seven-Year Plan* (Kirgiziya v

Semiletke. State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1960. 78 pp.), by K. D. Dikambayev, Chairman of the Kirgiz Council of Ministers. This is one of a series put out in each Republic, following the publication of the new Seven-Year Plan, and it does not contain very much new information, though it does list those areas of production which will be most important in the future: non-ferrous metallurgy, oil, gas, coal and food industries, and, in agriculture, the production of cotton, beet-sugar, meat and sheep. Once again, the aid of the "great Russian people" is acknowledged, and more attention is to be paid to propaganda. One may note that according to the author, the level of development of agriculture did not correspond with the technical equipment of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses until the September, 1953, Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. Especially important in the new plan is the fact that 40 per cent. of all capital investments in the U.S.S.R. is now being directed to eastern areas of the country, so that they might better use their natural resources. Among the more interesting statistics, it is reported that there are 4,580 enterprises in Kirgizia, including 735 major (krupnyye) factories and plants, 411 kolkhozes, 63 multi-branches sovkhoses, two machine-tractor stations and 44 machine-repair stations. It is pointed out, however, that much remains to be done on the mechanization and electrification of agriculture. On the question of housing (for city residents), eight square metres of housing are planned for each person by 1965, compared with the five square metres existing in 1959.

History of Tashkent

Tashkent in the Second Half of the XIX Century (Tashkent vo vtoroy polovine XIX veka. Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Tashkent, 1959. 241 pp.), is the title of a new outline of the social-economic and political history of the Uzbek capital by F. Azadayev. It describes the union of Tashkent with Russia in 1865, and gives information on the growth of the population and economic development of the city, against the background of the "classic struggle of the workers of Tashkent against the yoke of the Tsarist colonizers and local exploiters." The author complains that the earlier works on this subject have defended tsarism and the colonial status of Tashkent. Central Asia was brought into the sphere of the economic, political and cultural development of bourgeois Russia, when Tashkent became the "centre of colonial direction of tsarism, and together with this, the centre of the progressive influence of advanced Russian culture, Russian revolutionary thought and the working movement." A study of the events of this time is considered important for a correct understanding of the progressive role of the union of Central Asia with Russia, and the process of uniting the militant union of local workers and the Russian working class in the struggle against tsarism and the bourgeoisie. It is clearly stated, though, that this is a social-economic and political study rather than any evaluation of the culture of the area, and that Marxist principles of study are being used. The data comes from the Central State Historical Archives of Uzbekistan, including documentary publications, memoirs, statistical materials, and daily press reports. A map of Tashkent in 1890 is included, as well as tables showing the occupational

division of the population of the city in 1897, including lists of the industrial enterprises, the years they opened, and the number of people employed by various major plants.

Cultural-Enlightenment Work in Uzbekistan

The question of propaganda and "agitation" (agitatsiya) comes up for study in the book *Cultural-Enlightenment Activity of the Soviet State in Uzbekistan* (Kul' turno-Vospitatel' naya deyatel' nost' sovetского gosudarstva v Uzbekistane. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1959. 141 pp.), by Khaydar Pulatov. Such activity has had many facets, including communist agitation and propaganda, the creation of a new Uzbek written language and the liquidation of illiteracy, the emancipation of women and their inclusion in the construction of socialism, and the development of education, science, literature and art. Before the Revolution the Uzbek language used the Arabic alphabet, which was complicated and difficult to master. In 1927-8 it was put into Latin script, and finally, in 1940, into Russian script, and this is described as the "greatest achievement of Uzbek socialist culture." Khrushchev is quoted as saying that in a new stage of construction of communism, many functions of the state organs will gradually be transferred to social organs, such as trade unions, Komsomol, co-operative and other organizations, and the programme of the XXI Party Congress is quoted as pointing out the need for "strengthening ideological enlightenment work of the Party, the raising of communist consciousness of workers and, primarily, of all the rising generations, their education in the spirit of the communist attitude toward labour, Soviet patriotism, and internationalism, and overcoming the survivals of capitalism in the people's consciousness, the struggle with bourgeois ideology." An important theme of the book is the role of communist propaganda and agitation as the most important component part of the cultural-enlightenment work of the Soviet State, and special attention is drawn to the taking of education out of the hands of the clergy. The question of the emancipation of women in Uzbekistan is studied mainly in its relation to the position of women in the Muslim religion.

II. AZERBAYDZHAN

Azerbaydzhan Culture

In M. K. Kurbanov's *The Culture of Soviet Azerbaydzhan* (Kul' tura sovetского Azerbaydzhana. Azerbaydzhan State Publishing House, Baku, 1959. 137 pp.) a study is made of the history of the republic's culture, acknowledging its very ancient origins, dating back to the eleventh century, but praising particularly its development after its union with Russia. Many great names of Azerbaydzhan history are mentioned, with the rather novel approach of admitting that they flourished before their union with Russia, but saying that since ninety per cent. were illiterate, the masses did not benefit from this culture. A study is made of the development of various phases of culture. The written language dates back as far as the eleventh century B.C., and schools were known as early as the third century A.D., though at first they were only attached to religious institutions, and

limited to very few people. Now there are 103 people per 10,000 population in higher educational institutions, compared to three in Persia, and thirty-eight in France. Besides education, similar comparisons are made for science, the press, literature, art (including the theatre, music, cinema, circus, fine arts and applied arts), cultural-enlightenment institutions, and radio and television. An interesting chapter appears on Azerbaydzhan's cultural links with foreign countries, listing the foreign writers most translated into Azerbaydzhani: Flaubert, Balzac, Hugo, Byron, Dickens, Thackeray, Dreiser and Rolland. Shakespeare's works are regularly produced on the stage, and it is claimed that he "finds his second homeland in the Soviet Union." The most popular operas are Bizet's "Carmen," Verdi's "Rigoletto," Puccini's "Tosca," Rossini's "Barber of Seville," and Smetana's "The Bartered Bride." The list of countries whose films are shown in Azerbaydzhan is interesting for the order in which they are given. First are listed the countries of the Soviet bloc in (Russian) alphabetical order, and then other countries, presumably in the order of frequency, thus: Albanian, Hungarian, Chinese, Korean, German, Rumanian, Czechoslovakian, Yugoslav, English, Argentine, French, Mexican, Italian, Indian, Greek, Egyptian. The book ends with a listing of long-range plans in industry and agriculture, as well as education, with figures on capital construction, two pages of statistics on planned increases in industrial production, and another page on agriculture.

A biographical handbook of *Writers of Soviet Azerbaydzhana* (Pisateli Sovetskogo Azerbaydzhana. Azerbaydzhana State Publishing House, Baku, 1959. 213 pp.) contains the biographies of fifty-nine twentieth-century Azerbaydzhani writers, and one may note that all the writers chosen have written works about the historical, cultural and literary links between the Russian and Azerbaydzhani peoples, writings on classical Russian literature, the influence of Russian literature on Azerbaydzhani literature, and/or the patriotism of the Soviet people and their love for the Communist Party.

III. THE BORDERLANDS

Afghanistan

In his recent book *Failure of British Aggression in Afghanistan* (Proval britanskoy agressii v Afganistane. Publishing House of Social-Economic Literature, Moscow, 1959. 209 pp.) N. A. Khalfin makes what he calls a study of "British aggression in Afghanistan and the heroic struggle of the Afghan people for independence, unmasking the provocations and diplomatic intrigues of British agents striving to worsen relations between the Afghan state and Russia." The period covered includes the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, with special emphasis being made on the three Anglo-Afghan Wars (1838-42, 1878-81, and 1919). The author pictures Afghanistan as gaining its independence in 1919 after almost one hundred years of struggle against "British expansionism," and he extols the influence of the October Revolution on the development of the anti-colonial movement in Afghanistan, and the formation of the country as an independent state. He uses unpublished documents of the military archives in Moscow, as well as diplomatic and military archives

of Uzbekistan, and documentary publications, memoirs, autobiographies, historical research and articles, both by Soviet and foreign authors.

Persia

P. P. Bushev, in *Herat and the Anglo-Iranian War of 1856-7* (Gerat i Angli-Iranskaya Voyna 1856-7. Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1959. 250 pp.), makes a study of the Herat conflict of 1851-63 and the Anglo-Iranian War of 1856-7, from the viewpoint of what he calls the "aggressive foreign policy of England in the middle of the nineteenth century, her interference in the affairs of the Eastern states, especially in the affairs of Iran and Afghanistan." He starts off with a study of British colonial policy in Persia in the first part of the nineteenth century, which he sees in the context of a world-wide policy involved with improving communications and getting raw materials for the development of British industry. This is followed by a study of Anglo-Persian relations between 1851-5, the seizure of Herat by Persia, the military-political situation in the Middle East on the eve of the British invasion of Persia, the Anglo-Persian War and the Paris Peace Treaty of March 4, 1857. The latter is tied up with a change in international relations which, he claims, marks closer relations between France and Russia, with both opposed to Britain in the Persian area. He says that disagreements among the capitalist powers forced Britain to end the war. The book ends with a discussion of Taylor's mission to Herat and Anglo-Persian relations after the war, and his final conclusion that the invasion of 1856 was not connected with the defence of the independence of Herat, as British historians would have it, but rather part of Britain's expansion in the East, especially in Afghanistan, Persia, Central Asia and China. The book includes nine pages of bibliography, including doctoral dissertations in various languages, and the texts of twenty-four documents, treaties and letters.

A history of the development of philosophical and social-political thought, "under the banner of the struggle of materialism with idealism," is the subject of S. N. Grigoryan's *From the History of Philosophy of Central Asia and Iran, 7-12 Centuries* (Iz istorii filosofii Sredney Asii i Irana, 7-12 v. Institute of Philosophy, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1960. 329 pp.). The controlling feudal class is described as having declared as heresy everything which opposed the spirit and letter of Islam and "cruelly persecuted the representatives of scientific thought." However, as a counter-balance to Islam's dominance over the development of society, the outstanding thinkers of the peoples of Central Asia and Persia are described as having expressed the interests of the advanced forces of society, coming out with ideas and theories not in agreement with religious theories. The rationalist and material ideas of these medieval progressive thinkers of the peoples of the Near and Middle East are also depicted as having served as a weapon in the struggle against the "reactionary ideology of the (Roman) Catholic Church." The author does not pretend that this is an all-inclusive study of the history of philosophy and social-political thought of this period or area, but rather a presentation of some sides of this problem, especially emphasizing the struggle for ideas in this early medieval period and the activities of a series of outstanding

thinkers. Some of the works of Farabi, Gazali and Maimonides are quoted, mainly to show the conflict among the dogmatic theories of religion, but the author admits that the excerpts are carefully chosen, and have been used by the "other side."

Pakistan

In Search of Light (V poiskakh sveta. State Publishing House of Children's Literature, Ministry of Education, R.S.F.S.R., Moscow, 1959. 168 pp.) is a tale of Pakistan written by an Uzbek writer, Aybek (Musa Tashmukhamedov). This story is of interest for its political overtones, especially for the introductory comments of the background of the author and views on the separation of Pakistan and India. The writer is a Communist, and a member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, and has been particularly interested in the countries of the East. He last visited India in 1949, and saw the division of India and Pakistan as a British plot to keep control over the country, "consciously kindling the long religious hostility between the Muslims and Hindus," and causing great hardship by resettling many people. Comment is made on the struggle of the Pakistani peasants, workers and progressive intelligentsia with the landowners, bourgeoisie and reactionary Muslim clergy, "with all those who aided the British colonizers to realize the division of India." The story itself concerns a teacher who was fired from his job, because of a suspected sympathy for the communists, and is interpreted as a "struggle for peace, the growth of national self-consciousness of the peoples of Pakistan, and the rallying of the workers in the struggle for the freedom and well-being of their country."

ALAN BERSON.

THE ARMY TRAINING EXPEDITION TO THE KARAKORAM, 1959

By MAJOR H. R. A. STREATHER
(*The Gloucestershire Regiment*)

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, June 15, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: On your behalf, ladies and gentlemen, I welcome Major Streather, who will be describing an expedition to a part of Asia in which we are particularly interested. Whilst Summit conferences and talks are a little unpopular at the moment, I imagine we shall see, in the illustrated parts of the lecture at any rate, a few summits.

Major Streather joined the Indian Army in 1945 and served with the Chitral Scouts on the North-West Frontier until 1950. He remained with the Pakistan Army after partition. While serving with the Chitral Scouts in 1950, Major Streather climbed Tirich Mir with the Norwegian Expedition, that peak being 25,000 feet plus. He was a member of the American Expedition to K2 in 1953. He reached the summit of Kangchenjunga with the British Expedition in 1955; actually the expedition climbed to a few feet short of the summit, that being sacred to the gods, claimed by the natives to live there. In 1957, Major Streather led the tragic Oxford University Expedition to Haramosh, and in 1959 he led the Army Training Expedition to the Karakoram, of which we are about to hear. He is now serving with the 1st Battalion The Gloucestershire Regiment. In July, Major Streather leaves for Greenland as a member of Sir John Hunt's party which is taking boys there in connection with the Duke of Edinburgh's Award Scheme.

MR. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen,—In these surroundings I should possibly be reading a learned paper to my audience. However, not being a man of letters, I shall not attempt that and, not being a poet, I am not going to attempt to give flowery or philosophical descriptions of the Karakoram. Rather I propose to give what I hope will be a fairly light-hearted account of the Army Training Expedition to that range in the summer of 1959, illustrated with colour slides. I will reminiscence a little about a part of the world many present know much better than I do, although I have been particularly fortunate in that I have been in that area more recently than most of my audience—Pakistan, the North-West Frontier in particular, and more particularly North Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan.

As the Chairman has said, I served in Pakistan until the end of 1950, way up in Chitral; I returned in the summer of 1953 and went to K2, and in 1957 went back again to the Karakoram, to Haramosh in the Gilgit area. I was lucky enough to return to the area again in the summer of 1959, on the Army Mountaineering Association Training Expedition, the objects of which were somewhat different from those of most other expeditions. We were not going to try and climb to the summit of any particular peak or conquer anything. As far as I am concerned I am

convinced that that attitude, if it has not already gone, should by now have done so, and that the time has come when we can go to the mountains and enjoy them without being obsessed with the idea of climbing to the top. We wanted to give men an experience of travelling in high and barren country.

The plan was to travel light, moving about in the mountains, climbing as much as possible. It seemed that we could best do this by setting our sights reasonably low, at about 23,000 ft., climbing several peaks and visiting new areas rather than climbing one particular peak. That was the scheme with which the expedition set out. It had been my intention to go to Chitral, where, from the summit of Tirich Mir, the first mountain I climbed in 1950, I had had a wonderful view across the north of Afghanistan down across the Oxus and into Russia. Away to the north there are a number of peaks which had not been climbed until the Italians recently went there. It seemed a good area for our expedition. Unfortunately, because it was so near the Chinese-Russian border, we were not allowed to visit that particular region, and so we switched our goal to the north of Skardu, to the area at the foot of the Chogolungma Glacier, near the Hispar Wall, an area which had not been visited to any extent and which offered a good opportunity for tackling peaks between 17,000 and 23,000 ft. Several glaciers also afforded good scope for travel, and there were plenty of peaks, particularly on the southern side of the Hispar Glacier, which we hoped to climb.

The success of our expedition depended greatly on the co-operation of Pakistan, and we were fortunate in having three Pakistani officers join us. The Pakistanis were extraordinarily kind in providing us with freighter planes in which to fly up from Karachi to Rawalpindi and on up into Skardu before we started our march to the mountains. Skardu was to be our jumping-off place, but we managed, before flying there from Rawalpindi, to get in a quick visit to Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. We were entertained in Peshawar by Major Mohd Yusuf, the Political Resident. In 1957, when our Oxford Expedition had met with an accident on Haramosh, he had been the Resident in Kashmir and had been most helpful in getting our party home again.


I met another old friend in Peshawar who had been in the South Waziristan Scouts when I was serving in Baluchistan. He insisted that we take tea with him in his Khyber village. On arrival there we found a blood feud was in progress between his and a neighbouring village, but that there was a truce that was due to run out that evening, when the battle would start again. When I asked my old friend why he had left the Scouts, he said he found it more profitable to engage in smuggling over the frontier from Afghanistan!

From Rawalpindi we were flown by the Pakistan Air Force up past Nanga Parbat and along the Indus valley to land at a small air-strip in Skardu. I remembered having been there with the Americans in 1953, the year in which the Kashmir issue was reaching one of its climaxes. We had then had a terrific reception, the whole village turning out to greet us. We had realized that there had been a certain amount of self-interest in that reception. They hoped to solicit the backing of the Ameri-

(ZAKH)
CROSSING THE RIVER SHIGAR BY GOAT-SKIN RAFT




SPANTIK—LOOKING WEST UP CHOGOLUNGMA







PORTERS ON BANKS OF INDUS AT SKARDU



CAMP AT 21,000 FT. ON MALUBITING, NEAR GILGIT



MALUBITING EAST PEAK FROM CAMP 3



'GLOSTER' PEAK 19,300 FT. HISPAR WALL

can Government in helping to solve the Kashmir problem. At that time Great Britain was not doing very much to help them. It is sad to remember that the problem still exists, and in Skardu the talk often turns to the cease-fire line.

When we reached Skardu many local people asked to be allowed to come with the expedition as porters; some had been with us on K2 six years previously; it was good to see them again and find them all as friendly as ever. We stayed in the Rest House with its wonderful view northwards across the Indus. There was the usual activity whilst we sorted out equipment and food and everything we would require during the next weeks that we would spend in the mountains. From here on, the coolies would carry 60 lb. loads each.

We moved off in two parties in order not to flood the villages with too large a group for camp sites. We crossed the Indus in the same barge as the one we used in 1953. The local people say the barge was used by one of the Generals of Alexander the Great when he came to this region, and it is still known as "Alexander's barge"! We were swept down a considerable distance as we battled madly across the Indus to land on the far bank.

Soon we had to cross to the further bank of the Shigar river, and this time we were to use one of the most primitive but safest methods of water transport to cross these torrents. We crossed on zakhs—rafts made of blown-up goat skins and bamboo branches. After each crossing the rafts were turned over while the boatmen took the skins and blew them up again.

At last we were nearly through to Arandu and could see in the distance the mountains we had come to climb. Arandu is just at the snout of the Chogolungma glacier, and is a village on the alluvial plain. Here we made our depôt camp from which we planned to split up into small parties to reconnoitre the surrounding area in order to find suitable peaks and glaciers to work on over the next few weeks. At the same time we would become acclimatized to the conditions and altitudes.

From Arandu we enlisted both old and young to act as our coolies to get us to the advance base camps. Thence we set off on the first true phase of our expedition, to climb and reconnoitre the area. We were a party of sixteen in all, including the three Pakistan Army officers, two officers from the Royal Navy, and the rest from the British Army. At this stage we split into three groups and travelled around finding peaks which we thought might be suitable for climbing. After about a week we all returned to our main camp at Arandu to discuss our future plans and to decide in which area to work. During our reconnaissance we had found that the Kerolungma glacier and the Alchori glacier to the north would be useful areas to work on. There were several tempting-looking peaks at 18,000 to 19,000 ft., about the height we were needing.

We enlisted further coolies and set out in two main groups on the second phase of the expedition, to spend the next two weeks climbing. The headman of the village was beginning to realize that he was the only person who had coolies available and tried to push the fees up from four rupees a day to nine rupees. We did nothing; we knew he would come

round. He did, and we eventually set out at the accepted rate of payment of our coolies.

Major Jenkins, Deputy Leader, led the party to the Alchori, and they saw there several likely peaks, in particular one they decided to attempt and later, after much hard work in deep snow, were able to climb. This became known as Gloucester Peak—there were three of us from the Gloucestershire Regiment on the expedition.

At the same time the second party, under myself, had moved up the Kerolungma glacier to try peaks there. We had an advanced base named Ibex Camp after the splendid herd which we had seen on the first day of our arrival. We had come over the brow of a hill and there before us, only a couple of hundred yards away, had been the most wonderful herd of ibex one could imagine. We had watched them for a long time, and it was not until we started throwing stones that they had raised their heads and galloped off up into the snow. From Ibex Camp, four of us set out to try to reach one of the passes on the Hispar wall which, as far as I know, had not been visited before. We left early in the morning when the snow was hard and the going was very good. Eventually, when we reached the col, we had a wonderful view down into the Hispar glacier, one of the longest in the Karakoram range. Away to the north was Kanjut Sar, a peak climbed by the Italian expedition that same year, and a little to the east of it is a peak you will probably read about later this year, because Wilfred Noyce is taking an Oxford expedition to climb it. Just above Ibex Camp we saw three fair-sized peaks that we thought would be worth trying. We hoped we would be able to attempt them all from one forward camp. We established this above "Yeti's Nest," as a point on the ridge became known, and parties attempted the various peaks. A peak of about 20,000 ft., which we called Sugar Loaf, was climbed by two parties. One member was a Pakistani, Captain Jawed Akhter, who had already shown that he had an aptitude for climbing; he became very keen, and he and Hardman were the first to reach the summit.

A second peak was climbed, and then the third peak, which became known as Engineers' Peak, because we had two Royal Engineer officers with us. This was possibly the most difficult climb of the three, and the route the climbers took led up steep ice cliffs along the narrow ridge to the top.

Both parties returned to Arandu, each having had about two weeks' splendid climbing. All had gained a good deal of experience and we were ready to try something bigger. By now we were a pretty competent, experienced, very fit and well acclimatized party.

We now made the final plan for the two or three remaining weeks. We decided to run two small expeditions within the main expedition and to concentrate on two fairly large peaks: Ganchen, not previously attempted, a fine-looking snow peak of 21,000 ft. a little to the west of Arandu, and Malubiting, a peak of 24,000 ft. at the head of the Chogolungma glacier. Whilst we had little hope of reaching the summit of the latter in the time we had available, we felt we might be able to carry out a worthwhile reconnaissance in the hope that this would prove a suitable goal for a future expedition.

After the usual argument over coolie rates and sorting ourselves out, we split into our two parties for our last climbs. The Ganchen party was led jointly by Thomas and Platts. They had to cross the torrential river by means of a rope bridge, and then establish their base camp at the foot of one of the approaches to Ganchen. They then tried various routes, but were forced to retire without getting very high on the mountain. I was with the second party with Major Jenkins and six others.

We had a long approach up the Chogolungma glacier which involved establishing several intermediate camps. When we were nearing the mountain, Major Jenkins and I pushed on ahead to try to get a better view of the peak. There were two main summits up which we could not see any possible routes; it all looked frightfully steep and was threatened by avalanches.

Our original plan had been to try the eastern summit of Malubiting, about 23,000 ft., to see whether there was a possible route over this and on to the main summit. From further round the mountain we obtained a clearer view of the eastern approach, and it seemed we might be able to climb up to the saddle at about 20,000 ft., leaving a 3,000 ft. ridge to the summit itself.

To cut a long story fairly short, from the climbing point of view we spent a number of days as usual, going backwards and forwards between upper and lower camps and carrying forward food, tentage and equipment needed for the final attempt, slowly building up an assault camp from which an attempt would be made on the summit. As we worked our way gradually upwards, the other peaks of the Karakoram sank down below us, in particular Spantik peak, which the Germans had climbed two years previously and the peak on which the Bullock-Workmans reached a considerable height early in the century. We were confronted by a steep snow slope leading on to a col at about 20,000 ft. Just above this we established the final camp from which it was hoped a pair would be able to reach the summit. We had from that point a wonderful view looking down the Chogolungma glacier, past the intermediate camps we had established and way on down to Arandu. Away to the east we could see over towards K2 and the Mustagh Tower, a very spectacular peak which was climbed by a British and French party in 1958. From the shoulder we looked south to Nanga Parbat and to a peak I knew only too well—Haramosh, on which we had had a tragic accident in 1957.

From that high final camp we could see the route which we hoped would provide a way to the top for Jawed and Imrie, who had been selected as the summit pair. Horniblow, who was one of our doctors, and myself, helped them with the carry up to the high camp, and there we left them in rather doubtful weather. In the Karakoram one day will be perfect and the next snowing; one year August can be a wonderful month; another year it can be a terrible month. In 1959 we had had only a few storms, but I felt our luck could not last indefinitely. Four of us returned the next day to the high camp, and we were able to watch two small figures working slowly through the rocks and steadily making their way towards the summit. At about mid-day we saw an ice-axe glistening on the summit and realized that they had reached

it; it was a peak over 23,000 ft. and the highest of the peaks we managed to climb.

The weather was rapidly breaking and when, for the next few days, it started to snow in earnest, we were glad to get down and away from the high mountains. I was particularly glad that a Pakistani had been a member of the summit pair. Jawed had become a first-rate climber. He was now the first Pakistani to reach the top of a major Himalayan peak, and I am glad to hear he has been selected to join an American Expedition which this summer is to attempt the spectacular peak of Mashabrum, near K₂.

The time had now come to return to base. I decided to go down direct to Gilgit, taking Chapman with me, although it meant a difficult climb via the Haramosh Pass, which I knew only too well from the Oxford University Expedition in 1957. I wanted to arrange to fix a plaque in the cemetery at Gilgit in memory of the two climbers killed on that expedition. Chapman and I left for what proved to be a very hard climb and one of the very few crossings of the pass. To our left was the north face of Haramosh. We could not find the exact route we had taken in 1957 and it was late in the evening and darkening before we reached the old site at which we had had our base camp that year. We had come down virtually from nowhere and wondered what our reception would be when the local folk saw us. It is not the sort of place at which strangers are expected to arrive. As the people knew that when I was last here I was in a pretty bad state and had to be helped down out of the valley, I wondered if they would think it was my ghost arriving! Next morning, when the shepherd boys came up to where we had spent the night, they recognized me and soon there was quite a crowd to help us down to a beautiful spot near the little lake in the Mani valley. It was wonderful to be down on green grass again after all the time we had spent in the snow and among the rocks.

After we had rested for a couple of days, the time had come to go down to the heat of the valley and to Gilgit. In doing so we had a final splendid view of the summit of Haramosh which had, the year before, been climbed by an Austrian Expedition.

Looking back on the achievements of our expedition, we had climbed six new peaks varying between 18,000 and 23,000 ft.; we had travelled a good deal on glaciers; we had visited several new passes; but far more important, we had gained a great deal of experience and had achieved more than if we had concentrated on one particular peak. I hope some of the members of the expedition will find an opportunity to return to Karakoram, either as members or as leaders of future expeditions.

From my last slide of a beautiful Himalayan sunset, you can gather at least one of the reasons why those who have once spent any time in the region wish to return to it. As Blake put it:

“Great deeds are done when men and mountains meet;
These are not done by jostling in the street.”

The CHAIRMAN: We have listened to an interesting lecture illustrated by wonderful slides. I remind you that Major Streater is leaving in July

on an expedition to Greenland as a member of Sir John Hunt's party, going there in connection with the Duke of Edinburgh's Award Scheme. I am sure there could have been no better choice than that of Major Streater to accompany such an expedition.

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: Did Major Streater see anything of the Mir of Nagir? He must have been in his territory part of the time the expedition was in Karakoram.

Major STREATHER: We were on the southern side of that territory. I heard when in Gilgit that the Mir of Nagir and the Mir of Hunza were not particularly in favour at that time.

Sir OLAF CAROE: The area visited is most important from the international point of view, with China on the other side, north of the Karakoram. Mountaineering expeditions are frequently climbing peaks in the region. Are there any practical ways through the mountains between the Mintaka Pass in Pakistani occupation and the Karakoram Pass in Indian occupation? Did the lecturer hear any interesting points in regard to the frontier position north of the Karakoram?

Major STREATHER: The only pass I know of between the two you mention is the Mustagh Pass, over which Sir Francis Younghusband went in 1887. That pass is at about 18,000 or 19,000 ft., and I believe it to be the only pass through to the north. As far as I know, it has not been crossed for many years, and a change in the snow and ice conditions now make it extremely difficult.

Sir OLAF CAROE: Is it in Pakistani occupation?

Major STREATHER: It is.

Colonel CANTLIE: What is the feeling towards the Chinese? Is it friendly, resentful or hostile?

Major STREATHER: Definitely hostile. When I was there in 1949, I think it was, a number of Chinese Nationalists were thrown over the pass and left in the snow there, and the Northern Scouts got some of them down. Many died. Some were put into the fort up the Khyber Pass for a while. Occasionally a caravan would come through. When we were in the region in 1957, caravans had recently come through from somewhere in the Yarkand area.

Sir OLAF CAROE: Where is the potential prescriptive frontier between India and Pakistan in the Karakoram area?

Major STREATHER: There is no accepted frontier as high up as that. The frontier fades out into the very high mountainous area that is not inhabited.

Sir OLAF CAROE: Is the whole of the area under Pakistan?

Major STREATHER: I should say not quite all.

Brig. SULTAN MOHAMED: As far as I know, at least the area east of Skardu is in India.

Sir OLAF CAROE: That is further south; I am talking of the old Gilgit road to the north of the main chain of the Himalaya. Ladakh is under India and Skardu under Pakistan. I rather wondered where on the Karakoram the frontier came?

Major STREATHER: Not far from the area of the Karakoram Pass, which must be in Indian occupation.

Sir OLAF CAROE : It is important; where is the frontier?

Major STREATHER : The area was inaccessible.

Sir OLAF CAROE : As far as one knows, no information has been given of Chinese aggression against the Pakistan hill posts of Northern Kashmir.

Major STREATHER : There is a Chinese post on the north side and a Pakistan post on the south side of the Mintaka and Killik Passes. I believe the Indians are looking after the Karakoram Pass.

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE : What is the daily wage for coolies now?

Major STREATHER : Rs. 4. They also want to be paid half rates for returning empty.

The CHAIRMAN : As there are no further questions, I ask you to show your appreciation of Major Streather's talk and the wonderful illustrations and at the same time wish him good fortune and enjoyment on the expedition into Greenland. (*Applause.*)

NEPAL

By PROFESSOR H. MONTGOMERY HYDE,
M.A., D.Lit., F.R.Hist.S., M.R.I.A.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, June 20, 1960, Sir Esler Denning, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chairman of Council, Sir Philip Southwell, has asked me to apologize for his absence; he has to make a speech at a meeting of the Order of St. John which, unfortunately, coincides with this meeting.

I do not know that I have any particular qualification to take the chair for a lecture on Nepal, except that I was in that country in 1950. Professor Montgomery Hyde, who is to speak on Nepal, is at present Professor of History at the University of the Punjab in Lahore. He was for many years Member of Parliament for one of the Belfast constituencies and he has travelled widely in Asia. Indeed, we met and he stayed with me about eight or nine years ago in Tokyo when he was on his way to the Korean war. He is the author of a great many books on a variety of subjects, most of them legal.

It will be of interest to you to know that Professor Montgomery Hyde has been commissioned by the *Sunday Times* to go to Moscow to cover the trial of Francis Powers, the pilot of the U-2 which was shot down by the Russians.

Nepal is of interest particularly at this juncture because, as you probably all know, the King and Queen of Nepal are to pay a State visit to England in October next.

Professor Montgomery Hyde will now address us, show some slides and leave time for a few questions.

I AM grateful to the Royal Central Asian Society for this opportunity to speak about Nepal, a country which I visited two months ago. As far as I have been able to ascertain, no lecture has been given at any meeting of this Society on the subject of Nepal for a number of years. The last lecture was given, I believe, by Mr. Polunin, a botanist, in 1953.

I should like to talk rather more generally on the social, political and economic aspects of the country. First, I should like to thank our Chairman today for the graceful manner in which he has introduced me to you. As he has told you, I stayed with him some years ago in the winter of 1950-1 during the Korean war, when he was Ambassador in Tokyo, and I have the most lively recollections of his hospitality on that occasion, particularly as I was exhausted, being a person of peaceful disposition, by a visit to the Commonwealth Division at the Korean front. I can remember being lulled to sleep in the Embassy by the exquisite performance at the piano which Sir Esler gave me on that occasion. I hope that I shall not be blamed for turning the tables on him and lulling him to sleep in the next twenty minutes or so.

As Sir Esler has also remarked, the subject of Nepal has a certain topicality by reason of the forthcoming State visit of King Mahendra and Queen Ratna to this country in the autumn. I think it is the first time in history that any ruler of Nepal has come to this country. In that sense, therefore, it will be a unique occasion.

I feel sure there are members of this audience who know a great deal

more about Nepal than I do, but I think that everybody here is aware that the country was virtually a closed country to practically the whole of the outside world until barely ten years ago. It was a forbidden country. It was virtually impossible to obtain permission to enter it. None of the Everest expeditions could make their assault on the mountain from Nepal. They had to do it from the northern, Tibetan side, until the country, as a result of a profound revolutionary change in 1950, was opened up.

I expect also that you are aware that Nepal has produced two—and they are widely differing—individuals of world-wide fame and one famous breed of soldiers. The two individuals, who are separated by 2,500 years, are Buddha, the founder of a great religion, who was born and lived in Nepal 500 years B.C., and, more recently, the Sherpa Tensing, who accompanied the Everest expedition in 1954 and climbed to the summit of the mountain with Sir Edmund Hillary. Then there are the Gurkhas, who for more than a century replenished in manpower the British Indian Army.

Some of you may have gained some knowledge of the country through what is, I suppose, a best-selling novel by Han Su Lin, *The Mountain is Young*, and perhaps, too, by the interesting but possibly a little over-romanticized version of the revolution of 1950 which was given by Dr. Erika Leuchtag, the German doctor who was living with the Royal Family and who acted as an intermediary between them and the Indian authorities and, to that extent, facilitated the revolution.

Nepal is situated at the north-east corner of the Indian sub-Continent, bounded on the north by what is now Chinese territory, formerly Tibet; on the east by the two little States of Sikkim and Bhutan, which are virtually under the protection of India today; and on the south by India, particularly West Bengal and the provinces of Bihar and what used to be called the United Provinces or Uttar Pradesh, which extend round to the western boundary of the country as well.

The population is about $8\frac{1}{2}$ million. The area is about 53,000 square miles, of which only a small proportion, probably less than one-seventh, is under cultivation. Nepal can be divided into three parts: the southern, low-lying area called the Terai, adjacent to the Indian border; the central or valley area, of which the capital, Khatmandu, is the centre; and the northern or mountainous area bordering Tibet. That is, roughly, the physical set-up of the country. The Nepalese are people of Mongolian origin. By and large they are a happy, cheerful, and very friendly people. It is only recently, within the last ten years, that they have come in any degree into contact with the West.

There is as yet a tremendous amount of development to be done in the country. Great strides have been made since 1950, but the fact remains that in the mountainous northern region there are virtually no roads at all. There are very few bridle-paths along which pack animals can proceed, so that transport in that area is largely carried out by human beings with loads on their backs. The total road mileage in the whole of Nepal is only about 300 miles, of which a little more than half, about 170 miles, consists of motorable roads. They include an 80-mile stretch of road from Khatmandu to the Indian border at Raxaul which was built by Indian engineers and financed by Indian capital.

There are only about 60 miles of railways in the country and the principal method of bringing goods into the central valley, the Khatmandu area, is still conducted by the ropeway, which has a carrying capacity of about five tons an hour. Since 1950, air services have been developed and they carry a certain amount of freight, but, of course, they cannot in the nature of things handle anything like the amount which could be dealt with by an efficient road and railway service.

I do not want to inflict upon you a detailed history of the country. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century there were at least three principalities in the present Kingdom of Nepal who were intermittently at war with each other. The principality which was centred at the little town, which today is no more than a ruin, of Gurkha, about 60 miles north of Khatmandu, produced a ruler who founded the present dynasty, the Shah dynasty, in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The Gurkhas, as we know, are good fighters, and it was inevitable that in the course of the expansionist policy of the Shah rulers, they should come into conflict with the British in India.

War broke out between the Nepalese and the British in 1814 and it went on for two years. It was finally brought to an end by a treaty in 1816 which gave us the right to keep a diplomatic representative in Khatmandu and also the important right to recruit Gurkhas for the British Indian Army. Today, as the present Prime Minister of Nepal, Mr. B. P. Koirala, told me, there are something like 10,000 Gurkha soldiers employed in the British brigade in Malaya, and there are also, of course, still considerable numbers in the Indian Army.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, political power was seized by the Rana family, of which the leader, Jang Bahadur, came into power in the year 1846 in what was literally a river of blood. The Ranas made the premiership of the country hereditary in their family, with the result that all power was concentrated in their hands and the Shah dynasty, the Royal Family, were little more than ciphers until, eventually, in 1950, they, in the person of the late King Tribhuvan, overthrew the autocracy of the Ranas. The King, who took refuge in the Indian Embassy in Khatmandu, succeeded in making his way to India, where a compromise with the Ranas was arrived at. As an intermediary stage, he returned in the following year and there was a make-shift Government consisting of the more liberal elements, the present Prime Minister, Mr. Koirala, being then Home Minister, and one of the Ranas as Prime Minister. They did not last very long. The Ranas finally departed at the end of that year, and Nepal has gradually evolved its own form of democratic government. It now has a popularly elected Parliament, which came into being two years ago, with a two-chamber legislature which is based on the Western model.

The throwing open of the country to the outside world has aroused an interest in Nepal on the part of other countries, which was unknown in the days of the Rana rule. The Americans have come in with economic help, as also, of course, have the Chinese and the Russians, as well as the Indians, who to some extent have stepped into the shoes of the British since India achieved independence in 1947. In fact, if one looks at Mr. Nehru's statements at that time, I think they went a little further than

was altogether agreeable to the Nepalese authorities. Judging by some of his statements, Mr. Nehru was inclined to regard Nepal in the same category, at least as far as her foreign relations were concerned, as Sikkim and Bhutan, for both of which small States to the east of Nepal, India is supposed to be responsible in their foreign relations.

My visit to Nepal at the end of April coincided, broadly speaking, with the visit of Chou En-Lai from Peking. I was fortunate enough to secure an interview with the Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. Koirala. As the Chinese claim to Everest had only just been made and was very much in the news, I asked Mr. Koirala what he thought about it. He replied: "It came as a complete surprise to me, because when I was in Peking the other day this claim was advanced quite casually in the course of conversation with Mr. Chou. I was completely taken by surprise, because since the country was opened up in 1950-1, there have been a number of expeditions to these mountains, to Everest and others in the Himalayas, and the members of those expeditions had to obtain permission from us to proceed. The Chinese were perfectly aware, particularly with regard to Everest, that application had been made for this permission and that it had been granted. They never put forward any objection at the time. It was, therefore, a great surprise."

What happened is that there was a compromise. As the situation stands at present, China has relinquished her claim to the whole of Everest, and is confining it to the northern slopes of the mountain, which are in Tibetan territory.

For the next few minutes, perhaps I may round off what I have said by briefly indicating what are Nepal's relations with the outside world and, in particular, with Britain, India, China and the Soviet Union. As I have indicated, the Treaty of 1816, which concluded the war with Nepal, provided for our having a diplomatic representation in Khatmandu and provided also the facility to recruit Gurkhas for the British Indian Army. British influence increased and with the establishment of the Rana rule in the middle of the last century, or shortly before, our interest was recognized by the Ranas. Jang Bahadur, when appealed to by Lord Canning, who was Governor-General of India at the time of the Mutiny in 1857, willingly and readily supplied further Gurkha reinforcements to strengthen the British forces against the Sepoy rebels in that year.

Speaking, it may seem, a little cynically, it would not be unfair to say that while the Rana rule kept Nepal in a servile state and excluded her by and large from contact with the outside world, it suited the British book at that time because the country remained quiet. It was not a trouble spot so far as our interests were concerned, and our interests in that area of the world were in India. At the same time, the recruitment of Gurkhas for the Indian Army, in such large numbers, helped us. It also helped the Nepalese, as the arrangement provided Nepal with foreign exchange. Indeed, it still provides her with a much-needed source of foreign exchange.

During this period, there were few travellers. Even botanists were not allowed to go round the mountains collecting specimens, and climbers were not allowed to assault Everest. I got a good view into Tibet and a

good view of Everest from a peak of about 8,000 ft., 40 miles north-east of Khatmandu.

At a village in the valley a villager produced some old coins, and I asked where he had got them from. There were some Tibetan coins and one of the others was a louis of the reign of Napoleon III, of France, which some adventurous traveller must have introduced into the country over 100 years ago. He was quite convinced that the coin which he showed me was still in use in the West.

The situation has changed, of course, since 1950. Our influence is now shared with other countries, but our stock is still high in the country. We are respected there and the Nepalese look to us, if not for financial assistance or economic aid to the extent that the Americans provide it, at least for loans for assistance and for technical help, particularly in the educational field. That is important, because there is a good deal of Chinese Communist propaganda coming into the country. That is the kind of direction in which institutions like our British Council can help. The British Council is represented by the Cultural Attaché to our Embassy in Khatmandu. We have a library there for helping with the university and the schools. That is the sort of weapon which we can best employ to counter the propaganda of the Communist Chinese.

Then there is India. I have mentioned the role which India played at the time of the revolution in 1950 and 1951. The pendulum has swung a little bit in the other direction, because the Chinese have unquestionably encouraged certain local elements in anti-Indian sentiment. It has been represented that relations between the two countries, so far as India is concerned, are really conditioned by the desire to step into the shoes of Britain and encourage a continuance of the policy of isolation.

India cannot, of course, assume the same relationship towards Nepal that she has done in the case of the two neighbouring States of Sikkim and Bhutan. Nepal is quite free and independent to conduct her own foreign relations without any interference in the shape of a protecting State. She has, in fact, established diplomatic relations with most countries in the world and is a member of the United Nations Organization.

When I was in Khatmandu, I noticed a parade of young people, mostly students, carrying red flags, some of them bearing the hammer and sickle. I asked the Prime Minister about this. I asked whether he did not object to these Communist emblems being exhibited in the street. "No," he said, "Khatmandu has always been rather Leftish politically. After all, the revolution started here." When I asked why those boys were parading about, he replied that they were protesting against the recent trade agreement with India. "They think that it is unduly harsh," he said, "and that it is advantageous to India, and they have been encouraged in their actions, no doubt, by Chinese and, perhaps, even Russian influence. But we allow them to let off steam." So far as I could judge, he did not think that there was any great danger in demonstrations of that kind. It is, however, worth while noting that they do take place.

The security and stability of India are, of course, tied up with the security and stability of Nepal. This has become all the more important for India by reason of the Chinese occupation of Tibet. China has come

a lot closer to India. If Communism were, for the sake of argument, to triumph in Nepal, it would be a grave blow to the moderate political influences in India and would greatly encourage the success of the Communist movement in India.

China also occupies a rather special relationship with Nepal. For about 300 years, and really up to the present day, although it is somewhat skilfully veiled, China has regarded Nepal as a satellite. In the year 1792, a tripartite treaty was concluded between the then Emperor of China, the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the King of Nepal in Khatmandu. In that treaty of 1792, it was agreed that "China should henceforth be considered as the father to both Nepal and Tibet, who should regard each other as brothers."

This idea of Nepal as a satellite continued certainly up to the time of Colonel Younghusband's expedition to Lhasa in 1904. The fall of the Manchu dynasty in Peking in 1911 made no difference to the Chinese claims, which have been advanced recently in various ways by the present rulers of China. Nevertheless, another treaty was concluded in 1956 between the present rulers of China and Nepal, embodying what are called the five principles of :

- mutual respect for each other's integrity and sovereignty;
- non-aggression;
- non-interference in each other's internal affairs by any means—
economic, political or ideological;
- equality and mutual benefit; and
- peaceful coexistence.

In spite of those rather high-sounding principles, one at least has been breached. The introduction of Communist literature and propaganda in a very large way into the country is, certainly in my judgment, a violation of the principle of non-interference in each other's affairs by, amongst other means, ideological methods.

As I have mentioned, I was in Khatmandu at the time of Chou En-Lai's visit when the 1956 treaty was reaffirmed. I think that Chou was anxious that this treaty should be extended rather on the lines of the Sino-Burmese treaty, but Mr. Koirala, who, in spite of a deceptively gentle manner, is underneath a quite tough character, was not having any of that. Chou's mission was, in effect, a failure, and it resulted in nothing more than the reaffirmation of those five principles. There was even a climb-down on the Everest issue, as I have mentioned.

But China has kept up her interest and a recent border incident has been noticed in the newspapers. A Nepalese officer and soldier were killed and some others were taken prisoner, and the matter had to be settled after correspondence. It looks as though the Chinese had strayed further into the country than the actual boundary would have justified.

Finally, there is the position of Soviet Russia. The official Soviet line was reflected in a recent article in the newspaper *Isvestia*, of February 18, 1960, which was Nepal's national day, congratulating the Nepalese "on having swept away the despotic feudal régime of the henchmen of the British imperialists which had ruled Nepal for more than a century."

Relations in diplomatic and other fields have been established with the Soviet Union. Two years ago, in 1958, King Mahendra, paying his first visit to Europe, took in Moscow, and met Khrushchev and the other Russian rulers, as a result of which a Russian technical mission arrived in Khatmandu. In the following year, in April, 1959, an agreement was arrived at which provided for the exchange of ambassadors and also technical aid to the extent of about 30 million roubles, which was to cover the construction of roads, hydro-electric plant, a sugar factory, a cigarette factory and hospitals. So Russia certainly has got her foot in Nepal, and in February this year King Mahendra's visit as head of the Nepalese State was returned by Marshal Voroshilov, who was then President of the Russian State, accompanied by two members of the Praesidium, Mr. Kozlov and Madam Furtseva.

DISCUSSION

Mr. HANCOCK: May I ask the lecturer to amplify two points? First, does he think that there is any real danger at the moment from Chinese aggression? According to the Press, Chinese maps show Nepal as being part of China. Secondly, in regard to what he said about India guaranteeing the freedom and independence of Nepal, does he think that India, if called upon, would implement that guarantee, or that the Nepalese would want India to do so?

PROFESSOR MONTGOMERY HYDE: I do not think there is any immediate danger of a Chinese invasion of Nepal. It is more a long-term danger. I think there will be more of these rather needling border incidents. The surprisingly accommodating way in which Chou En-Lai dealt with the most recent incident suggested that the Chinese did not want the matter to go any further. It must, of course, be borne in mind that the easiest and most direct way for the Chinese to invade would be through Tibet. Because of the total absence of communications, it is very difficult to invade the country.

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that India went completely Communist, and that this included Sikkim and Bhutan. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Chinese would come round the other way and then take over Nepal without much difficulty from the south. Assuming, however, that that terrible eventuality does not occur, I think that the Chinese invasion of Nepal is a long-term danger.

Concerning the Indian guarantee of Nepalese integrity, it is difficult for me to express a firm opinion, as there are different points of view. It is a matter of opinion to what extent reliance can be placed upon that guarantee. We must remember that, not a guarantee, but certainly an expression of influence, was made in regard to Tibet; but when the invasion and taking over of Tibet occurred in 1950, Nehru did little more than make a protest. He continued to protest, but there was nothing further. There were no troop movements; no militant action of any kind. It was simply confined to a protest. It might well be, therefore, that in the event of anything similar happening to Nepal, India would not go much beyond protesting. Having been opened up to the world, however, Nepal is in a fairly strong position. The United Nations, as well as the

Americans and ourselves are there. This combination, added to anything that India can do, is, I think, a fairly good protection for Nepal.

The CHAIRMAN: On the question of maps, attention has been drawn to the fact that even in the days of the Manchu dynasty, the maps were marked showing various territories as part of China. I should like to stress that, because this aspect has arisen in connection with other matters. The marking of maps showing Tibetan and Nepalese territories as part of China is nothing new. It is not a development of the Communist régime. Indeed, when I was on Admiral Mountbatten's staff during the war in India and we had a Chinese liaison mission, the question of maps raised dissension even then. It is not, therefore, a new development.

Mr. NAISH: Nobody seems to invade anybody else's country nowadays. Countries are always taken from within. It seems to me that that is the way Nepal would be taken if anything of the kind happened. I refer to the sort of thing which has happened in Cuba. What does the lecturer think of this?

PROFESSOR MONTGOMERY HYDE: I indicated that that danger was present in my mind when I referred to the Communist Chinese literature which is coming in, which we must try to counter more effectively than we have been able to do, so far, by showing the advantages of remaining in the free world. There is, however, no doubt that that Communist propaganda is coming in. I am quite certain that Mr. Koirala is a realist. He knows the strength of the Communist movement. Of the 110 Members of Parliament, four are Communist.

However, to give another illustration, the Nazis had only about four members in the Reichstag legislature in the 1920's, but they were able to take over the country within a few years. Czechoslovakia is another of the many examples which one could mention. The danger certainly is present, and the pressure on the Communist Chinese propaganda front must be watched all the time.

The CHAIRMAN: We must stop there; our time is up. It only remains for me to express the thanks of all of you and of myself to the speaker for his very interesting talk and for the excellent photographs he has shown us.

The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation, and the meeting then ended.

A VISIT TO THE MALDIVE ISLANDS

By GROUP-CAPTAIN H. ST. C. SMALLWOOD, O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, September 14, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It would be rather impertinent for me to introduce Group-Captain Smallwood, whom we all know so well and who does so much for the Society. He really is a high flyer, is he not? He dashes off to all these places, and now he has excelled everything by his recent visit to the Maldive Islands, about which we are going to hear. I will ask him to address us on this most interesting subject.

WHEN authors write a book they nearly always offer thanks to various people for giving them information and helping them. Although this is only a very short chapter rather than a book, I should like to say that a great many people have given me a great deal of aid. First of all, the people whom I wish to thank are those at the Commonwealth Relations Office who were extremely helpful to me. Then there were those in the Royal Air Force who remembered an old comrade and treated me extremely well wherever I went. I had the great good fortune of being a friend of Lord Bandon, Air Commander in Chief, Singapore, and his help and welcome in Singapore were most gratifying.

The Maldive Islands, which are liable to be entirely forgotten by the world, are, as you know, a string of little islands in the Indian Ocean about 400 miles south west of Ceylon. They consist of about 12,000 coral atolls, and I suppose one could call 2,000 of those islands. Of the 2,000 islands, only 200 are inhabited. They are typical of all the little islands in that part of the world.

The people are fairly highly civilized. They are a race on their own: very keen explorers, boat builders and fishermen, and, generally speaking, they seem to get quite a lot into their lives. When one first goes there one wonders what is the *raison d'être* of this extraordinary sprinkling of islands on the surface of the ocean. This archipelago was formed by plateaux rising to different elevations from the depths of the Indian Ocean.

In the sixteenth century the Portuguese several times tried to establish themselves on the islands, but without lasting success. The second cross the Maldivian peoples had to bear took the form of pirate raids by the Moplas of the Malabar Coast. In the year 1645 the Maldivians were not very happy because they were liable to be raided by all sorts of people and as an act of self-defence they sent tokens of homage and claims for their protection to Ceylon. To this the Ceylonese responded and there has always been a steady stream of trade between the two places.

As well as being very skilled boat builders—they have three types of boats—the Maldivians weave cloth and, generally speaking, are reasonably self-supporting. There has been a good deal of intermarriage with Indians from Southern India and this has produced a Dravidian type, but Arab

influence is also visible and gives many a Semitic appearance. They are Mohammedans and belong to the Sunni sect. In spite of the fact that the present religious atmosphere is one of Mohammedanism, relics of Buddhist worship have been found on some of the islands. No one quite knows where they came from, but one may presume they probably came from Ceylon.

This group of islands was originally a sultanate, and only a few years ago the old government was disestablished and the sultanate returned. They had for a short time a republican government, but that did not seem to suit the people very well and the position now is that the Maldivians are quite independent, really, except that they are under British protection and we do look after their foreign affairs for them. Generally speaking, we interfere as little as possible with the general administration of the islands. We are there to help, if necessary.

I want to disavow any suggestion that I am an authority on these far-away islands, because I have only recently made a visit to them. I have not had the advantages of going and living amongst the people. Once you have been to an island it is true that there is not very much more to see. All coral atolls are like one another, and being on one of them is rather like being on any of the 2,000 others. My trip was hasty in that I travelled something like 22,000 miles in sixteen days, almost entirely by air. The trip should not be advocated for anybody who wants a rest-cure. The long flights were rather tiring and it was to a certain extent a relief to find myself back in England.

On the 200 islands, there is a population of something like 93,000 people. The climate is fairly equable, never very hot, never very cold. Sea breezes blow throughout the year and the full force of the monsoon is not felt.

Since 1887 the islands have been a British Protectorate. The people are peace loving. They have expressed the wish that they should become a member of the Commonwealth, and that I think would be a very good thing. They do want a great deal of help, help that we ourselves are perhaps better fitted to give them than almost anyone else. They have their own language but many of them have learnt Urdu, and I was gratified I could talk to many of them, having served in India for a good many years. They are rather like the Cingalese and resemble them to a certain extent.

The importance of these islands has only recently become obvious. We always used Ceylon as an airbase, and when the Ceylon Air Force was formed we were quite politely told that they wanted the place themselves and we had to find somewhere else. We found these islands and an enormous airstrip was constructed there, largely with the help of our good friends Costains, several of whom are members of this Society. This airfield is extraordinary in that it is constructed almost entirely out of the coral of which the island is made. The ready-made materials were on the doorstep.

Their importance has increased considerably since the trouble in Africa. A glance at the map will show you that a route across this part of the Indian Ocean runs parallel with a route that might go across Africa.

Owing to the trouble in the Congo a lot of our communications in that part of the world may be interfered with.

In addition to the big air strip at Gan in the southern group of islands, another strip is being constructed at Malé, which is the seat of government. We have recently sent a British resident, a most esteemed officer, to live at Malé, on King's Island. He was formerly in Gan, but the Maldivians themselves said they would like him to be up at the seat of Government. This officer works under Sir Alexander Morley, who is the United Kingdom High Commissioner for Ceylon. He has an adviser from the Royal Air Force and is in close touch with the Maldivian minister. There used to be a feeling on the part of the Maldivians that our big interest in Gan was inclined to operate adversely; but I think the work that has been done there by Britons has been so good and reliable that they have now accepted us.

At one time the Maldivian official who was in charge in Gan was looked on as a rebel and practically excommunicated. However, better counsels have prevailed and he has now been taken back into favour. He is a very good administrator and the Maldivians would have made a great mistake if they had gone on treating him as if he were a rebel.

As to the commerce of the islands, coconuts grow everywhere and the main trade is in fish. They catch a kind of tunny or bonito. They bury it and when it has reached a sufficient state of putrefaction it is sent to Ceylon, where there is a ready market for this peculiar product. It is in a much more advanced stage than Bombay duck. There is no doubt that the commerce could be increased a great deal, but I think the British Government wisely keep things advancing rather slowly, because we see object lessons all over the world as a result of the mistake of a too rapid advance towards civilization. The copra trade could be increased and improved and with care they could grow still more coconuts. The fish trade could, of course, be improved by the use of steam trawlers.

The medical work carried out by the medical branch of the Royal Air Force is beyond praise. They look after the R.A.F. personnel and they are always helping the people of the islands with their strange complaints. There is a certain amount of malaria there, though not a great deal, and a very nasty disease which is called filariasis which begins with a swelling of the ankles and bring about a nasty fever and is carried by a mosquito. The medical officers go out to the islands, and when it is announced that "the doctor is coming" the people collect to be attended to. The desire for medical attention is such that before a man can go to the doctor he has to get permission from the headman, otherwise the whole village would take up the time of the doctor in a rather wasteful way.

The islands are essentially coral atolls which one sees in many parts of the Eastern seas. Every island which is inhabited has a main street running from end to end. This street is walled with coral blocks, and cross streets run at right angles to the main streets. These roads are well kept up, tidy and clean; certainly there is less litter in them than in the streets of London.

I should like to give you a short account of my journey and I hope it will not sound too much like a Cook's tour. I left Lyneham in Wiltshire

one day, unfortunately rather late, and we had a night stop at Aden. We then went straight back to the aircraft and flew on for Gan, the main air strip of the Maldives. I was there about a couple of hours before flying on to Singapore, and met the Air Force officer in charge and others I had known in previous times, who made me most welcome.

While I was in Singapore H.M.S. *Gambia* came in. It was commanded by Captain Mann, R.N., and he and all his officers were invited to a party there. I thought it was unlike sailors to want to go to a party where there were no ladies to entertain them, and I asked Lord Bandon what he did about this. He said that he phoned an organization and said, "I have twenty officers coming. Please send twenty women." They worked in offices and were available for parties. They enjoyed the arrangement and the people they entertained enjoyed it too. It was a sensible thing to do.

My pictures cannot convey a great deal to you, but all along the verandahs of the house were hanging orchids of rich and rare varieties. A delicate odour pervades the place which might have originated from the breath of angels. Sprays of oriental blossoms decorate the rooms such as Moyses Stevens and Constance Spry can only have dreamt of. Lady Bandon has the professionals beaten at their own game.

I was awakened at 3 a.m. by a signal from the U.K. High Commissioner in Ceylon saying that it was doubtful if there would be any means of transport for me from Ceylon to Malé. This was a bit of a blow as it meant I should have to confine my visit to the southern group of islands.

On my arrival back at Gan, Arthington-Davy took me over. He was the C.R.O. representative and is a dedicated character giving his whole time, in fact his life, to the Maldivian people. I was allotted an air-conditioned room in the R.A.F. station, which was commanded by Michael Constable-Maxwell, two of whose eight brothers I had known previously.

We went to an island called Fedu in a dohney, a type of boat well suited to these atoll seas. You can row them or sail them and I did more sailing in my few days there than ever in my life before. When trips are made from the main island to the other islands certain products from the N.A.A.F.I. are taken. The benevolent government allows the buying of only certain things, however, because the advance must not be too quick. They do not want money to be wasted on tins of fruit salad and such things which are easily obtainable.

There are two phases of life in the Maldives, the service side and the people. The service personnel are well looked after. There are no women. It is a station where people remain for only six months or a year, and though one might expect them to suffer heavily from boredom, a tremendous amount is done to prevent that. There are cinemas and every game ever thought of is there, and I found very much less boredom amongst the service people than I anticipated. The other aspect of life is looking after the local people, and that is very well done.

On the second day of my investigations I was taken to call on Mr. Afeef, the local Maldivian administrator, and he also seemed a man dedicated to his job. Although once looked upon as a rebel, he was now completely accepted into the body of the government. He was what they

call President of the Council and had a lot of councillors to help him. Each village had its headman.

The three most populated islands in the southern group are Fedu, Maradu and Hitaddu. I spent several days visiting these islands, travelling sometimes in dohneys, sometimes in baggalohs and sometimes in bartillis. These boats travel all the way to Ceylon and back and are surprisingly good sea boats. They take a good deal of navigating. Sailing is the chief way of getting about, helped by the energetic oarsmen, who, though not very robust to look at, are sturdy. They accompany their stroke with songs which are said to be of highly Rabelaisian if not salacious character. The boats, near the water, enable one to see the marine life, particularly the bonito and porpoises.

My next move was to pay a visit to the High Commissioner in Ceylon. In order to do that I flew in a service aircraft, a Shackleton—a machine known for its reliability if not for its comfort—from Gan straight to Ceylon. After sitting in an uncomfortable corner for some time the captain of the aircraft asked whether I would rather not sit up in the front where one got a wonderful view. I accepted this offer and was able to take some snapshots through the Perspex screen at about 6,000 ft. The coloration of the water around the atolls is particularly beautiful.

When I landed I was told that a car was coming to take me to Colombo. I was given a room in the Galle Face Hotel there. It is a sad place compared with what it was some years ago. Then, it was gay, and when a ship came in there was a gala and everyone had a good time. Now it is dreary and down-at-heel. I dined with one of the High Commissioner's staff that night; and next morning the air adviser, Group-Captain Rodney, said he was not going to allow me to stay at the hotel and he wanted me to stay at Trenchard House.

A little while ago I was driving in England and on the screen in the car in front of me, instead of the usual notice "Running In, Please Pass," there was one saying "Running Down, Please Pass." That seemed to express the state of Ceylon today. They were running down and they did not mind who passed. You have only to read the Press to realize the rise in corruption in the Ceylonese government service, and it is a sad place compared with the well-administered place it used to be when I knew it before.

I had a very interesting interview with Sir Alexander Morley and his attractive Viennese wife, and was told that a meeting had been arranged for me with the Maldivian Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Ibrahim Nazir, the next day. I went to see him and he was housed comfortably a little way out of Colombo. He was polite and nice to me and we had a long conversation, through an interpreter. I am told that he understands English very well but prefers not to speak it. He seemed very interested in the people and spoke chiefly of the need for education amongst the Maldivian people. He made the astonishing proposal that when I got back I should induce a lot of female teachers to go there from Great Britain to teach the Maldivians.

I told him that we were not very well supplied with teachers ourselves and I did not think it would be easy to persuade women teachers to go out to Malé. I asked whether anyone else would help and he said some

help came from the Jesuits. When I asked whether they did not try to make converts he said, "No; they do not do that at all. They teach as much as they can and see that people observe their own religion, without trying to convert them." I said that was very admirable and he should try to get some more of the same kind.

I left Ceylon and went back to Gan and had trips round to the various islands. It was a curious thing that wherever we went everything seemed almost exactly the same. On my return to England I was rather surprised that it was not looked upon as at all desirable that I should talk over the radio. The attitude was that as there had not been murder and sudden death it was not of great interest to the British public. I cannot impress upon you too firmly that we have had a tremendous diplomatic success and the more our Commonwealth Relations and our Royal Air Force people are congratulated on it the better.

If we go into a country and subdue it with guns and that sort of thing, everybody is frightfully interested and excited and it is an important thing. But here we have got all we want with the goodwill of the people and it has all been so easy that it is not news. I think that is rather a pity.

On my return from Ceylon I had to wait a few days for a training flight to bring me back to England. This took me in a curious and unexpected direction. First of all we flew straight to Aden, which was normal. As the *Britannia* was doing a training flight it was decided to go right across Africa, and we flew from Aden, one of the most hideous places in the world, across Lake Rudolf, Kenya, Uganda, Entebbe and Lake Victoria, and across the then peaceful Belgian Congo, flying due west to Kano, the capital of the soon-to-be-independent Nigeria.

We got into Kano at 8.15 and I suffered certain indignities at the hands of a Nigerian corporal whose responsibilities had not taught him civility. He looked at me with great contempt and disfavour and said, "Where is your passport!" I pointed out that I did not need one as it was a British Protectorate. He said, "Show me your passport!" I was advised that he was not in the right but that it would save complications if I did not argue.

We were up at 4.30 the next morning and flew across Libya, the Sahara and French West Africa to the Mediterranean. The island of Malta peacefully nestling in that sea was a geographical eye-opener. We landed and I was met by the local R.A.F. Commandant and taken to lunch in the mess. There we had to wait quite a long time because the Duke of Edinburgh was visiting the island and inspecting his marines. We left very late and got into Lyneham at night after the last train had gone to London, however a kind friend gave me a lift to Reading. I came back tired and happy, full of recollections of a worthwhile trip to these little-known islands. One point I would stress again is the importance of these islands following the outbreak of trouble in Africa. A stopping place on the way to South East Asia and the Antipodes is a thing of great value, and the people who have had the foresight to arrange it merit our best thanks.

DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: This talk is about a part of the world we have not all had an opportunity of seeing. Group-Captain Smallwood has said he will

be glad to answer any question you may like to ask him. Perhaps I may ask the first. I understand that so far as the political problems of these thousands of islands are concerned, there is an upper magalis and a people's magalis. Perhaps that question could be enlarged on.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: I should like to enlarge on it but the seat of government is at Malé which I never actually reached. At one place I saw the number one man hold a ritual council, and presumably that would be repeated in a larger way at Malé.

Mr. LIST: What is the political situation between the British Government and the Maldivian Government with regard to flying facilities? Have we perpetual rights to use the Maldivian Islands as we will for flying purposes, to the exclusion of all other nations?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: Not quite. We have a thirty years' lease which I hope in due course will be renewed. Nobody else has shown any desire to go and fly there, but it would not be at all surprising if somebody did. We paid down a certain amount in cash for the lease, and if it comes to a renewal we shall probably produce a lot more cash.

A MEMBER: Do you know why they speak Urdu?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: It is because of their contact with India. There has been a perpetual traffic between India and the Maldives. Urdu is the lingua franca of India and I suppose its use has been merely a matter of convenience.

Mr. PAXTON: Has there been any victimization of the people who set up an independent republic in the South? They were arrested at one time.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: There was, to that extent. But, fortunately, complete agreement has been reached and now everybody is happy and together. There is not a rebel government any more.

Mr. PAXTON: Is there a rainy season?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: It is not a season; it goes on intermittently all the year round. There is no monsoon. There are showers and dry spells throughout the year.

The CHAIRMAN: May we hear a word about money? How many kyat (?) to the £?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: I believe they have given them up. The money I saw was good old English money.

The CHAIRMAN: Are they on rupees?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: No; I did not see a rupee.

Mr. M. R. PRICE: Are there many Indians in the country?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: Only a very few. There are a few Pakistanis and a few Arabs; and a certain group of these people go to Egypt for their education, which I think is a pity.

Mr. PRICE: Are there many Sindis there?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: Very few.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that we all thank Group-Captain Smallwood for the trouble he has taken in order to give this talk and for the slides. I will ask you to express your appreciation in the usual way. (*Applause.*)

REPORT

Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic: Being a Report to the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Enquiry Committee on Tibet. Published by the Commission, Geneva, 1960 (6, Rue Mont-de-Sion, Geneva). Pp. 345.

Everybody interested in the present situation in Tibet should look at this publication. It follows on an earlier Report of July, 1959, by the Commission itself, entitled *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*. The present volume is a Report by an *ad hoc* Legal Enquiry Committee, not by the Commission itself, but it carries a foreword by the Commission's Secretary-General, M. Jean-Flavien Lalive, of which the following extracts give a fair summary:

"The terms of reference were interpreted so as to avoid political issues and were restricted . . . to considering the record of the Chinese People's Republic in Tibet, and to whether the question of Tibet is a purely domestic affair on the most restrictive interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations. . . . An attempt has been made by the Committee to appraise human rights as they used to exist in Tibet and as they exist after almost a decade of rule by the Central People's Government of China. . . . What has happened to these people and what is still happening to them is a matter for the conscience of all who respect the rights of a peace-loving nation and people. . . . The events in Tibet, as shown in the findings of the Committee, are in breach of what jurists everywhere would understand by the Rule of Law in its most elemental meaning of a government of laws where human dignity is respected." And, finally, "The only force at the Commission's disposal is the force of ideas; the only sanction which the findings of the Legal Enquiry Committee possess is that same force of ideas. This force may or may not ultimately prevail, but it is with the conviction that it must be tried that this Report is presented for the consideration of all who are concerned for the right to live in peace and liberty with their fellow-men."

The Report is supported by a mass of evidence. The main body consists of a general summary of three issues—namely, of Genocide, Human Rights, and the status of Tibet. Briefly the conclusions are: (i) that genocide has been committed against the religious group of Tibetan Buddhists; (ii) that the Chinese authorities in Tibet have violated most of the Articles of the U.N. Declaration on that subject; (iii) that up to 1951 Tibet was at the very least a *de facto* independent State, and that Tibetan repudiation in 1959 of the 1951 Agreement terminating that independence was justified.

No attempt has been made to determine whether Tibet's independence up to 1951 was *de facto* or *de jure*, but the Committee have no doubt that her status was such as to make the Tibetan question one for the legitimate concern of the United Nations, or, in other words, not barred by the terms of Article 2 (7) of the Charter.

The members of the Committee signing the Report are Sri Purshottam Trikamdas of India as chairman, two other lawyers from India, and one each from the Philippines, Ghana, Norway, Ceylon, Malaya and Thailand. The fact that the Committee was overwhelmingly composed of eminent professors of law from Asia is not without significance. Lord Shawcross, the British representative on the Commission and originally a member of this Committee, resigned "due to unforeseen personal and professional commitments," and Dr. Maung resigned on becoming a member of the Government of Burma.

As the Secretary-General remarks in his Foreword, the Committee was not concerned with the complex of problems arising from India's frontier dispute with China over the India-Tibet borders. Nor, of course, could it concern itself with what is perhaps the major political problem posed by the tragedy of Tibet. This is that, alone of the great colonial powers, China, in Tibet, and the U.S.S.R., in Central Asia, are maintaining a rigorous imperialism over subject and alien peoples. Who are the imperialists today?

OLAF CAROE.

REVIEWS

The Arabs of the Middle East: Population and Society. By Gabriel Baer (Hebrew). Ha-Qibbuṣ Ha-Meuḥad Publication. Tel Aviv, 1960. Pp. 267, with bibliography and index.

In spite of unreliable and outdated statistics, Dr. Baer has made an industrious and generally convincing attempt to establish the basic facts on which sociological studies ultimately depend. Excluding Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia from the scope of his book in accordance with the "generally accepted" view, he has concentrated on the eastern half of the Arab world. His chapters deal successively with population figures, the social roles of women and family units, membership of organized religious communities, ecological distribution and the social structure; and his cautious treatment of the mass of material that he has systematically assembled from publications in Hebrew and Arabic, as well as in Western languages, will commend his book to the serious student.

EMILE MARMORSTEIN.

The Sinai Campaign. By Edgar O'Ballance. Published by Faber and Faber. Pp. 212. Maps, appendices and index. 21s.

Major O'Ballance, who had previously written an account of the fighting between Israel and the Arabs in 1948-9, has now given us the story of the Israeli invasion of Sinai in 1956. The author has experienced the problem of the prolific accounts available from Israeli sources as opposed to the virtual non-existence of any material dealing with the Egyptian viewpoint. This is no fault of Major O'Ballance's, and indeed he makes great efforts to achieve impartiality. Yet the one-sided origin of most of his information is inevitably evident. On the Israeli side, the orders issued, the views of the staff and the movements of the commanders are fully related. On the Egyptian side, these details are the object of conjecture. Indeed, in a few places, the Egyptians are, perhaps inadvertently, referred to as "the enemy."

In spite of this inevitable limitation, the performance of the Egyptian army emerges as rather more creditable than it has been represented previously. In several actions, Israeli attacks were repulsed with casualties, and the Egyptian anti-aircraft artillery receives some commendation. Again, whereas past writers have often minimized the influence of the Anglo-French threat to Suez on the Sinai operations, Major O'Ballance is inclined to admit that the operations would have taken a different course if they had been a straight fight between Israel and Egypt.

The difference between the two armies is clearly brought out. The Israelis relied entirely on mobility, every unit was mechanized, even if many of them only had commandeered civilian transport. The commanders were full of energy, extremely aggressive and always held the initiative. The Egyptians were everywhere obsessed by the defensive, were well dug in behind several belts of barbed wire interspersed with minefields and many of the units were incapable of movement. This defensive attitude originated with the officers, who seemed incapable of taking the initiative, although in some cases the men fought well without any officers. The author's comments on the shortcomings of the Israeli army are interesting. Particularly is it surprising to learn that the Israeli wireless communications were often inefficient, even between the tanks in the same regiment.

In general, the author's comments on the Arab States, particularly from the political angle, tend to be inaccurate, and emphasize once more the fact that most of his information came from the Israeli side. For example, on page 18, Major O'Ballance states that "the Israelis came to the conclusion, with perhaps a good deal of reason, that the Jordanian authorities were either unable or unwilling to prevent Arabs from infiltrating into Israel." The Israelis frequently repeated this charge in the years from 1949 to 1956. The Jordanians, during the same period, on

many occasions endeavoured to establish police co-operation with Israel, so as to intercept infiltrators, but the Israelis invariably refused, preferring to make use of direct armed reprisal raids. Major O'Ballance, however, only refers to the Israeli viewpoint. There are also a number of small inaccuracies in Chapter 5, in which the author describes events in the Arab States since 1956.

The sketches of each action in this brief campaign are most valuable and very clear. It would have been an advantage if a footnote had been added, wherever a battle was described, giving the page number of the map illustrating the incidents in question. The relevant map, when found, is always clear, but the reader is sometimes obliged to spend some time looking for the particular map which he needs.

In spite of these minor drawbacks, the book is extremely clear and gives an accurate picture of the operations. In these days of guided missiles and nuclear bombs, it is a pleasure to read of so original a campaign, carried out with conventional weapons, and so clearly illustrating the essential importance of decision, speed, mobility and the offensive spirit.

J. B. G.

Both Sides of the Hill—Britain and the Palestine War. By Jon and David Kimche. Published by Martin Secker and Warburg, Ltd. 1960. Pp. 277. Indexed. 25s.

Though the authors devote the greater part of their book, perhaps in almost too great detail, to Arab-Jewish hostilities, these were not in their eyes the most important aspect of the conflict in Palestine in 1947-8. They give warning, indeed, that the Arab-Jewish war is still not ended; the battle for the remaining Arab part of Palestine has not yet been fought and is reserved for the second round. The decisive outcome of the conflict, in the authors' eyes, was the defeat of Britain, heralding as it did the elimination of Britain's imperial position in the whole of the Middle East. It is their contention that far from appreciating this basic significance of the conflict, the British Government of the day followed a deliberate policy of drift until disaster overtook their country. The only vicious censure is reserved for Mr. Ernest Bevin.

When the authors describe the happenings on the Jewish side of the hill, one can accept their testimony. They have had access to the Israeli documents, to Mr. Ben Gurion's personal notebooks, and no doubt to freely given information from every Israeli source. Their account of what went on in the Arab camp also for the most part reads plausibly, though one may question their claim to have received confidences from many Arab leaders. It is when they come to discuss the policy of the British Government that one begins to wonder whether their professed objectivity can be accepted at its face value. They claim to have had almost constant contact at the time with many of the principal members of the Labour Government, and since then to have interviewed almost all the leading personalities who were in any way connected with the formulation and execution of its policy. Even so, one can feel legitimate doubt whether Mr. Bevin's colleagues and advisers would have betrayed his confidence to provide a journalist with material for blackening his name. It seems more likely that the authors have cleverly used their imagination and such information as they managed to pick up, to confirm an already existing prejudice. One may hope that the second volume of the life of Mr. Bevin will provide a more objective picture of what was really in his mind.

That having been said, let it be admitted that the authors have told an exciting story. Nor would one question some, at any rate, of their findings—*e.g.*, the debt owed by the Israelis to Mr. Ben Gurion and to the spirit of the Haganah, the role played by King Abdulla and its effect on the Egyptians. As to the central theme of the book, that it was the Palestine conflict that sounded the death-knell of Britain's position in the Middle East, this is perhaps open to argument. Even before the second world war Britain had begun to shed her imperial responsibilities. Palestine or no Palestine, the process was bound to continue at a greater pace after the war. Indeed, it was already in full swing before the Palestine conflict burst, and its ex-

tension to the Middle East was inevitable after the loss of imperial India. In their discussion of the Palestine conflict itself, the authors somewhat detract from the value of their record by their strange reserve about the attitude of the United States, with all the effect it inevitably had in different ways upon the British, the Arabs and the Israelis. Nevertheless, the Kimches have given their readers much to think about and no one interested in the Middle East should fail to read their book.

J. M. T.

The New-Old Land of Israel. By Norman Bentwich. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 1960. Pp. 161. 18s.

Professor Bentwich has written this book in order to give the general reader some account of the archæological discoveries which have been made in the Holy Land in recent years, on both sides of the frontier. He gives a brief survey of Palestinian archæology, and then deals successively with Jerusalem and the natural regions into which the land is divided. In addition to archæological information he has some interesting things to say about the present development of the land. Here and there one may question some judgments which are quoted—*e.g.*, it is doubtful if “the general opinion of the scholars” today would regard Akhenaton as reigning just after the Exodus period (p. 33), and if the Lachish Letters belong to the last siege of the city in the reign of Zedekiah, it is difficult to see how some of them could be part of the evidence on which Uriah, in the reign of Jehoiakim, was convicted of treason (p. 79). In the final chapter, which deals with the Dead Sea discoveries, the view of Professor Driver and Dr. Roth is stated alongside others, and while Professor Bentwich does not commit himself to one view more than another, he suggests as “a possible synthesis” of diverse theories that the settlement at Qumrān “included both religious votaries and others who combined the martial spirit with piety” (p. 147). The general reader will certainly thank him for a very enjoyable introduction to what is in any case a fascinating subject.

F. F. B.

Israel—A Blessing and a Curse. By Hedley V. Cooke. Stevens and Sons, Ltd. 1960. Pp. 308. Index. 25s.

This book by a former United States consul in Jerusalem is offered as “an unbiased critical appraisal of Israel in its political, social and developmental aspects,” suitable for “both the general reader and expert.” The blurb goes further in stating that the book “is probably the first study giving an objective picture of a country never far from the international headlines.” Objectivity in contemporary affairs is extremely hard to achieve, perhaps more so when an author like Mr. Cooke set out to determine “the real rights and wrongs of the Palestine issue.” Mr. Cooke’s contribution is surely not the first to claim objectivity, nor is it likely to be the last.

His keen mind and deep sympathy are aided by a smooth style and clear expression. He does not hide his limitations. While he had close contact with the Jewish side through marriage and long residence, he can show very little first-hand acquaintance with Arab affairs. However, this did not deter him. He made an attempt to see both sides, but hardly the *real* “rights and wrongs.” Israel emerges, from his inquest with minor scars, but innocent. The Arab side, with the exception of the refugees themselves, does not seem to get as fair a deal.

The allusion in the title of the book is of course to Deuteronomy xi. 26: “Behold, I set before you this day a blessing and a curse.” If Israel is a “blessing,” Mr. Cooke’s own account shows clearly that it is for the Jews alone, whereas if it is a “curse” the book shows equally clearly that it is the lot of the Arabs, not only the refugees but those who survived in territory now under Israeli control. Mr. Cooke, as he himself says, “wishes Israel well,” but he is not blind to its sins of commission and omission. Of the former he condemns such barbarous outrages as the destruction of the Arab village of Qibyah by the Israeli army (pp. 90, 94, 97, 99); and of the latter he equally condemns the subjection of the Arabs in Israel to restrictions and disabilities that make a mockery of the fundamental laws of the state.

But, on the whole, the author considers such matters as lapses or signs of immaturity that might be put right in the course of time. As to the question of the refugees, he suggests a token contribution by Israel for their settlement. If he really knows the mind of Israel leaders he would not have made it; none of them is likely to consider even this token "solution" seriously. The problem of the refugees is, of course, closely bound up with the question of boundaries, and indeed with the juridical right of Israel to the territory it now holds. Neither can be divorced from the other. Nor can either or both be divorced from the United Nations' partition resolution of 1947 and the United Nations' resolution of 1948 regarding the repatriation of the Arab refugees. But while Israel accepts the former, she rejects the latter. Any resolution of the problem of the refugees, therefore, must have United Nations authority and backing, acting through the agency of the major Powers. Speculations by journalists and authors, and dreams of the unfortunate sufferers, require moral, and even physical, force to translate them into concrete action.

Insufficient knowledge of conditions in the Arab countries is revealed in a number of cases. Not heeding his own warning, the author repeats the Israeli propaganda slogan that the education of Arabs in Israel surpasses that of the education of Arabs in Arab countries. But of course neither the author, by his own admission, nor the authors of this cliché, cut off as they are from contact with the Arab countries, can be accepted as competent judges of the matter. Let us take one example to illustrate how absurd this claim is. The circumstance of a single Arab Muslim girl studying at the Hebrew University is pronounced as "a fact duplicated only rarely in the Middle Eastern Arab countries" (p. 28). If the author could not visit the universities of Beirut, Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, he might have read such an international publication as *The Year Book of Education*, from which he would have gathered that the fact is being many times duplicated, and has been duplicated during the last four decades.

What is said about Arab education in Israel in general is superficial and clearly coloured by propaganda (pp. 106-107). In this matter also Mr. Cooke fell victim of another Israeli propaganda myth which claims that Israel is doing for the Arab villagers more than the British did. There is a general tendency in Israel to depreciate the achievements of the British mandate.

But if the author was caught sometimes, he did, to his honour and credit, escape many times. Thus he makes clearly independent remarks about the fact that German Jews keep aloof from other less civilized oriental Jews who are already charging the state and public with colour or racial discrimination (pp. 31, 127); about the fact that foreign aid constitutes from one-fourth to one-third of Israel's entire national income and over 50 per cent. of the state budget, exclusive of French arms aid (pp. 51, 64, 65); about the exclusion of Arab labour from Jewish enterprise by the policy of the Federation of Jewish Labour (Histadruth) (p. 73); about the seizure of land belonging to Arabs who are residents and citizens of Israel (pp. 108-109); about the bureaucracy and corruption accompanying the evil practice of *Proteksia* in government departments (p. 117); about "unbelievable and inexcusable disorder" in some of the more famous *Kibbutzim* (p. 124); and about the illusion that anything more than oases could be created in the Negev (p. 137).

In concluding his book, Mr. Cooke grows lyrical and assumes the role of moral admonisher. For the Children of Israel who had made or fought their way up to the country east of the River Jordan "there remained the simple matter of crossing the Jordan and conquering Canaan" (p. 287). As simple as dispossessing the indigenous population and usurping their rights. The same tragedy as has been enacted in our own time against the Arabs of Palestine. The title of the chapter in which this remark occurs is aptly called "The Analogy."

One of the most interesting points Mr. Cooke makes is that a new immigrant community, even after becoming sovereign, through whatever means, has no moral right to reduce the long-settled people of the country to the status of second-class citizenship, and that there are international legal limitations upon Israel's rights of sovereignty in this matter which the Community of Nations should demand of Israel (pp. 178-80). But the author overlooks the often repeated pronouncement by its present leaders that Israel is a Jewish state, and that, according to Ben Gurion's declaration to the World Zionist Congress, his first loyalty was to *the Jewish people*

of the world. Where will the Arabs, refugees awaiting repatriation, or citizens expecting justice and equality, fit in? Will a single Arab refugee be admitted if there is a Jew wishing, for any reason, to enter? Will Jewish employers of labour take an Arab resident if there is a Jew, resident or a new immigrant? All these questions tend to show that Israel has not only created political and national problems for itself and the Arabs. It has also created racial and religious complexities in international relations. Both aspects of the subject are inherent in Mr. Cooke's able discussion. His book deserves careful study.

A. L. TIBAWI.

The Power Struggle in Iraq. By Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press. 1960. 6" x 8½". Pp. 90. Sketch map.

In this little book Mr. Shwadran has "attempted to interpret . . . the development of events in Iraq in the twenty-one months (*i.e.*, until about April, 1960) since the revolution of July 14, 1958." He believes that, within the framework of permanent historical-geographical factors, "individual leaders have been the destiny-shapers of the recent history of the countries of the region." Considerable space is accordingly devoted to the examination of the characters of four leading figures thrown up by the revolution—Abdul Kerim Qasim, "the sole leader"; Fadhil Abbas al-Mahdawi, the buffoon-president of the so-called People's Court; Ahmad Salih Abdi, the Military Governor-General; and the Marxist-Leninist Ibrahim Kubba (in turn Minister of Economy, Agrarian Reform, and Oil Affairs until his dismissal in February); also to the "Qasim-Nasir Controversy." Other chapters deal with "the Events" (marked by the milestones of the Arif-Gailani trials, the Mosul outbreak, the Kirkuk incident and the attempt on Qasim's life), with "Economic Development" (especially oil policy and agrarian reform), and with "Great Power Policies" (in which he judges that so far the Soviet Union has been more successful than the Western democracies).

The author has stuck closely to his brief as set out in the title, and we are given no hint as to what the great mass of the Iraqi people, a force that is neither pro-communist nor pan-Arab (in the sense of being willing to accept Egyptian hegemony or leadership), is really thinking under a régime far more autocratic than anything experienced in the Hashimite era. However, since Qasim, once well described as "the man on the bolting horse" of communism, seems in recent months to have brought the animal under some kind of control, the reader, without necessarily accepting the whole of the argumentation, especially that part which concerns the character of Qasim himself, will probably be little disposed to quarrel with Mr. Shwadran's cautious conclusion with its three "ifs": that if Qasim can continue to maintain the balance between the communists and the nationalists, if the oil revenue continues to flow, and if he can maintain the unity and loyalty of the army, it is more than likely that he will retain power and bring some measure of stability to Iraq.

C. J. E.

Independent Iraq, 1932-58. Second edition. By Majid Khadduri. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 45s.

The first edition of *Independent Iraq* was published in 1951. The new edition purports to bring the story up to 1958. In actual fact the later years are dealt with very cursorily, and the narrative stops with the formal accession of King Feisal II to the throne in 1953. Even Dr. Fadhil Jamali, who with his ardent Arab nationalism and reforming zeal was, one would think, a prime minister after the author's own heart, does not get a mention. The impact on Iraq of the Suez operation is passed over in silence and the revolution of 1958 receives only the most perfunctory treatment. One looks in vain for General Kassim's name even in the index.

Professor Khadduri's chief interest seems to be in the formal aspects of politics—constitutions, electoral systems, the programmes of political parties, etc. There is an initial chapter on the machinery of government and a later one on constitutional

development. The formation or suppression of parties is given full treatment and their programmes are described at length. The main body of the book is, however, devoted to a meticulous account of the rise and fall of the mostly ephemeral governments that proliferated throughout the period. There is a good account, too—the most exciting chapter in the book—of the machinations of the Axis Powers. If there is a theme, it is that Iraq's greatest hope lay and still lies in the "liberal and progressive elements" whose influence on the political scene seems to the outsider to have been so small. In his last paragraph the author advocates a return (*sic*) to democracy as the safest way towards ultimate stability and progress.

To those interested in the constitutional problems of the old régime in Iraq, in the endless intrigues of the politicians and in the numerous plots of the officers' corps, this study will be of great value. What the ordinary reader will find lacking is the breath of life. The chapter on foreign policy is perhaps the extreme example. There can be few countries where constitutions and programmes matter less and personalities more than Iraq. Yet of the personalities of the innumerable politicians and soldiers whose names throng the pages of this work we are told disappointingly little. Yet many of them were men of vivid personality.

The result is a rather academic work, undoubtedly useful as far as it goes, but hardly enthralling. And though the study is admittedly one of Iraqi politics, one could have willingly borne with a little more about the economic side. The Development Board is indeed given a few pages, but more might have been made of what even from a constitutional point of view was a highly interesting experiment.

J. M. T.

Iran: Past and Present. By Donald N. Wilber. Published by Princetown University Press. Pp. 312.

Fortunately, it is never too late to review some books. Mr. Wilber's 1958 Edition of his *Iran: Past and Present*, which was first published in 1948, belongs to the category of books which continue to deserve notice, not so much until they are bettered, but because they will always remain reference books of value.

However, some apology is due for the tardiness of this notice of an excellent work; and in this instance the fault lies with the reviewer, who, while constantly having resort to his review copy, has through pressure of business delayed for an unconscionably long time expressing in public his private commendation of this contribution.

It is, perhaps, not the kind of contribution which would immediately recommend itself to people who have lost sight of the wood, being dazzled by the chimera of sheer erudition. But though not a book of severe scholarship, even the most erudite would be hard put to it were they to seek an impressive list of inaccuracies. For the value of *Iran: Past and Present* is the succinct way in which it presents an outline of Persian history and the salient features of the land and people of Iran today, in a form which is both easily accessible and hardly ever so inexact that the learned, turning to this book to refresh their memories, are compelled to cast it on one side and refer to more recondite sources.

If the scholar wishes to recall the main events of the Qājār period, or of the reign of the existing dynasty, Mr. Wilber provides sufficient information reliably. The same may be said if one wishes quickly to recall such matters as heights of mountains, the area of the country, the names of rivers, etc.

Leaving the scholars aside—scholars who cannot be expected to clutter up their brains with a number of statistics and dates whose presence would cloud intelligences which should be occupied with more important matters—we come to a wide public which should be concerned with a book like this one; perhaps more intimately concerned with such a work than the experts can be expected to be.

One of the interesting features of these days, for those of us who are interested in Iran, is the number of queries which members of the general public make about Persia and the Persians. I imagine it is true to say that this interest is equally lively on both sides of the Atlantic. Certainly, as far as experience goes in this country, there has of recent years been a great quickening of curiosity about the subject of

Mr. Wilber's book; and, even when only less perfect editions than the present one were available, this reviewer frequently had recourse to Mr. Wilber's name when recommending to enquirers an informative and compact work about the subject of their question. Clearly, then, he has received the revised edition, the fourth, of a work in whose favour he has long been prejudiced. But I do not think indulgence need be craved on this score, for surely this is the best recommendation the book could have: that it gives the merchant, the tyro in diplomacy and the intelligent person so much valuable information as to be indispensable reading for any member of the public who wants an introduction to Iran.

Going one step further, it is high time in talking about books on Persia that we looked beyond business men and others who may develop an interest in Iran which is perhaps only temporary and not very profound, and thought again about the enthusiasm for knowledge of Persia which informed a large number of thoughtful Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when works like the *Travels* of Pietro delle Valle and Chardin and Tavernier were produced and translated into languages other than their original. Then travellers in Persia were also anthropologists, long before the word anthropology was used to designate an academic discipline; and in those days, when the corpus of knowledge was less, country clergymen and other cultured persons in England, having, perhaps, read Dr. Hyde on the ancient religions of Persia, would request their booksellers to furnish them with works that would tell them more about a great people and a unique terrain. It is one of the ironies of this age that, with the overwhelming increase in scientific and technological knowledge that must be one of its main characteristics, there is found more ignorance among intelligent Europeans of the facts of a country like Iran than would have been discoverable in any self-respecting combination room sixty years ago.

I do not suggest that Mr. Wilber's book has quite the superior quality and extraordinary fascination of some of the works to which reference has been made, or that it will assume the lustre of these with the passage of years. What I do suggest is that it is the kind of book those today so lamentably ignorant of Iran ought to read, and that it is one of the best of its kind. Moreover, since Mr. Elwell Sutton's now very out-of-date *Modern Iran* was published, it is almost the only book of its kind in English; a fact which is a measure of the gratitude Mr. Wilber is owed.

P. W. A.

The Book of Government or Rules for Kings. The *Siyasat-nama* or *Siyar al-Muluk* of Nizam al-Mulk. Translated by Hubert Darke. Published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd. 1960. Pp. 259. Indexed. 28s.

This work has been noticed in the Press with more praise than criticism, and indeed on the face of it praise is deserved. The ignorance and heedlessness of British legislators over questions relating to Iran has been a source of woe to British students of that country in times which go back considerably before the present century. One of the books it would be useful for members of Government and Parliament who have to do with Persian questions to read is this one. At the time of the 1951 oil crisis, this book was not available in the English language to indicate to journalists and others something of the origins of Persian political attitudes, something of Persian political habits, and something of the centuries of suffering and survival of a people who, at least, deserve respectful and thoughtful consideration and, at most, a high degree of admiration.

Recalling the lack of this work in English in 1951, and regrets attendant upon it and upon the foolish and ignorant things which were said then about Iranians, I welcomed Mr. Darke's translation enthusiastically. Enthusiasm on the score of its being a book which should certainly be read by the increasing number who today have to make decisions of one kind or another in which their own and Iranian interests are engaged is not abated by perusal of the book. But looked at in the way a serious student might regard it, there are reservations.

The notes are extremely inadequate, and this inadequacy by itself goes a long

way to invalidate the book if it is to be reviewed on the level of the austerer scholarship. Yet the service rendered by Mr. Darke in providing this translation is such that one is extremely reluctant to dismiss his work on the grounds that punditry might advise, for a fault for which the translator is possibly not entirely responsible. For it may be suspected that the publishers, as some publishers tend to, did not encourage deep footnotes; and it seems certain that a man who would take so much trouble over the translation of the text would have had at his command all the notes necessary had he been allowed full scope to insert them.

If the notes were neglected because the translator and his publishers thought the Nizām al-Mulk's message capable of telling the story on its own, then again they were falling into an error for which, these days, they cannot be entirely blamed. When it is assumed that the reading public is not intelligent enough and capable of having its curiosity sufficiently aroused to want to examine in detail matters suggested to it by books, then the blame lies not entirely with the authors and publishers who attempt to cater accordingly, but of course with a public whose slapdash and apathetic reactions give reason for these assumptions. But Mr. Darke and his publishers should have recalled greater days, when intelligent readers were more industrious and curious, to whom books were gateways to a variety of information and to enlargement of understanding.

It is not possible to criticize in detail Mr. Darke's translation, because he has used several different manuscript sources and not worked from one established text. This is because one has not yet been made. If the news be true that Mr. Darke's own text of the original may be published in Iran, it is extremely heartening. The original of this book is one I have long wanted to see printed in an endowed series of Persian and Arabic texts in England. But if it is to be brought out in Teheran, then at least we shall have a new and better text of the *Siyāsat-nāma* than those available to date. Perhaps the completest praise for Mr. Darke's translation is that he is obviously a European scholar well qualified to give us the revised Persian text of a work to which he has applied himself with so much diligence, and of a masterpiece whose writer's spirit Mr. Darke seems eminently qualified humanely and subtly to comprehend.

P. W. A.

Bases of Islamic Culture. By Syed Abdul Latif. Institute of Indo-Middle East Cultural Studies, Hyderabad, India. 1959. Pp. 234. Rs. 10.

Islam denotes a mode of living; living consists of acts and feelings based—consciously or unconsciously—on a philosophy of life. So the author of this book divides it into two parts, the beliefs on which Islam is based and its expression in conduct. Each chapter is accompanied by "proof texts" from the Koran and the traditions about Muhammad. The book deals with Islam as it ought to be, with only occasional glances at the imperfections in its practice. The fundamental beliefs are that God is one, that nothing is like Him, that He made men of one blood to dwell on the earth, so that every one has some responsibility for the whole, that God has revealed His will to men and that this life is not the end but a preparation for something better. In the second part the author tries to reconcile the absolute power of God with human freedom, and is no more successful than other thinkers. He then treats of discipline; that imposed by revelation consisting in worship, payment of the religious tax, fasting and pilgrimage; self-discipline which is the practice of the presence of God. A chapter is given up to knowledge which is essential to civilized life, and the sweet reasonableness of Islam is emphasized. The Islamic state does not fit into any of the categories recognized by Western thought. The final chapter sets out the demands which Islam makes on its followers.

One must admire the spirit in which the book is written. It may be criticized from two sides. First, that it is not consistent with itself. The author, in common with all Muslims, insists on the uniqueness of God, "that nothing is like Him" (in other words, man can know nothing about Him), yet he expects man "to create in himself the attributes of God"; substitute for "attributes" the word "qualities" and the contradiction is obvious. Again, he speaks of a future life, yet says that

heaven and hell will come to an end. Whatever these terms mean, whether places or states of mind, the souls of men must be somewhere, and one cannot imagine an orthodox Muslim teaching absorption into the Godhead. Second, it does not agree with what Muhammad thought. Everything shows that Muhammad believed hell to be eternal; this book asserts that it is a purgatory and that all will be eventually purged of sin. That Islam is the religion of peace is contradicted by its early history. Points of detail might also be contested. The author condemns modern divines for fostering mediævalism and earlier divines for misunderstanding the Koran; he might be more severe and blame them for not seeing that their doctrine of the Koran is too mechanical to satisfy modern knowledge. One must add that the transcription of Arabic names and words is erratic.

A. S. TRITTON.

India: The Most Dangerous Decades. By Selig S. Harrison. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, U.S.A., and Oxford University Press, London. 1960. Pp. 350. 40s. net.

Here is another monumental example of the great interest being taken in the United States in the development of political life and affairs in the newly independent India. And, again, it was organized largely through the concerted efforts of American universities. It is monumental not merely in being a big book, but especially because of the wide research which the great number of references to and quotations from official and other studies, books, speeches and magazine articles show the author to have made into different branches of his subject. A feature of particular interest for people who know India, as well as for those newly learning about the great sub-continent, is that it specially deals with mischiefs that have been brewing in the wake of the establishment of Indian "national independence" and with the consequential probabilities.

The author, after working for the Associated Press of America in its Detroit Bureau and at its New York Foreign Desk, was, "during three years' residence in New Delhi," its correspondent "covering India, Pakistan, Nepal, Ceylon and Afghanistan." After that triennium, he returned to his native country and "began this study during a Nieman Fellowship in journalism at Harvard University and later as a consultant to the Modern India Project, University of California (Berkeley), and as a research associate of the Language and Communication Research Centre at Columbia University." It was, he says, his assignment to India which led to this book—which deals only with India.

Mr. Harrison's emphases, the use he makes of some of his quotations, his interpretations of historic events, his neglect of others, and so on, sometimes invite criticism. He would doubtless not, on the strength of his brief experience, claim infallibility in such matters. But his account, as an experienced journalist and student, of what is now going on is penetrating and, in its factual information, truly interesting and valuable. What chiefly made him choose "Most Dangerous Decades" as the sub-title of his book were the already disruptive and still growing forces of separatism in the Indian States (in former terminology, Provinces). That their borders should be redrawn on linguistic lines was a demand pressed upon the British Raj in India: and inherited from it by the Government of independent India. Its reference by the new régime to a States Reorganization Commission could not result in solution of the very deep and complex questions involved, and Mr. Harrison shows how alarmingly they have increased in bitterness and strife.

He writes, for instance, of the British having, by insistence on the use of English in certain branches of public affairs and on consequential education in English, induced the growth of an English-educated élite not intimately representative of the masses of the population and of their ideas, especially in the villages; and declares that the masses, now newly enjoying universal franchise, have fresh leaders in more intimate touch with them and are bursting with linguistic and racial jealousies and with intense hatred of control by the Central Government in the Indian capital. This hate he shows to be specially excited in central and southern India by the new Central Government's resolute efforts to make Hindi the common language to be

used throughout India, a policy, say the southerners, restarting the age-old determination of pre-British Powers in northern India to dominate the south. In the threatening situation created by these conflicting agitations, our author tells us, Soviet-sponsored and Soviet-inspired communist propagandists have found a remarkably successful and promising hunting-ground.

Are we to accept the picture as authoritative? Well, the dangerous trend towards fragmentation of the body politic which it indicates was foreseen years ago by Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, when in speeches he warned the advocates of linguistic provincial, or state, boundaries that they were preparing "a boiling cauldron of trouble." Mr. B. R. Ambedkhar, former non-Brahmin Law Member of the newly independent Government of India, protested, as Mr. Harrison reminds us, that in India "linguism is only another name for communalism." There are thoroughly up-to-date authoritative warnings of the same kind. The Indian President, Rajendra Prasad, in a message to his country on August 15, thirteenth anniversary of the establishment of Indian independence, reminded his people that "the political and administrative unity of the country was achieved and maintained by the British," and warned them that "unless we meet squarely the challenge of these forces of casteism, communalism, regionalism, and, I may add, linguism, we may be losing the opportunities which freedom has brought in its wake"; while Premier Jawaharlal Nehru, in a "call to the nation" on the same date, uttered a solemn warning that "if anyone keeps his province, or language, or communalism above the country, then that will amount to weakening the foundations of freedom itself" and "spell disaster for India." Mr. Harrison tells us what was in their minds to make them choose such grave words.

A. H. B.

A Bunch of Old Letters. Written mostly to Jawaharlal Nehru and some written by him. London: Asia Publishing House. 1960. Pp. 523. 30s.

Nehru: The Years of Power. By Vincent Sheean. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1960. Pp. 306. 21s. net.

Every one of us has his or her psychological and mental make-up and consequential behaviour influenced, disturbed, constrained this way or that by the experiences of life and occupation. To publish over 500 pages of the private correspondence of a prominent and influential political leader in world affairs as he wends his way through this puzzle garden must be to throw revealing new lights upon his known activities. In the present case, Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru personally made "a selection for publication" from letters "mostly written in the twenties and thirties and the early forties in the course of our struggle for freedom and during the intervals when I was not in prison" and after "termites and other insects had made a feast of many of my papers" and, so he says, police had at times taken others. The revealing new lights are, therefore, those which in after years he thinks it most appropriate for the information of other people. The volume was first published in India in 1958, since when another letter or two has been included.

The Pundit told us in his autobiography, written in prison years ago, that his heart contained no anger against England or the English people, and he has further testified that his mind and outlook are largely what the impress of his long years at Harrow and Cambridge made them. What must puzzle many people about him, in spite of his writings and speeches, is how on earth he and his political associates in India became possessed of the idea that their agitations could reasonably be described as a "struggle for freedom." For the past century before this collection of letters was put together the steady, designed development of that freedom, for and by the peoples of India, was the declared aim of British statesmanship concerning India and the perpetual objective of British administration and leadership there. Progress and eventual success depended not on activities of the kind that repeatedly got the Pundit into prison, but, rather, on the sustained and practical co-operation given by those of his fellow-countrymen who relied upon the British assurances to that effect—not only because they believed the British promises to be British bonds,

but also because, through their studies, primarily of the British history and literature set before them in schools and colleges founded by or with the help of the British raj, they had the wit to perceive that national independence and freedom are of the very essence of British political idealism and British imperialism. If the Pundit and Gandhi and their associates had, for instance, whole-heartedly co-operated in working the India Reform Scheme of 1919, their great and wonderful land and its people would almost certainly have attained national freedom several years earlier than they did.

The letters now before us are from very many correspondents, who mostly offer in them political advice according to their several viewpoints. There are some from Jawaharlal's distinguished father, Pundit Motilal Nehru, who, after three years strenuous opposition to the 1919 Reforms Scheme, following its inauguration in 1921, got elected to the Central Legislature as leader of a party resolved upon the destruction of the new constitution from within, but who found their disruptive effort dissolved by their own co-operation in working it, so irresistible was its practical virtue in winning their support. Letters clearly inspired by the kindest desire to give constructive help reached Jawaharlal from Sir Harcourt Butler (Governor of the United Provinces), Lord Lothian, Sir George Schuster. Others reached him from fellow-Indians and were generally encouraging, though not always in agreement. Sir Tej Bahdur Sapru sent a warning that insistence on the widespread use of Hindi, in substitution for English, would lead to trouble. There are sharp exchanges with Mr. Jinnah over the communal problem. There is a silly anti-British letter from the Director of the American Civil Liberties Union. Also notable are inciting letters from British party politicians. Thus, Sir Stafford Cripps wrote on October 11, 1939, when the Indian National Congress was non-co-operating in the prosecution of the newly started great war: ". . . Congress should now stand as firm as a rock upon its demands. . . . Some people still think we are fighting for the ideals of democracy and freedom, but of course it has now become clear that, as on former occasions, that is but the excuse of imperialism fighting for its life. . . . The one bright feature in the present all too gloomy outlook is that masses of people, including some of the most die-hard Tories, are realizing that our old civilization is finished. . . ."

There is room for a measure of sympathy with Pundit Jawaharlal in the midst of all this intriguing postal assortment, and we may guess how much it helped him to keep throwing spanners into the machinery of constitutional progress instead of assisting it.

Mr. Sheean's book about Pundit Jawaharlal and his Government is splendid reading and a brilliant piece of descriptive journalism by one who, as he says, has "visited India repeatedly during the past twelve years, usually for months at a time." His naturally ingenuous delight in what are to him, as an American, India's curiosities, modern achievements, political and social institutions, scenery and people is infectious. To those who know India, slips which he makes here and there owing to the brevity of his acquaintance with the great sub-continent are amusing rather than important. For instance, he has a good deal to say about Gandhi, with whom he discussed affairs, but he describes him as "the little black man" and fancifully tells us that "the world at large saw all India aroused in 1921, again in 1930, again in 1941, by Gandhi's irresistible appeal to the masses in the national struggle." Yet he agrees that "India as a whole *never* accepted Gandhi's teaching." But Gandhi did not disguise that his reason for prescribing non-violence was that if and when violence occurred there was immediate popular clamour for the police to stop it, whereas if people in their practice of civil disobedience avoided violence the police would be unable to intervene.

The author has a vivid chapter, "The Potter and the Welder," describing the gradual development of Indian heavy industry and the adaptability of the villager for it, and says that when a factory director gave him tea in his room in a factory it was "for all the world like the same room in the most modern of American factories"—and then excuses the comparison by adding, ". . . but such things usually do seem American to us because we saw them for the first time at home." He writes, in a chapter headed "The Enchanted Valley," an illuminating review of what is usually called the Kashmir Problem. His description of the Indian Premier

is a fine tribute to Jawaharlal and shrewd analysis of the method and the meaning of the Pundit's remarkable hold upon the imagination and even worship of the Indian people, not only in political circles but in every town and village. His chapter on "The Man Nehru" is both intimate and candid, not the least readable bit of it being his lively account of an angry dressing down given him by Jawaharlal for a despatch that he sent to the *Herald Tribune* of New York, giving the Karachi point of view on Kashmir. Lastly, as an appendix, is reprinted a document written for private circulation by Pundit Jawaharlal, and here reprinted by his permission, on the economic outlook and economic policies of India and the more advanced countries of the West. It affords a welcome glimpse into the study and assessment of Indian and world conditions by the Premier and his associates and of the consequential policy which they are likely to follow.

A. H. B.

India Today. By Frank Moraes. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1960. Pp. 242. Indexed. 10s. 6d.

I recall the days when the author of *India Today* was arousing interest as a young and thoughtful member of *The Times of India*, in Bombay. Since then he has come increasingly to be regarded as the most objective of Indians seriously writing about his country in its most formative post-independent years.

The present work is really a series of essays to be read separately if necessary, yet collectively projecting the story of India as a whole. Something is provided for all tastes. History, from an Aryo-Dravidian synthesis lost in the past, down to Jawaharlal Nehru, is compressed and clarified. The impact of the British is fairly placed in perspective. We are arraigned for stultifying economic development through the importation of our own financial skill and resources. We are equally commended for the creation of an Indian middle class, and indeed for the creation of Indian political consciousness itself; a proposition with which Englishmen would find no difficulty in agreeing.

The modern pattern of economic development is faithfully analysed and traced, with its firm trend to complete socialization through persuasion. But for the reader who knew best the India of the 1920s and 1930s, the most fascinating passages are those which deal with Mahatma Gandhi, his relationship to the Indian National Congress and Nehru, and the subsequent test to which the Congress has been submitted in India's brave new world of the 1950s. With the passing of martyrdom and gaol for the sake of independence, things are very different. Mr. Moraes has not spared the Congress leadership.

It is refreshing to find Mahatma Gandhi submitted at last to an objective analysis. The great man has suffered too long from an unintelligent adulation by his various disciples and biographers which has done him no good; and Mr. Moraes restores the balance. Cottage industries and the spinning wheel had their part to play in the India of the 1920s. Today, to an India feeling its way forward to a balanced economy of agriculture and industry, a structure based on the Mahratta plough is clearly meaningless. Thus we are told that Gandhi's economic ideas were a "deterrent to clear thinking and positive action." We are further reminded that the Mahatma, while disliking both capitalism and industrialization, was quite prepared to accept large capitalist contributions to his political and social funds. Only when we pass on to note the closing days of disillusion does the author permit himself to recognize the great man coming into his own. When all around him were losing their heads in the general madness, "he yet insisted that justice should be done to all without fear or favour. . . . This was Gandhi's finest hour."

There is much else, including a valuable appraisal of foreign policy which includes a cautious approach to Kashmir within the context of the new threat from China. Altogether, this is a book which can usefully be in the hands of all serious students of modern India.

BIRDWOOD.

India, 1947-50. Volume I, Internal Affairs. Volume II, External Affairs. Edited by S. L. Poplai. Oxford University Press. Indexed. 87s. 6d.

These two volumes of documents, including parliamentary and other speeches, are a most valuable, indeed necessary, manual for students of an eventful and bloody period in which the two successor states of the partitioned Indian Empire established their independence.

The first volume, devoted to Internal Affairs, brings out the achievement of India and Pakistan in maintaining a degree of political and economic stability at a time of stress for the Sterling Area, involving the devaluation of the pound and of the Indian, but not the Pakistan, rupee. India contended with grave difficulties; Pakistan had to build her State "from scratch"—to use the favourite phrase—and simultaneously to receive a horde of Muslim refugees, mostly poor, in exchange for the Hindu emigrants to India, who took with them much of the country's capital.

The exacerbation of strained Indo-Pakistan relations by the questions of Junagadh, Hyderabad and, above all, Kashmir, are the subject of many documents in Volume I, and are taken in Volume II on to the wider stage of Commonwealth and foreign diplomacy and the United Nations Organization.

Most ably edited by the Secretary-General of the Indian Council of World Affairs, Mr. Sundar Lal Poplai, these documents are not only invaluable material for the study of recent history and formation of future policy, but also give fascinating reading to anyone who knew the sub-continent during any part of the period reviewed.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

The Indian Heritage. By Himayun Kabir. Asia Publishing House, London. First Edition 1946. Second Edition 1947. Third Edition 1955. Reprint 1960. Pp. 142 + iv. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 18s. 6d. net.

This little book, as shown by its increasing demand during the last fifteen years, is an extremely competent study and analysis of Indian history.

It will be seen that, as stated by Mr. Panikkar in *The Indian News Chronicle* and by Dr. Ramaswami Aiyar in *The National Standard*, we have here a really brilliant starting-point in Indian historical thought; taken very seriously indeed both in Europe and Asia. There is a clarity of concise expression too often lacking in such ambitious surveys of broad historical horizons. He appears to have collected his ordered facts on a spacious butterfly-board, and then suitably spotlighted them in their relative historical importance as components of the "synthesis" which is the Indian sub-continent.

The first thirty pages of "Introduction" provide an eloquent and unbiased survey of the general and political background since the beginnings of history 5,000 years ago. True, a Hindoo might have given us a slightly different perspective to a Muslim. It is often inferred by the latter that if it had not been for the British, the Quran might well have become the dominant influence throughout India. Kabir's masterly survey of the merging process over the years probably throws greater light on the real facts than will be found in most publications today.

The main tides of migration start with the Aryan invasion impinging on the Indus valley sites of Mahenja Daro, linked as it was with the Sumerian civilizations five milleniums ago. The very diversity of the various influxes in itself contributed to a kind of unity. But the process started well before the Aryans, and successive inroads of fighting races came to conquer, but ended by losing themselves in the Indian cauldron, a cauldron which never cooled. Mechanical juxtaposition of heterogeneous elements made for a sort of malleability and a rich complexity in the social structure. Geography was a factor. The vast spaces offered room for independent development followed by gradual merging. It is an interesting speculation what effect D.D.T. might have had on the Indian sociology during those thousands of years. Vigorous hillmen and warriors were in turn emasculated by malaria and the anophelese mosquito. It was not until the British adopted the practice of returning home after life stints in the unhealthy plains that invading vitality could overcome the pervasive lethargy of Indian summers. This loss of energy is one of the most striking facets of the old world so conspicuous all over the East.

In all the East, and indeed in all the world, the "kathak," or story-teller (p. 52), has kept tradition alive and provided a sonic record of historical background. Before the art of writing it often formed the only connection with the past. The wandering minstrels recounted tales of ancient valour and romance. The caravans had no need for passports, to the great advantage of knowledge and miscegenation. People and events were crystallized into the broad pattern of a cohesive Indian history as here convincingly explained. Invading dictators came and went to leaven the process till civilization from the West hardened the molten mass into its modern mould. Perhaps the British influence put forward national consolidation a few decades and gave a prepared background to the structure of government we now see was lacking in the Congo.

This eloquent story of the kaleidoscope of Indian history will probably take its place as the first uncompromising record of how the nation emerged in the pattern of today.

G. M. ROUTH.

Men and Mules on a Mission of Democracy. By Parmananda Sharma. Asia Publishing House (printed in India). Pp. 129. Illus. Sketch map. 29s.

Despite the title, here is a very human account of a mission on electioneering business to the Spiti Valley of the Inner Himalaya. Leaders, members, moviemans, doctor, police, orderlies, mules—and a dog—followed this Tobias in a round trip, entering Spiti from the Sutlej side by way of Rampur, and leaving it by the Kunzum and Rohtang Passes to Kulu. The book carries a persuasive foreword by Mr. Nehru, commending it to all interested in mountains and electioneering. Though the mountaineering is in fact just a trek over difficult Himalayan terrain, fortunately it prevails over the elections.

Spiti is of course a Buddhist country in close touch by race and religion with Tibet and Ladakh. For that reason alone the story is now worth a thought. That apart, Mr. Sharma writes the evocative prose demanded of a true lover of the Himalaya, sometimes it may be a little reminiscent of the Victorian romantics—Tennyson's *Lotus Eaters* is among his inspirations—but in faultless English and ringing true. It would be hard to find more eloquent descriptions of the glories of the Panjab Himalaya.

On the more practical side the author has to confess that only 20 per cent. of the voters came to the polls, and, when asked how their political preferences were determined, they replied:

"We will do as the Lama Guru decides."

"And how will the Lama Guru decide?"

"The book will guide the Lama Guru."

On their journey the party traversed many of what used to be the Panjab Hill States, now no longer under princely rule. As in duty bound, Mr. Sharma identifies the Kshatriya with tyranny and waywardness, and recalls with satisfaction "the powerful surgeon's knife of Sardar Vallabhai Patel." He embroiders this theme by citing the tale of the conspiracy and revolution conducted by Kautilya, "that subtlest of Brahmin brains known to history," who overthrew the monarch and substituted the rule of the intelligentsia. Here, no doubt, he sees the pattern of modern India. But in India are many forces, concealed below an illusory surface. Patterns are interwoven.

For the price, the maps are not very good. There are a number of misprints. But all who are moved by memory of the Himalaya should read what Mr. Sharma has to tell.

OLAF CAROE.

Tibet Disappears. By Chanakya Sen. Asia Publishing House. Pp. 474. 48s. 6d.

This is not a book, but a compilation of treaties, speeches in and out of parliament, diplomatic notes and press conferences, entitled on the fly-leaf "A Document-

ary History of Tibet's International Status, the Great Rebellion and its Aftermath." As documentation it is valuable, giving as it does Tibetan, Indian, Chinese and British material and points of view with impartial honesty, and ranging beyond the White Papers published by the Government of India. In particular it may be referred to as a sort of Indian Hansard on Tibet. The debates in the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha are enthralling, and bring home to the reader the intensity of Indian emotion and concern not only over the violation of India's own frontiers, but, more altruistically, over the tragedy that has overcome the people of Tibet.

Mr. Nehru's speeches and press conferences are given in detail. But more interesting perhaps, for the Indian Prime Minister's words and attitudes have already appeared in White Papers, are the speeches of such leaders of political thought as Acharya Kripalani, Professor Ranga, M. R. Masani and M. A. Ayyangar. Messrs. Brajeshwar Prasad and S. A. Dange appear as rather lone voices speaking for China. Most moving of all is an extraordinarily eloquent oration made by Mr. Jaya Prakash Narain before the All-India Convention on Tibet held in May, 1959. Mr. Narain ended with words which challenge the title of this book: "Then is Tibet lost for ever? No. A thousand times, No. Tibet will not die because there is no death for the human spirit. Communism will not succeed because man will not be slave for ever. Tyrannies have come and gone, and Cæsars and Czars and dictators. But the spirit of man goes on for ever. Tibet will be resurrected." The passage gives some notion of the force behind the Indian conviction of the doctrine of the Avatar, in this case the reincarnation of the spirit on a national scale, transcending the individual soul.

The last chapter in the book contains an unavoidably incomplete survey of the exchanges on the Indo-China border question, breaking off before this had reached the fierce controversies which arose over the later incidents when Chinese attacks led to deep penetration and loss of Indian life.

There is a map opposite page 465, reproduced from the India Government's official *Atlas of the Northern Frontier*, and showing the areas of Chinese encroachment along the Himalaya and in Ladakh.

The least satisfactory part of the book is the Introduction, which contains palpable historical and geographical errors. The Ganga River does not rise in Tibet, though more than one of its tributaries does (p. 1); it rises at Gaumukh, near Gangotri; Tibet does *not* border on the Soviet Union (p. 2); the Manchu dynasty did *not* become rulers of China in the fifteenth but in the seventeenth century (p. 4); sovereignty is quite different from suzerainty (p. 12); and a Tibetan delegation did *not* take part in the drafting of the Chinese constitution (p. 13). It is begging the question to say (p. 5) that, even at the height of Chinese power, Burma, Nepal, Ladakh, Bhutan and Sikkim were never really integral parts of the Chinese Empire. And on page 26 is an inevitable dose of the opiate of "the ageless friendly relations between China and India." There are perhaps no two great peoples in the world who have developed more separately and with less contact than these two.

Nevertheless, in bringing together a mass of documentation, this book serves a most useful purpose.

OLAF CAROE.

Ceylon. An Introduction to a "Resplendent Land." By Argus John Tresidder. 1959. Van Nostrand Company Inc., Princeton, New Jersey. Pp. 237 + x. 8½" x 5¼". Map. \$3.50.

The author is one of those observant travellers who make a real study of the countries they visit on official business—in this case five years of service as United States Public Affairs Officer. His bibliography of some eighty books and twenty-four articles probably covers all the main sources of information regarding this fascinating island. In his Preface he classes this little book as an *apéritif*, rather than an *entrée*, designed to whet the appetite of intending visitors and stimulate further study. It is not a guide book but a travelling commentary, especially for the uninitiated.

The chapters cover the land and its people—History, Politics, Economy, Religions, Art. They form an adequate survey of the problems past and present of a defence-

less and desirable island exploited by Indians, Moors, Portuguese and Dutch. Only the British eventually took steps to convert the economy into a viable independent State. These luscious tropical islands, abounding in every kind of natural resources, cry out for national development; but two main factors are needed—capital and a virile population. D.D.T. has reduced malaria but has not yet generated adequate energy among the Sinhalese or even the Tamils. The weakening of the British steel frame has added to the number of unsolved problems.

Yet if "Sri Lanka" could produce a Rockefeller prepared to allot a billion to build up a prosperous State, there is probably no country in the world which could ensure a more profitable return.

With all this Mr. Tresidder has produced a very readable book, in spite of the profound nature of his information. He thinks his words will encourage newcomers to explore for themselves. They will; but the pleasure they will give those who already know and love this beautiful island will to most readers seem much more important. Happy memories will be revived—one might almost say relived. The writer's object has been definitely achieved.

G. M. ROUTH.

Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age. By George Vernadsky. Yale University Press. 1959. 8vo. Pp. 347. 8 Maps, Bibliography and Index. 60s.

Readers of the three earlier volumes of Professor Vernadsky's monumental history of Russia, of which six further volumes are promised, will not be disappointed with the present work, which is clearly the fruit of much thoughtful study and is written in the lively and unlaboured style that gave grace to the previous works, in which Professor Vernadsky has had the collaboration of Michael Karpovich.

The period covered by the fourth volume in the series is perhaps the most significant, and by no means the least interesting in the dark and turbulent history of Russia. The drastic reforms of Peter the Great, and the role played by Russia in the power politics of eighteenth-century Europe belong to the history of modern Europe, and as such are part of the normal equipment of any student of European history. These developments, important as they were in determining the subsequent shape of Eastern European politics, were the inevitable outcome of the vast sixteenth-century movement for the unification of the Russian lands, the formation of an imperial Russian state and the assumption by Church and State of the claims and policies of Byzantium. This last, the claim to the headship of the Orthodox world, was to have momentous consequences in Russia's attitude towards the Western world, and created an attitude of mind which still expresses itself in a messianic urge to preach and, when possible, to enforce conformity.

Professor Vernadsky's narrative, after a short introduction dealing with the background of Russian life at the middle of the fifteenth century, begins with the accession to the throne of Muscovy of Ivan III, a ruler who was to transform the Grand Duchy of Moscow into the unified state of Russia, comprising the lands and fiefs of the more or less independent principalities and city states such as Novgorod, Tver and Riazan. By casting off the yoke of the Tartar Khans, Ivan was able to direct the energies of the Russian people into the movement for unification and expansion which has lasted until our own times. By his marriage with Sophia Paleologue, niece of the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI, Ivan fulfilled his ambition to be head of the whole Orthodox world and successor of the Cæsars of Constantinople as well as *Gosudar Vseya Rusi*, Sovereign of All Russia. In this he had the support of the Church, bringing about the union of Church and State, a concept which in modern terms still informs Russian political thinking, albeit the role of the Church is now taken by the Party.

This transformation, within the space of a few years, of a small dependent Russian dukedom, owing fealty to the Khans of the Golden Horde, into a powerful centralized state, gave to the Russian people something they had hitherto lacked—*i.e.*, a sense of unity on a national basis. As the power of the State was consolidated, the sense of imperial dignity and authority led to the claims of a great power and to the conflicts with Russia's great northern neighbours, Poland and Lithuania.

The course of these conflicts, which won for Russia a seaboard on the Arctic and an outlet to the Baltic, is described with a wealth of detail by Professor Vernadsky. The repercussions of this struggle, and indeed the whole movement for expansion inaugurated by Ivan and continued by his successors, are still felt today. The roots of much that is still characteristic of Russian external policies are to be found in the expansionist urge of both pre- and post-Petrine Russia, just as the influence of the Tartar overlordship was to be found in many of the practices of government and administration in later Tsarist autocracy. The harshness, suspicion of foreigners and obscurantism of Russian administrations may also be to some extent attributed to Tartar influence, although official Orthodoxy undoubtedly played a part.

The chapter dealing with Western Russia in the sixteenth century presents a comprehensive picture of Russian society at that time, and of the disturbing influences of Church and State that contact with Poland, Lithuania and the Western world generally brought in their train.

Professor Vernadsky has access to many Polish and Russian sources that are not readily available to the British student, and in describing the religious conflicts of the latter part of the sixteenth century that were an important aspect of relations between Orthodoxy and the Catholic world of Poland, he throws a good deal of light on an obscure and tangled period of Russian history.

The convolutions of present-day Russian policies, which appear to be either arbitrary or to be linked with ideological considerations, are in fact meaningful only if considered in the light of Russian history, which in turn is of course largely determined by the facts of geography, climate, race, etc. The main trends of Russian history, however, stem from the great convulsive movements which the Russian people have been fated to undergo. Among these, perhaps the most significant have been the Tartar invasion, the great movement for national unity under Ivan III and his successor Basil III, the disastrous "Time of Troubles" (1598-1613), the reign of Peter the Great, the Pugachev rebellion during the reign of Catherine and, in our own times, the great revolution of 1917. All these are characteristic of the violent and drastic nature of political change in Russia, and are in keeping with the main attributes of Russian personality. The centralization of power, brought about by the Tsars to administer a vast and turbulent land, remains the pattern of Russian political life today. Professor Vernadsky's study of a formative period will help the student as well as the general reader to understand how this came about and where the springs of action in Russian affairs find their source.

C. H. ELLIS.

The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities. By R. Conquest. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. Pp. 203. 6 Maps. 30s.

The appearance of Mr. Conquest's account of Soviet Russian ruthlessness in dealing with whole groups of the nationalities within the Soviet Union is most timely in view of the violent propaganda attacks on Western colonialism now being made by spokesmen of the Communist bloc. Mr. Conquest has made full use of Soviet documentation in his study, these sources providing not only the main facts but also illustrating the shifts of policy and interpretations of history that are characteristic of Soviet official pronouncements.

Behind the Soviet attack on the record of Western countries in Asia and Africa there is, of course, a political motive that goes far beyond traditional Russian tactics of creating a disturbance in one area in order to gain a major objective elsewhere. It is to gain the leadership of the whole neutral and uncommitted world, in particular the newly independent African and Asian states, and in so doing to weaken the influence of the free world.

Support of claims for national independence for colonial peoples, however, carried some risk of rebounding within the territory of the Soviet Union where some 30 millions of the population consist of national minorities, mainly of Asian race and largely Muslim in religion. Economic development in the areas, particularly of Bokhara, Tashkent and Ashkhabad in central Asia, are not heard in the United Nations, together has offset this danger to a certain extent. The fact that the voices

with those of Ghana, Nigeria and Guinea is no indication that the descendants of the Golden Horde and the armies of Tamerlane and Ghengiz Khan have lost their love of freedom and the sense of a notable historic past.

The existence of a colonial régime within the Soviet Union is masked by a spurious form of autonomy and the outward forms of national cultures, while the lands and economic life of the regions are being taken over in an ever-increasing scale by Russian settlers.

As the inheritors of the Tsarist Empire, and by her own policies of expansion, the Soviet Union is now the greatest of all Colonial powers. The fact that the Caucasus and the vast plain of Central Asia, with their large Muslim population of Turki and Mongol origin, are contiguous with Russia proper, tends to obscure the true nature of the relationship that exists between these areas and the central government at Moscow.

In a brief introductory chapter, Mr. Conquest outlines the history of the Russian occupation of the Caucasus and Turkistan, which was carried out in the last century at a time when the colonial expansion of European powers was in full swing overseas.

During the early years of the Soviet régime in Russia, the resistance of the Caucasian native population to the Russian invasion, as well as that of Turkistan, was extolled by Soviet writers. All this has changed. The official line now is that Russian occupation and rule were beneficial to the conquered people and that native resistance was the work of reactionary and treacherous agents of foreign powers.

Traditional native literature, mainly epic poems, has been purged of "decadent and nationalist ideas." Any native official, writer or public man who dares to place local interests or aims above those of the Soviet Union or the Communist party meets with short shrift. Within the Soviet Union, "nationalism" is synonymous with "bourgeois deviation" and counter-revolution, while Soviet support for nationalist movements elsewhere are explained by the Communist concept that "support must be given to such nationalist movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow imperialism." (Stalin: *Problems of Leninism*. 1924.)

Mr. Conquest has preceded his account of the wholesale deportation of the various racial groups between 1941 and 1945 with a description of the minorities in the Caucasus, which were the principal victims of that appalling episode. In addition to the Chechen-Irgush tribes of the North Caucasus and the Barbadian, Balkar, Karachai and Kalmyk peoples in the same region, the Volga Germans, who had been settled in the Lower Volga area since the time of Catherine, the Crimean Tartars and several large colonies of Greeks, were also forcibly ejected from their homes and lands and transported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. This operation was carried out in the most ruthless fashion, ostensibly as punishment for the action of some sections of these communities who were accused of co-operation with the German armies during the war. More than a million men, women and children were transported from their historic homelands, their property seized, and their lands taken over by Russian and Ukrainian settlers.

The names of the regional administrative areas were erased from Soviet maps, and all references to these peoples in Soviet official publications, including the Great Soviet Encyclopædia, were expunged or underwent drastic revision. National Caucasian heroes, such as Shamil and Mansur, hitherto acclaimed as fighters for freedom, were reduced to the stature of traitors and bandits, and the struggle for freedom by these people against Tsarist overlordship became, in Soviet accounts, a treacherous rebellion against rightful authority.

It was not until 1955 that silence about the deportees was broken. Brief references then began to appear in the Soviet press regarding the existence of these people. But it was not until the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow in February, 1956, when Khrushchev made his attack on Stalin, that the facts regarding the deportations were admitted. In attacking Stalin, Khrushchev denounced, among other misdeeds of the former Soviet leader, the deportation of the Chechens, the Ingushi, Balkars, Karachais and Kalmyks as an unjustified act; no reference was made to the Crimean Tartars or the Volga Germans.

Khrushchev's speech was followed in July, 1956, by a decree which, in effect, re-established the administrative units of the deported people, and foreshadowed their resettlement and rehabilitation. In subsequent pronouncements it was made public

that restitution would be made, and, in fact, since that time the remnants of the victims of Stalin's "Nationality Policy" have been returning in small groups to their homelands. How many perished during the deportation may never be known. So far, the Volga Germans do not seem to have been allowed to return to their former region, and the Crimean Tartars appear to have been scattered. In any case, the farms and lands of all the deportees have been largely occupied by settlers from Russia and the Ukraine, who now form a majority of the population in territories which hitherto were inhabited almost entirely by people of non-Russian race.

The decision to permit the return of the deportees was evidently reached at a time when the policy of attacking colonialism and supporting nationalist movements in Asia and Africa was under consideration in Moscow. The Soviet Union was vulnerable to counter-attack unless some action was taken to repatriate the deported minority groups. Stalin, now a convenient scapegoat, could be charged with impunity with an act for which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had been responsible. (Officials, including General Serov, who were in charge of the deportation, are incidentally still active as Soviet security officers.) Awkward questions regarding the Kalmyks and other tribes were being asked by Asian leaders and newspapers. The Arab world, and political leaders in other Muslim countries, such as Indonesia and Pakistan, now objects of Soviet attention and solicitude, were apt to inquire what had happened to their Muslim brethren in the Caucasus and the Crimea.

The deportation and destruction of the corporate life of these unfortunate people is on a par with the Soviet treatment of the nomad people of Kazakhstan. The settled agricultural and urban Turki-speaking people of Turkistan have benefited from the economic advancement of the territory now known as Uzbekistan and Kirghizia, but national unity has been impeded by an arbitrary division of the people into separate administrative areas and the imposition of different alphabets for what is virtually the same language.

It is to be hoped that Mr. Conquest's careful and dispassionate account of Soviet treatment of subject races will come to the attention of the leaders of those governments which are now taking over the reins of authority and the administration of former colonial lands, and who are being subjected to the blandishments of a government which poses as the friend and supporter of African and Asian nationalism, while giving none of the realities of autonomy and freedom of choice to its own national minorities.

C. H. ELLIS.

Lords of Life. By H.R.H. Prince Chula Chakrabongse. Alvin Redman. Pp. 352, with map, index and genealogical table. 35s.

Under this splendid if somewhat misleading title Prince Chula, himself only debarred from succession because his mother was a Russian, has written what is virtually a family history of the Chakri Dynasty which, since 1782, has occupied the throne of Siam (or Thailand—a hybrid word which the rest of the world has been constrained to adopt as the official designation of this country). The title has been described as misleading only because one cannot fail to be struck, on reading this book, by the appalling mortality rate in what was, until 1932, a polygamous monarchical system which meant that royalties, as the author himself concedes, were legion (it could, of course, be argued that the death-rate amongst the descendants of the technically monogamous Louis XIV was equally high). Prince Chula seeks to show that, at any rate in recent times before the revolution of 1932, the monarchy was paternal rather than absolute, but in view of the proliferation of royalties it was the fact that, until that year, the reins of government were in their hands and all the great offices of state tended to be occupied by them. Thus there is justification for the contention that the history of the Chakri Dynasty up to 1932 is the history of Siam from 1782. An initial chapter gives an outline of the history of preceding centuries, though to go back as far as "circa 4000 B.C." raises doubts as to whether facts can be separated from legend. The author shows that the kingdom of Siam

as we know it was only established in comparatively recent times, while the present capital of Bangkok was selected by the first monarch of the dynasty (Ayudhya, which had been the capital for 417 years, was sacked by the Burmese in 1767). The earlier history of Siam was one of constant wars with neighbours to the east, to the west and to the north, in particular with what are now known as Burma, Laos and Cambodia, but in that respect it did not differ so much from history in other parts of the world. What is significant is that a system of absolute monarchy could survive until 1932 and thereafter be translated into a constitutional monarchy without undue upheaval; and that Siam, in spite of her vulnerability and comparative weakness, managed to retain her independence and her individuality. Even today Siam is very unlike the other countries of South-East Asia, and Prince Chula's book helps to explain why this is so.

E. D.

Thailand. An Introduction to Modern Siam. By Noël F. Busch. Published by D. van Nostrand and Co., Ltd. Pp. 161. Bibliography. 12s. 6d.

The Asia Foundation found that there was a demand for a small informal book that would provide the casual reader with a picture of modern Siam, and this able, urbane little book by Mr. Busch, a skilled writer and journalist, does just that.

Reviewers are always keen on spotting inaccuracies in the books they review, but, after reading every page of *Thailand*, I can honestly say there is no major error, and the slips that do occur do not matter a row of beans. For instance, Mr. Busch puts the number of Siamese students in Britain at five hundred. It is, in fact, between fifteen hundred and two thousand. He refers to Phya Manoprakorn, one of the early Premiers of Siam after the revolution of 1932, as being, at that time, a judge of the Supreme Court. If I remember, Phya Mano, whom I had the pleasure of knowing—he was a polished, witty lawyer—was Chief Judge of the Appeal Court and not a member of the Supreme or Dika Court.

The only valid criticism of this book that occurs to me is that Mr. Busch, during his four years in Siam, fell in love with the people and the country, and he has not yet recovered from his pleasing infatuation.

This leads him not into mis-statement but certainly into presenting a very touched-up portraiture. One would imagine from these pages that the Siamese were sunny, Buddhist extroverts with a constant happy smile. They are, but they are not that alone. How dull they would be if they were. King Mongkut said: "My people is like an ass that trembles when you hold the halter but kicks his master when his back is turned." King Mongkut was a shrewd, good Siamese.

Again, when Mr. Busch has to refer to the Japan-Siam alliance in the last war, he says that the Japanese occupation was a gentle and restrained one. In fact, the Japanese had three active torture chambers in the city of Bangkok, one at Sala Daeng House, one at Sapatum Police Station and one at Japanese H.Q. The Japanese were only restrained with those who humbled themselves before them.

Curiously enough, Mr. Busch does not refer to the six-month British occupation of Siam in September, 1945, when 100,000 Japanese soldiers, still armed in Siam, were shipped back to Japan after the greatest land victory over the Japanese of the war by General Slim and his Anglo-Indian Army in Burma.

In a more pretentious book these disbalances might be fatal, but, in this book, they do not defeat its only object—to draw a simple rounded picture.

The talented drawings by Alan Thielker I found fascinating and sensitive. Everyone interested in modern Siam should buy this book. I did not know that Phalukon's crest is still used by the Ministry of Finance in Bangkok. The type of *Thailand* is so clear that even middle-aged reviewers can read it without glasses.

GERALD SPARROW.

Bamboo Doctor. By Stanley S. Pavillard. Published by Macmillan and Co. Pp. 206. Maps. 18s.

A recent film entitled "The Bridge over the River Kwai" revived public interest in the story of human suffering endured by our prisoners of war and by thousands

of other helpless Asian labourers in the building of the Japanese Railway of Death between Bangkok and Burma. This book is one of a number of that same theme, and it has appeared at a moment when this revived public interest may lead to its being widely read. It unfolds a grim tale of suffering and brutality, and the squeamish will not find it easy going; but it does give a graphic, dramatic and true picture of the disastrous war in Malaya and of its even more disastrous aftermath in terms of human suffering in prison camps throughout South-East Asia.

There are people who think that such books should no longer be written because they tend to exacerbate international relations and to revive the memory of horrors which had best be forgotten. If there is any force in this contention it certainly is not the whole of the picture, and surely this type of record should be read and remembered as showing to what heights of courage humanity can aspire, and how resilient to suffering the human spirit can be.

The doctors were the heroes of the prisoner of war camps in South-East Asia, and particularly the British doctors. They strove to uphold the highest traditions of their calling under the most daunting conditions, almost without drugs or appliances, and in spite of the hostility of their Japanese captors. Doctor Pavillard is one of a very brave company of dedicated men, many of whom paid the supreme price, and how he worked and how far he succeeded and came safely through the valley of the shadow of death is well and modestly told in this short volume. Here, indeed, is the true Christian ideal of love and help for one's poor suffering fellow human beings.

To niggle a little at one or two slips, one would like to remind the author that the title "Resident Councillor" (see pages 9-11) applied to the head of the Colonial administration in the Settlement of Penang only and not to the protected Malay State of Kedah, where the Senior British Official was then entitled the "British Adviser." The spelling of the local fish and tropical fruits so glitteringly set before us on page 58 might also have been given some attention by the proof-reader—"mangusting" is surely rather a depressing (one almost writes "disgusting") aberration for the pleasant word "mangosteen."

W. C. S. CORRY.

Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953. By Ping-ti Ho, the University of British Columbia. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Pp. 278. Appendices. Index. 48s.

This book is the fourth in the authoritative series of Harvard East Asian Studies. It represents a colossal task brilliantly achieved and has statistical and historical material of the first importance. Formerly of Tsinghua University in China, the author is Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies at the University of British Columbia and currently Senior Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, Columbia University.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I covers "The Official Population Records"; Part II examines "Factors affecting Population." Part I is preceded by a list of forty-four tables appearing in the text, a great convenience for reference. There are four appendices, followed by scholarly notes on points arising in each chapter. The index is followed by (a) a romanized bibliography, with Chinese characters, of primary Chinese sources (eighteen pages), supplemented by a glossary of Chinese characters not included in the bibliography; (b) a bibliography of secondary Chinese and Japanese sources (six pages); and (c) a bibliography of works in Western languages (four pages).

It is not, of course, possible to follow the author's close reasoning in relation to the value of the various population statistics over a period of nearly six centuries. But the interesting fact emerges that probably the most accurate were those of the first census in the Ming dynasty, in the reign of the first Ming Emperor, Ming T'ai-tsu. This took place in 1381-82 in the form of labour returns, which were revised ten years later. "The resulting population returns," writes Dr. Ho, "with their brief information on age, sex and occupation, bear a certain resemblance to modern census returns." We have to wait till 1776, Ch'ien Lung's time, nearly four cen-

turies later, for "enumerations comparable in nature and quality to those of the Ming T'ai-tsu period." This standard seems to have been maintained for some seventy years. During this period the control of the provinces by the central Government was effective. But round about the middle of the nineteenth century the disintegration caused by the T'ai-ping Rebellion made for decentralization, and for round about 100 years the returns appear to have been unreliable. It was not till the census of 1953, in the Communist régime, that the data became comparable for usefulness.

The figures of population given in Dr. Ho's book at these three points of time were 65,000,000 in the Ming T'ai-tsu period (1381-82) and in 1776 (Ch'ien Lung's time) 268,000,000. Thus the population quadrupled in some 400 years. The figure in 1953 was 574,000,000, showing that the population rather more than doubled in 200 years.

Dr. Ho concludes Part I of his book by saying that "to appraise the probable pattern of population movements during the past half-millennium, it is necessary to know the historical circumstances peculiar to each period and to investigate the various economic and institutional factors that were related to population changes."

We thus arrive at Part II, relating to "Factors affecting Population." But there has necessarily been some reference in Part I to such things, and the attention of readers should be drawn to the distressing figures in Table 14 of female infanticide and Dr. Ho's comments, though he is reluctant to go beyond the evidence by inference and points out that "the evidence is truly overwhelming in magnitude, but it is qualitative only" (pp. 58-62).

Of the six chapters in Part II, four are concerned with economic factors, which throw interesting light on some phases of China's history, to which, unfortunately, space precludes detailed reference. Then comes a fascinating chapter, Chapter X, on "Catastrophic developments"—famine, floods and wars, mainly civil wars. Dr. Ho provides valuable reinforcement of much that has been written by foreign writers. Those familiar with the classic of Thomas Taylor Meadows, *The Chinese and their Rebellions*, and the comparatively recent book, *The Blue Horizon*, by Mrs. Grantham, will find the pages devoted to what Dr. Ho calls "the effect of man-made disasters" fascinating reading. "The T'ai-ping Rebellion," he writes, "is deservedly called the greatest civil war in world history. In sheer brutality and destruction it has few peers in the annals of history."

Of the future Mr. Ho has this to say:

"Today the population of China is again increasing rapidly, even more rapidly than during the eighteenth century. The return of peace and order, the removal of some institutional barriers, the beginnings of large-scale industrialization, and especially the nation-wide health campaign, cannot fail to stimulate population growth. Historically the Chinese population has been responsive to economic and political conditions and has had a tendency towards prolonged growth even at the expense of progressive deterioration in the national standard of living. Whether history will repeat itself or whether the new China can achieve a rate of economic growth greater than her current rate of population growth remains to be seen. But the existence of a population of 600,000,000—which is both China's strength and weakness—has already compelled the pragmatic Communist state to adopt a policy of limiting future population growth."

Although the book was published in 1959 the story is only brought to 1953. We therefore do not have the benefit of Dr. Ho's comment on the fact that China has now reversed her policy of birth control and by close surveillance discourages her citizens from exercising it. The confidence of the rulers of China in maintaining economic growth ahead of the increase in population is remarkable. But they are not without their anxieties. Last year great floods in the province of Kwangtung in South China are said to have inundated more than a million acres, causing acute food shortage. More recently, drought is reported to have affected round about a third of the country's land under cultivation. Nevertheless, there is no suggestion of a reconsideration of policy and China's population remains "not only a national problem," as the publisher's announcement states, "but a serious concern of the Soviet Union and the Western world as well."

THE FOLLOWING NEW BOOKS HAVE BEEN ADDED TO
THE LIBRARY

- Bankers and Pashas.* David S. Landes.
The New-Old Land of Israel. Professor Norman Bentwich.
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Power Struggle in Iraq. Benjamin Shwadran.
The Naked Hills. Charles Beardsley.
Afghanistan—Sub-Contractor's Monograph. 2 vols. HRAF Wilber 2.
The Tales of Marzuban. Translated from the Persian. Reuben Levy.
Trance in Bali. June Belo.
Ceylon. Argus John Tressider.
My Russian Journey. Santha Rama Rau.
Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia. Col. G. E. Wheeler.
Our First Half-Century. 1910-1960. S. A. Government.
The Revolt in Tibet. Frank Moraes.
Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism. Lama Anagarika Gobinda.
Impatient Giant. China Today. Gerald Clark.
The Junkman Smiles. G. R. G. Worcester.
A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder. J. R. Partington.
The Turkish Language of Soviet Azerbaijan. C. G. Simpson.
Chinese Art and Sculpture. Rene Grousset.
New Patterns of Democracy in India. Vera Micheles, Dean.
The Book of Government or Rules for Kings. Nizam Al-Mulk.
(Translated by H. Darke).
Yemen on the Threshold. Erich W. Bethmann.
Documents on International Affairs. Presented by R.I.I.A.
Iran Past and Present. Donald N. Wilber.
Bases of Islamic Culture. Seyed Abdal Latif.
The Indian Heritage. Humayim Kabir.
Indian Cavalryman. Freddie Guest.
Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age. G. Vernadsky.
Nasser's new Egypt. Keith Wheelock.
Tibet Disappears. Chanaya Sen.
Soviet Deportation of Nationalities. R. Conquest.
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The Royal Central Asian Society invites advertisements of publications, maps, libraries, businesses, etc., dealing with all aspects of the life and history of Central Asian and neighbouring countries, for publication in the Society’s Journal.

The Journal appears in January, April and a double number, July-October, and has a world-wide circulation of approximately 2,000.

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NOTICES

THE principal objects of the Royal Central Asian Society are to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries, and to further international friendship.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service are connected with one of the countries of Central, Western, and South-east Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 10s. (£2 for residents in the London area.) There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

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NOTICE TO MEMBERS

For the last few years the journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. We are still receiving only £637 in income from this source. Now that members once more are living a more settled life, the Council again appeals for the signature of covenants by those who pay British Income Tax, and would particularly ask that those proposing new candidates for election should point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed at the time when they take up membership.

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VOL. XLVIII

APRIL, 1961

PART II

CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL - - - - -	118
ANNOUNCEMENT AND NOTICES - - - - -	119
IN MEMORIAM - - - - -	121
PERSIAN SOCIETY UNDER THE QĀJĀRS - - - - -	123
A RECENT VISIT TO TURKEY - - - - -	140
THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R. - - - - -	149
ISRAEL AFTER SUEZ - - - - -	160
LELAND BUXTON IN THE YEMEN, 1905 - - - - -	168
THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA - - - - -	173
CORRESPONDENCE - - - - -	159
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - - - - -	210

REVIEWS :

Corrigendum, 181	Englishmen in Tibet from Bogle to Gould, 195
Divide and Lose, 181	Tibet in Revolt, 195
Nasser's New Egypt, 182	Britain and Chinese Central Asia, 196
Personal Column, 183	The Way and the Mountain, 197
Israel Resurgent, 184	Russia and China, 199
Women and the New East, 184	Les Mouvements Nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie, 201
Daughters of Allah, 185	Neither War Nor Peace, 202
Crossroads. Land and Life in South-west Asia, 186	Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941, 203
The Chronicle of Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz, 187	Özbekcha-Ruscha Lughat/Uzbeksko-Russkiy Slovar, 204
The Sabres of Paradise, 188	An Introduction to the Turkmen Language, 206
The Politics of the Developing Areas, 189	The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1958, 207
The Memoirs of Lord Ismay, 190	Han Fei-Tzu. Works from the Chinese, 208
Karachi Through a Hundred Years, 191	Ballads and Stories from Tun-Huang, 209
A Punjabi Village in Pakistan, 192	
The Mind of Mr. Nehru, 193	
Islands of the Marigold Sun, 193	
Pilgrimage for Plants, 194	

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ANNOUNCEMENT

A Special General Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society was held on Wednesday, January 25, 1961, at the Royal Society, Burlington House, when the following Resolution was passed, some sixty members being present.

RESOLUTION

That the provisions of the Rules of the Society be altered in manner following: that is to say, by adding the words "and for that purpose to purchase, take on lease or in exchange, hire or otherwise acquire, any real or personal property, and any rights or privileges, which the Society may think necessary or convenient, and to borrow or raise or secure the payment of money in such manner as the Society shall think fit" at the end of Rule 1(c).

The Resolution was proposed by the Chairman, who explained that under the Society's Rules, as they stood, the Society had no authority to purchase or lease property. The amendment was made necessary by the fact that our agreement with the Palestine Exploration Fund, whereby we house our offices and library in their premises at 2, Hinde Street, W.1, is to be terminated on December 25, 1961.

Major Ainger seconded the proposal, which was then put to the vote and passed unanimously.

NOTICES

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 1961

The Annual General Meeting will take place at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, June 14th, at the Royal Society's Rooms. It will be followed by the Anniversary Lecture, to be given by H.R.H. Prince Chula Chakrabongse of Thailand, G.C.V.O.

AFTERNOON PARTY, 1961

Members are asked to make a note of the date Thursday, July 20, 1961, from 4 to 6.30 p.m. at Hurlingham Club, Fulham, S.W.6.

The cost of tickets will be 12/6 per head, to include a strawberry and cream tea, parking facilities, etc. A circular letter enclosing form of application for tickets will be sent to all members shortly.

The Council are pleased to announce that the Royal Central Asian Society will be joined on this occasion by members of the Anglo-Iraqi Society and by members of the Anglo-Arab Association.

REVISED MEMBERS LIST. A revised List of Members of the Royal Central Asian Society is due to appear in 1961. This list will include all Members whose subscriptions have been paid up to and including 1960/61. Members are asked to ensure that the Secretary is in possession of their correct designations and current addresses.

NOTICE TO JOURNAL SUBSCRIBERS

The Council regret to announce that owing to high cost of production, it will be necessary to increase the price of the Journal from 25/- per annum to 45/- per annum, this increase commencing from January, 1962.

It is desired to improve the amenities in the Society's offices and Library. If members have any small tables, carpets, rugs or bookcases they would be willing to present, or to lend, to the Society, these would be gratefully accepted by the Secretary.

Gifts of books on Asian countries would also be welcomed for the Library, and offers of help in cataloguing and arranging the books would be much appreciated.

The following back numbers of the Society's Journal are urgently wanted :

1914 Part 3.	1931 Parts 3 & 4
1916 Parts 2 & 3.	1932 Parts 1, 2 & 3.
1917 Part 4.	1934 Parts 1 & 3.
1918 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1935 Parts 1 & 3.
1919 Parts 1, 2 & 4.	1936 Part 3.
1920 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1937 Part 1.
1921 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1938 Parts 2, 3 & 4.
1922 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1940 Part 3.
1923 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1942 Part 2.
1924 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1944 Parts 2, 3 & 4.
1925 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1945 Part 1.
1926 Parts 3 & 4.	1947 Parts 1, 3 & 4.
1927 Parts 1, 3 & 4.	1948 Part 1.
1928 Parts 1 & 3.	1951 Parts 2 & 3.
1929 Part 1.	1952 Part 2.
1930 Part 1.	1957 Part 1.

IN MEMORIAM

THE LATE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

One of our Honorary Vice-Presidents writes :

THE Marquess of Zetland, who died in February last at the age of 85, had a long connection with the Royal Central Asian Society. As Lord Ronaldshay he was one of the Founder Members of the Society, in 1901. In the following year he read a paper to the Society, entitled "The Nushki Scistan Route." He became a member of Council in 1905 and was Chairman from 1908 to 1913. He then became a Vice-President until 1927 and from then until his death was an Honorary Vice-President. He was thus a friend and supporter of the Society from its very beginning.

He was a man with great resources of character. Though by nature reserved, his speeches and his books gave expression to deep feeling and to his almost passionate interest in the affairs of Asia. No man of his generation made a greater study or had a more profound knowledge of India and other parts of Asia. His books—for example "A Birds-Eye View of India" or "The Heart of Aryavarta"—made a notable contribution in their day to the knowledge of his own countrymen, of India, of the Hindu way of life and of the Buddhist religion. Later, his official biography of Lord Curzon showed him to be a historian of fine quality and judgment.

But he was very far from being only a writer and thinker. He was essentially a man of action. Physically, until the last few years of his life, when he was sorely stricken, he possessed unusual strength, as his long journeys in Central Asia as a young man, and his deer-stalking in later life at his beloved Letterewe in the Western Highlands revealed to his closest friends.

He had many interests. The Freemasons of the North and East Ridings will long remember him as their head and example. Racing, throughout his life, was an absorbing interest.

But without any doubt the greatest interest of his life was India. "I love India" was the refrain of a memorable speech in 1926 in which he bade God-speed to Lord Irwin as he set out to take up the task of Viceroy of India. Probably he found his greatest satisfaction in his years as a very successful Governor of Bengal from 1916 to 1922 and during his time as Secretary of State for India from 1935 to 1940.

He had great talents which he devoted for the best part of his life to the British connection with India. In the long roll of British names who have served that cause, few have surpassed him in knowledge and statesmanship: none have been more devoted to that cause. His name will be held in honour by this Society which he helped to found and by those who in the future will study the quality of British service to India.

AIR COMMODORE K. C. BUSS, O.B.E.

THE Society has suffered a great loss in the passing of Kenneth Buss. He had been a member of the Society since 1923, nearly forty years, and his deep knowledge of Arabian affairs was always at the Society's disposal. His knowledge of Arabic, both written and spoken, was very great, but his modesty prevented this being more widely realized.

He sometimes spoke on the B.B.C. and contributed important articles to the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

His help to the Society included the Hon. Secretaryship of the Dinner Club.

H. Sr. C. S.

PERSIAN SOCIETY UNDER THE QĀJĀRS

By PROFESSOR ANN LAMBTON, O.B.E., B.A., PH.D., D.LIT.

Report of a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society at the Royal Society's Hall, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1, on Wednesday, December 7, 1960.

The President, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir William Dickson, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., took the chair, and at the conclusion of the lecture, presented to Professor Lambton the Sir Percy Sykes Memorial Medal awarded to her by the Society in 1960.

The PRESIDENT: Your Royal Highness, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to introduce to you today Professor Ann Lambton, who is going to talk to us about Persian Society in the time of the Qajars. We are more than usually fortunate in our lecturer, because Professor Ann Lambton is the greatest living British authority on Persia. She has been deeply interested in Persia since about 1931. She has spent many years there, including the five years that she was Press Attaché at the British Embassy, Teheran, during the war, and several visits since. She has travelled throughout the length and breadth of Persia and she really combines something which is quite unusual. Not only has she a profound and unrivalled knowledge of classical Persian literature and history, but she has complete command of the Persian language and her Persian Grammar is a standard work. She has also an up-to-date knowledge of Persian politics and people, and is the author of several books and articles, including *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* and *Three Persian Dialects*.

Since 1952 she has held the post of Professor of Persian at London University. So we do have here an authority second to none, and I am sure you will be interested in her lecture. I have the greatest pleasure in introducing her.

THE Qājār period, beginning with the rise to power of Āqā Muḥammad Khān after the death of Karīm Khān Zand (which occurred in 1779) and ending with the deposition of Aḥmad Shāh in 1925, sees the transformation of Persia from a medieval Islamic monarchy with an administration following the traditional pattern which had prevailed in the eastern provinces of the former 'Abbasid Caliphate to a constitutional monarchy with the outward forms of a western European representative government. This period also saw a major change in the relations of Persia with her neighbours and the Great Powers: indeed it was partly because of this changed position, coupled with the advance in technology and the spread of liberal ideas in Western Europe, that Persia felt the need to accomplish this transformation. From the turn of the eighteenth century onwards the pressure of Great Power rivalry in Persia, which almost inevitably flowed into the vacuum created by the relative weakness and disunity of Persia, became a permanent and important factor in the internal situation.

The treaty of Turkomanchai (1828) shows the change in Persia's relationship with the Powers. By article 7 'Abbās Mīrzā was recognized as heir to the throne. On his death in 1834 both Russia and Great Britain appear to have recommended to the shah through their envoys in Persia

that he should settle the succession on Muḥammad Mīrzā;* and when the latter, on the death of Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh, marched on Tehrān to assert his claim to the throne, he received help from both the British and Russian envoys. From his reign onwards the pressure of the Great Powers on internal events became increasingly clear. Ḥusayn Khān, who was sent on a mission to Britain to congratulate Queen Victoria on her accession, had an interview with Prince Metternich in Vienna en route, in which he described the attitude of the shah as follows: "The shah is sovereign of his country, and as such he desires to be independent. There are two great powers with whom Persia is in more or less direct contact—Russia and the English power in India. The first has more military means than the second: on the other hand, England has more money than Russia. The two powers can thus do Persia good and evil; and in order above all to avoid the evil, the shah is desirous of keeping himself, with respect to them, within the relations of good friendship and free from all contestation. If, on the contrary, he finds himself threatened on one side, he will betake himself to the other in search of the support which he shall stand in need of. That is not what he desires, but to what he may be driven, for he is not more the friend of one than of the other of those powers: he desires to be with them on a footing of equal friendship. What he cherishes above all is his independence, and the maintenance of good relations with foreign powers."†

When it became clear that Persia could not close her frontiers to the encroachments of the Great Powers she sought to counter the pressure coming from them by herself adopting modern western methods; and throughout the nineteenth century there is a gradual feeling towards modernization and westernization, to which increasing travel, modern education, and the growth of newspapers, among other things, made their contribution. The problem before Persia was a twofold one: on the one hand to accept help from the Great Powers, first France and Great Britain, and later Russia and Great Britain, to modernize and develop the country without falling under the political or economic dominance of either; and on the other hand, since modernization involved the spread of governmental influence on a much wider scale than heretofore, to ensure that this should be felt by the population to be less, and not more, oppressive (though few, if any, realized this to be a problem).

Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh and his son 'Abbās Mīrzā both recognized the imperative need for modern weapons to enable Persia to resist Russian arms.‡ Both Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh and his successor, Muḥammad Shāh, seem in some measure, to have believed that they could make use of one or other of the Great Powers to regain lost territories. The episode of the three Persian princes who came to London after the accession of Muḥammad Shāh in the hope of obtaining British support in an attempt to win the throne of

* *Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan*, London, 1839, pp. 1-3.

† G. H. Hunt, *Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign*, London, 1858, p. 127.

‡ Mīrzā Buzury, 'Abbās Mīrzā's minister, told Morier in 1809 that no pains had been spared to acquire a knowledge of military tactics, and the theory of fortifications, which they had gleaned from French and Russian books translated by 'Abbās Mīrzā's order (*A Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor to Constantinople, in the years 1808 and 1809, 1812*, London, 1812, p. 283).

Persia is a comment on the extent to which foreign intervention was considered part and parcel of political life in Persia. Charming though they appear to have been as persons, there is yet a lack of realism and ineffectiveness in their approach to the outside world.* A similar lack of realism characterized the actions of many of their fellow countrymen, in particular in their attitude to modernization. Few seem to have realized the very great effort and application which would be required if modernization and westernization were to be successfully accomplished.

Nāṣir ud-Dīn Shāh (1848-96) had probably a clearer appreciation of Persia's position in the world than his predecessors and of the need for change if she was to retain her independence. During his reign the number of persons who had a knowledge of Europe and liberal movements in Europe steadily increased. The growth of this class, their writings, and influence on society towards the turn of the nineteenth century is one of the most striking features of the period, but one which I shall not have time to touch on today. Nāṣir ud-Dīn, realizing that Persia could not transform herself without foreign help and that, in any case, foreign intervention could not be prevented, conceived, therefore, a policy of inducing foreign powers to invest in Persia in the hope that they would contribute to the development and prosperity of Persia because they had a stake in the well-being of the country themselves. This clearly emerges from his letters to Mīrzā Husayn Khān Mushīr ud-Dawleh on the subject of the ill-fated Reuter Concession.† The greed of the various parties concerned and the rivalry of the powers, coupled with the disunity of Persian society, were, however, an insuperable barrier to such a policy. Also the absolute power which the ruler enjoyed and the hideously sychophantic atmosphere by which he was surrounded almost inevitably warped his judgement. Nāṣir ud-Dīn at the end of his reign was, if not reactionary, indifferent to reform, whereas in his early years he had been relatively enlightened and liberal.‡ By the end of the nineteenth century there had been, in some fields, striking changes in Persia but there had been very little, if any, progress towards administrative reform. It was the failure in this field, coupled with popular resentment at foreign exploitation of Persia and the belief that the shah and his government were selling the country to unbelievers, which eventually provoked the constitutional revolution of 1905-6.

The Qājār period is a long one. It can, perhaps, be conveniently divided into four phases: the reigns of (i) Āqā Muḥammad Khān (1779-97), (ii) Fath 'Alī Shāh (1797-1834), and Muḥammad Shāh (1834-48), (iii) Nāṣir ud-Dīn Shāh (1848-96) and the early years of Muzaffar ud-Dīn Shāh, and (iv) the constitutional period (1905 onwards). Political and social con-

* J. B. Fraser, *Narrative of the Residence of the Persian Princes in London in 1835 and 1836*, London, 1838, pp. 66 ff.

† See Farhād Mu'tamid, *Sipahsālār-i A'zam, Tehrān*, A. H. (solar) 1325, pp. 151 ff.

‡ Cf. Curzon, who mentions the internal and external difficulties facing Nāṣir ud-Dīn (*Persia and the Persian Question*, London, 1892, i, pp. 400-1), and *Majmū'eh-i Āthār-i Mīrzā Malkam Khān*, in which the editor, Muḥammad Muḥīṭ Ṭabāṭabā'ī, draws attention to the contrast between Nāṣir ud-Dīn's behaviour as a young man and his actions as an old man (Tehrān, A. H. (solar) 1327, p. 86).

ditions varied in each of these : the change between the first phase and the last is a striking one. Underlying all these phases, however, there is an attitude of life and conception of the place of the individual in society, which largely determined how the government worked, whatever its form. Thus, although the change in outward forms was striking, the change in the structure of society was less marked.

The Qājārs, like various other Persian dynasties, were by origin Turkish or Turkoman tribal leaders. We know little about their distant origins—the accounts of the court historians, who provided them with convenient genealogies, can be neglected. They were among the tribes who came back to Persia with the Safavids. In the reign of Shāh ‘Abbās they were divided into three branches; one was sent to Marv, another to Qarābāgh, and the third branch, from which the dynasty sprang, was settled in Astarābād, an area peopled by Turkoman tribes for many centuries. The background of the Qājārs was, thus, the background of the steppe: and even in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in spite of the pomp and luxury of the court and Nāṣir ud-Dīn’s European journeys, that background was not very far away. It is seen in the readiness with which most of the Qājār princes adopted a camp life, and led their troops in forays and expeditions; in Āqā Muḥammad Khān’s contempt for the officials of the bureaucracy; and in the passion of Fath ‘Alī and Nāṣir ud-Dīn for the chase, which nearly drove one of the latter’s ministers, I‘timād as-Saltāneh, at times, to distraction. William Ouseley mentions that Fath ‘Alī, like most members of the Qājār family, preferred a nomadic to the settled life, a village to a city, and a tent to a palace.* Sir John Malcolm, comparing the practice of the Qājārs with that of the later Safavids, states, “The reigning family has hitherto disdained those enervating and luxurious habits which led the last Seffavean monarchs to confine themselves to their harems. They not only attend personally to public business, but are continually practising manly exercises, and engage in field sports with all the ardour of a race who cherish the habits of their Tartar ancestors. The present king [Fath ‘Alī] is an expert marksman and an excellent horseman: few weeks pass without his partaking in the pleasures of the chase.”† The royal court was constantly on the move. At the beginning of the century there were no wheeled carriages in Persia and the shah always rode unless he was ill, in which case he would travel in a litter. Great attention was paid to the royal stable and the finest horses from every part of the kingdom were sent to the shah.‡

The Qājārs were never able fully to achieve family solidarity, though the steps taken by Āqā Muḥammad Khān enabled his heir apparent, Bābā Khān (or Fath ‘Alī Shāh as he was known after his accession), to succeed to the throne with little difficulty; but he had nevertheless to contend with various rebellions by members of his own family and others. The death of Fath ‘Alī was followed by struggles between rival claimants

* *Travels in Various Countries of the East, more particularly Persia*, London, 1819-25, iii, 151.

† *The History of Persia from the Most Early Period to the Present Time*, London, 1829, ii, 396-7.

‡ Cf. Malcolm, ii, 403.

to the throne; and that of Muḥammad Shāh by widespread disorders. The outlying areas, notably Kurdistān and Balūchistān (apart from the provinces disputed with Russia in the North-West and North-East and with Afghanistan) were at best very imperfectly assimilated to the empire. Āqā Muḥammad Khān and Nāṣir ud-Dīn both fell to the hand of assassins. The steps taken to conceal the death of Faṭḥ 'Alī and Nāṣir ud-Dīn until adequate measures could be taken to prevent the outbreak of disorders are also indicative of the delicate nature of the balance between government and anarchy.

It was the custom of the Qājārs—a custom followed by the Saljūqs, an earlier dynasty also of Turkoman descent—to give provincial governments to princes of the ruling house, even when these were mere boys. They would be sent to their governments accompanied by a vazir or *pish-kār*, in whose hands the administration would often largely remain.* This system, had the power of the paramount ruler been unquestioned, might have worked quite well; but, in fact, it had two main drawbacks. In the case of ambitious princes it encouraged them to use the provincial resources to rebel, and secondly it meant that in each provincial capital there was a copy (on a smaller scale) of the court at Tehrān with all the burden which that imposed on the local population.†

Marriage alliances were used, as they had been by the Saljūqs, as a means to consolidate the royal power, to cement alliances, and to terminate, or prevent, blood feuds.‡ Qājār women were given in marriage to local tribal leaders, important members of the bureaucracy, and leading religious dignitaries, and women taken from these and others into the royal household. Some of the Qājār women exercised considerable influence, notably Mahd 'Ulyā, who, after the death of her husband, Muḥammad Shāh, presided over the council of state until her son, Nāṣir ud-Dīn, arrived in Tehrān from Āzarbāyjān, where he had been governor.§ The shah's wives were also sometimes centres of intrigue around whom the discontented, or the enemies of a particular minister, would gather, as happened, for example, in the case of Mīrzā Husayn Khān Mushīr ud-Dawleh, whose fall from office was partly due to the opposition of the hostile party assembled round 'Anīs ud-Dawleh, Nāṣir ud-Dīn's favourite wife.||

The tribal heritage of the Qājārs was not their only legacy from the past. They also revived much of the administrative machinery of the Safavids; and they took over the theory of the ruler as the Shadow of God upon earth, and the pomp and circumstance of the royal court, which offered a great contrast to the tradition of the steppe. The irresponsible nature of the shah's power is clearly shown in a letter from Mīrzā 'Alī,

* Cf. 'Abdullāh Mustawfī, *Sharh-i Zindagī-i man*, Tehrān, A. H. (solar) 1324-5, i, 40. From the reign of Faṭḥ 'Alī onwards Āzarbāyjān was the seat of the *valī-ahd* and hence the most important provincial government.

† Cf. *The Persian Princes*, i, 5.

‡ The Qājār rulers were notoriously prolific; Faṭḥ 'Alī had a vast number of wives and some ninety children. (Mustawfī, i, 40). Fraser puts the number higher, at 120-130 sons and some 150 daughters (*The Persian Princes*, i, 4).

§ R. G. Watson, *History of Persia*, London, 1866, p. 359.

|| *Sipahsālār-i A'zam*, pp. 134 ff.

deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British minister, Mr. McNeill, dated January 6, 1838/8 Shawwāl, 1253, in which he states, "the Monarchs of Persia, as far back as memory reaches, or is preserved in history, have always been despotic over Persian subjects, in like manner over their lives, and property, and families, and reputations, and lands, and goods; so that even if they should order a thousand innocent persons to be put to death, it would be in no one's power to call them to account."* Curzon, writing in the latter part of the nineteenth century, states the shah "has absolute command over the life and property of everyone of his subjects."† The superiority of the position claimed for the shah *vis-à-vis* all other persons is also emphasized in a memorandum by Hājji Mīrzā Āqāsi to Faṭḥ Muḥammad Khān, the representative of Kāmṛān, the ruler of Herāt, dated 14 Rabi' I, 1253/18 July, 1837, in which he says in reply to a demand that the shah should treat Kāmṛān as his brother, "The treatment of the King, the Asylum of the Faith, to Feridoon Meerza (the King of Persia's brother), is that of a master to his servant. Let Prince Kāmṛān be like Feridoon Meerza, for higher expectations would be presumptuous. It might, indeed, be proposed that he should be treated with more favour than His Majesty's brother; but no one can presume to aspire to be regarded as brother to the King of Kings; for all are the devoted servants of the great King."‡ On the other hand, when Sir Harford Jones had an audience with Faṭḥ 'Alī in 1809, he was introduced as "Ambassador from your Majesty's Brother, the King of England."§

The Qājārs, having possessed themselves of the throne and become absolute monarchs, were forced by the nature of the case to support their power, which was in fact often instable and precarious, by continually impressing on their subjects the high and almost sacred character of their power. "Everything," as Malcolm states, "connected with the royal name and authority is treated with a respect increased by the form which attends it. If the king sends an honorary dress, the person for whom it is intended [whether he is a royal prince or not] must proceed several miles to meet it and clothe himself in his robes of favour, with every mark of gratitude and submission. If a firmaun, or mandate, is written by the monarch to any of the officials of government, this is also met at a distance by the person it is addressed to, who, after raising it to his head, gives it to his secretary to read, and all stand in respectful silence till the perusal is finished."||

Various European travellers have left accounts of the splendour of the Qājār courts and the tremendous importance attached to titles and outward symbols and demonstrations of power. Sir R. Ker Porter describing an assembly held by Faṭḥ 'Alī writes, "He [Faṭḥ 'Alī] entered the saloon from the left, and advanced to the front of it, with an air and step which belonged entirely to a sovereign. . . . He was one blaze of jewels, which literally dazzled the sight on first looking at him. . . . While the great king was approaching his throne, the whole assembly continued bowing their heads to the ground, till he had taken his place. A dead

* *Correspondence*, p. 102.

† *Correspondence*, p. 51.

§ Morier, *Journey*, p. 189.

† *Persia*, i, 391.

|| *History*, ii, 407-8.

silence then ensued, the whole presenting a most magnificent and, indeed, awful appearance; the stillness being so profound among so vast a concourse, that the slightest rustling of the trees was heard, and the softest trickling of the water from the fountains into the canals.”*

“In no court,” wrote Malcolm, was more rigid attention paid to ceremony. Looks, words, the motions of the body, are all regulated by the strictest forms. When the king is seated in public, his sons, ministers and courtiers, stand erect, with their hands crossed, and in the exact place belonging to their rank Nothing can exceed the splendour of the Persian court on extraordinary occasions. It presents a scene of the greatest magnificence, regulated by the exactest order. To no part of the government is so much attention paid as to the strict maintenance of those forms and ceremonies, which are deemed essential to the power and glory of the monarch.”†

The progress of the shah through his domains, or of a governor through his province, was attended by pomp and circumstance and the presentation of costly presents to the shah or the governor by the local population. Likewise, if the shah favoured one of his subjects by a visit, this was apt to be an expensive affair for the host, presents being usually expected by the shah and his retinue. The arrival of a foreign embassy was regarded as an occasion when the shah ought to appear in all his grandeur; and since the power and wealth of a foreign government was judged by the pomp which surrounded its envoy and the respect accorded to him, foreign envoys were careful to make a display themselves and to demand that due respect should be shown to them as the representatives of their sovereigns. To withhold such marks of respect on the part of the Persian government was tantamount to a deliberate insult and an intention to impress the power of Persia on the minds of her subjects and neighbours.‡

On the other hand the shah, in the tradition of the ideal Persian and Islamic rulers, was accessible to all for the redress of grievances. The possibility of an appeal to the throne was, in fact, one of the few checks upon the rapacity of officials; though admittedly its effectiveness was limited by the fact that the shah sometimes shared the spoils of office with his officials. Moreover, the accessibility of the shah was open to abuse in that false accusations were often made and officials were in some measure forced to provide themselves, by whatever means, with money to satisfy the cupidity of their superiors and to save themselves from disgrace and punishment. As Malcolm pointed out “when the court is corrupt, innocence is no security.”§ Mu‘ayyir al-Mamālik, who was brought up at the court of Nāṣir ud-Din, and wrote an account of the private life of that monarch, however, states that “It was possible for everyone to receive an audience with the shah and most suppliants submitted their petitions without an intermediary to the hand of the shah himself. Members of the lower

* *Travels*, quoted by R. G. Watson, *History of Persia*, pp. 139-40.

† *History*, ii, 399-400.

‡ Cf. the ill-treatment of ‘Alī Muhammad Beg who was carrying a letter from Lieut. Pottinger to Mr. McNeill in 1837 (see *Correspondence*, pp. 66 ff.) and the incident of Mirzā Hāshim Khān in 1854 (see G. H. Hunt, pp. 161 ff.).

§ *History*, ii, 352.

classes were easily able to obtain an audience and present their complaints orally; and if the right was on their side they seldom returned disappointed. If anyone had a complaint against the shah's son, the *Nā'ib as-Saltāneh*, he would submit a petition to the shah through the *sadr-i a'zam*; if anyone had been oppressed by the *sadr-i a'zam* he would demand redress through one of the '*ulamā*', one of the eunuchs of the palace, or '*Azīz as-Sultān*'. In short there was a possibility of escape from tyranny and oppression for the people; they knew there was someone who would give them redress."* These claims are, no doubt, somewhat exaggerated; nevertheless, the appeal to the shah was not negligible. But, because of the irresponsible nature of the ruler's power, life and property were fundamentally insecure.

After the Qājār family the leading members of society were the great tribal leaders, the Bakhtiārīs, the Kurds, the Afshārs, the Qārā Gozlūs, the Arabs, the Qashgā'ī, the Balūch, the Turkomans, and others. They often held considerable lands in the areas they inhabited. Their power derived from the military forces which they were able to assemble from among their followers and which they were bound to provide when called upon by the shah. The heads of the great tribes, the *Ilkhānīs* and *İlbegīs*, were nominally appointed by the shah; but in practice he was usually forced to appoint to these offices the natural leaders of the tribes. In many cases the tribal leaders held provincial governments; and in some of the more remote areas they were virtually local rulers. They showed a constitutional inability to combine; the threat which they offered to the ruling house was, therefore, usually localized. This weakness of the tribal leaders was deliberately fostered by Fath 'Alī Shāh and his successors, who encouraged dissensions among the tribes, making tribal feuds instruments of state policy. Frequently relatives of the tribal leaders, or even the leaders themselves, would be kept at court as hostages for the good behaviour of the tribe;† and their restoration to their people would be "dependent upon their willingness to serve as tools of the policy and conduits to the exchequer of a corrupt administration."‡ The tribal leaders also often found it expedient to have their representatives in the capital or the main provincial centre to transact their business and to watch over their interests.§ The virtues most prized among the tribal leaders were generosity and courage; but once settled in the towns or compelled to become courtiers they did not materially differ from other high officials. As a whole the tribes had, as Malcolm points out, the virtues and vices of their condition: they were sincere, hospitable, and brave; but rude, violent, and rapacious. Their women folk enjoyed a far higher degree of liberty than the townswomen.||

The dividing line between the tribal leaders and military officers was not clearly marked; and that between the civil and military officials was also fluid. In the early Qājār period the shah led the army in battle himself. By the reign of Nāṣir ud-Dīn this had ceased to be the case, and the command of the army was exercised by one of the Qājār princes until 1871

* *Yāddāshthā'i az Zindagi-i Khuṣūṣi-i Nāṣir ud-Dīn*, Tehrān, n.d., p. 60. See also Mustawfī i, 126.

† Cf. W. Ouseley, i, 307.

§ *History* ii, 463.

‡ See Curzon, ii, 272.

|| Cf. Morier, *Journey*, 240.

when Mīrzā Husayn Khān Mushīr ud-Dawleh was appointed *sipahsālār* in place of Kāmārān Mīrzā, for whom Fīrūz Mīrzā Nuṣrat ud-Dawleh had deputized.* The provincial governors usually commanded the military forces in the province in which they were; and military expeditions against refractory tribal groups and others were a not uncommon part of their duties. Officials such as the *beglarbegīs*, whose functions in the nineteenth century were those of a police officer, were usually, though not always, members of the military classes.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the army consisted of the shah's body-guard and irregular horse and militia levied in the form of contingents from districts and tribes, serving under their own leaders, the provision of such contingents being sometimes one of the conditions upon which provincial governors held office and landowners received grants of land. The royal body-guard was formed of *ghulāms* and a standing army. The former numbered, according to Morier, 3,000 men.† Malcolm puts them at between 3,000 and 4,000, and states that "the body-guard was formed promiscuously from Georgian slaves and the sons of the first nobles of Persia," who were well mounted and well armed. The Qājār princes holding provincial governments had similar, though smaller, body-guards.‡ By the middle of the nineteenth century the size of the body-guard of the shah appears to have decreased. Watson puts it at little over 1,600;§ Curzon, however, puts it at 2,000.|| The standing army in 1809 was composed of some 12,000 men, levied from the tribes and the city population, though principally from Māzandarān and the Qājār tribe. It was divided into bodies of 3,000 men, which did duty in turns in the palace as *ḡashīk-chīs* or guards. The main body of the shah's military forces, however, was formed by tribal levies. They were required to attend court annually at the feast of the New Year; if their services were not required that year they would be given leave to return to their homes.¶ The provincial governors were also able in time of need to levy contingents from the tribes and villages in their governments.

During the course of the century there were various attempts to substitute for the irregular forces regular or semi-regular forces, formed and disciplined in European fashion. A number of military missions and military instructors from various nations were employed to this end. Mīrzā Taqī Khān Amīr Nizām, Nāṣir ud-Dīn's first *ṣadr-i a'ḡam*, instituted various reforms, particularly in regard to pay and recruitment; the contingents furnished by the villages and tribes were required to serve for a definite period and while in service received provisions and a small annual payment; and in 1851 the *Dār ul-Funūn*, the first school to teach modern sciences, was set up partly in order to provide officers for the new army. Mīrzā Taqī Khān's military reforms, however, proved abortive. The next attempt was made by Mīrzā Husayn Khān Mushīr ud-Dawleh, who be-

* *Sipahsālār-i A'ḡam*, p. 54.

† *History*, ii, 356.

‡ *Persia*, i, 396.

† *Journey*, p. 242.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¶ Morier, *Journey*, pp. 240-3; *A Second Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor to Constantinople, between the Years 1810 and 1816*, London, 1818, p. 214.

came *sipahsālār* in 1871. The order for his appointment states that it was the royal wish to bring about a new order and discipline in military affairs. Full powers in military matters were accorded to him.* Army finance had been the object of much pecculation: the pay and rations of the troops was often in arrears and the effective numbers of the contingents were often much less than was stipulated; and nepotism prevailed in the army as elsewhere. Mirzā Husayn Khān realized the evils of this situation.† With a view to reorganization and the introduction of European discipline on a more thorough-going scale he centralized army finances and gave the minister of war (*vazīr-i lashkar*) full control over, and responsibility for, the military budget. Some small measure of success attended his efforts. Curzon, writing about 1890, states the army was composed of irregular tribal cavalry, semi-regular infantry, cavalry and artillery, equipped, drilled, and clothed more or less on European lines; irregular infantry, raised and supported by local districts and cities; irregular cavalry and semi-regular cavalry and regular infantry supplied on a territorial basis by quota.‡ But the problem of the regular payment of the military forces and the provisioning and equipment of the army was never satisfactorily tackled. Pay was often, if not usually, in arrears, and the lack of adequate commissariat arrangements prevented the army becoming an effective fighting force.

The civil administration of the Qājār empire was based on the pattern of the Safavid empire. All officials were the shah's deputies. He was the sole executive; officials had thus no real responsibility; they were elevated and degraded at the shah's pleasure. The most important branch of the administration was that dealing with finance; and the *mustawfi al-mamālik*, the head of this division, was the most important official after the *šadr-i a'zam*, or prime minister. Āqā Muḥammad Khān, the founder of the Qājār dynasty, personally supervised the administration, which during his reign was on a relatively small scale, his two main officials being the muster-master (*lashkar nevīs*) and the *mustawfi*. Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh also personally directed the administration;§ during his reign the administrative system was considerably expanded; a *šadr-i a'zam* was appointed; a *mustawfi al-mamālik*, under whom were *mustawfis* for each province or group of provinces, whose duty was to prepare the revenue assessment of the province or provinces under their charge; pass the accounts of the province, and verify and sanction drafts on the provincial revenue; a chief muster-master, who came to be known as the *vazīr-i lashkar* or minister of war, each regiment having under him its own financial officer and muster-master (*mustawfi* and *lashkar nevīs*); a *munshī al-mamālik*, a kind of chief secretary; a *šāhib dīvān*, whose main function appears to have been to sign documents; a *mu'ayyir al-mamālik* or mint-master; a *khaṭīb al-mamālik*, who read the *khuṭba* in the name of the shah at the New Year and on other ceremonial occasions; a *munajjim bāshī* or chief astrologer; and a host of other officials belonging to the court and to the central and local administration.

* *Sipahsālār-i A'zam*, pp. 55 ff.

† Cf. Letter quoted in *Sipahsālār-i A'zam*, p. 63.

‡ Curzon, i, 576.

§ Cf. P. A. Jaubert, *Voyage en Arménie et Perse*, Paris, 1821, p. 240.

The members of the bureaucracy at the beginning of the period held a clearly inferior position in society to the tribal leaders and landowning classes, who regarded them with slight contempt. They were often men of education and polish; unlike the tribal leaders they seldom practised martial exercises or field sports.* As the administration became more complicated the relative status of the higher ranks of the bureaucracy rose. Many of the tribal and landowning classes were absorbed into their ranks, while members of the bureaucracy often became large landowners themselves; and the distinction between the various classes became less sharp, their leading members all forming part of the entourage of the shah.

Towards the middle of the century Nāṣir ud-Dīn seems to have realized that the old forms of government were no longer in keeping with the trend of the times. About the year 1858, after the dismissal from the office of *ṣadr-i a'zam* of Mīrzā Āqā Khān (who had opposed Nāṣir ud-Dīn's desire for modernization), the shah set up six ministries: interior, foreign affairs, war, finance, justice, and lastly stipends and *awqāf*. The ministers in charge were to act independently of each other, referring when necessary to the shah, and only holding a council of ministers should some important matter come up. All orders were to be signed by the shah himself.† A number of other ministries were later added. It was not till 1871 that a *ṣadr-i a'zam* was again appointed.‡ In 1859 an assembly known as the *masliḥat khāneh*, a kind of consultative assembly, was set up.§ The office of chairman was given to 'Tsā Khān I 'timād ud-Dawleh, one of the Qājār leaders, who was nearly related to the shah's mother. The membership of the assembly was wider than that of the council of ministers, and included *mustawfis*, various other officials, and *mullās*; orders were given that similar assemblies should be set up in the provinces. There are records of such assemblies being held in some provinces, but it does not appear to have become the general rule. It seems probable that the shah intended to set up something in the nature of provincial councils.|| It follows, however, from the irresponsible nature of the power of the shah, that the authority of this council could only be advisory; and in effect its function was often confined to an academic discussion of action already taken by the shah. Perhaps for this reason it was from the beginning virtually a dead letter. In 1871 a supreme council (*dār ash-shawrā*) was set up;¶ this, too, was a purely advisory body.

Government office was regarded as the road to wealth. The high offices of state, whether provincial governments, or civil or military appointments at the centre or in the provinces, usually went to the great families. First among these was the Qājār family, and after them the foremost tribal families, and families who drew their strength mainly from their landed estates, intermarriage between whom was not uncommon. Nepotism was a marked feature of the administration. There was also a strong hereditary tendency in office: on the death, or transfer, of a high official, his office was

* Cf. Malcolm, *History*, ii, 414.

† Mustawfi, i, 119.

‡ See *Sipahsālār-i A'zam*, p. 100; Mustawfi, i, 156; and Curzon, i, 426.

§ See *Rūznāmeḥ-i Vaqāyi'-i ittifāqiyeh*, No. 452, 21 Rabi'II, 1276.

|| *Mustawfi*, i, 126.

¶ *Sipahsālār-i A'zam*, p. 128.

not infrequently given to his son, even though the latter might be a child. The hereditary tendency was specially marked in the office of *mustawfi*, partly because of the skill and training required for this office; the records of the *mustawfis* were, moreover, regarded as their private property, there being no state archives; and this made it more difficult for someone from another group to become a *mustawfi*. The office of *mustawfi al-mamālik* was frequently a stepping-stone to the office of *ṣadr-i a'zam*. At best the rule of the high officers of state, especially in the provinces, was patriarchal with the traditional virtues of an Islamic ruler being, to some extent, practised; at worst it was venal and oppressive, the land and its inhabitants being squeezed to the last drop, until no remedy was left them but flight.

It was not, however, an invariable rule that the high offices of state should be held by men belonging to the great families. There are notable exceptions. Hājji Muḥammad Ḥusayn Khān Amīn ud-Dawleh, who became *beglarbeg* of Iṣfahān under Āqā Muḥammad Khān was originally a grocer. He first became the *kadkhudā* of a quarter, then *kalāntar* of the city, and after that a *dābiṭ* or tax-collector of a rich district near Iṣfahān; he then made himself agreeable in the sight of Āqā Muḥammad Khān by a large *pīshkash* (or present) and got himself appointed *beglarbeg* of Iṣfahān. From his intimate knowledge of the markets, and all the resources of the city, and of its inhabitants, he managed to increase the revenue; he then became the partner of every shopkeeper, farmer, and merchant, setting up those who were in want with capital and increasing the means of others who were already in trade. He thus appeared to confer benefits, when, by his numerous monopolies he raised the prices of almost every commodity.* His fortunes continued to prosper under Fath 'Alī Shāh, to whom he became *mustawfi al-mamālik* in 1806.† Mīrzā Taqī Khān Amīr Nizām, Nāṣir ud-Dīn's first and greatest *ṣadr-i a'zam*, was also of comparatively humble origin; his father was a cook, and later a steward, in the household of Qā'im Maqām. Amīn us-Sultān, another of Nāṣir ud-Dīn's chief ministers was also of relatively low birth.‡ It was thus possible, though difficult, for any able man, irrespective of birth, to attain to high office and thus to wealth. This possibility perhaps did something to mitigate the evils of the administrative system in the eyes of the population.

Salaries were often nominal; officials were expected to live on the country. The perquisites of office on the other hand were great; but so also were its dangers. A fall from favour was often followed by mulcting, exile, and even loss of life. Hājji Ibrāhīm, Āqā Muḥammad Khān's *lashkar nevīs* and chief minister, after holding the office of *ṣadr-i a'zam* under Fath 'Alī Shāh, was thrown into a cauldron of burning oil; the hated Hājji Mīrzā Āqāsī, Muḥammad Shāh's *ṣadr-i a'zam* was exiled to Karbalā after the death of his master, and Mīrzā Taqī Khān Amīr Nizām was dismissed as the result of intrigue and murdered.

* Morier, *Second Journey*, 131.

† Lisān ul-Mulk Sipīhr, *Tārikh-i Qājāriyeh, being the final part of the universal history entitled the "Nāsikh ut-Tawārikh,"* Tabriz, lith., A. H. 1319, p. 66.

‡ See Curzon, i, 426.

Intrigue and corruption (which Mīrzā Husayn Khān Mushīr ud-Dawleh once called the mother of all evils) were the constant concomitants of public life. Both derived from the prevailing insecurity and both in turn fostered that insecurity. Office was largely obtained and held by gifts to the shah and others. Further, since power was measured by wealth and power meant relative security, there was a general tendency to seek to accumulate wealth. This was partly expended by its holders to defend their interests; they also used it to enable them to live on a grand scale, partly because open-handedness and hospitality were among the prized virtues of society, but also in order to attract clients, which itself meant an increase of power. Moreover, because of the fundamental insecurity of society there was a tendency for the weak to attach themselves to some patron. The obligation to protect a dependent was generally acknowledged; and since an insult to a dependent was regarded as tantamount to an insult to his protector, attachment to the train of a powerful man was a way of achieving relative security.

The tribal leaders, landowners, and the high officials of the bureaucracy were not the only important classes in the land: there were two other groups, one which in some measure limited their power and the other which to some extent provided the liquid funds without which they could not have lived as they did, namely, the religious classes and the merchants. The religious institution continued to be subordinate to the political as it had been under the Safavids; and throughout the period there was an increasing tendency towards secularization. As in the case of the bureaucracy there was often a strong hereditary tendency in the religious offices. And because of the nature of the religious institution the religious classes, more than the bureaucracy and the holders of temporal power, represented an element of stability in society; and from time to time they appeared as the leaders of local movements of self-help and resistance to the extortion of the government. The most important religious dignitaries were the *mujtahids*, whose influence was great, though its nature somewhat difficult to define. Appeals to the shah through a *mujtahid* or recourse to a *mujtahid* in case of a dispute with an official were not infrequently effective. Some *mujtahids*, no doubt, abused their position, but in general they provided a sanctuary for the oppressed. The *shaykh ul-islām*, the highest religious official in each of the large cities, and the *imām jum'eh*, who was in charge of the Friday mosque in the principal cities, were nominated by the shah; they and the *qādis* and many of the *'ulamā* received stipends from the shah, which in the case of the *shaykhs ul-islām* were far from negligible. The fact that these officials of the religious institution were appointed by the shah to some extent limited their independence and the confidence which the people reposed in them; but in general, to the extent that they avoided connection with those in power and gave evidence of integrity, they were looked upon by the people as their protectors. They were sometimes men of true religion and integrity; but frequently they were venal, ignorant, and bigoted.

Shī'i orthodoxy, however, was not the only form of religious expression: many found their need best answered by membership of one or other of the Šūfi orders, as full members or as a kind of lay brother. The in-

fluence of these orders on society is difficult to evaluate; occasionally they were subject to persecution; and sometimes their members were used by the state as informers. Among the Ṣūfis, as among the religious classes in general, there were men of piety and true religion as well as a not inconsiderable number of impostors and others who, posing as Ṣūfis, bated upon the community.

Movements of social revolt, because orthodoxy was associated with the ruling institution, tended, as in earlier times, to take on a religious colouring; and because there was no separation between church and state unorthodoxy was almost automatically regarded as a threat to the existing régime. The most important example of this in the nineteenth century is the Bābī movement, which shows both messianic and social tendencies. The movement began about 1844, but it was not till after the death of Muḥammad Shāh in 1848, by which time the *bāb* was already a prisoner, that the movement was accompanied by bloodshed. In the confusion following the death of Muḥammad Shāh there were numerous clashes between the *bāb*'s followers, bands of whom had been roaming the countryside proclaiming the advent of the *mahdī*, and their opponents.* For the first four years of Nāṣir ud-Dīn's reign the Bābīs continued to be militant; after an attempt in 1852 to assassinate Nāṣir ud-Dīn they were subjected to a brutal persecution, which brought their militant phase effectively to an end.

Broadly speaking fanaticism was not a marked feature of Persian life under the Qājārs. There was little cause for Sunnī-Shī'ī strife since the two communities, for the most part, did not live cheek by jowl. Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians, though subject to certain disabilities and marks of discrimination, were tolerated; ugly incidents, including the persecution of the Bābīs, occurred from time to time but were the exception and not the rule. Hostility to the West was associated in the public mind with the defence of Islam. The conception of a national state had little appeal for the man in the street, but the idea of Islam in danger at the hands of infidels immediately evoked response. Opposition to, and intrigue against, rivals frequently took the form of attacks against alleged unorthodoxy or disloyalty to Islam. Unscrupulous use was often made of religious prejudices. Muḥammad 'Alī Mīrzā; 'Abbās Mīrzā's brother and rival, attempted to cast odium on the latter and his efforts to form a modern army by seeking to show that in adopting the customs of infidels 'Abbās Mīrzā was subverting the religion of Islam. In order to counteract this, 'Abbās Mīrzā caused a passage of the Qur'ān favourable to the improvement of the means of attack and defence in the cause of religion to be copied and disseminated throughout the country.† Similarly, the opponents of Nāṣir ud-Dīn's policy of modernization claimed to be the defenders of Islam, representing his projected reforms as contrary to the Qur'ān. On the other hand the protagonists of the movement for reform at the end of the nineteenth century, which culminated in the grant of the constitution, interpreted the rule of law which they were demanding to mean the rule of the *shāri 'a* and claimed to be the defenders of the country in the

* E. G. Browne, *A literary History of Persia*, C.U.P., 1930, iv, 151.

† Morier, *Second Journey*, p. 213.

face of those who, they alleged, were selling the lands of Islam to infidels.

The merchant classes, in the absence of banks, played an important part in the provision and transmission of funds. The Qur'ān, by its prohibition of usury, made large-scale operations in credit difficult; but legal devices were devised to circumvent this. In the nineteenth century, although Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Armenian merchants played an important part, the main internal trade of the country was probably in the hands of the Muslim merchants. It was to them to whom the government looked in emergencies. When Nāṣir ud-Dīn marched on Tehrān on the death of Muḥammad Shāh to establish his claim to the throne, the necessary funds were advanced to him by a Tabrīzī merchant. Similarly, officials whose pay was in arrears (as was often the case) and others in difficulty had recourse to merchants to tide them over. When a provincial governor was not chosen from a great or wealthy family it was customary for him to find some merchant to guarantee his remission of the provincial revenue due to the central government. Sometimes government officials would be in actual partnership with the merchants as in the case of Amīn ud-Dawleh (mentioned above); in some of the remoter provinces on the other hand the governor himself might virtually monopolize trade or certain branches of it.

In the larger cities there was a *malik ut-tujjār* who was, in effect, the head of the local merchant community; he received his title from the shah or the provincial governor. There was a strong hereditary tendency in this office also. The leading merchants ranked below the leading members of the bureaucracy, the military, and the landowning and religious classes, though they sometimes achieved assimilation to these by marriage alliances, the acquisition of land, or government service. On the whole the bazaar merchants tended to be closely allied to the religious classes and it was a familiar phenomenon for the bazaar, on the instigation of the *'ulamā*, to close in protest at some action by the government. In spite, however, of the important role played by the merchants in the community, there was no development of merchant companies or of a strong middle class. On the other hand the craft guilds had a vigorous corporate life.

The main function of the masses, whether in the town or the country, was to pay taxes to the government, the local leaders, or both. For hundreds of years this had been their function, and the gulf in mutual understanding and wealth between them and the rest of the population was wide. In the course of time they had developed a technique to enable them to some extent to cheat and defraud their oppressors. But on the whole their lot was woefully insecure. To the extortions of the tax-collector and the degradation of personal servitudes were added the horror of periodic outbreaks of cholera and plague, famine and high prices caused by actual shortages or by hoarding and cornering; the fear of raids by marauding Turkomans and others; and, in the cities, rioting by the mob, who could easily be incited to violence by the unscrupulous. The degree to which insecurity prevailed both in different parts of the empire and at different periods, however, varied. In the latter part of the reign of Nāṣir ud-Dīn, security, outwardly at least, was relatively good, and the writ of the gov-

ernment ran through most of the country.* In general, however, the only remedies open to the people in the case of extortion and injustice were an appeal to the shah, recourse to one of the religious leaders, the taking of *bast* or refuge, and, in the last resort, flight. The great Shī'ī shrines, especially at Shāh 'Abd ul-'Azīm and Qumm, were favourite sanctuaries; *bast* could also be taken in the royal stable,† foreign legations, and, from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, the telegraph office.

The canvas I have attempted to sketch is a broad one: there are many aspects of society that I have not touched upon; much remains to be filled in. Intrigue, insecurity, venality, the intensely personal nature of power, and a lack of realism, often coupled with vanity, are plainly to be seen. To some, including perhaps the Persian reformer, these features may seem almost to fill the canvas. But they are not all: the witness of foreign travellers on the whole is of a hospitable, friendly, likeable people; and in the pages of their narratives one meets many instances of civilized, courteous behaviour, generosity and dignity, gaiety and courage.

The PRESIDENT: Your Royal Highness, Ladies and Gentlemen. On your behalf I wish to thank Professor Lambton immensely for coming here and for the quality of her lecture. I shall not attempt to comment on it because there are others present who are better able to do so, but she gave us a fascinating picture of the history of those times. Persian history goes back so far that if one can obtain a brevet of a certain period it is to some degree helpful in understanding the problems which modern Persia faces.

I should have liked to question Professor Lambton, as would many of you, and I am sure she would have liked to answer our questions. But, unfortunately, our hosts require this hall and we have not many minutes of time left. So if we end now, Professor Lambton, it is not because we do not want to ask you a lot more—we do.

Before we leave I have a happy duty to perform as President of the Society. It is to present the Sir Percy Sykes Memorial Medal to Professor Lambton.

As time is short I will not go into a long history of the medal. Let me say, briefly, that the Society owes the medal to the generosity of Lady Evelyn Sykes and the children of the late Sir Percy Sykes who created a trust fund from which these medals are supplied. We welcome two representatives of the family here with us today, Lady Reilly and Mrs. Sinclair.

The medal is awarded by our Council to any distinguished person, traveller or writer deemed to have increased man's knowledge or stimulated man's interests in Asian countries or worked to further the cultural relations between the Commonwealth and Asian countries. The medal is struck by the Royal Mint. The Council does not necessarily award the medal every year but only to those who truly fulfil the charter of the medal. The Council had no doubt that Professor Lambton, on all counts, is a most worthy recipient of this award.

I have already given a very imperfect account of Professor Lambton's

* Cf. Curzon, i, 405-6.

† Cf. Malcolm, ii, 403.

qualifications to talk to us, her great knowledge of Persian history, customs, and language, but she does stand for more than that. I think it correct to say, and ambassadors in the audience will agree, that she is one of our most valued links with modern Persia, a great and friendly country, and an ally in the Central Treaty Organization area.

Professor Lambton visited Persia last year and she is continually renewing her knowledge of that country. She knows the people of all classes, has many friends among them and is deeply respected in Persia. In this and in her work of teaching students of Persian at London University and encouraging enthusiasm for knowledge and understanding of Persia, her problems and her people, Professor Lambton is implementing one of the major objects of this Society, which is the furtherance of understanding between nations of the East and of the West. That is an object to which the Society most sincerely holds.

Therefore, Professor Lambton, on behalf of the Society, I have the honour to present to you the Sir Percy Sykes Memorial Medal and to offer you our warmest congratulations. (*Applause.*)

PROFESSOR ANN LAMBTON: I am deeply sensible of the honour which has been conferred on me by the presentation of this medal. To anyone who is a student of Persia it must be a matter of great satisfaction to receive a medal donated in memory of Sir Percy Sykes, with whose work and interest we are all familiar. I should like to express my grateful thanks to the Society for the honour.

A RECENT VISIT TO TURKEY

By MR. M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.A., J.P., F.R.G.S.

Report of a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society, held at the Royal Society's Hall, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1, on Wednesday, November 2, 1960. Mr. C. J. Edmonds, C.M.G., C.B.E., was in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Philip Southwell is either just arriving back from his travels or has not yet arrived, and has asked me to deputize for him today. I will not say to introduce the lecturer, because he is well known to us. He has been a member of the Society for twenty years and has been extremely good, after his various travels abroad, in coming to lecture to us. I will content myself, therefore, with recalling briefly one or two points about his career which have made him such an expert on the subject which he will talk about today.

His travels in Central Asia, Siberia, Persia and Turkey started as long ago as 1918. From 1914 to 1918 he was correspondent to the *Manchester Guardian* in Russia. He has written a number of books on Russia and Germany, and the *History of Turkey*, published in 1956. His last lecture was three or four years ago.

He visited Turkey again in September this year, largely to collect material for a third edition of the *History of Turkey*. Also, very fortunately, he was able to see the new conditions in Turkey since the revolution of a few months ago. It has changed, but I find the changes difficult to follow, and I am sure that you will all be interested to hear this latest news.

IT is always a very great pleasure for me to address this Society again, because, as the Chairman has said, I have been for many years a member of it and, secondly, I always know that whenever I am here amongst you, all members are in one way or another experts on some aspects of life and affairs in Central Asia—and Central Asia includes a very large area of country, extending almost into North Africa.

If I appear to hurry, I hope you will forgive me, because I am trying to work to a time-table. I want to get through the lecture in half an hour in order to be able to show you some slides that I have taken recently in Turkey and also some that I took forty-eight years ago, in 1912, when I was there for the first time, in very much the same country as I have visited recently, to show you a certain amount of difference between the Turkey of those days and the Turkey of today, and also, at the same time, some similarities.

I decided to make this journey in order to get a first-hand impression of what has happened in Turkey since last May. I have had some writing to do for *Encyclopædia Britannica* in connection with the history of Turkey since 1908 and I also felt that I must try to bring my own little *History of Turkey* up to date for another edition if one is wanted, as it may be shortly. The present one takes us only up to 1954.

A good deal has happened, of course, since that time, and especially since last May. For some time before that, I had become increasingly uneasy at what had been happening in Turkey and I felt in a sense that my reputation was at stake, because I had for some years been saying that since the National Revolution of the Ataturk, Turkey had definitely taken

a line in the direction of parliamentary government and Western democracy. What has happened in recent years rather disproves that.

At the same time, I have the excuse that I clearly had misgivings as far back as 1957, because in a lecture which I gave to this Society in January of that year, I said the following :

“One cannot avoid certain misgivings about the internal state of Turkey and candid friends must point out where it seems there are signs of weakness. . . . One must ask where is Turkey finding the resources for her tremendous development. . . . Turkey cannot eat her cake and have it. A large capital development programme involves a cutting down of internal spending power. . . . But the Government will not put any credit squeeze on their peasants. Hence the impasse which has led to certain internal stresses and strains with political repercussions. . . . The Government has introduced a Press Law which gives very wide powers to the Public Prosecutor and to judges and forbids public meetings except at a general election. This is something that all well-wishers of Turkey must be anxious about. . . . The present situation is not healthy.”

I said that to this Society over three years ago, and after that things have got steadily worse. The Democratic Government of Mr. Menderes originally came into power after the general election of 1950, on a wave of dissatisfaction at the rather severe control over the economy of Turkey exercised by the Populist Party. The Democrats were supported by the rising middle class interested in trade and industry, and they wanted more freedom and less of what they called “Etatism,” less State control.

Mr. Menderes was also determined to initiate a policy of economic development. In principle, this was, of course, a very sound thing, but he forced it through at break-neck speed. Roads were built and docks, harbours, hydro-electric plants, irrigation schemes, silos and factories sprang up all over the place; and there is no doubt that Turkey has now great capital assets to her credit which she never had before and which will pay rich dividends to her in future years. It can also be said, however, that for the money which Turkey has borrowed, internally and from abroad, and the money which she has received in grants from the United States of America, there should be far more assets still than actually she has at the moment. In other words, there has been tremendous waste.

There is evidence that cereal silos have been built in places where the peasants grow little cereals except for their own use. Sugar beet factories and refineries have been put up where little, if any, sugar beet is grown. A lot of these things were done in order to satisfy local political interests. That is how a lot of the money went to waste. There have been charges of corruption, which are common enough in countries in the Middle East, as many of us know, but not so frequent in Turkey since the National Revolution. For the traditions of the Ottoman Empire had created in Turkey a degree of self-discipline greater than one finds in the other countries of the Middle East.

All this wild spending on investments, some of which were valuable and some of which were not, brought about a disastrous state of affairs,

and under the former régime Turkey has been running a foreign debt which threatens her with bankruptcy. She is, naturally, not a very rich country. She has no oil like the Arab countries and Persia. She has chrome, which is valuable, and certain minerals, but she has no rivers like the Nile, the Euphrates and the Tigris for extensive irrigation. She has the Euphrates and the Tigris, but only the upper waters of them.

Consequently, Turkey has to depend a great deal on her agricultural exports. Here she is hindered largely by the absence of rainfall over many areas of the Anatolian plateau, where the rainfall is very fitful. Before the big developments of the last ten years, her trade balance was slightly active, but only very slightly; and with the huge development schemes on hand, with imports of capital goods of all kinds rising heavily, her balance of payments has become increasingly passive. Her trade deficit in 1958-59 was over 100 million dollars in the one year. Her commercial debt has accumulated over the last five years and in 1958 amounted to 420 million dollars, of which 150 million dollars was with this country; and it has since increased. These are not the latest figures.

The prospects were, and still are, that the proceeds of Turkey's exports—at least half of them—will have to go to meet the interest and the sinking fund on her commercial debt alone. This agreement was come to with her creditors in July, 1958, and leaves insufficient for imports of goods without further extensive credits. The position, therefore, was getting desperate at the end of the Menderes régime.

But Mr. Menderes went on merrily borrowing wherever he could, hinting to Britain and America that Turkey must get further help because she was such a bastion in the Middle East against Russian Communism.

Meanwhile, inflation and rising prices have been going on apace and when, under the late régime, the free Press began to criticize this policy, Mr. Menderes increased the persecution of opinion, which he had begun in 1956 and to which I referred in my last lecture here four years ago. Finally, last winter, he pushed a Bill through Parliament setting up a commission and conferring on it power to arrest and imprison members of the Turkish Parliament who criticized the Government or did anything to undermine its prestige in the country. In other words, he started to tamper with the Constitution.

Then, indeed, one could see in Turkish affairs appearing before our eyes the ugly face of Abdul Hamid once more. Turkey was sliding back fast to some of the more sinister features of her past. Soon after this, university students started demonstrating in the streets of Ankara and Istanbul and were joined by the military cadets, which was a quite unprecedented thing to happen. Some students and cadets were killed in the disorder that took place last May. Information then came to the officers of the Army that Menderes planned to arrest some of them. Then, the Army struck and within twelve hours the Government was taken over, a Military Directory was set up and the late Government was put behind lock and key.

In this country, we do not like military chiefs—except retired ones, of course—taking part in politics. We had our experience of this 300 years ago under Cromwell. Turkey, however, has different traditions. You must always judge a country, not by our standards, but by the standards

out of which that country has grown and from its history. In times past, the Turkish Army has often interfered in politics, and generally with beneficial results. It was the Adrianople Army Corps under Mahmud Shevket Pasha which marched on Constantinople in 1908 and deposed a tyrannical Sultan. The great reforms of the Ataturk from 1923 to 1926 were put through only thanks to the backing of the Army.

In far-off days, the Janissaries, with the aid of the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Ulema, used to intervene to depose corrupt and tyrannical Sultans. When the Janissaries themselves became corrupt, the modern Army in 1826, under Sultan Mahmud II, aided by the religious chiefs, dissolved the Janissaries. Today, we have the same sort of thing in the Turkey of the twentieth century. The present Military Directory is the creation of the modern Army, recruited mainly from small middle-class people and peasants. They are backed by the intellectuals and professional classes. In other words, at one time the intellectuals behind the Army were the mullahs, who wore huge turbans, sat squat-legged on the floor and consulted the Koran. Today, the intellectuals behind the Army wear European clothes, sit on chairs and study the lectures and economic theories emanating from the London School of Economics. It may be different in some ways, but it is the same in others.

This is all much in the tradition of Turkish history. As that fine old Turkish statesman and colleague of the Ataturk, Ismet Inönü, said to me when I visited him six weeks ago on an island in the Sea of Marmora, "What has happened since May is the next stage of the Turkish National Revolution begun by the Ataturk."

I spent some time in Istanbul and Ankara and saw a number of people. Istanbul is the commercial centre of Turkey and the seat of the chief newspapers. One thing struck me very much. In 1956 when I was there, the newspaper editors were all deeply depressed and some were under sentence of imprisonment merely for criticizing the Menderes Government. Today, they show their intense relief at what has happened. They accept the military régime as something temporary and they criticize it on detail and matters of fact and nothing happens to them. In fact, their advice is often taken. They expect an election next year, and I think they will get it.

Some argument, however, has taken place, or is said to have taken place behind the scenes, over whether some of the younger members of the Military Directory with strong views on social and economic reform may not be wanting to keep the Directory in power for a long time in order to give direction to the social evolution of Turkey. Some of the younger officers have studied at the London School of Economics and at the Economic School at Harvard. They have a slight authoritarian and semi-Socialist tinge about them. But it seems that they are being curbed.

For this is what happened to me in Ankara. I was to have had an interview with one of these members of the Directory who was of the Left. On the morning of my appointment, I presented myself but I was told that he was very sorry that, after all, he could not see me. Three days later, I learned that he had resigned from the Military Directory, or had been pushed out—I do not know which. So I got the impression that the older officers are asserting themselves and are sincere about their state-

ment that in the course of the next year they will retire and hand over to whatever party gets power at the general election.

I attended a Press conference addressed by the head of the Directory, General Görsel. He gave me a very good impression. He answered a lot of questions very calmly and with much common sense. The atmosphere of the conference was good. The Press representatives were mainly Turkish, but there were foreigners there, too. They were not really hostile, but they sought information and, I think, they got most of the information they wanted. There were occasional bursts of friendly laughter.


General Görsel seems to me to be a good example of a fine Turkish officer, but not of the old conservative, heavy type. He is modern in his outlook but he is clearly restraining the wilder elements of the Directory. He has much power. The commanders of all the Army groups in the country are directly responsible to him and not to the Directory. He has taken steps to stop some of the wilder economic schemes of the late Government, but is carrying on with others of them. All the same, the economic position of Turkey is catastrophic and rumour was afoot when I was still in Ankara that Turkey was going to ask for a moratorium on her foreign commercial debt. That, however, has not happened, and it may not happen, but it is the kind of thing which is in the air. It may also explain the reasons for some of the economies which are being made, not only in the Army. It has happened since I have left there and it is difficult for me to say what it is that has happened, but that seems to me to be a possible and simple kind of explanation, that they are cutting down.

Why did Mr. Menderes act as he did? I believe that his intention at first was quite sound and that he originally had no intention of adopting tyrannical methods or persecuting critics, but he got so devoted to the idea of developing Turkey's economic resources at all costs and at break-neck speed that he became increasingly intolerant of criticism. He seems to have got himself deeper and deeper into the mud of authoritarianism until, finally, even if he wanted to, he could not get himself out of it. That is the most charitable explanation I can give to it. He may have been the victim, in other words, of his excessive zeal, but the fact that such a thing as his régime was possible shows that Turkey is still politically immature, although much more mature than the other States of the Middle East. We have seen examples of this kind of thing happening some time ago. We have seen what happened in the Arab States, in Pakistan and Burma, where semi-permanent authoritarian régimes have succeeded chaotic attempts to set up parliamentary governments. It seems that Turkey has succumbed in much the same way through internal weaknesses, but I think she will get over it more quickly than the others are likely to do, because the traditions of the old Ottoman Empire and self-discipline are stronger in Turkey than in any of the other countries, except, possibly, Persia. There, of course, conditions are difficult owing to the large tribal areas. Turkey overcame that some time ago.


Mr. Menderes still has supporters in the country. He has a large peasant backing because he gave the peasants all they wanted, even at the expense of imposing increased burdens on the rest of the population. He gave the peasants prices for wheat above the world market prices, which




1. TOMB OF MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATURK AT ANKARA.



2. MODERN HARBOUR AND SILO AT TREBIZOND ON BLACK SEA.



3. DROUGHT-RESISTANT GRASSES GROWN AT EXPERIMENTAL STATION ANKARA.



4. CHURCH OF ST. SOPHIA TREBIZOND, WHERE BYZANTINE FRESCOES HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED.

resulted in higher prices for people in the towns and the taxpayers have had to pay big subsidies to the peasants.

This policy has now been reversed by the Directory, which has not been very popular with sections of the peasants, but it is perfectly right. Mr. Menderes also had some of the business interests, contractors and agents for importers of foreign goods on his side because they profited by the reckless spending of foreign grants and loans.

He had support from other quarters, too. He encouraged the reactionary elements among the mullahs and imans of the Islamic faith. It is said that he encouraged the suppressed Dervishes, but I cannot vouch for that. I saw no evidence. It is true, however, that the opposition has increased against such important reforms for popularizing Islam as the translation of the Koran into Turkish. That has been opposed by some of the mullahs. I had direct evidence when I was in Trebizond that the Iman there is obstructing the work being done on uncovering friezes and wall paintings in some of the former Byzantine churches there which are being undertaken by a group of archæologists from Edinburgh University. Certainly, the reactionary religious influences, which were suppressed by the Ataturk in his day, began to come out of their holes under the Menderes régime. I found the mosques full at prayer time and especially on Fridays. I like to see Turkey hold to Islam, but it is a very different thing if the old religious influences—the influences which kept Turkey backward for the greater part of the last century—are allowed to come back.

One of the difficult problems affecting Turkey's economy is the state of her agriculture. Here balance of payments would improve if she could raise the output from the land and have a steady export to such countries as Egypt and the Mediterranean countries of cereals and livestock produce. Two obstacles lie in the way. The first is that the peasants dry and burn animal dung, or Tezek, instead of using it on the land. The second is that the type of grain and grasses which are grown are poor. I went to see the Minister of Agriculture in Ankara because I wanted to know what was being done in this connection. I found as Minister there a certain Dr. Toshun. I have known Dr. Toshun for many years. I have known him as the chief research officer on the improvement of grasses and grains at the Ziraat Institut or Agricultural Research Station just outside Ankara.

It was encouraging to find that the Military Directory had put a scientist and not a politician in charge of agriculture. He was astonishingly frank with me and hid nothing. As a scientist, he was concerned more with facts than propaganda. He told me that he could not see Turkey's agriculture improving at a very rapid rate. The present yield of cereals in Turkey was an average of one ton per hectare. By the use of fertilizers and improved strains of grasses and cereals, he thought that in five years the yield might be raised to 1.2 tons per hectare—that is all—and that in ten years it might be increased 20 per cent. above the figures that he hopes for in five years' time. The problem is to find the right kind of cereals and grasses for the frequent dry seasons on the Anatolian plateau.

Over 2,000 drought-resistant grasses have been collected from all over the world and tried out on experimental farms. Twenty have been selected and most of these are natives of Anatolia itself; some have come from the

American continent. The problem now is to grow them on a large scale and then induce the peasants to grow them. This would increase the output and reduce the peasants' overhead costs and make them less dependent on subsidies and artificial high prices which Mr. Menderes offered them for political reasons. I went over the experimental stations both in Ankara and in Erzinjan, where I went later to see what was going on. A certain Dr. Omr Tarman, who is in charge of this now since Dr. Toshun is Minister, took me round, and I will show some slides presently.

No one can get a proper impression of Turkey if he goes only to Istanbul and Ankara. Eighty per cent. of the population of Turkey are peasants and I always go to the provinces when I am in Turkey after I have been to the two capitals. This time, I went to Erzinjan and then over the mountains to the Black Sea coast. When going to places like that, one sees that in those places, at least, Turkey has not changed very much.

Forty-eight years ago I did a journey over much the same country on horseback when I was a young man, and I can say that except for better roads, the country is now very much as it was in those days, as will be seen from my photographs. One never sees a woman's face even now. If you walk in the villages, all the women cover their faces at your approach. The methods of farming are as primitive now as they were then. People stare at a stranger from the outer world as if he was a man from Mars. I told that to a Turkish lady in Istanbul. She said, "Do not worry. They do the same to us when we go into that part of the country."

I found that in parts of the country along the Black Sea coast towards the Russian border the Dere Beys, or local chieftains, still have great influence. Not so very long ago, they used to raise private armies for the Sultan, but the National Revolution put an end to that. They cannot do that now, but they can, and do, use great political influence locally, and whole families still largely politically lead the countryside.

At Erzinjan, a town destroyed by an earthquake some twenty years ago and rebuilt, I arrived just as a military review of parts of the Third Army was in progress, and I was invited by the Governor to attend. The Turks have lost none of their efficiency at soldiering, but good military material is not enough without modern weapons. However, I understand that the Americans have done a lot in this respect. I think that anyone who fought the Turkish Third Army would not have a pleasant time.

I crossed three mountain ranges from Erzinjan in a local bus running from there over the mountains to Trebizond, on the Black Sea coast. One range was up to 6,000 ft., the famous Zigana Pass, where the Greeks under Xenophon first saw the sea in their famous expedition. In spite of better roads today, however, travelling is still uncertain, because no one in those parts of Turkey thinks of servicing or repairing a machine, just like in other parts of the East. It simply runs until it collapses. Then, if it is put right, it is the Will of Allah!

That happened three times on my journey in one day across the mountains to Trebizond. Once, the car broke down on one of the 5,000-ft. passes. The gears were taken out and spread on the road. We sat there in desolate surroundings for two hours, having had neither food nor drink that day, wondering whether we should ever get to Trebizond. In the

old days, a good old horse would always get you there, slowly but surely. Today, it is not so certain in these parts of the East. However, over this bus Allah was compassionate and merciful, the gears proved mendable and we got to Trebizond in pouring rain and pitch darkness at about 10 o'clock at night.

From there, after a few days in Trebizond, I went on a Black Sea steamer coasting along the south coast of the Black Sea and the north coast of Anatolia, calling at all the ports on the way back to Istanbul. I saw considerable changes since I was there forty-eight years ago. Every port now has a nice harbour, well laid out. The previous régime, and the one before that, must take credit for that. It started under İnönü's régime of the Populist Party. So you can see modern Turkey again when you get to the Black Sea, but before that it was very much the Turkey I remembered of old.

Then followed some slides.

DISCUSSION

Mr. MILNER BARRY: Is it thought that General İsmet İnönü and the other Opposition leaders had anything to do with the revolution?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: Ex-President İnönü has been very strong in saying that there is absolutely no truth in the rumour, and I think that that can be believed. I have known him as well as any foreigner can know a Turkish statesman of that calibre. I have met him four times and he has always received me. Although he knew that he would benefit enormously by a *coup d'état* of this kind, I think I can believe him. I am sure he has done his best to keep out of it.

A QUESTIONER: I have heard somebody say that Turks can have five wives. Can you tell us about the marriage law in Turkey and whether they can have five wives?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: As far as I am aware, there has not been any alteration in the law. You can say that polygamy is absolutely forbidden—it may go on still in some out-of-the-way parts—and divorce is now regularized. A man cannot divorce his wife as in the old days. In that respect, it can be said that Turkey has come up to the level of Western practices generally. What may go on in many out-of-the-way places, I do not know. Those things may be possible there, but not otherwise.

A QUESTIONER: Except for very rich men, would they not find it expensive to buy five wives?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: Yes. That was true even before the revolution. Polygamy was not very widespread even then for that reason. The prophet Mohammed laid it down that no one wife was allowed to be treated any differently to the others. I do not say that that was always observed, but, anyway, there was a tremendous moral obligation. It was sanctioned by public opinion even in those days.

A QUESTIONER: Do the wives fraternize and get on with each other? Are they friendly to each other if there are five wives in a family?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: I would not like to say. I have no personal knowledge!

Mrs. St. JOHN COOK: Will the opposition of the newer element fade out as the older generation dies?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: Yes, I think so, undoubtedly. What Turkey has to overcome now is the question of how to run her public affairs and to do it by parliamentary methods and public discussion, to which the Government of the day must listen. Mr. Menderes has come a cropper because he did not do that. In other words, Turkey is not yet through her most important stage of becoming a Western democracy. I think that she will get through it.

At the moment, the Democratic Party has been suppressed completely. It was allowed to go on for a long time after May, but it has now been dissolved. The question now is what kind of Opposition there will be. Nobody seems to know. There are rumours. It was said that the Military Directory would try to organize an Opposition. Everybody expects that at the general election ex-President İnönü will come back with a big majority.

There is also the National Democratic Party, which is very much to the Right. Whether they will get much support I do not know. But I do not think so. It is thought that possibly the people of the Military Directory, or some of them, will retire and organize a legal Opposition to the Populist Party. That seems to me to be the next stage in the political development of Turkey.

Major-General BEDDINGTON: What is the basis of land tenure in the agricultural districts of Turkey?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: Private peasant ownership. But the Populist régime, when in office, had a land law limiting the size of the holdings to 500 hectares. It was honoured more in the breach than in the observance. It did happen that there were distributions of land to landless peasants, but mostly from State property. There are some larger estates which have not been touched. It is said that the Military Directory will do that.

In Turkey, there is not the same problem as in Persia or the Arab countries. There are no enormous land-owners owning whole areas or provinces. It never was so. Even in the old régime, the Sultan was the principal land-holder and he did not give away land when he had it in Anatolia. He did not give it to his pashas. It largely went to the peasants. So Turkey's agrarian system is much healthier than that of any of the other Middle Eastern countries.

Major-General BEDDINGTON: What would the peasants burn as an alternative fuel if dung were to be used as a fertiliser?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: I asked that very question. I was told that there is now a system, which started in Tunisia and Morocco, of treating dung with a certain chemical which creates methane and carbon dioxide, which can be used for burning and also will leave a portion for manure. I do not think it is anything that can be produced on a big scale as yet. As far as I can see, it is more or less in the experimental stage. The main hope is in drought-resistant grasses and cereals. There is oil, of course, and Turkey has coal. A lot can be done by the development of the use of coal and oil.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid that brings us to the end of our time. It only remains for me, on your behalf, to thank Mr. Philips Price for having come to us so soon after his recent journey to Turkey and for the most enthralling lecture he has given us and the wonderful slides he has shown.

The vote of thanks was accorded unanimously by acclamation.

THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

This is the eighth in a series of reviews of new Soviet literature on the six Muslim republics of the U.S.S.R. and the countries bordering on them. The present article deals with books received between August and the end of November, 1960. It is contributed by the Central Asian Research Centre in collaboration with the Soviet Affairs Study Group of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

I. CENTRAL ASIA

Cultural History

IN honour of the 70th birthday of the noted Georgian scholar Iosif Abgarovich Orbeli, a group of Soviet scholars decided to present a collection of articles about the history, philology, archæology and art of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Near and Middle East, from ancient times to the present day. The results of this endeavour were published in 1960 in *Research on the History of the Culture of the Peoples of the East* (Issledovaniya po istorii kul'tury narodov vostoka. Publishing House of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow and Leningrad, 1960. 527 pp.). The book starts out with an eight-page biography of Academician I. A. Orbeli, who devoted most of his life to the development of Orientology. The first part of the book is about the Caucasus, and includes two articles on architectural schools and problems of style in architecture in medieval Azerbaydzhan. The section on Central Asia includes articles by L. N. Gutilev on *The Talassk Battle of 36 B.C.*; N. V. D'yakonova and O. I. Smirnova on *The Interpretation of Pendzhikent Painting*, studying its relation to historical and religious movements throughout Central Asia; A. N. Kononov on *The History of Russian Turkology* (until the nineteenth century), in which he gives a history of the different Turkic languages, their relation to Russian, and the influence of the Russian language and culture on their neighbours; R. G. Mukminova on *The History of Vaqf Land Ownership in Central Asia in the XVI Century*; A. A. Roslyakov on *Basic Features of Turkmen Fortification in the XVIII-XIX Centuries*; A. L. Troitskaya on *Sagira* (in the sense of "Orphans") in the *Kokand Khanate (XIX Century)*; S. N. Ivanov on *Categories of Voice in Participles of the Uzbek Language*; and Ye. V. Sevortyan on *The Verb-forming Affix -sa/-sy/-syn in the Turkic Languages*. The final section of the book is on the Near and Middle East. Among others, there are articles by I. N. Vinnikov on *Notes on the Koran*, which analyses several verses with the obvious intention of casting suspicion on the meaning, and implying contradictions in the Koran; M. B. Rudenko on *Kurdish Literature*; I. P. Petrushevskiy on *The History of the Poll-Tax under the Mongolian Empire*; and other articles on Persian archæological discoveries and Persian grammar.

Exploring the Pamirs

An attractive book on the Pamirs has been written by Nikolay Vasil'evich Krylenko, formerly a high Party and Government official in the

Soviet Union. In this book, *Through the Unexplored Pamirs* (По неведомому Памиру. State Publishing House of Geographical Literature, Moscow, 1960. 348 pp.), Krylenko describes a series of trips he took from 1928 to 1933 to this highest part of the U.S.S.R., in Central Asia, bordering on Afghanistan and China. The book is written in diary form in an interesting style, and contains maps of his routes and many excellent photographs.

Political Structure of Kazakhstan

In his book *The Political Structure of Kazakhstan* (Politicheskiy stroy Kazakhstana. Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1960. 294 pp.), S. Z. Zimanov gives a detailed study of the organization of local power in what he calls the pre-khan and post-khan periods. Special attention is given to the ending of the power of the khans, the establishment of the new system of control and its role in the social life of the Kazakhs. It is based mainly on material from state archives, and is intended principally for specialists concerned with the history of this period. As is generally the case with Soviet studies of this kind, most of the period is studied in the light of the influence of the Russians on Kazakhstan, and as part of the class struggle. The first twenty-eight pages of the book form an introduction examining what had been written previously. Then follows an outline of the social conditions of the Kazakhs, including the economic (all agricultural) development of the land, the influence of Russia in establishing a line of settled areas among the nomadic population, the class struggle, and the patriarchal family structure of society under the influence of Islam. Attention is given to the organization of the khanates, including the administrative apparatus, feudal congresses, local nobility, etc. The conclusion is reached that the downfall of the khanates was not a result of the daring attempts of a great sultan nobility, nor of feudal and monarchical movements, nor again of collaboration with the clergy or with other countries, but rather of the development of economic, social and political conditions, and the strengthening of Russia's influence. An examination is made of the reforms carried out in the Greater Horde in 1822, which the author admits did accomplish many positive things, though the Horde remained subordinate to the "goals of colonial policies." The last two chapters are about the power and administration of Kazakhstan after the liquidation of the khanates, and about the State policy of the Tsarist colonial government, implying that this influence of the Russian Tsars was a "lesser evil." *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* of September 3, 1960, criticized this book for its acceptance of the "lesser evil" interpretation of Tsarist annexation, a theory now officially repudiated. Although the whole review is generally favourable, the author is also criticized for not analysing critically the archive sources which he uses.

Changes in Central Asia and Survivals of the Past

The first of two books written by A. Altmysbayev, *Some Survivals of the Past in the Consciousness of the People of Central Asia and the role of Socialist Culture in Struggling Against Them* (Nekotoryye perezhitki

proshlogo v soznanii lyudey v sredney Azii i rol' sotsialisticheskoy kul'tury v bor'be s nimi. Department of Philosophy and Law of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1958. 91 pp.), is a most interesting study of some present-day conditions in Central Asia, especially in regard to religious beliefs. In some ways, more questions appear to be raised than are answered. Altmyshbayev claims that there are two basic types of survivals of pre-bourgeois social formation and bourgeois society. The first type includes such practices as polygamy, bride price (*kalym*), ancestral seniority, blood feuds, the isolation of women from male society, occurring in various parts of the country and mainly in the republics of Central Asia, but not among peoples formed into bourgeois nations before the October Revolution (*e.g.*, Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia). The second type includes "non-communist attitudes to labour and public property; an incorrect attitude towards family, drunkenness, manifestations of religious prejudices, and national particularism. These are found all over the country, though surviving more strongly and for a longer period among those peoples who passed to socialism without going through the stage of capitalist development. He especially attacks here the violation of "communist principles of selecting trained personnel" by the play on links of family and friends, as well as national origin. "In the words of Mao Tse-tung, contradictions in Soviet society are contradictions of an internal character (inside the people), that is, non-antagonistic (*sic*) contradictions. They are manifested not only in the form of a struggle between conscious and unconscious attitudes towards labour of the two groups of Soviet people, but also in the struggle between the antiquated and the new, more progressive style of work of the economic and cultural organs of Soviet power . . ."

Other breaches of labour discipline, such as speculation, pilfering and embezzlement are regarded as reflecting the struggle against communist consciousness of an ideology which is hostile to socialism, and as an attempt to disorganize the normal current of planned production. A surprising allusion to sabotage is made, when the author says "we will not dwell on the facts of subversive activities, on sabotage carried out by undisguised foreign and internal enemies of Soviet society. This open struggle of the enemies of the people against socialist society has, in the minds of some elements of the Soviet people, nothing in common with the survivals of the past. The campaign against such elements should be stern and relentless." The author, while admitting that respect for the wisdom and experience of older people "is one of the best national ethnic traditions," inveighs against excessive insistence on the rights due to the heads of families. This, he says, is due to lack of awareness of the socialist principle of labour—from each according to his ability, to each according to his labour. In some families the heads of family simply do nothing, and live at the expense of working members of the family. In Kirgizia, for example, nearly ten per cent. of those living on *kolkhozes* who are capable of work have not put in the required number of hours. At meetings, wives often just look at their husbands to find out how to vote on an issue. Many men will not help with work at home, considering it beneath their dignity. As to religion, Islam is blamed for the retain-

ing of "backward customs and reactionary traditions," with this "negative tendency" having revived during World War II, and especially in the past three or four years. The weakening of anti-religious propaganda is chiefly blamed for this. Taking Kirgizia as an example, the author says that during the war there were only 10 registered and 15 or 20 unregistered mosques and churches. However, in 1957, with data still incomplete, there were more than 50 registered (including 34 Muslim) and 400 unregistered Muslim and non-Muslim religious societies and groups. This is not including the larger number of unregistered individual mullahs, or itinerant preachers, of whom there were 309 in the Osh oblast alone. He gives the numbers attending daily and weekly prayers, and asserts that inroads have even been made on youth, 35 per cent. of those baptized in Kirgizia in 1957 being under 30 years of age. The book ends with recommended measures for fighting these "survivals," including increased ideological propaganda, the raising of the economic and cultural life of the country, and the elimination of the existing differences between mental and physical labour and between city and country.

Another book by A. Altmyshbayev is called *Some Features of the Form of Transition of the Peoples of Central Asia to Socialism* (O nekotorykh osobennostyakh formy perekhoda narodov sredney azii k sotsializmu. Department of Philosophy and Law of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1959. 97 pp.). He claims that the attaining of socialism in the republics of Central Asia proves the validity of Lenin's teaching on the possibility of so doing without passing through the stage of capitalist development. The peoples of Central Asia, "with the support of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia," went directly from patriarchal and feudal conditions to socialism. This is supposed to support the Leninist position on the "unity of content" and the varied forms of the transition of peoples to socialism. In Central Asia the "content" of their political power was the dictatorship of the proletariat, and its form the peasant Soviets. The author says that in the construction of socialism in the republics of Central Asia, in other areas of the Soviet Union, and also in the countries of Eastern Europe, with all the varied forms of transition to socialism, the determining principles (content) are: the leading role of the Communist Party in the revolutionary struggle of the working masses; the union of the proletariat with the peasantry and other revolutionary sections of the population, with the working class in the leading role; the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the development of relations between peoples on the basis of equal rights and proletarian internationalism; the construction of a classless socialist society. Experience has shown, the author continues, that the main deciding factors in the transition of backward peoples to socialism are, first, the intensification of the liberation movement of the revolutionary democratic forces among backward peoples and, second, the presence of moral and material aid and support from those countries where the working class has already come to power.

Kirgizia

Kirgizia on the Eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution (Kir-

giziya nakanune velikoy oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Institute of History of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1959. 112 pp.), by A. G. Zima, describes the political, economic and social situation in what is now Kirgizia in the hundred years leading up to the October Revolution. Russian aid in developing the area is stressed, but the Tsarist régime is criticized for not developing the cultures of the individual peoples of Turkestan. The development of capitalism was particularly slow because of the distance of the area from the centres of Russia and Turkestan. The "progressive character" of the colonial policy of Tsarism is considered a result of the union of Kirgizia with Russia, and as having resulted despite rather than because of the policies of the Tsar. The economic situation in Kirgizia from 1933 to 1937 is the basis of a book by B. Chyymylova, *Workers of Kirgizia in the Struggle for Fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan in Industry and Transport* (Trudyashchiesya Kirgizii v bor'be za vypolneniye vtoroy pyatiletki v oblasti promyshlennosti i transporta. Institute of History of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1959. 56 pp.). The author says that little research has been done on this period (though he does not mention why!), and as with most books of this type, emphasis is laid on the aid given by the Russians, and on the role of the Communist Party in developing mass socialist competition, mastering new techniques, increasing productive labour, lowering costs and improving the quality of production in industry.

In R. Z. Kydyrbayeva's *Ideological and Artistic Features of the Epos "Sarinzhi-Bokey"* (Ideynokhudozhestvennyye osobennosti epos "Sarinzhi-Bokey." Institute of Language and Literature of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1959. 41 pp.), a Marxist analysis is made of the classical form of the epos. It is described as having been born in the "womb of primitive and communal structure" of epic creative work, and as a description of daily life, outstanding events and activities. This particular epic is supposed to describe the ways of life and family-marriage relations of the Kirgiz people, and the task of the analyst is to seek to uncover the ideological and artistic peculiarities of the poem, and shed some light on its national character. "Ideological content" is mentioned as a "weapon of the struggle of the working people for a better future," with this epic in particular expressing the hopes of the people for a better life. The author stresses what he calls the struggle of the people against obsolete family relations, and says that work really expresses the yearnings of the workers against religion. He comes to the conclusion that "religion does not lie at the basis of the epos, but religious images enter into it as elements representing perceptions of nature and social life"! The quotations the author chooses are difficult to interpret, as they are taken out of context.

A. Dzhumagulov, in *The Family and Marriage among the Kirgiz of the Chu Valley* (Sem'ya i brak y kirgizov Chuyskoy doliny. Institute of History of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1960. 95 pp.), makes an ethnological study of the Kirgiz, saying that there has been no specialized research on this theme up to the present time. Some of his work is based on interviews with elderly kolkhoz workers, and some on his personal observations. His study begins with the second half of the nineteenth century, at the time of the Kokand khanate. According to the

author, the basic economic unit in the patriarchal and feudal structure of the country was the small individual family, which preserved, however, some features of the great patriarchal family. The union of Kirgizia with Russia gradually brought her into the orbit of capitalistic development, and undermined the patriarchal structure of Kirgiz society. In family and marriage relations the ancestral way of life remained firm, including rites and ceremonies known as "the custom of evading," the inter-relation between the brother of the mother and the children of her sister ("avunkulat"), "the custom of returning home" and others. Only the October Revolution, according to Dzhumagulov, liquidated this system, and helped create a "new Soviet Kirgiz family." The book also contains tables giving the terminology of the many relationships involved, the names of all family members, and how they were addressed.

The Dungans

In *The Dungans of Semirechensk* (Dungane Semirech'ya. Institute of Language and Literature of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1959. 103 pp.) M. Sushanlo makes a study of the historical development of the Dungans, a people who had their origin in North-West China. After an uprising in China in the middle of the nineteenth century, some of them came to Kirgizia and Kazakhstan, and the group under study are those who settled in the area now constituted by the Alma-Ata Oblast (Kazakhstan) and part of the Dzhambul Oblast. The sources used include unpublished archive documents, material on the Dungans in the manuscript section of the Department of Social Sciences of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, published data, folklore, and material from scientific expeditions made by the author. The author goes into many traditional and varying explanations of the origin of the Dungans, and goes out of his way to support the theory that they are purely of Chinese origin, and have no relation to Muslims in the rest of the world. He studies the economy of the Dungans up to the October Revolution, and then speaks of the great advantages brought by their association with the Russians. In 1928 a new Latin alphabet was devised for the Dungan language. Finally, in 1952, the cyrillic script was introduced, which, according to the author, made it "easier for the Soviet Dungans to learn the Russian language." The benefits of this latter, as expressed by Sushanlo, is worth quoting, for it is in line with general Soviet policy on teaching Russian to all the peoples of the U.S.S.R.: "the knowledge of the Russian language for Soviet Dungans and other non-Russian peoples and nationalities of the U.S.S.R. promotes intercourse with the Russian people, and assists mutual contact, and the training of scientific and technical personnel. Without a knowledge of Russian, it is impossible to build a new culture and way of life, and the broad mass of Dungan workers cannot become acquainted with the achievements of world-wide culture, including the culture of the great Russian people."

The Kara-Kalpak

L. S. Tolstova, Candidate of Historical Sciences, has written a fairly thorough study of *The Kara-Kalpak of the Fergana Valley* (Karakalpakki ferganskoy doliny. Kara-Kalpak State Publishing House, Nukus, 1959-

183 pp.). In 1939 there were 185,800 Kara-Kalpaks, mainly in the Kara-Kalpak A.S.S.R. in Uzbekistan. There are others in several oblasts of Uzbekistan, some in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and a few in Afghanistan. In 1953-4 the author began a study of the history and ethnological peculiarities of the Kara-Kalpaks of the Fergana Valley (18,520 of them in 1926), living in all three oblasts of the valley, *i.e.*, Andizhan, Naman-gan and Fergana, along the Syr-Dar'ya and Kara-Dar'ya Rivers. She criticizes pre-revolutionary writers for not going into the "social reasons for the deplorable state of the great part of the Kara-Kalpak population, and for examining the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks as a single entity, without making any distinction among the classes . . ." The first chapter concerns the settling of the Kara-Kalpaks in the Fergana Valley, the oppressive control exercised by the different khanates. They entered the Russian Empire (as the Fergana Oblast) in 1860-70, and "as for all other peoples, this event had a great progressive significance: the working masses were freed from despotic khanate authorities, feudal parcelling out was abolished, the permanent feudal civil wars and wars between the Bukhara and Kokand khanates which had ravaged the population and hindered the normal development of the area's economy came to an end." The incorporation into Russia is also seen as having promoted the development of productive forces in the country.

Essays on the History of National Education and the School in Kara-Kalpakia (Ocherki po istorii narodnogo obrazovaniya i shkoly v Kara-kalpakii. Kara-Kalpak State Publishing House, Nukus, 1958. 74 pp.) is the title of a short book on the history and development of the educational system in Kara-Kalpakia from the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the period of the Khiva Khanate (1810-73) education was fully dependent on the government. The main advantage of the Tsarist period (1873-1917), according to the author, Zh. Urumbayev, was that "as a result of the union of the people (of Central Asia with Russia), the people of the Khorezm oasis, especially the Kara-Kalpaks, were saved from being converted into colonial slaves of British imperialism, and secured the opportunity of joining the advanced culture of the Russian people." The book treats of other things the Russians did for the Kara-Kalpaks, having nothing to do with education—the building of factories, steamships, highways ("which aided in the improvement of communications with the central part of Russia"), improved trade, made a "scientific recording" of Kara-Kalpak folklore with the use of the Russian alphabet, etc. All business correspondence and statistics in the Tsarist period were carried out in Russian, and the need for schools, especially for teaching the native language, was fully met only in the post-Revolutionary years.

Archæological Explorations

An attractively presented book on *Explorations by the Khorezm Expedition in 1954-6* (Polevyie issledovaniya khorezmskoy ekspeditsii v 1954-1956 gg. Institute of Ethnography i/n N. N. Miklukho-Maklaya, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Part I, Moscow, 1959. 208 pp.) has been published under the general editorial direction of S. P. Tolstov. The first article is by Tolstov, on the work of the Khorezm Archæological-Ethnographic Ex-

pedition, and goes into the main purposes of the explorations. The main interest was in the problem of the history of the area around the ancient river-beds of the Amu-Dar'ya and Syr-Dar'ya Rivers, and the primitive, ancient and medieval irrigation systems based on them. The expedition worked in three periods: June-November, 1954; June-November, 1955; and April-October, 1956; and discovered many relics affording insight into earlier cultures. Many pictures and diagrams of their discoveries are given. A second article is by N. N. Vakturskaya, on a trip to the southern Kyzyl-Kum in 1955. A final article, by M. A. Itina, sheds light on the 3,000-year history of Khorezm.

Literature of the U.S.S.R.

L. I. Klimovich has compiled an *Anthology of the Literature of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.* (Khrestomatiya po literature narodov SSSR. State Educational-Pedagogical Publishing House of the R.S.F.S.R. Ministry of Education, Moscow, 1959. 974 pp.). The book is a second volume, the first having been published eleven years before. It contains excerpts from such literatures as those of Azerbaydzhan, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia and does not claim to be complete. The compiler characterizes Soviet literature in general as "socialist in content, nationalist in form," and says that the literature of any people cannot be rigidly confined within geographical or national limits (e.g., Central Asian, Transcaucasian, etc.). "There was such an important and steady exchange of literary treasures not only between Central Asia and Transcaucasia, but between them and neighbouring eastern countries, that the work of many poets is sometimes regarded by the different peoples as their common heritage." Klimovich says that Russian literature has had a great influence on the development of the literature of the peoples of the East. "The advanced state of Russian literature, notwithstanding the policy of tsarism and the nationalistic aspirations of the local bourgeoisie, encouraged the national qualities of the literatures of other non-Russian peoples, and aided in the assimilation of new styles, and in the development of democratic and proletarian motifs." The whole question of literature is treated as part of the Soviet nationality policy.

II. THE BORDERLANDS

General Ethnography

The first volume of a two-volume survey of the ethnography of Asia has now appeared under the title of *An Outline of General Ethnography: Non-Soviet Asia* (Ocherki obshchey etnografii-zarubezhnaya Aziya. Edited by S. P. Tolstov, M. G. Levin, and N. N. Chebokсарov. Institute of Ethnography i/n N. N. Miklukho-Maklaya, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1959. 501 pp.). The second volume of this series, concerned with the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union, was received before the first, and was reviewed in the last issue of this *Journal*. The present volume follows much the same pattern as the other: it is a study of the culture and way of life of the countries of Asia, special emphasis on the example of the Soviet people in leading the way to so many countries. The

book is divided into four parts. The first deals with the peoples of Eastern Asia, including China, Mongolia, Korea and Japan, as well as Tibet and Sinkiang. The second section is about South-east Asia. The third treats of South Asia, including India, Pakistan and Nepal. The final section is called South-Western Asia, and includes Afghanistan and Persia, and all the Arab countries of Asia. There are maps showing the distribution of the various peoples.

Under-developed countries

Competition of Two Systems and Under-Developed Countries (Sorevnovaniye dvukh sistem i slaborazvityye strany. Publishing House of Social and Economic Literature, Moscow, 1960. 111 pp.) is the title of a new book by A. Kodarchenko. The author describes the competition of the two social and economic systems, socialism and capitalism, as a basic characteristic feature of the present epoch. His main interest is the economic competition between the two, their interest in under-developed countries, and a comparison of the economic rate of growth of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. He considers colonialism as the basic obstacle on the road of progress of under-developed countries, and attacks the motives of Western countries in giving aid. Socialist aid, on the contrary, helps these countries to conserve foreign currency and gold, and his attack on Western aid is more a piece of propaganda attack than a contribution to existing knowledge. The Western countries are accused especially of seeking to place under their control the economies, and especially the industrial development, of the under-developed countries.

Afghanistan

An extremely well-presented book on *Contemporary Afghanistan* (Sovremennyy Afghanistan. Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Institute of Eastern Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1960. 502 pp.) has recently been published, under the editorship of N. A. Dvoryankov. The book is a well-documented study of all facets of Afghan life. The first main section is about the country and population. This includes an account of the physical geography, an analysis of the population, including a chart of the various nationalities and their location and a description of their customs and clothing, a brief analysis of the state structure, and a detailed study of the languages and religions. The treatment of the Moslem religion is on the whole factual, and only at the end is there some criticism of what the author calls the influence of the clergy in education, the press, and in the state administration. The second part of this book is a study of the economy of Afghanistan, with emphasis on the aid given by the U.S.S.R. This section deals with the agriculture, industry, transport and communications, foreign trade and finances of the country. There follows a seventy-three-page historical survey, wherein the author seeks to put Russian-Afghan relations in the best and British and American action in the worst possible light. Included in this survey is the ludicrously exaggerated statement that Britain sent 340,000 troops against Afghanistan in the Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. According to *The Third Afghan War, 1919, Official Account*, Calcutta, 1926, approximately 75,000 cavalry, in-

fantry and pioneers [engineers] were engaged. With artillery and ancillary troops the real total was in the region of 100,000.) The fourth and last main section deals with the culture of the country, and this includes detailed sub-sections on education, historical science, philological science, libraries, museums, press, radio, literature, monuments, arts, health, etc. The book also includes a 115-page supplement of useful tables which include instructions on the transcription of Afghan personal and geographical names and terms, and the relation between Afghan and Russian terms; a statistical survey of the economy, including tables on land distribution, Afghan imports and exports, and Afghan foreign trade; measurements; the Afghan calendar; newspapers and magazines; administrative divisions and a sixteen-page chronology of events. In addition, there is a bibliography for each chapter, given in the original language of the sources, and indices of names, terminology, institutions and geographical places mentioned in the book.

India

Three short books on India have appeared recently, all of which seek to emphasize friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union. The first, *Ten Months in India* (Desyat' mesyatsev v Indii. Krasnodar Book Publishing House, Krasnodar, 1959. 55 pp.) is by M. I. Bal'zamov, who tells of a ten-month visit he paid to India in 1956-7. He was sent as a geological advisor to a newly-organized Oil Commission. The book is mainly a description of some of the Indian customs, and is by no means always complimentary. A brief biography is given of the author, who is a Communist Party member. The other two books, *The Friendship and Collaboration of the U.S.S.R. and India* (Druzhiba i sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Indii. M. A. Kocharyan, Institute of Orientology of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1959. 45 pp.), and *The Republic of India* (Respublika Indiya. Yu.P. Nasenko, Publishing House of Znaniye, Moscow, 1960. 48 pp.), are both published on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Indian Republic. The first book studies the foreign policy of India, dividing this into two periods, 1947-54 and 1954-59. It naturally praises the increasingly friendly relations between the Soviet Union and India in the latter period, while admitting that their points of view do not always coincide. The second book gives more information on the creation of the Republic, the attitude of Britain being strongly criticized. The author says that the aid given by the Soviet Union forced the U.S.A. to increase her aid. In this book foreign policy is described in greater detail, being divided into three periods, 1947-49 (neutralist, but leaning towards the Western powers), 1950-53 (also neutral, but not leaning to either side, and marked by a lessening of British influence), and 1954-59 (marking the "active struggle of India for the strengthening of peace in Asia"). Nasenko claims that "the general interests of the Soviet Union, China and India in its struggle for peace in Asia and in the whole world, are the basis of their friendship and collaboration. . . ."

ALAN BERSON.

CORRESPONDENCE

5, THE OVAL,
SCOPWICK,
LINCOLN.
March 7, 1961.

To the Editor.

DEAR SIR,

I am sure that I am not alone in believing that the Central Asian Research Centre, in collaboration with the Soviet Affairs Study Group of St. Antony's College, Oxford, is performing an extremely valuable task in summarizing the contents of new Soviet literature on the six Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R. and their neighbour states. In raising a small point of criticism I hope that this will not be taken as ingratitude. But I am wondering whether the criteria that are applied on what should or should not appear in summary are strict enough.

The value of the summaries, it seems to me, lies chiefly in the isolation and presentation in a compact form of new ideas or facts peculiar to the areas themselves. If this is so, it is merely confusing to have mixed up with these summaries ideological points that belong, properly, to the general Party line. For instance, there is nothing especially noteworthy in relation to Kazakhstan about the remarks on Stalin (p. 59, January issue of the *Journal*), quoted from *Torzhestvo Leninskiikh idey v Kazakhstane*, any more than there is in the long quotation (p. 63) from *Kul'turnovospitatel'naya Deyatel'nost' Sovetskogo Gosudarstva v Uzbekistane* regarding the functions of the state in the period of the transition to Communism. The line here is not substantially, or uniquely, different from, say, that of Romashkin in his lengthy examination of the question before the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in June, 1958 (see *Voprosy Stroitel'stva Kommynizma B CCCP*, published by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1959; pp. 105-28).

A point of exactness in translation arises on p. 66. Although a case can be made out for rendering the Russian word "svet" as "light," I feel that it is clearly wrong in the context "v poiskakh sveta." Here the sense is unmistakably "world," *i.e.* the translated title should read "In Search of the World."

Yours truly,
T. F. L. LONG,
Squadron Leader, R.A.F.

ISRAEL AFTER SUEZ

By PROFESSOR NORMAN BENTWICH, O.B.E., M.C.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society by Professor Norman Bentwich, O.B.E., M.C., on Wednesday, October 19, 1960, Sir Nevile Butler, K.C.M.G., C.V.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: I hardly need to introduce Professor Norman Bentwich to this Society, for he is a very senior and distinguished member. As an international lawyer he is in the first rank. Since 1920 he has given service in official and unofficial capacities to Israel, about which he has come to talk to us. Even before that time he served in Cairo, and in recent years he has done great work with refugees.

As well as being Vice-Chairman of the Governors of the Jewish University, Professor Bentwich has further contacts with Israel. In refugee work he has helped Mrs. Bentwich, whom we also welcome here today, and who similarly has a distinguished record of public service and is, I believe, an Alderman on the London County Council. We welcome her in particular today because she has kindly provided the slides that we are to see later.

On the subject of "Israel After Suez" we could not have a more authoritative speaker than Professor Norman Bentwich; and I now invite him to address you. (*Applause.*)

THIS talk will be rather like a suet pudding. You will have all the stodge first, and then the currants—the pictures taken by my wife; and then I hope there will be questions. I am going to speak generally on the development of Israel since the Suez Campaign in 1956.

The main result of that campaign was that Israel gained a much greater sense of security. In the years immediately before Suez, the Israeli Government and people were very worried by the constant raids, particularly from Egypt, and there was a general air of tension. The Suez Campaign was all over in five days—and they were five crowded days. At the end, Israel was in occupation of practically the whole of the Sinai Peninsula.

Israeli troops remained there for two or three months, but the United Nations Assembly had passed a resolution that they should withdraw from the whole of that territory; and our country and the United States were also urging that Israel should withdraw. In the end Israel got an assurance that, when her forces were withdrawn from Sinai, there would be an Emergency Force of the United Nations (which had been brought into being for the purpose) posted over the frontier, in Egypt, and that force would remain to ensure that there was no disturbance of the peace from either side.

What was most important for Israel was that a small part of that force was stationed in the Sinai Peninsula, on its eastern shore, to assure freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Akaba. There, before 1956, the Egyptians had kept up a complete blockade of the gulf which leads from the Red Sea to Israel's tiny stretch of coast on the northern part of the gulf. The Emergency Force has remained there since 1956, and in fact

shipping has been able to pass freely to and from Israel's port, which is Elath, on that northern shore. It is very vital to Israel to have this kind of "window" out to Asia and the Indian Ocean.

On the other hand, the blockade of the Suez Canal against all ships carrying cargo to or from Israel has been kept up. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has made many attempts to secure some relief from that position, which is a violation of International Law, but so far without success. Vessels not only of Israel but of other countries carrying innocent cargoes, like cement and fertilisers, from Israel have been held up and compelled to unload their cargoes at Port Said or Suez. On that side, therefore, there has not been any improvement.

Generally, since 1956, there have not been serious crises or disturbances of the peace on the frontiers of Israel. There have been a number of small incidents—raiding, and some actual minor engagements; but there is a large body of United Nations observers there to keep watch, as well as the Emergency Force, and they act like the referee in a football match. When there is an offside offence, they come in and stop it. In these last four years that action has been effective in avoiding any grave disturbance of the peace.

Although constant, very violent threats come from Nasser and others, Israel, during all that period, has persisted with her big schemes for development. There has been a remarkable development of the country, agriculturally, industrially and in every way. Let me tell you of a few of the big things that have happened in these four years.

One is a scheme of irrigation for the Negev—which comprises more than half of the territory of Israel and was an empty and arid region. Israel has been settling people in villages all along the northern part of the Negev for ten years now, and this scheme of irrigation brings the waters of a little river, called the Yarkon (which is near Tel Aviv and Jaffa) through pipes to the Negev. As a result, the whole of that northern part of the Negev is now a cultivated and fertile region.

Israel had worked out bigger schemes, in consultation with American Government experts, for using the waters of the Jordan mainly for the development of irrigation in the State of Jordan, but partly, also, for the development of the Negev. Those schemes are held up, however, because there was, and is, obstinate opposition from the Arab States, Syria and Jordan, to carrying them out—because they will give some benefit to Israel.

Another big development in the Negev has been at the port of Elath, on Israel's nine-mile stretch of coastline on the Gulf of Akaba. At the time of the Mandate there was nothing there but a police post. What was then a mere speck in the sand has now become a town and harbour with some 6,000 inhabitants. Two pipelines have been laid from Elath right across the Negev to the Mediterranean, the smaller carrying Israel's own oil requirements; the other, bigger one (which was opened this year) is a supply line of international importance, carrying oil from the Gulf of Akaba across to the refinery at Haifa which may work to its full capacity.

There has also been a big mineral development in the Negev. Mr. Ben Gurion has often spoken of Israel's vital need to develop this arid part of the country—he is a voice crying to the wilderness, not in it—

and these four years have brought a remarkable development of minerals there. The most important source is the Dead Sea itself, which is a great reservoir of chemicals like potash, magnesium and bromide. These are now being worked by a nationalized industry on a large scale, and there is a considerable amount of export. Then the large deposits of phosphates are being worked, the material being carried to Haifa, where it is turned into fertilizers. That is an industry with a growing export trade. Further, there are copper mines, the actual mines which were worked in the time of King Solomon, 3,000 years ago, though the machinery used today—mostly from Germany—is somewhat different. That is another mining development which is bringing great benefit to Israel. Beersheba, the principal town of the Negev, has a population of near 50,000, having increased from 2,000 in 1949. Apart from all that is being done in the Negev, another striking and significant development is the export by Israel of brains and “know-how,” particularly to the peoples of East and West Africa and the Far East, especially Burma. Those countries are now turning regularly to Israel for expert advice and help in the development of their economy. They have a great regard for the co-operative farming and industry of Israel, and many officials come from those countries to spend some time in Israel, studying the work that is being done there. I have read that Israel today has some 500 experts and scientific advisers in these African countries and Burma; and there are 200 or more persons from those countries resident in Israel for a year or two, studying these systems.

Turning to other aspects of development, one which is of great importance is the steady growth of the population. In the early years of Israel's existence immigration was on a very big scale, averaging in the first three years about 200,000 a year. That meant that in three years the Jewish population of the country (which, when the State was created, was only about 650,000) was more than doubled by immigration. Since that time immigration has not continued on so great a scale, but since 1956 there has been a total immigration approaching 200,000.

In the year 1957 there was a big immigration into Israel from Central Europe, following the outbreaks in Hungary and Poland, which led to a large exodus from those countries; and a considerable part of their Jewish population got away and reached Israel. Many thousands, too, came from Egypt. The total of immigrants in that year was about 80,000. Again, during the first few months of the following year a considerable emigration from Rumania came to Israel. That was stopped, it is believed, by Soviet intervention and has now practically dried up.

In recent years immigration has been mainly from Eastern countries. Almost all the Jewish population from the Yemen arrived before 1956, but there has been a steady flow from North Africa and Egypt. Today the total population of Israel is over 2,100,000, of whom about 1,900,000 are Jews—three times the population at the time when the State of Israel was created in 1948—and about 225,000 Arabs. The Arabs are largely cultivators, living principally in Galilee.

As to the position of Arabs in Israel, while it cannot be said that they are completely equal citizens, they share in the social services on the same

terms as the Jews. The education, health and other social services are available to them. There is still some restriction on the movement of Arabs living near the frontier (which form a large part of the Arab areas) and also there is in those areas a military administration. One or two of the political parties in Israel are fighting for the abolition of those restrictions. The position of the Arabs now is certainly much easier than it was in the early years of the State, when considerations of public security were powerful.

Just a few words on the economic development. The economy of Israel is very irrational by all general classical economic standards. It is based on two things: faith, which is a powerful force in every aspect of life in Israel, and an unwritten partnership between Israel and the Jewish communities of the world. The Jews of the world feel this strong attachment and desire to help to build up the Home, and to help in the settlement of the vast immigrant population which has come in. So although the economy of Israel is very irrational and full of problems—I have heard it likened to a pomegranate, full of pips—nevertheless the position in these years has substantially improved. In the early years of the State the value of imports into Palestine was three or four times the value of her exports. That could not be allowed to go on interminably. Today her imports are about twice the value of her exports. Food imports are reduced because of a great increase in agricultural production there. Israel today is much more self-supporting. The only big food import which continues is of wheat, for bread; for that cannot be grown on the scale required.

Besides a steady increase in agricultural exports, like citrus fruits and groundnuts, there has been a bigger development in industrial production for export. However, Israel still has an adverse balance of trade, the total difference between the value of imports and exports amounting to about 300 million dollars a year. (I apologize for quoting figures in dollars, but America plays a very important part in helping the development of Israel, and dollars are taken as the standard of currency.) The amount of that difference has to be raised by Israel from outside sources; and they come from four different contributions. The first is the gift contribution of the Jewish communities of the world to Israel, which goes on year by year to an amount of 70,000,000 to 80,000,000 dollars, representing about one quarter of the deficit.

An equal contribution is made by the Government of the German Federal Republic. Some years back President Adenauer declared that Germany wanted to make some material retribution for the terrible things done by the Nazis to the Jews; and West Germany is paying, over a period of ten years, a total of 800,000,000 dollars. That payment is made by Germany in kind, largely in capital goods, like ships. It will continue only for another five years. But in these last four years it has been an important factor in Israel's development. One aspect of it is that Israel has been building up a considerable merchant fleet—now approaching half a million tons. Most of them are new ships, built in German shipyards as part of those reparations or indemnities.

Then the Government of Israel raises loans in different parts of the world—known as "Israel Independence Bonds"—which provide another

one-fourth of the deficit. Lastly, a grant-in-aid is given by the United States of America, and smaller sums come annually from the United Nations in the form of technical help for Israel. In those various ways the deficit of 300,000,000 dollars annually is covered.

Thus the economic position has been greatly stabilized, and in the last two years the increase in exports has been (in proportion) considerable. Israel hopes, therefore, that in the foreseeable future—in, say, ten to twelve years' time—she will be viable economically, assuming she continues to get (as I believe she can realistically expect) the help of Jewish communities outside in carrying through the big developments of settlement and industry.

On the political side, from the beginning Israel has had a Coalition Government. Israel has a very just but extremely complicated electoral system—called *Scrutin de Lister*—under which any party getting a certain quotient of the total votes cast gets a proportionate number of seats. The result is that in the Israel Parliament (or “Knesset”) a dozen or more parties are represented and no party has a majority over all the rest. The core and centre of the Government, from the declaration of independence in 1948 till today, has been the party known as Mapai—a kind of Central Labour Party. Also in the Government is a Socialist Party more to the Left, called Mapam; and a party of religious Socialists. The Prime Minister throughout has been the head of the Mapai, Ben Gurion, except for a period of less than two years, when he went into retreat in a small pioneering, agricultural, collective community. During that period Mr. Moshe Sharett, who was Foreign Secretary, became Prime Minister. The posts of Foreign Secretary, Minister of Labour, Minister of Education and others are also held by members of Mapai, although it has less than half the total members in the Knesset.

Before the last General Election, about a year ago, Mapai had 40 out of the 120 seats. The party now has 47 seats, so that Ben Gurion is in a stronger position with regard to other parties in the Coalition. In Ben Gurion's present Cabinet there is, for the first time, a Jew from this country—Mr. Abba Eban, who was Israeli Ambassador in the United States until last year, and was also Israel's Principal Representative at the United Nations. He is now Minister of Education.

Lastly, about the cultural development which, again, has been remarkable. The outstanding achievement of Israel on the cultural side is that Hebrew has become and is the language of the whole population. Two-thirds of that population have come in as immigrants from abroad, speaking many different languages—Yiddish, English, Arabic; some even a Spanish dialect, Ladino. The Government has been able to make Hebrew not only the official language but the language in which people actually speak and do business. Three main instruments have been created by which this remarkable achievement has been brought about. The first is that Hebrew has been the language of the primary school, and all the children are mingled together, learning all subjects in Hebrew; and from school they take it to their parents' home.

The second instrument is the period of National Service, which in Israel is long—two and a half years for males, two years for females. That

period is not mainly one of military service. It is used as a period of education. A complete and full course of Hebrew is arranged for those doing that Service, and those who are immigrants, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, acquire Hebrew as their language, as well as acquiring a knowledge of the history and geography of the country.

The third instrument is the introduction of residential colleges for the intelligentsia among the immigrants—those coming from foreign countries who have been at universities or in professions, like teaching, law, medicine, engineering, and so on. They are enabled rapidly to acquire Hebrew by attending a residential college (called "Ulpan") for a period of six to nine months, according to the ability to learn the language. After this intensive course of Hebrew they are able to carry on their profession in what is the language of the country. Those three provisions, and a wide system of evening classes extending all over the country for the study of Hebrew, have brought about the position that Hebrew is the living language of the people.

The Hebrew University has grown rapidly. When it was re-opened in 1949, with 1,000 students, work was carried on in all kinds of scattered, improvised premises, because the original university buildings, on Mount Scopus, though occupied by Jewish police and caretakers, are cut off by Arab territory, and have not been accessible for academic purposes. Today the university has not 1,000 but 7,000 students; and a new University City has been built since 1954. It will be completed within a year or two, so that there will then be a complete university with modern buildings and equipment and six faculties: Humanities, Science, Medicine, Law, Agriculture, and the Economic and Social Sciences.

Equally remarkable has been the growth and development of the Technological Institute, which trains engineers of all kinds—not in Jerusalem but at Haifa. That has trebled and quadrupled in size. Then, lastly, the Weizmann Institute of Science at Rehovot is engaged in fundamental and applied research. It was created by Weizmann, the first President of Israel, who was a devoted scientist as well as statesman. That institute plays a big part in the development of the country. In fact, the growth of Israel and the achievement of turning what was a very backward country, in large part arid, into a thriving country has been brought about, in the main, by the application of science of every kind to the working life of the people through the University, the Technological Institute and the Weizmann Institute.

This summer a big international gathering at Rehovot, where Dr. Weizmann had his residence, was concerned with the application of science to the advancement of new nations. It was attended by representatives of thirty new nations of Africa and Asia. Israel is making a scientific contribution not only for the benefit of her own people and country but for these other new States which are as yet undeveloped.

That is the story. I fear that it has been rushed and somewhat rambling; but what stands out is that Israel is, uniquely in the present world, a country of abundant faith. Her people believe they are engaged in building up a better life for themselves and all people, and that makes it go. (*Applause.*)

A series of colour slides was then shown, to which Professor Bentwich provided the commentary, showing the transformation of barren desert areas into richly productive agricultural areas, various old and new buildings in the cities, and aspects of everyday life in Israel. A brief question-and-answer period followed.

Sir RICHARD GALE: Is there much movement of the population out of Israel?

Professor BENTWICH: Since 1949 the total number of emigrants has been somewhere near 100,000, which would represent 9 to 10 per cent. of the total immigration; but the emigrants from Israel do not consist entirely of new immigrants. Some of the older inhabitants have gone.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER SYKES: In what part of Palestine has there been the recent agricultural progress to which you referred?

Professor BENTWICH: That has happened all over the country; but it has been marked along the coastal plain, which today is densely populated; and also in the whole of Galilee, which is within the State of Israel. The most remarkable development, however, has been in the northern part of the Negev, in and around Beersheba, which is today an intensive area of agricultural settlement as a result of the irrigation scheme I mentioned.

Colonel KEIGHLEY BELL: You have said that since the Suez incident Israel has felt more secure. Have the Government of Israel been able to reduce the amount of money set aside for defence in the period since then, or is that still a millstone round their necks?

Professor BENTWICH: I am afraid they have not been able to reduce. Although there has been internal security there are, all the time, threats from the Arab States, who are continuing to arm themselves with the most modern weapons and aircraft. They are a permanent danger, and Israel has had to keep in step, so that her expenditure on armaments today is as heavy as it ever was.

Sir OLAF CAROE: Have the Arabs in Palestine the vote?

Professor BENTWICH: Yes, and in the Israel Parliament there are 8 Arabs among the 120 Members. One of the striking things in the last election was that the Communist Party—which, in the previous Parliament had 5 Members, two of them Arabs—was reduced to 3 Members, with only 1 Arab.

Sir OLAF CAROE: What is the size of the oil pipeline that runs from Elath?

Professor BENTWICH: The original pipeline was of 8 in. diameter. The larger is 16 in.

Dr. BRAMLEY: What is the feeling of the population in Israel in face of these threats from these well-armed Arabs?

Professor BENTWICH: I believe that a general feeling of security is developing. The people accept that there may be incidents, but they are not perturbed. They have faith that things will be all right.

Mr. NEISH: We have heard about the Jews and Arabs, but there are other nationalities in what was known as Palestine. I am thinking particularly of the Armenians. The Armenian Church owned a considerable amount of property in Palestine and when the State of Israel came into existence

they denied access to that property; and representatives of the Armenian Church were not even allowed to inspect it to see if it needed repair. Now, in desperation, it has been forfeited, without any compensation whatever. You spoke about Dr. Adenauer giving assistance, but it seems to me that those people who lost a great deal in Palestine should also be compensated.

Professor BENTWICH: I imagine the difficulty is that the Armenian Church and all the Armenian convents are on the Arab side of Jerusalem, where the Armenian quarter is. The Government of Israel has declared over and over again that Israel will pay compensation for all land taken, whether from the Armenians, the Arabs or anyone else; but until there is some means of negotiation with the Arabs on the other side, it is not possible to proceed with consideration of the compensation for Armenian land in Israel.

Mr. NEISH: Armenians who are personal friends of mine say this property is on the Israel side.

Professor BENTWICH: The Armenian Church had considerable property around New Jerusalem, which is on the Israel side; but there cannot be negotiations because the leaders of the Armenian Church are on the Arab side, and there is no intercourse.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid our time is up. It remains for me to thank Dr. Bentwich. We expected a great deal from him and we were not disappointed. We thank him for his talk, and we thank Mrs. Bentwich for the beautiful slides which recalled nostalgic memories and provided an entertaining complement to a most fascinating lecture. (*Applause.*)

NOTE

In addition to the lectures reprinted in the *Journal*, the following have taken place recently:

28.9.60: Mr. Richard Harris spoke on "Myths and Realities in Modern China."

29.11.60: Miss Constance Paul gave an Evening lecture illustrated by films on "The Women of Afghanistan" and "Approach to India."

14.12.60: H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark showed his film "Asian Allies" taken on the tour described in his lecture of May 18, 1960.

8.3.61: Dr. Laurence Lockhart gave a talk entitled "Impressions of the Middle East in 1960," illustrated by slides.

LELAND BUXTON IN THE YEMEN, 1905

With a note on Mahmoud Nadim Bey

By ERIC MACRO

FOR a European who has travelled in the Yemen in 1892 to be able to relate his experiences sixty years afterwards is a considerable accomplishment. Such a person was Dr. Samuel Zwemer who died only a few years ago. Anne Wyman Bury, who spent her honeymoon in Sana'a in 1913, was still able to recall her vivid memories of that ancient city thirty-six years later. Earl Granville, who journeyed to the capital of the Yemen from Hodeida and returned to the coast at Aden in 1903, could tell of his adventures after an interval of more than fifty years.

These early visitors to the Yemen were venerated by the younger generation as giants of their time and when we met them we felt as they themselves must have done when ushered into the presence of the masters of their time—Doughty or Wilfred Scawen Blunt. Regrettably, such opportunities no longer exist. The Frenchman, Alfred Bardey, and the Belgians, Désiré Charnay and Eugène Gallois, all of whom went to Sana'a in 1897, cannot now be traced. George Wyman Bury died at Helwan in 1920. Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob died in 1936 and Captains Richardson and Brock who accompanied him with Sir Bernard Reilly to Bajil in 1919 are no longer with us. Wavell, who was in Sana'a in 1911, was killed in East Africa during World War I. Charles F. Camp was killed near Menakha in 1909; he and his wife first went to Sana'a in that year. Charles Moser, who was in Sana'a in 1910, did not write his experiences. There remain three of the earlier travellers: Sir Bernard Reilly (1919), still concerned with the affairs of Southern Arabia; Shmuel Yavneeli (1911-12), who was, and still is, an outstanding figure of the Jewish labour movement; and, finally, one who can claim the greatest seniority, Leland William Wilberforce Buxton, whose recollections of his journey to Sana'a in 1905 are still clear after fifty-six years.

Mr. Buxton can tell visitors to his Kensington home of his gun-running activities in Macedonia in 1904 with as much relish and humour as he can discuss the present-day activities of the Imam Ahmad. He was twenty-one when he set foot in the Yemen but he had already had experience of the Near East. A member of the great Buxton and de Bunsen family complex of Norfolk, he received the normal upbringing appropriate to his family's status. From Harrow he went up to Trinity and can scarcely have left Cambridge long before he was fighting in Macedonia. He entered the Egyptian Civil Service in 1907. There had, of course, been many other Englishmen in Sana'a before Buxton. Many of the East India Company's servants had travelled there during the early years of the seventeenth century. Dr. Pringle was in the capital in 1801 and again, with

Lamb and Elliot, in 1802. Other British visitors to Sana'a were Crutenden and Hulton (1836), Wolff (1836), Stern (1856), Millingen (1874), Haig (1887), and Harris (1892).

Nothing other than the spirit of adventure had initiated Buxton's journey. One day, early in 1905, when in the lobby of the House, he happened to meet Aubrey Herbert, who had recently held an appointment at the British Embassy at Constantinople and who later, in 1911, entered Parliament. There and then they decided to try to reach Sana'a.

By the end of August, 1905, Buxton and Herbert were sailing south from Suez in a Greek ship. After spending a night at Jeddah, where they met a solitary Englishman, they set sail next morning for Massawa. Finally, having dropped anchor two miles offshore, they landed by *sambuq* on the wooden jetty at Hodeida. Immediately they were plunged into difficulties with the customs authorities. Dr. G. A. Richardson, the Consul, was on leave and they were pestered by a German Jew, who seemed to have some vague connection with the Consulate. His sole object in being in Hodeida was to make money and he abused and bullied all and sundry, including his own clerk, a German from Hamburg. In the centre of the town a man was chained to the ground as a punishment for a long-forgotten crime. He had been in that position for forty years and seemed content enough with his lot. Buxton noticed that blue eyes and fair hair was quite common among the Turkish troops and was interested to discover what a polyglot collection of human beings they were.

At that time Hodeida was a port of considerable trade and Buxton was surprised at the apathy of the Turks in leaving all commerce completely in the hands of the Yemenis, Jews, Greeks and Indians. The Turkish administration seemed content to stand by and merely collect taxes and to garrison the various towns on the Hodeida-Sana'a-Taizz roads, the frontier areas and such places as Turba, Mocha and Sa'ada. Even the medical stores, which should have been sent to the Turkish troops in Sana'a, were fast deteriorating on the quayside under the continuous heat of the sun.

The usual difficulties were encountered when the projected journey to Sana'a was mentioned to the *mutasarrif* of Hodeida. Herbert explained to him in French that he and Buxton were rich English nobles on their way to shoot tigers in India—"et lions," interjected Buxton for good measure. Even the *mutasarrif* realized that there seemed to be something wrong in shooting lions in India and he put further difficulties in the way of the journey. Herbert tried to reassure him that they really were on their way to India and wished en route to visit Sana'a, about whose beauty they had heard so much.

After three days of prevarication and obstruction by the Turkish authorities, the *mutasarrif* finally dispatched them with an escort of 150 troops and a recommendation to God. It was 9 a.m. before they moved off, four hours later than was intended. They rode on mules and marched continuously, with changes of escort and mounts, for the next forty hours. The fact that the month was Ramadan did not detract from their difficulties.

They passed by wells (probably Dar Tannan) five miles from Hodeida

and paused at Bajil for a short time. Buxton found it a mean and miserable town, the people unfriendly (Jacob's mission found them equally so in 1919) and the flies unbearable. From Bajil they continued through Beha where the foothills begin. In the area of Obal and Hedjile the journey was more enchanting and delightful days were spent walking, riding and resting in this area of coffee and olive production. In 1905 one-third of the average coffee crop had been exported and prices had risen twenty-five per cent.

The expedition continued up the Wadi Hajan through Wasil and arrived at Atara shortly afterwards. Here they spent the night in a foul-smelling tower (*burj*). After passing the pleasant village of Hajra, they stayed the night at Menakha, where they were looked after by the only foreigner in the town, a Greek named Dimitri, who had lived there for many years. He formed an attachment to alcohol in later years, and eventually handed over control of his guest house to an Arab. He was certainly not there in 1912.

Buxton mentioned travelling through "Beit i-Nijit" and "Betajig" before reaching Mafhaq. The first of these could only be Beit Mahdi and the second Igz, Idz or Ajaz. These are the only two villages of note between Menakha and Mifhaq. The remainder of the journey may be traced as follows, the names of villages in brackets are those not remembered by Mr. Buxton but through or by which he must have passed: Suq al-Khamis, Beit es-Salaam, Boan, Yazil (Beit esh-Shabi), Senan Pasha (Metne is on the left of the road, Senan Pasha to the right; Buxton did not enter Metne, although when leaving Boan he must have seen it straight ahead of him across a sea of hummocks, perched on a salient knoll), (Musajid, which is half a mile off to the left of the road on the left bank of its own wadi). Today, these names are hardly worth marking on a map. All the villages between Mifhaq and Sana'a are piles of rubble and the activity of these places as it was known under the Turks has long since disappeared. Both Boan and Suq al-Khamis are deserted apart from the government rest house and the telegraph office in the latter and motor cars can only reach as far as Suq al-Khamis from Sana'a, unless the road has been extended during the last few years. The bridge over Wadi el-Garah near the village of the same name carrying the Yazil-Boan road is still there and another stone bridge, built by the Turks before 1812, crosses an unnamed tributary of the Wadi Saham at Boan. The only other bridge which existed before 1939 in the Yemen that comes to mind is that built over the Wadi Laa near Hajja in 1932 by Denis Castongay. It is a steel truss span with stone piers. Karl Twitchell laid out the route of the Obal-Mabar-Sana'a road but did not detail the grades or curves. He also laid out several sections of road between Hodeida, Zeidya, Hajja and Amran.

Luigi Caprotti had died some years before but Guiseppe, his brother, was able to look after Buxton when he arrived in Sana'a. They seem to have got on extraordinarily well together. Ahmed Feizi Pasha was out of the capital negotiating with Imam Yahya, probably at Sa'ada—the Imam's northern capital. Mahmoud Nadim Bey, acting Governor of Sana'a, who was the Pasha's deputy, received the visitors and refused them permission to travel to Aden. However, they were able to spend some

days in Sana'a, during which they could pursue their own particular interests.

A digression about Mahmoud Nadim Bey's connection with the Yemen is worth recording here. He provided the continuity in the Turkish imperial administration in the Yemen during the first quarter of the century. He had already been in the *vilayet* for some years before Buxton was in Sana'a and later succeeded Izzet Pasha as *vali*, or civil Governor-General of the Yemen, in 1912, after the revolt of 1911. He was a dark, heavy-jowled and portly Syrian with large black moustaches. He wore the tarboush of the Turkish official, high jackboots, large gold rings on his fingers and was never without one of his extra large Turkish cigarettes. In later years he took to wearing, occasionally, a *keffiyah* instead of a tarboush in order to identify himself more closely with the Arabs. He was a tall, powerfully-built man who seems to have grown fat during his long period of service in the Yemen. An early photograph shows him as a smart and slim young man in the black-braided uniform of a senior Turkish administrator; his moustaches were large enough even for those days. During 1914-15, he was feverishly active in trying to win over the Idrisi Sheikh in Asir to the Turkish cause. The task was a difficult one and called for very careful management on his part. During World War I, the continuance of good relations between the Turks and the Imam was solely due to his good offices and during that time he issued a great deal of hostile propaganda against the British in Aden. When the war came to an end and Ali Said Pasha, the commander of the Army Corps in the Yemen, handed over his sword in Aden, Mahmoud Nadim Bey remained in his palace at Sana'a and it was he who handed over the reins of power to the Imam in 1919.

With the commandant of artillery, and 300 other Turkish soldiers and officials, including Raghیب Bey, the Governor of Hodeida, he threw in his lot with the Imam and entered his service as adviser. Raghیب Bey is still (1959) living in the Yemen.

When Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob's mission was detained at Bajil by the Qohra sheikhs in 1919, it was Nadim Bey who was deputed by the Imam to negotiate for its release with a ransom of £T4,000. He was frank and vehement in his views on the administration of the Yemen. He realized how turbulent were the inhabitants of this poor relation of Turkish imperial domains and the great extent to which they hunted their grievances. Before 1919, the majority of the officials were Arabs and he blamed them for much of the unrest in the *vilayet*. He admitted that the Turks had mishandled the Yemen as they had other provinces. In 1919, in his new position as Adviser to the Imam, he had said on one occasion, "If I were still in power I would chastise these Arab dogs as in the olden days." In reality, although he firmly believed that there would never be complete unity of the Arab peoples, he loved the Yemenis and earnestly hoped for an improvement in their condition, despite the scant courtesy latterly paid to him by the Imam. He was not the only former member of the Ottoman Government living in the Yemen after World War I and he was ably assisted by a smart little Turkish officer, his A.D.C., who was allowed to retain his *kalpak* and Turkish military uniform.

Buxton found Nadim a strong character, frank and good company and anxious that he (Buxton) should be given every consideration on his return journey to Hodeida. He was never invested with the dignity of Pasha, but from 1912 onwards was afforded the rank as a matter of courtesy. He finally returned to Syria in 1924 after a period of twenty years' continuous service in the Yemen and it would be interesting to know how he spent his years of retirement and at what date he died.

Buxton spent much of his time in the Qaa al-Yahud and to this day he is still much interested in the fate of the Yemenite Jews who left for Israel in 1948. Of the 8,000 Jews who lived in Sana'a in 1904 only 2,000 remained alive as a result of famine and disease brought about by the siege of Sana'a in 1905. Buxton's reminiscences of what he was told of conditions in Sana'a during that siege remind one of Wavell's experiences in the capital six years later. Herbert remembered some of the names of the gates of Sana'a, but does not seem to have studied them all. One can imagine how difficult it was in Buxton's short stay in the city to study it in detail. He was interested more in obtaining access to a forbidden city than in studying its topography. He said that there were sixty-eight mosques in Sana'a; certainly in 1939 there were only forty-four.

Unfortunately, the travellers missed the profusion of peach and apricot blossom in the gardens outside the town walls. They found these extremely well-tended and in the agricultural areas four barley and three wheat crops were gathered each year. At Gajaran water was found at about four feet below the surface.

Although the return to Hodeida was easier, they met discourtesy at Bajil from the Turkish commandant and at Hodeida were again looked after by the German Jew who had entertained them on their first arrival at the port. In spite of the traditional liberalism of Buxton's family, he found himself casting imperialistic eyes towards the Yemen. The visitors' dream of a British-owned Hodeida-Sana'a-Aden railway was never realized. Work was started on the Hodeida-Sana'a railway in March, 1911. By the end of the year, £500,000 had been spent and only five miles of track were laid before the project was abandoned. The Italians had ideas of constructing a railway from Hodeida to Sana'a which never came to fruition. Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob proposed to the Imam at Sana'a in 1923 that the Aden-Lahej railway should be extended to Sana'a but the project never materialized. The story of these projects, their implementation and failure, is interesting but is too long to be detailed here.

From Hodeida, Buxton sailed to Aden, leaving there at the first opportunity for Bombay. The s.s. *Africa* took him to Muscat and on to Bahrain, where he met Van Ess but, regrettably, missed Samuel Zwemer, who was absent from the island. Towards the end of January, 1906, Buxton sailed for Baghdad and from there returned to England.

THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA

By MR. W. S. C. LEECH

Report of an address to the Royal Central Asian Society at the Royal Society's Hall, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1, on Wednesday, November 16, 1960. General Sir Richard Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., was in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure this afternoon to introduce Mr. Leech, who, as you know, is going to talk to us on the subject of Malaya. He spent some twenty-eight years in Malaya and Singapore and he was the Eastern Chairman of Boustead and Company for several years. I believe he was also Honorary Diocesan Treasurer at Singapore. Like so many others, he was interned by the Japanese during the war.

Since the war he has returned to England. He has been President of the Malayan Commercial Association for two years and, I believe, also President of the British Association of Malaya for a year.

He has visited Malaya as recently as January and February of this year, and I think the Society can congratulate itself on having him to talk to us today. Particularly is this so, as this week is, I think, the beginning of the City of London Commonwealth Weeks.

With these few words, ladies and gentlemen, I will ask Mr. Leech to speak to us.

I FELT extremely honoured when I was invited to be your guest this afternoon and was highly gratified when it was suggested that the subject of my remarks to you should be "The Federation of Malaya," in which delightful country and amongst whose charming and friendly people I have been privileged to live, work and play for twenty-eight years. Although I retired from residence in the Peninsula six years ago, I spent two months in the country early this year, to renew old friendships and acquaintanceships and to inform myself at first hand of the tremendous political, social and commercial changes that have occurred there since 1954. I was fortunate in being able to visit five of the units comprising the Federation and to talk with all sections of society from Ministers of State to small-scale padi farmers. What I saw and heard was good, encouraging and rewarding.

With your tolerance, I should like to refer for a few moments to the map to refresh memories, because an understanding of the geographical features, position and political and administrative divisions of the country will facilitate an appreciation of its emancipation and of its commercial and industrial potential.

Malaya, which is a beautiful country, lies in what is a commercial and military strategical position in south-east Asia on the main sea route from the West to the Far East, to which it is, in fact, the gateway. It is bordered on the north by the Kingdom of Thailand and on the south by the State of Singapore, which is not, either politically or administratively, a part of the Federation of Malaya, to which, however, it is joined by a causeway carrying a main road and railway and to which it is closely related commercially. To the west are the Straits of Malacca—the main seaway between the West and the East—which generally are sultry and humid and

the shores of which are, in great part, muddy and swampy, although they contain the excellent deep water ports of Penang and Port Swettenham and the minor ports of Malacca and Port Dickson, in addition to a large number of small ports suitable only for coastal shipping. To the east is the fresh South China Sea and countless miles of golden sandy beaches that are a constant delight to those who appreciate the beauty of nature unspoilt by man. There are no deep water ports on the east coast, although there are reasonable facilities for coastal shipping at Kuantan and Kuala Trengganu. Nonetheless, very large quantities of iron ore are shipped annually in ocean-going vessels lying a few miles off shore at Dungun and Tumpat.

Immediately behind each coast there are substantial fertile flats that are devoted to agriculture; padi and coconuts being the main crops of the coastal plains, behind which lie undulating country and the foothills to the main mountain range. It is largely in these areas that rubber is grown on a vast commercial scale and where tin is won from the ground and the river bottoms. It is but rarely that tin is mined in the sense that we regard mining in this country, in that the ore is usually recovered through the medium of huge dredges operating on the rivers and on ground that has been flooded for the purpose. There are, of course, exceptions, more particularly in the State of Pahang where the Pahang Consolidated Mines mine the ore out from the ground.

Down the centre of the country and forming its backbone are the jungle-covered mountains, rising to some 6,000 ft.

Malaya is a warm, moist, evergreen country of massive mountains, delightful valleys, broad rivers and coastal plains, in which abundant rainfall and a very great deal of sunshine produces a warm—(average temperature in the 80's)—and a humid climate. Such a country and climate induces a happy and comparatively carefree and contented nature in its peoples, especially in the Malays and the Nomadic Aborigines, the latter living in the main in the jungle-clad lower slopes of the mountains. Some of the aboriginal tribes still disdain the use of clothes, and are probably all the better for that, and, in the main, find sustenance from the vegetable, animal and bird life of the jungles in which they live, relying in small measure only upon cultivated crops. Efforts have been made and doubtless are still being made to bring to these people some of the modern facilities of living; but one may be permitted to doubt if that will do much to increase the human happiness of the aborigines. To them almost alone are known the secrets of the Malayan jungles, which cover three-quarters of the country, and great parts of which have yet to be the subject of thorough geological and agricultural survey. The natural wealth that may be hidden and stored up in the jungle mountains is a fascinating speculation, but probably of no interest to their aboriginal inhabitants, although maybe providing immense scope for commercial development.

The peoples of the villages and plains are friendly, happy and courteous folk, who have made great strides socially in the last three decades. The northern States only came under direct Western influence in 1910 and even when I first went to Malaya in 1926, it was almost unknown for a Malay girl to go to school—now it is unusual for her not to do so.

The people of the cities and towns, like those of most other great centres of population, are sophisticated and astute, embracing the full social range from the millionaire business tycoon, through the university-educated professional classes to the artisan, the small shopkeeper and the labourer. Lest there should be any misconception, I should say that the millionaires and the very rich are not the Europeans, most of whom are middle-class people having middle-class incomes. The real commercial wealth lies almost exclusively in the hands of the Chinese.

You were last addressed upon the subject of "Malaya" by my friend, Mr. W. C. S. Corry, C.B.E., in October, 1955, since when much water has flowed under the bridges, carrying with it Malaya, from the dependent category of a British Protected Territory to full, equal and freely independent membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In considering that tremendous and historic advance, we should perhaps look back a little, as well as taking note of the present, in an endeavour to assess the immediate future.

There is a quite frequent misconception in this country, and more particularly in other countries, whose Governments never tire of proclaiming what they allege are the evils of colonialism, about the Malay States, which have never been colonies of the British Crown. The small settlements of Penang, Province Wellesley and Malacca were indeed colonies and, together with the colony of Singapore, were known as the Straits Settlements, but the nine Malay States were sovereign territories under the protection of the United Kingdom by virtue of freely negotiated treaties.

The settlements of Penang, Province Wellesley and Malacca lie on the west coast of the Peninsula, of which they were the first areas to be developed commercially by Europeans, Portuguese, Dutch and British. Penang was the first British Settlement and was founded by Captain Francis Light, who also played a prominent part in the founding of the city of Adelaide in South Australia. He came not as a conqueror but as a trader, and as such purchased the island of Penang from the Sultan of Kedah. In his day, piracy and pillage were popular sports and influenced Light in selecting for his trading post an island that could easily be defended. Later generations of traders confirmed the wisdom of his choice because of Penang's natural inshore deep water facilities, but today, with the disappearance of much of the entrepôt trade upon which the fortunes of the island were founded, it would be better if the port and commercial centre were situated on the mainland opposite. To move across the strait however, and build a major ocean harbour and commercial city at Prai or Butterworth would be an extremely costly undertaking, because of an insufficiency of deep water and of substantial engineering problems set by tides and currents; but it could be and may be done in the future.

The Straits Settlements were administered on the spot by Resident Counsellors working under the direction of a Governor, who resided in Singapore and who was directly responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang became federated in what were known as the Federated Malay States, but Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Johore declined federation and were known as the Unfederated Malay States. All the States,

whether federated or not, were under British protection and, save in matters pertaining to the Moslem religion and to certain Malay customs that remained the responsibilities of the Sultans, were obliged by treaty to accept the advice of the protecting power, which was in effect the policy maker. The internal administration necessary if the protecting power was to fulfil its treaty obligations was the responsibility of successive Secretaries of State for the Colonies, working through the medium of a High Commissioner, who also held the office of Governor of the Straits Settlements, he in his turn working through British Advisers or Resident Councillors in each State. These officers and their associates were found by the Malayan Civil Service and allied technical services, which were second to none and which produced many brilliant and devoted men.

What might be termed the "Protection Period" lasted until 1957, when the Malay States and the Settlements to which I have referred acquired independence as the Federation of Malaya, and immediately sought and obtained full membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Federation is a unique member of that close society of nations in that it is a kingdom comprising a Federation of Kingdoms and having as sovereign a king elected for a period of five years by the sultans of the various states, comprising the Federation, from among their own number; Her Majesty the Queen being recognized as Head of the Commonwealth. In that respect, the Federation of Malaya differs from the other kingdom and, of course, from the Republican members of the Commonwealth, but it has exactly the same responsibilities and enjoys just the same benefits as other members, irrespective of their various and diverse domestic constitutions.

The Federation is a democracy, as indeed are the individual States and the Settlements comprising it, each State and Settlement having its own elected legislature for local business, much on the lines of the Provinces in Canada and the States in Australia. Each State is a kingdom, the sovereign of which is a Sultan, or in the case of Perlis, a Rajah, but the Heads of the Settlements are Governors appointed by the Government of the Federation. Members of the British Commonwealth are represented in the Federation by High Commissioners and their staffs, whilst Ambassadors represent other countries, there being in Kuala Lumpur a sizeable Diplomatic Corps.

There is a tendency to regard the achievement of independence by territories under the jurisdiction in one form or another of the United Kingdom as being something new and a modern advance in political thought and application, but such is not the case, the process in fact being a very old one dating from 1867, when an independent Government was constituted for and in Canada. Indeed, the doctrine of ultimate independence for such countries was formulated in 1813. Thus the achievement of independence by Malaya three years ago was nothing very surprising, although it was quickened by the rapid growth of nationalist feeling following the war, but it was the result of planned development and the consequence of wide general policy that for over 100 years has seen a gradual change from nineteenth-century Empire to twentieth-century Commonwealth. Malaya's advance to Commonwealth membership is to be wel-

comed as crowning British and Malayan endeavour in the Peninsula, despite the setback caused by the Japanese occupation of the country between 1942 and 1945.

We may thus say that Malaya's advance to the position it holds today has been normal and has proceeded as intended by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and by the able and sincere Malayan political leaders, but it has been achieved more smoothly and with far fewer teething troubles than in some other previously dependent territories, and it is perhaps profitable to consider why that was, as it might have been supposed that the very multitude of different peoples having varying religious faiths and cultures and often opposing interests and aspirations within the country would lead to enormous difficulties. Basically, I think it can be said that the highly successful and peaceful manner in which the evolution was completed was due to the long, wise, and sympathetic work of the Malayan Civil Service and technical services which were notable for their loyalty, integrity and ability, and not less to the ability, temperament and fundamental statesmanship of Malays and Malayans. Together they established over a long period a sound and always advancing administration that became highly respected—and rightly so—and that has enabled an enormous development of commerce and industry, which in its turn has made financially possible great social progress. Social services, such for instance as education, health and communications, were built up in the days of "Protection" to a high level, but the present enlightened independent Government working gladly on the rich legacy of the protecting power, is constantly improving and adding to them.

It may be said that independence came to Malaya at the right time in the right way, but that is not to say that the present Government has had no immediate difficulties and problems to solve. It has, and some of them it has resolved already. First among its achievements can perhaps be placed the ending of what for twelve years was known as the "Emergency," which is to say active warfare against armed bands of determined Communists, mostly Chinese, operating against the legally constituted Government and also against individuals of all races living in the country. The history of the "Emergency" is a long story, that can be mentioned here only as being an immediate danger that the new Government could not ignore, even if it wished to, which it did not. In seeking to continue the policy of the old protecting power in ending what amounted to armed political banditry, it had the willing assistance of the armed forces of various component parts of the Commonwealth and Empire. Working in loyalty and co-operation one with another the civil and military authorities finally succeeded at the end of last July in quelling what might be termed the Guerilla Insurrection.

Thus a long and costly military struggle is over, but that is not to say that the fight against Communism is ended and the Government is conscious of the course that must be pursued to counter insidious Communist infiltration in a large number of spheres of civil life. The prosecution of that task is related to another primary objective of the Government, which is endeavouring to create a Malayan national citizenship covering all the races resident in the Peninsula, such citizens to be Malayan not Malay,

Chinese, Indian, Eurasian, European, etc., and having a single undivided loyalty to Malaya. The achievement of that objective, which primarily is political and social, should help to counter Chinese Nationalist Communism which at present threatens the unification of the Malayan people. It is, moreover, a noble exercise in human fellowship that must receive general support.

The population is multi-racial, numbering at the last census in 1957 approximately 6.3 million, of which 47 per cent. were Malay, 38 per cent. Chinese, 12 per cent. Indian and Pakistani and 3 per cent. others, including Europeans. In addition to the Government schools and university teaching in the English language, each race group has had its own schools where the children have been taught in their mother tongues, and each has its own places of religious worship, whether Moslem, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, etc. This has tended to create narrow and sometimes selfish racial outlooks and often competitive policies and endeavours in political, social and commercial spheres, and there is no doubt that the different racial communities—they were indeed separate communities—had deep-seated and primary loyalties to their various countries of origin, although very large numbers of them were Malayan born. There may have been no very great harm in that during the period of protection, but clearly it is undesirable in a new nation that must of necessity mould all the people into Malayan Nationals, having one predominant loyalty to Malaya, despite their individual and distinct cultures and historic backgrounds. Already, some measure of unity has been achieved. There are, for instance, Malay, Chinese and Indian Ministers in the Government and the different communities live, work and play together in outward amity and complete religious freedom and toleration, each contributing something to the whole and each benefitting in some degree from the others. There is indeed much racial tolerance, but a completely unified outlook in a single national sense is yet to be built on the firm foundations that exist already. In the course of time there may evolve a Malayan race made up by inter-marriage, etc., of the various peoples, and a common language that may be basically Malay, but that may have absorbed into it much of the various languages now spoken in the country. Indeed it could be that the evolution will be comparable to that which has been seen in this country, where over the centuries there has been produced from a multitude of different peoples the present-day Briton and the present English language.

Inevitably the success of the political and social aims of the Government must be influenced in a large measure by the economy, which is at present reliant to a dangerous extent upon the prosperity of the rubber and tin industries. That has caused the Government to direct its attention to the advance of secondary industry and to rural development, both of which demand the investment of more capital and more technical knowledge and skill than is currently available in the country. The political stability that is necessary if foreign capital is to be attracted has been obtained—the “Emergency” is over—the Government party has a huge majority in the legislature and in the country; effective opposition is negligible; violently radical legislation is not contemplated; taxation is relatively low and there are no restrictions upon the movement of capital. As

a further attraction new industries can enjoy a four-year tax holiday under certain conditions. There is room for the employment of capital in manufacturing, in civil engineering works and in rural development, and there is room also for the merchant, for the importer and for the exporter, who is prepared to take the risks that normally are contingent with business overseas, such risks in Malaya being no greater than elsewhere, and probably less great than in many areas.

It must be appreciated, however, that the Government will exercise care lest any one country should tend to secure a position of dominance in the economy. No one country, not excluding the United Kingdom, can expect to acquire any specially privileged position. It must be accepted that capital, skill and experience will be sought in the most economically favourable quarters, having proper regard to political considerations, and that it is desired that new commercial and industrial endeavours shall take the form whenever practicable of partnerships between Malayan and expatriate capital and that Malayan personnel will be well represented in the direction and administration of enterprise. The desire is that a proportion of the profits derived from capital investment shall remain in the country and that Malaysians shall be employed in the highest positions in commerce and industry, although not to the exclusion of other essential skilled personnel. Indeed the present immigration regulations are designed in part to protect local ability, of which more and more will become available as time goes on.

There can be little doubt that business opportunities in Malaya are considerable and that international competition for the fruits of those opportunities will be acute. In general it is likely to be the courageous and the first on the spot, and more especially those who can anticipate astutely, who will secure the highest rewards. Historically and traditionally the United Kingdom has enjoyed a predominant position in the trade of Malaya, a position that will not endure merely "for old times' sake," but rather that will be dependent on a high degree of awareness, imagination and efficiency. It is thus necessary that we in this country should be represented in Malaya at both Government and commercial level by first-class personnel, failing which British influence in the economic field in Malaya, and as a natural sequel in the political field, will go by default.

New industries which have been given "pioneer status" and which enjoy some tax remission and protection, include agricultural machinery, brewing and malting, chemical, textile and toilet preparations, pharmaceutical products, plastics, paints, electrical and electronic instruments, domestic appliances, food preparations and petroleum products, all financed by free capital. The target for investment in new industries in the next ten years is Malayan dollars 3,000 million, this being equivalent at current rates to pounds sterling 350 million. To facilitate and encourage industrial and social development, the Government is to spend 17½ million pounds on the Cameron Highlands Hydro Electric Scheme which is intended to give the country an additional electricity supply of 100,000 kilowatts, whilst a new and modern harbour is to be constructed at Port Swettenham to increase materially the capacity of that port.

The country enjoys the highest standard of living in Asia, the purchas-

ing power of the population consequently being high by Asian standards. It has first class port facilities, a good railway system, the best roads in South-East Asia and there are very frequent and fast sailings from United Kingdom ports. Labour has proved itself to be adaptable to new ideas, processes and skills. Thus there is reason to think that the political, social and commercial outlook in the immediate future is bright. I believe there are great opportunities for U.K./Malayan partnerships to the mutual benefit of both parties.

Now I would like you to see a short film entitled "Malaya 1959," for the loan of which I am indebted to the Malayan High Commission in London.

Following the film:

The CHAIRMAN: I fear that it is half-past two, and therefore we must bring this meeting to a close. I should like, on your behalf, to thank the lecturer for a most stimulating and exciting discourse. One does think for a moment of how much we in this country, and others all over the world, owe to the members of the old Civil Service in parts of the world where they have sown the seed and helped to develop the natural characteristics of the countries in which they worked.

I would leave one thought in your minds. Whatever Britain did in the past was done as a result of trading. In those days the traders had to fight and the results of battles affected the way they were able to trade. Now today we are back in the trading era but battles will not bring trade. The battles will be with other traders. Whether we win or lose those battles very largely depends, I think, on the initiative our traders are able to display. If this is an example of the kind of initiative which will make that trade flourish, I think that we have nothing to fear. (*Applause.*)

REVIEWS

CORRIGENDUM

Volume XLVIII, January, 1961, Part I, page 107. The review of the book *The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*, the last three lines of p. 107 should read: and largely Muslim in religion. Economic development in the areas, particularly in Central Asia, has offset this danger to a certain extent. The fact that the voices of Bokhara, Tashkent and Ashkhabad are not heard in the United Nations, together

p. 108
with those of Ghana . . .

Divide and Lose. By Michael Ionides. Published by Geoffrey Bles. 1960. 44. 271. Sources and index. 21s.

Few writers about the Middle East have much to say in defence of British leadership or much sympathy with its difficulties. Mr. Michael Ionides is no exception. His heart is with the Arabs and for him British policy over the years was little more than a series of blunders and of failure to understand the Arabs' legitimate aspirations. The worst blunder was to deny them adequate support against the Zionists' persistent efforts to acquire more Arab land.

Mr. Ionides' theme is briefly as follows: However necessary, and even desirable, it may have been at the outset to impose British control over the Arabs (incidentally he ignores the part played by the French), the control was from the first bitterly resented. Nor was the resentment assuaged when in course of time the states were granted nominal independence; for the treaties which embodied this independence were so framed as to make it inoperative if ever British policy and Arab policy failed to coincide. Whenever that happened the British will prevailed and the treaties provided the instrument by which it could be made to prevail. Therefore all Arab opinion had one principal aim—to get rid of the treaties and gain real independence of British domination. The Arabs differed only as to means. There were those who believed that they would best gain their end by co-operating with the British and so earning their gratitude. It was the royal families and their supporters who chiefly thought that way, incidentally providing themselves with a means of support against any of their own unruly subjects who might be agitating for social reforms. On the other side were those who believed that the British would only listen when subjected to violent opposition. This was the division that gives the title to the book, and the argument is that the British finally lost out because of their inveterate habit of always doing the unpopular thing and failing ever to stand up to Zionist pressure. When the Americans took over the British mantle, they fell into precisely the same errors. The result was that Arab public opinion, always ignored by British governments, came to favour the extremists and finally threw out the co-operators. The whole issue was bedevilled by the ambitions of Zionism, the danger of which became an obsession to the Arabs, who not only believed the Israelis to be bent on further expansion but saw the Western Powers either unable or unwilling to prevent it. Mr. Ionides considers that the co-operators might conceivably have won the day against the extremists if they had been given support by the West on the only issue (apart from independence) on which they and all Arab opinion really wanted it—defence against aggressive Zionism. But it was not to be.

Mr. Ionides believes, and rightly so, that the British public was always left in ignorance of the Arab case. Actually one may doubt whether the Arabs always saw the issues quite as clear cut as Mr. Ionides does himself. Nevertheless it is all to the good that their case, both over independence and over Zionism, should be put in this highly readable form. The Zionist case has been put so often that it is high

time we heard the other side and, if Mr. Ionides indulges in some special pleading, it is no more than what we are accustomed to from the Zionists. Even so, he could be accused of sometimes loading the dice too heavily against the Israelis. After all, one could hardly expect them to accept Egyptian raiding with equanimity even if (and this is a more controversial issue than Mr. Ionides would have us believe) the Israelis brought it upon themselves. Nor can one blame them for taking Colonel Nasser's threats seriously. Mr. Ionides himself describes the Colonel as a man of great courage and great competence. Were the Israelis not justified in taking his words at their face value, especially at a time when he was receiving massive supplies of arms from Russia?

As for Mr. Ionides' animadversions on British policy, of course one has heard it all before, though never more forcibly put from the Arab point of view. Yet there are those who believe that Britain was not always quite so inept as popular opinion now seems to assume. Let us take comfort from some words of another distinguished student of the Middle East, Mr. Albert Hourani. Not so long ago he wrote these words:

"Policies must be judged at the moment of crisis; in the critical years of the Second World War, British policy proved its worth. England had enough strength to beat back the enemy from outside, and enough support among the rulers of the Middle East to be able to use the resources and communications of the whole area easily and peacefully, and to defeat easily the only important challenge from within, in Iraq in 1941. The support given by the Wafd in 1942, and the fact that it was possible to restore independent rule in Iraq as soon as the régime of Rashid Ali was destroyed, proved that British policy had been well conceived and executed."

Perhaps the trouble was that so few people in Britain realized after the Second World War that the whole situation had radically changed and that the people of the Middle East were no longer ready to accept "indisputable British control," which the British were in any case no longer able to enforce. They could therefore be successfully challenged by Zionists and Arabs alike, with both of them screaming at the tops of their voices that they were being let down. While Mr. Ionides is at times somewhat dogmatic in his argumentation, it is difficult to controvert his main thesis that the Arabs were bound eventually to repudiate their alliances with the West unless those alliances could be seen to satisfy Arab as well as Western preoccupations; and the overriding preoccupation of the Arabs was, and is, Zionism.

Before concluding this review, a word should be said about the fifteenth chapter, which contains some highly instructive comments on the problems of development. They are applicable not only to Iraq but to all "under-developed" countries and will, one hopes, be widely read.

J. M. T.

Nasser's New Egypt. By Keith Wheelock. Foreign Policy Research Institute No. 8. Praeger, New York. Pp. 326. \$6.

Mr. Wheelock's book can be divided broadly into three parts. In the first he describes the policy of the *coup* and the consolidation of the régime; in the second he describes the social and economic pattern that the régime attempted, and is attempting, to establish; and in the third he relates the foreign and Arab policy of the new Egypt to the conditions he has described and to the nature and ambitions of President Nasser.

His method is that of diligent compilation of fact and opinion, and his sources are given in great detail. Sometimes sentence after sentence is sourced until one begins to wonder how any intervening phrases found their place in the book without an authority to justify them.

It is, perhaps, this method which is responsible for some of the defects. In the first place, sources not of equal value appear so when statements of fact are equally substantiated by them. Mr. Wheelock, for example, notes in the preface his debt to the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* of London and cites it as a source no less than sixty-five times, although in the nature of the case this periodical cannot easily have direct access to the sort of fact for which it is used.

This citing of authorities can disguise an opinion as objective fact, for the thousands of conflicting opinions and statements to be found in Egypt provide ample opportunity for opinionated selection. There is a lot to be said for the author taking responsibility on himself. Mr. Wheelock's authority, after years of diligent study, is surely worth more than this report of an itinerant correspondent of *The Baltimore Sun*, no matter how good the latter might be.

In the political sections and in the final summing up there is much I would question, but the densely graduated structure makes it difficult to do so briefly. But here is an example: The policy of neutralism is presented as that of Nasser, whereas it was the policy of most Egyptians and of the Wafd Government before the army *coup*. A section of the relevant chapter, headed "Nasserism on the Wane," refers to 1958, when Nasserism was at its peak in popular opinion and waning only with governments, most of which had, in any case, never liked it. Mr. Wheelock, in support of this thesis, goes on to say of the quarrel between Bourgeiba and Nasser: "There was, however, strong Arab sympathy for Bourgeiba's position. He seemed to express the feelings of other Arab leaders when he said: 'To intervene permanently in the internal affairs of others is not, as far as I know, a method of being neutral.'" This again confuses Arab governments, some of whom sympathized with Bourgeiba, with Arab peoples, most of whom sympathized with Nasser.

The economic section of Mr. Wheelock's book is by far the most useful. He draws together a great deal of material about this hazardous part of President Nasser's policy. I doubt whether the situation is as bad as he makes it appear, but my opinion in this respect cannot diminish the value of Mr. Wheelock's study of the most difficult and obscure aspect of the Egyptian régime.

TOM LITTLE.

Personal Column. By Sir Charles Belgrave. Hutchinson and Co., Ltd. Pp. 248. Map, illustrated, indexed. 30s.

Sir Charles Belgrave tells us the story of his thirty-one years in Bahrain, how he found it much as it had been for centuries, without security or any formal government, and left it with a fully-fledged administration. It is a great achievement for a man to look back on—this long time spent in a bad climate under, at any rate to begin with, miserable conditions—and it is doubtful whether there is anywhere in the world now where such a thing would be possible, or indeed whether anybody could be found to undertake the task. The confidence of an Eastern Ruler in the white man chosen to assist him is a thing of the past. The Rulers, where they survive, have mostly been shorn of much of their power, and the white man no longer enjoys the prestige he did in 1926.

Bahrain is an island, or rather a group of islands, in the Persian Gulf, with an area of, say, 350 square miles and a population of about 125,000. It is almost more appropriate to think of it as a large estate with the Shaikh as the landowner, rather than as a separate political unit under a monarch. However, the discovery of oil in 1932 enhanced its importance, and the British subsequently made it their political and naval headquarters on the Arab shore of the Gulf. Belgrave describes its development in his own charming way, and one can hear his voice in every line of it. He organized the police, introduced education, built up the revenue—thanks to oil—constructed hospitals, stamped out malaria, and in fact was a regular Pooh-Bah. In the end, as was more or less inevitable, education produced a number of angry young men who demanded his dismissal and a greater share in the administration for themselves. "Never," as a Persian poet has said, "did I teach a man archery, who did not end up by drawing his bow at me."

One thing that strikes a reader who has a knowledge of Bahrain is the absence of references to the Residency and Political Agency. The transfer of the British Political Residency in the Persian Gulf to Bahrain in 1946 is not even mentioned. Daly, who was Political Agent when Belgrave and his wife arrived, and more or less nursed them in their early days, is spoken of with appreciation, and the Residency, at the end of their time, is criticized for the encouragement it is alleged to have given to the subversive elements, but in between they are hardly mentioned, and one

is left with the impression that the Residency and the Agency were of little importance to the life of Bahrain. This, however, may be considered as a compliment, as Bahrain is internally independent and the British authorities do not interfere unless necessity compels.

The book is well turned out with a picturesque map, attractive illustrations and an index. The translation of Arabic names is not in all respects orthodox but good enough for the general reader. There are a few minor errors, which would only be noticed by somebody with an intricate knowledge of Bahrain, and a few obvious misprints. For instance, the same place is called Sakhtir on p. 19, Sakhrir on p. 69, and Sakhir on p. 97.

I enjoyed the book, which is a fitting monument to a unique career, and hope many will read it.

RUPERT HAY.

Israel Resurgent. By Professor Norman Bentwich. Published by Ernest Benn, Ltd. 1960. Pp. 238. Map, index and bibliography. 27s.

Israel Resurgent, written by Professor Norman Bentwich, is an up-to-date history of the State of Israel combined with a handbook on the resettlement and social development of the Jews who have re-established themselves in the Holy Land.

The book is written by a man who has been an ardent Zionist during the whole of his life and who has spent many years working for his people in Palestine, first as a senior officer in the Civil Service of the mandatory period, and later as a professor at the Hebrew University. His enthusiasm for the cause to which he has devoted so much time imparts a glow to his words which cannot fail to affect most readers. One wonders, however, whether this depth of feeling does not result in rather too rosy a picture being presented. For instance, are the Arabs of Israel quite as contented with their lot as Professor Bentwich suggests?

The author does not venture many prophecies about the future, and wisely so. Forecasts of events in the Middle East rarely prove to be correct. He does write of a reunited Jerusalem which will be the spiritual centre of the three "heavenly" faiths but, apparently, the political centre of Israel and, therefore, of the Jews of the world. The attraction of this conception to Zionists is obvious, but it will be some time before all the other people concerned come to regard it with equal favour.

A readable and informative book which should be read by anyone who is interested in Middle Eastern affairs.

A. S. KIRKBRIDE.

Women and the New East. By Ruth Frances Woodsmall. The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C. 1960. Pp. 436. Map, index, illustrations. \$5.50.

This is a splendid book of its type—a factual type. Miss Woodsmall reports on an extensive tour of Eastern countries in which she observed the progress of women, participated in some of their projects, and above all extracted an encyclopedic number of facts relevant to the social changes and liberation of women for the last fifty years. This was made possible by a Ford Foundation grant. It must be underlined, however, that this book is not the result of one tour, but of decades of study. The countries featured are Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and India.

There is a foreword by Dr. Bayard Dodge in which he reminds us that "the customs of two-thirds of the women of the world are changing to a greater extent in our lifetime than they have changed during the last 2,000 years." The truth of this warrants such a book as Miss Woodsmall has written, and she is the right one to have done it, for she has been associated with the encouragement, study and administration of women's endeavours since 1917. For eight years she was the executive head of Y.W.C.A. activities in Turkey, Syria, Egypt and Palestine, and for twelve years General Secretary of its World Organization in Geneva.

The author follows roughly the same plan for each country, *i.e.*, the Setting, Education, Health, the Political, Economic, and Legal Status of Women, and an outline of existing Women's Organizations. Each country has a section of photo-

graphs and statistical tables. There is, as an appendix, a regular Who's Who of forty-four leading women of the East. A second appendix gives the approximate number of Moslems, and those of other faiths, in certain countries of the area, plus a total estimate of Moslems in the world of Islam.

Here are some arresting facts picked at random from this book: The first Indian woman to graduate in law did so as early as 1894. Djakarta has thirteen women's banks, the main purposes of which are to teach women how to save and to manage their own affairs efficiently. A Japanese weaving expert helps train Afghanistan women in handcraft. Nursing in Turkey dates from Florence Nightingale's Crimean days when Turkish women helped her voluntarily. And here is a statement of, presumably, unintentional irony: there are an estimated four million Christians in Indonesia, divided thus—"Roman Catholics, referred to as Catholics, one million; Protestants, referred to as Christians, three million."

Women and the New East is a well-produced book of quality, published by the Middle East Institute, Washington. (Does this mean that the most elastic term on the surface of the globe is now still further stretched to include Indonesia?!) It is a work that must have been carefully proof-read, for its 436 pages have negligible errors. But in another edition the word Nestorian (p. 408) and "the current specific problems" (p. 310) should have their r's brought under control. To tell the truth, the reviewer's English eye had become so used to such spellings as "centered" that it took two looks before being sure that there was something fundamentally wrong with the word "current." One more detail—Miss Woodsmall tells of a women's organization in Iran called the 17th of Dey Society which "commemorates the Emancipation of Iranian Women, 17th of Dey, 1314, Islamic Calendar—January 7th, 1936." It is rather misleading to call it Islamic Calendar which is strictly speaking the lunar calendar of the Hegira. The above date is according to the Iranian form which is solar.

Could Miss Woodsmall's next book be a study of the role of women in the clash of ideas now raging in the world. It is no secret that youth, welfare and women's organizations are often deftly used, the world over, by Communists to infiltrate their ideas and way of life. The crucial challenge to the magnificent pioneers Miss Woodsmall writes of, is to think out and live out a uniting ideology that is not anti-Communist but superior to Communism.

M. R.

Daughters of Allah. By Henny Harald Hansen. Translated from the Danish by Reginald Spink. George Allen and Unwin, London. 1960. 8½ × 6½ in. Pp. 190. Illustrations and sketch map. 21s.

In 1957 a Danish expedition to Iraqi Kurdistan, as a contribution to an urgent and sadly belated programme of "salvage archæology" in the Ranya plain doomed to be flooded by the approaching completion of the Dukan dam, undertook the excavation of a mound called Gird-i Shamshara, on the right bank of the Little Zab, about six miles downstream of the Darband-i Ramkan gap. The author of this book, the ethnologist of the party, is not here concerned with the most interesting results of the dig. (For these, which offer many striking and indeed amusing parallels between the political conditions prevailing on the eastern frontiers of Assyria in the first half of the second millenium B.C. and those prevailing in Iraqi Kurdistan towards the end of the second millenium A.D., the reader must be referred to *The Shemshāra Tablets*, a preliminary report by Professor Jorgen Laesso, Copenhagen, 1959.) From the outset Mrs. Hansen broke away from the expedition and took up residence, first with the family of the Shaikh-Squire of the small village of Topzawa near the dam, and later in Sulaimani with the family of her schoolmistress-interpretor, with whom, always accompanied by a brother, she paid a series of shorter visits further afield. She tells us that the results of her scientific work are to be written up later and that in this book of travel she has set out to give an account of her experiences as a woman living among Muslim women in Kurdistan.

Now although much is heard of the rapid strides made since 1918, and especially since 1945, by the movement for the emancipation of women in the Middle East, it is

probably true that in many countries, whether veiling has been "officially abolished" or not, real progress has been limited to the capital, or at any rate the larger cities, and that in the smaller provincial towns and in rural areas (even in Kurdistan where formerly the women were reputed to be far freer than their sisters elsewhere), public opinion still insists on the strict observance of the old conventions. The male European visitor is still almost completely debarred from anything but the most superficial contacts, not only with one half of the population, but also with the other half on the domestic side of its everyday life.

In addition to the initial advantage of being a woman, Mrs. Hansen has brought to this study of Kurdish society the special qualifications of a trained scientific investigator and a warm-hearted mother and grandmother. Having shared as she did in the daily round of her hosts, she is able to give us detailed and accurate accounts of such things as: the arrangement and furnishing of the ladies' apartments; feminine attire, jewellery and make-up; the customs and observances connected with birth, with marriage (at all stages from the negotiations for an engagement through the contract, preparing the trousseau, decking the bride and escorting her to her new home, the merry-making and the arranging of the bridal chamber, to consummation), and with death; superstitions; the polygamous household; shopping and dress-making; at-homes; cooking, meals, washing-day and other domestic chores; the care, or rather the shocking ignorance about the care, of children; and much more besides. There is a short description of dancing by men but, curiously, no mention of the mixed *rashbalak*, when women join the line.

In the penultimate chapter Mrs. Hansen meditates on her experiences. "Instead of enumerating the benefits which one would like to see extended to that part of Kurdistan where I stayed, I would rather point out certain values which I found there; certain positive features in the life of Allah's daughters. For me personally they made life vivid and harmonious, in an environment that lacked everything in the way of modern conveniences, and entertainment in the widest sense. . . . My Kurdish women showed no trace of any preoccupation with the business of passing time. They spent their time as if they liked it, and lingered over whatever they happened to be doing. They lived always in a way relaxed and self-contained, as the various activities of the day slipped through their hands. The prevailing social convention was one of dignity, grace and pleasantness. Nobody's nerves were on edge. . . . Time neither flew nor dragged. It slipped by quietly and gently, as though every minute was vital and significant."

The women of Kurdistan, on their side, have been fortunate in finding such an able and comprehending interpreter. The illustrations are well chosen and the pen-and-ink sketches that head the chapters attractive; but a book so packed with matter of documentary value deserves a fuller index. In conclusion, a word of appreciation for Mr. Spink, who never once reminded the reviewer that he was reading a translation.

C. J. EDMONDS.

Crossroads. Land and Life in South-west Asia. By George B. Cressey. Lip-pingcott Co., Chicago, New York, Philadelphia. 1960. 7 x 10 in. Pp. 593. Illustrations, maps, tables and charts. Index. \$12.

Crossroads from the dawn of history up to the twentieth century: a good 10,000 years of it: and the area still remains the most enigmatic, most controversial and most explosive portion of the world's surface. A spider's web, or "cat's cradle," would perhaps be as applicable a term for this triangle of confused racial aspirations, jealousies, hatreds and politics of the dozen kingdoms and republics that go to make up this battleground: not to mention the galaxy of satellites around their borders—semi-independent Sheikdoms, Sultanates and Protectorates.

Such is the field Mr. Cressey attempts to cover in this one volume. Afghanistan and Arabia, Persia, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and Jordan, plus the afore-said satellites, are all described in *nine* chapters, from the point of view of location, inhabitants, climate, land and land-use, rivers, mineral resources, oil, and international

contacts. A Tree of Knowledge, and, in my humble opinion, correct and up to date. Part II consists of eight chapters analysing each region in detail.

The illustrations are profuse and well chosen; and the maps, tables and charts covering population, rainfall, crops, water supply, foreign trade, irrigation projects, mineral resources, etc., make it an encyclopædia of the Middle East which should be in every library as a reference book, and indispensable to every business firm whose tentacles extend into South-west Asia.

D. C.

The Chronicle of Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz. Concerning the Afghan invasion of Persia in 1722, the siege of Isfahan and the repercussions in Northern Persia, Russia and Turkey, translated from the original Armenian and annotated by C. O. Minasian, with an introduction and additional notes by L. Lockhart. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Armenian Library, Lisbon. 1959. Pp. xxiii, 77. No price indicated.

The Chronicle of Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz is a situation report concerning events in Persia, Armenia and the Caucasus which had taken place since March 1, 1722, written on September 2, 1723, by an intelligence agent stationed at Resht to his superior, Minas Tigranian. A Russian translation was handed to Brigadier Levashov, the commander of the Russian forces in Gilan. It forms a very interesting page in the history of Armenian national movements. Minas, then Archbishop of All the Armenians in Russia, with his headquarters at Astrakhan, and well known as the former collaborator of that enterprising patriot Israel Ori, had accompanied the army of Peter the Great on its capture of Derbend in September, 1722. Since June, 1722 (*i.e.*, for sixteen months prior to his report, see para. 133, p. 68) Petros had been the leader of an armed group of twelve Armenian volunteers, all ex-merchants, and it was his task at the time to collect information from refugees and others passing through Resht. Although it is not therefore at all surprising to find Petros reporting that "all over Persia and Turkey we are spoken of as slaves of the King of the Russians," both men were first and foremost patriots who had placed their hopes for the salvation of the Armenians under Muslim domination in their Russian fellow-Christians; it is clear that Petros and his men received and expected no financial help from the Russians, and not only paid their own way, but advised their chief how best to raise funds for their cause from the Armenians. One of the principal informants interviewed at Resht, Hovsep Apisalaymian, was the secretary of Ange de Gardane, French Consul at Isfahan, and the author of several reports contained in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay. He left Isfahan on August 8, 1723, and gave Petros a valuable account, extending from para. 6 to 87 of the "chronicle," of the battle of Gulnabad (March 8, 1722), the capture of Isfahan and the deposition of Shah Sultan Husain by the Afghan Mahmud, and the beginning of the latter's reign as Shah of Persia; details are given of the heavy tribute demanded of the Armenians of New Julfa, and of the famine in the capital and the steep rise in food prices. Paras. 88 to 124 contain the information supplied by Mekertich Vardapet, who arrived on August 21, 1723, in Resht from Tabriz, whither the deposed Shah's son, the future Tahmasp II, had fled. The vardapet furnished Petros with examples of Turkish and Persian anxiety in face of the growing Russian menace, and of the actions taken by the Georgian Muslim Vali of Kakheti, Muhammad Quli Khan (Constantine III), and his deputy at Erivan with regard to the Catholicos of Echmiadzin, Astuatsatur I, who, being in touch with the Armenian troops (see, *e.g.*, para. 104), was not quite the "simple churchman" he claimed to be. Other informants gave Petros information on the situation in Gilan, Tabriz and Tiflis (paras. 125-132). The only section which is wholly the work of Petros, the final paragraph 133, gives an eloquent account, accompanied by a request for powder and shot, of the difficulties of the Armenians "surrounded by the enemy on all four sides" and "alleged to have wrecked the country by bringing the Russians into Persia, by taking the Afghans to Isfahan and by raising 60,000 Armenian soldiers to join the Russians and destroy Persia."

The chronicle is thus a precious document which throws much light on a very

confused situation and is of interest to all students of the activities of Persians, Turks, Russians, Armenians, Georgians, Lezghians and Kurds in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. The present translation was made from Hovsep Pondoyantz's edition, published in the Armenian journal *Krunġ* (Tiflis) in February-March, 1863, which is exceedingly rare. A Russian translation was published by K. Patkanean in 1870 which, though not quite so rare, is still far from being in every Armenologist's library. One is grateful, therefore, to Dr. Minasian and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Armenian Library for placing the contents of the Chronicle more closely at our disposal. The language of the original, dialectical and full of foreign loan-words and expressions, is rich in obscurities for the ordinary Armenologist, who is likely to find the language of the fifth century considerably easier. Dr. Minasian, a resident of Isfahan with first-hand knowledge of the local Armenian dialect and familiarity with the terrain affected by the events described in the Chronicle, is ideally well suited for the task of translating and explaining this difficult text. His English is perfect. Patkanean's translation, which has had to be corrected in various places, has been consulted. Useful historical and topographical notes have been added by the translator and by Dr. Laurence Lockhart, who has placed the Chronicle's data in perspective by constant reference to such parallel sources as Father T. Krusinski's *History of the Revolutions of Persia*, L. A. de la Mamie de Clairac's *Histoire de Perse*, Friar Alexander of Malabar's *Kort narigt*, and the *Dagregister* of the Chief Merchant of the Dutch East India Company in Isfahan. Perhaps reference could usefully have been made in the prefatory notes by Dr. Minasian to the interesting article by Ashot Hovhannisean (Petros de Sargis Gilanentz, patmakan kensagrakan aknark, *Ararat* (Echmiadzin), January-February, 1916, pp. 105-128), which provides useful references to documents contained in the Moskovski Glavnyi Arkhiv Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del—Dela armyanskie.

The word *marchil* on p. 45 is Georgian *marč'il*, a silver coin worth 60 kopecks; *thavad* (p. 58) is without any doubt Georgian *t'avad-i*, "one [who stands] at the head," "leader," "prince." *Geghagoon* (p. 55) is a corruption, influenced by popular etymology, of the name of the ancient Siunian canton of *Geghark'uni*.

C. J. F. DOWSETT.

The Sabres of Paradise. By Lesley Blanch. John Murray, London. 1960. Pp. 480. Illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. 30s.

The central figure in Lesley Blanch's book, *The Sabres of Paradise*, is the Imam Shamil, the picturesque and formidable leader of the Murid sect in the Caucasus, whose defence of the independence of his country against the Tzar's armies for a quarter of a century (1834-59), is the epic of the Muslim people of North Caucasia.

Shamil, who has become a contentious figure in the constantly changing assessment of historical characters in Soviet historiography, was at first described by Soviet writers as a Caucasian national patriot. Since then, the "official line" has undergone a number of changes from treatment of Shamil as a patriot to outright condemnation as a stooge of Turkish and British imperialism. At present, the official attitude is somewhere between these two extremes, a desire to avoid alienating Islamic opinion evidently influencing recent pronouncements.

In spite of these recent Soviet attempts to "place" Shamil in the background of the orthodox picture of Russian relations with the tribal and other national groups of the Russian borderlands, he remains perhaps the most significant personality of the nineteenth century Russian wars of expansion and conquest in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Miss Blanch tells the story of Shamil's fight for the independence of his people, and the fierce campaigns fought by the Russian armies in the Caucasus with dramatic skill, depicting the leading characters on both sides with a lively and discriminating pen.

Although her sympathies evidently lie with the tribes, despite their savagery and fanaticism, she gives a clear and unbiassed account of the trials and tribulations of the Russian armies in their long struggle against a resourceful enemy whose tactics

and cunning were more than a match for Russian arms, until better leadership and improved tactics defeated the exhausted tribesmen.

As one could reasonably expect from the author of *The Wilder Shores of Love*, Miss Blanch's description of such incidents as the capture by Shamyl's men of a Georgian Princess and her French governess, and the sad fate of Shamyl's son, brought up as a Russian Guardsman, the darling of St. Petersburg society, and forced by the Tzar for political reasons to return to his tribesmen, are told with sentiment and much picturesque detail. Her gift for lively narrative is matched by her ability to hold the reader's sustained interest despite her many digressions into side issues.

Shamyl's vain attempt to win British support for his cause, and the unaccountable failure of the French and British to enlist his support during the Crimean War are related with a touch of irony at the expense of Queen Victoria and her subjects. The author, however, devotes the best part of her story to the struggle in the bleak and often terrifying mountains of the North Caucasus, the harsh life of the inhabitants of the fortified villages and the fanatical zeal of the Murid tribesmen.

Shamyl's final defeat at the hand of the chivalrous Russian commander, Prince Bariatinsky, and his years of honourable captivity in Russia, are described with feeling and sympathy.

The background of these events provided the material for much of the best work of Tolstoy, Lermontov and Pushkin. Tolstoy's *Cossacks* and *Hadji Murat*, two of the finest stories in any language, and Lermontov's *Hero of our times* vividly describe the life of the Russian soldier and his formidable opponent. Miss Blanch has successfully provided us with an enthralling account of these campaigns which presents the story from the background of the Caucasian defenders.

The book is well documented, the author having access to much new material. Despite excessive length, due partly to a tendency to be led away into side issues, the book is the most readable account of the campaigns that has appeared since Baddeley published his *Russian Conquest of the Caucasus* more than half a century ago.

C. H. ELLIS.

The Politics of the Developing Areas. Editors: Gabriel A. Almand and James S. Coleman. Published by Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press. Pp. 576. Indexed. 80s.

The editors and co-authors of this massive political study are breaking fresh ground. In this quite exhaustive study they are attempting to review within a sociological context the political processes of change and progress which are affecting South-east Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Near East and Latin America. India and Pakistan are included within South-east Asia, and while this is an unusual arrangement, it is seen to be a perfectly logical and legitimate conception in view of the immense cultural influences which both Muslim and Hindu traditions emanating from the sub-continent have had on the East Asiatic littoral and on the archipelagoes in the Eastern seas.

The aim, as the authors explain in their introduction, has been to introduce and to develop a functional approach to Comparative Politics as distinct from certain "conceptual forms" of political practice. They are making the rather valid point that the influence of "Western" States, and in this category they place European countries and the United States together, has been so great that the disciplines of political science within recent years have been working within a limited sector of political expression, that of the modern, complex, primarily Western state.

They consider, and very rightly, that there is now an imperative necessity for broadening the scope of international politics to include, as a part of the basis of analysis, a much wider range of processes and ideas than have been considered seriously until now, and feel that a considerable enrichment of political science will result. This is indeed undeniable and only realistic. It would seem that the authors are well aware that, for example, the colonial powers such as Great Britain, Holland and France (it is curious that Portugal, perhaps the most resilient of colonial powers, is so little mentioned) have been quite well informed about the traditional influences

within the countries which they rule, but somehow their knowledge has not been very fully shared. It should, perhaps, be mentioned that an attitude of considerable fairness is maintained towards colonial powers, and that this is quite unusual in works of American scholarship of this particular stamp, where a certain *animus* is so often found.

The style is somewhat turgid, there are many new, unfamiliar and somewhat stilted terms, and both time and effort are required to read this book. The effort is, however, rewarding.

It is perhaps unlikely that it will receive much attention from those among us whose decisions are most likely to affect the course of events in these countries, since they are more conditioned to being influenced by two-page memoranda prepared by individuals who are expected to have digested works of this kind in their stride (but who seldom have). There would be benefit to be derived from a wider circle of reading than those students for whom it will be prescribed as a text-book.

Being primarily a work of theory and analysis, it does not convey as readily as it might a sense of application or even a suggestion of the rules of procedure to guide its readers towards the acquisition of political know-how; it can be said that it provides a thoughtful and most topical basis which may well lead towards better informed practise on the part of a new generation which will be obliged to deal with the merchants and officials of the emergent nations on an entirely new footing, different from that of any previous relationships. In other words it is a reasonable antidote to backward thinking.

A. H. S. CANDLIN.

The Memoirs of Lord Ismay. Heinemann. 1960. Pp. 464. Index, maps, diagrams. 42s. net.

This is a fascinating record of the war years, and of the functioning, seen from the very centre of the control, of the machine of Government, and its progressive adaptation to war problems and conditions.

Lord Ismay's book contains no sensational revelations, and not the shadow of an indiscretion. But its importance is great as giving the day-by-day picture of the burdens carried by the Prime Minister, of his decisive handling of problems and people, and of his single-minded concentration on the destruction of Hitler, and the winning of the war. It brings out sharply, too, the issues that faced a Prime Minister with, on the one side, the United States, not necessarily always sensitive to wider Commonwealth considerations, yet on which this country was critically dependent; and on the other, Marshal Stalin, concerned to extract from his Allies the maximum of assistance for the Russian cause and for long-term Soviet interests, with the minimum of gratitude and regardless of any risk or damage to the interests of his friends. The story of the betrayal of the Polish Resistance, and of the cynical Russian cashing-in, at the last moment, on the defeat of Japan, make disillusioning reading.

There were issues to be resolved even with our American allies, to whom our debt was so great—the future of India; the significance of the Pacific as against the European theatre; again and again the sincerely felt and carefully reasoned differences of view between the British and United States Staffs emerge. But equally there emerges the immense value of the close relationship and mutual confidence between Roosevelt and Churchill—even if now and then there were misunderstandings or divergences; its importance in the resolution of clashes of view at lower levels; and the significance of the help and support given to their defence advisers by the President and the Prime Minister. There is a generous tribute to the fairness and impartiality of Eisenhower, and to his contribution to the ultimate victory.

There are other reflections that are suggested by Lord Ismay's survey. Above all, perhaps, the debt we owe to Lord Hankey's work in building up the Committee of Imperial Defence. If its machinery had in some respects to be adjusted in the light of war experience, there was no change made that did not prove the soundness of the general principles on which it had been based, or the ease with which they could be applied to very different conditions. Next, the vital necessity in war conditions

of the marriage of military and political thinking; and the smooth and successful working of the Cabinet Secretariat under the wise guidance of Lord Bridges. Finally, in a different field, the dangers that we had to face in South Asia because of the need to concentrate our resources in the area of the knockout blow. Those who were in India in the earlier years of the war, and especially in 1942-43, have vivid memories of the grave and searching risks faced by those responsible for Government with the slender equipment available, and of the magnitude of the help, for all that, given by India to the winning of the war in men, money, and supplies.

Lord Ismay's early service was in the Indian Army, of which he paints a moving and nostalgic picture. It fell to him to see the dramatic and successful resolution by Lord Mountbatten of the problem of relations between this country and the sub-continent in 1947. He brings out well the sharpness of the issues, the strength of local feeling, the deep apprehensions of the two great communities about their future position, and the tragic bitterness and loss of life that accompanied the final settlement. But he brings out, too, the anxious care that went to the framing of that settlement, and the deep concern that the transfer of power should be on terms acceptable to all affected.

Lord Ismay's Memoirs may lack sensational disclosures. But they will be a document of permanent value for the history of the inner conduct of the war, whether in the political or the defence field, and of the war relationship between this country, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. It is impossible to lay them down without reflecting on the importance of their author's contribution—the result of his imperturbable temper, long experience and complete integrity, which were the foundation of the confidence reposed in him not only by Sir Winston and the Chiefs of Staff, but by all with whom he had to deal.

GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

Karachi Through a Hundred Years. By Herbert Feldman. Published by the Oxford University Press. Pp. 238. Illustrated and indexed. 27s. 6d.

In 1955 the Kabul Players, under Dr. Shahnawaz, put on a performance of "The Importance of Being Ernest" at the Nowshera Club. There is a reference in the play to the devaluation of the rupee, and in those surroundings this had such a topical ring that one wondered at first if, as Ernest, Mr. Madden Gaskell, of the Pakistan Tobacco Company, were not interpolating an impromptu.

How wrong, of course; and reading *Karachi Through a Hundred Years* one realizes this afresh. Wilde wrote in 1895: writing of the problems, of the sub-Continent in the last decade of the nineteenth century and of the Herschell Committee, Mr. Feldman describes how in 1893 the Karachi Chamber of Commerce "addressed a petition to the House of Commons calling for a remedy to correct the continuous fluctuation in the exchange value of the Indian rupee, in terms of the money of gold standard countries."

Karachi Through a Hundred Years, as its sub-title indicates, is the Centenary History of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1860-1960. In sifting the proceedings of the Chamber from its earliest days and converting them into a comprehensive account of the part the Chamber and the great Karachi houses have played in the economic life of the sub-Continent, Mr. Herbert Feldman has achieved a *tour de force*. At times the strictly chronological treatment may perhaps be somewhat tantalizing. For example, the fact that apparently the Indian railways were retarded by inability to raise capital elsewhere than in London, is one that would afford interesting material for a separate chapter. And the Indian currency question is another example. But, after all, this is a history of an institution, and in giving this history in chronicle form, Mr. Feldman has presented the reader with the clearest possible picture of the changing and developing concerns of the great mercantile community which is his subject. Communications, the mail system, the over-land route, the Suez Canal, the railways, port-development, income tax and weights and measures, cotton and America, wheat and America, the great canals, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the loss and the gain, commercially, of two world wars, the expansion of Karachi, the forming of Pakistan and the inauguration of the present régime—

all these and much else pass under review, while, from the annals of the Chamber, the records of its contributions to current problems and its constructive criticism of Government, there emerges an impression of probity, common-sense and political impartiality worthy of the finest traditions. There are some notable and distinguished names in the story, from the founder, D. McIver, first Chairman of the Chamber, and Mackay (first Earl of Inchcape), down to the present. There is the redoubtable figure of M. de Pomeroy Webb, later Sir Montagu Webb, chairman of and on from 1904-20. There is an account of the Delhi conference on railway policy, where the Chamber was represented by G. H. Raschen, of Forbes, Forbes, Campbell and Campbell, Ltd. And the concluding photograph, of the Managing Committee and Centenary Sub-Committee, 1959-60, brings the roll-call both of firms and representatives down to the present: Messrs. Cree (President), Leslie, Gafafer (Vice-president), Eumorfopoulos, Windle, Stephens, Williams, Banks, Henson, Drummond-Forbes and Condon representing Mackinon Mackenzie, Burmah Shell, Volkarts (a foundation firm) the Secretaryship, Forbes Forbes Campbell, Finlays, Surridge and Beecheno, Associated Cement, Glaxo, Pakistan Tobacco and Burmah Oil.

The Centenary Membership includes 115 firms and 49 associates.

The author is, if anything, too modest in his account of the help which the Chamber has given since the inauguration of Pakistan to Commonwealth and foreign missions in Karachi. And it is a tribute both to the standing of the Chamber and to the good sense of the Pakistan Government that, although the Chamber has now been required to revert to a wholly non-Pakistan membership, it has nevertheless been allowed to retain unchallenged its title of the Karachi Chamber.

Mr. Feldman writes ably. He draws on a wide range of reading for this embellishment of his narrative. And he has many penetrating comments, for example on the influence of war on corruption, which save his story from becoming too particularized.

Mr. Feldman and the Pakistan Branch of the Oxford University Press are to be congratulated. In *Karachi Through a Hundred Years* they and the Centenary Sub-Committee of the Chamber have saved much from oblivion. Those coming to Karachi and its business life for the first time will find here an impressive record. And the record should constitute a valuable source book for the future student of the economic history of the sub-Continent as a whole. All will find, as is so easily forgotten, the truth of the old tag, that there were men before Agamemnon. *Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona multi.*

MARTIN MOYNIHAN.

A Punjabi Village in Pakistan. By Zekiye Eglar. Columbia University Press and Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. 240. Index, glossary, bibliography, illustrations. 48s.

This is, in fact, an anthropological study of a Punjabi village by a Turkish Moslem lady selected to receive one of the Clarke F. Ansley annual awards by the University Press. The author actually lived in the village for five years, learnt the language and identified herself with the whole plane of living in this Gujrat village of Mohla and its surroundings from 1949 to 1955, during and after the recent changes of Government.

During this period there had been fundamental and revolutionary upheavals in land tenure, education, law, and administration. Her sex, religion, and Turkish background, of course, enabled the author to adopt a uniquely objective outlook.

The structure of customs and usage in this, as in most of the 82 per cent. of Indian rural village life, is surprisingly complex. It is a growth of long-standing organization of methods to maintain family life intact. The key to the methods is a system known as "vartan bhanji," which, so to speak, codifies and co-ordinates the relations between castes, sects, sections, families, and relations, a medium to express

the minutiae of village life in practical form. In Britain lawyers carry much of this burden of interpretation of custom and method. In India it is the woman's task to translate traditions and domestic events into a workable system. A work such as this has a vital place in the anthropological analyses of life in the Punjab, so necessary in any scientific approach to what is now coming to be regarded as an essential factor in the study of modern states.

G. M. ROUTH.

The Mind of Mr. Nehru. By R. K. Karanjia. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1960. Pp. 112. 10s. 6d. net.

This is a straight bit of journalese. It is written by an experienced Indian journalist and consists of unrestrained answers given by "Mr. Nehru" (more correctly Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru) to a mass of questions put to him, during many interviews, concerning Indian and international affairs with which he is immediately concerned as Prime Minister of India and participant in the realm of U.N.O. Lest readers might wonder whether the reporting is accurate, Mr. Karanjia notes that it follows several talks with the Pundit, "some just between ourselves, others in the presence of a 'third man,' the tape recorder." The general result is usefully illuminating. The Pundit has often in his published speeches expounded his judgments on public affairs. Close observers have provided further explanations in books and other published comments. What he here says to the interviewer throws an intimate light upon how his mind has been working behind all this. People who read his speeches upon Indian life and affairs may, for instance, find differences between his current statements and his earlier appreciation of Marxian theories. Here we find "that although the logical reasoning of Marx was correct, other factors have intervened, . . . have produced a new set of conditions and Marxism must be reviewed in this new context." Again, in his autobiography the Pundit declared Gandhi to be "more or less a philosophical anarchist" who favoured a political and social structure "wholly based on violence and coercion" and whose psychic coercion "reduces many of his intimate followers and colleagues to a state of mental pulp"; but lately he has been proclaiming Gandhi a prophet whose mantle he is proud to have inherited, and here we may perceive just how "the mind of Nehru" has readjusted itself. He has often professed his belief in socialism, but here we find: "Now the question arises how to bring about the moral and spiritual standards." "Isn't that unlike the Jawaharlal of yesterday?" asks the interviewer, for "what you say raises visions of Mr. Nehru in search of God in the evening of his life!" And, "Yes, I have changed," answers the Jawaharlal of to-day. And he shows why and how. We go on to study views, in harmony with this, on international affairs, particularly on the importance of harmonious co-existence. "What the world is groping for to-day seems to be a new dimension in human existence, a new balance: only a fully integrated man with spiritual depth and moral strength will be able to meet the challenge of the new times."

It is all a remarkable story of how the mind of the Indian leader has become adjusted and developed under the pressure of his experiences since the days when he decried the co-operative efforts of his fellow-countrymen and British statesmanship to further the unification and modern political development of the Indian peoples to fit them for independence.

A. H. B.

Islands of the Marigold Sun. By Suresh Vaidya. Robert Hale, Ltd., London. Pp. 192. Map and illus. 18s. net.

Here is a happily told story of a delightful holiday tour through beautiful island scenery and amid picturesque and friendly peoples. The author is a talented Bombay Hindu journalist, a vivid descriptive writer possessed of much experience as contributor to Indian, British and American publications and as B.B.C. broadcaster and talks organizer for Indian radio. The islands? They are the Andamans and

Nicobars, a string of 214 big and small ones stretching 350 miles from north to south in the Bay of Bengal and lying more than 800 miles eastward of the Madras coast. In the days of the British raj in India, they were for more than a hundred years used as a penal colony for convicts sentenced to transportation and were forbidden to tourists. The convicts on their return to freedom commonly settled there, quite contentedly. The Japanese seized the isles during the recent war and released the prisoners whom they found still in gaol. Since then, the new Government of India have not re-established the prison and have done their best to encourage Indian colonization there, but the old penal settlement won for the islands a bad name and the new colonization plan has not as yet proved successful.

There is a regular steamer service between Madras and the isles and Mr. Vaidya found this both convenient and comfortable. He happily spent several months holidaying and travelling about both Andamans and Nicobars, evidently enjoying the varied and beautiful scenery, the pleasant climate and the friendliness of the people—both the aborigines and the ex-convicts who, with their unhappy past forgotten, find their lives in their colony more attractive than anything they could visualize during the visits they have been enabled to make to their native land. He had interesting meetings with the aboriginal Jarwas and with the still more ancient stone-age Onghies. His brief studies of their ancient customs and traditions could be fascinating. The natural products of the fields and woods of the islands he found full of novelties. He went “breathless with astonishment” at the size of a silk cotton tree—with a buttress 25 ft. wide and bole easily 8 ft. across—and at sight of a ficus with trunk radius of 12 ft. and a buttress width of 40 ft. And “what a sun, so bright and brilliant! What greenery, so lush and pleasing! What a cool, sedative breeze! How strange, I thought, that the British should have chosen to convert this beautiful place into a penal settlement.” Everywhere, as he shows, he found the people—aborigines, redeemed and settled ex-convicts, new colonists, officials (from Burma and Bengal) content and happy.

A. H. B.

Pilgrimage for Plants. By Frank Kingdon-Ward. Published by Harrap. Pp. 180. Bibliography, index and illus. 18s.

Few can have had, on the whole, a more satisfying life than Frank Kingdon-Ward. He spent a large part of forty-five years in Assam, Burma, Tibet and South-west China, in the high mountains and valleys which he obviously loved so much, searching for and collecting the plants which he knew and loved equally well. The chapters of this, his last book, deal separately with his searches for various plants and groups of plants with which amongst botanists and gardeners here and in America his name will always be associated—*Rhododendron*, *Primula*, *Meconopsis* and *Prunus*, to name only a few. His descriptions of his journeys to find these plants convey vividly the excitements of anticipation and achievement, especially when he finally found hundreds of plants of the beautiful Manipur lily, *Lilium mackliniae*, growing near the top of Sirhoi Kashong in Manipur State.

There were frustrations and disappointments, too, when a dwarf pink rhododendron was seen growing on the opposite side of a raging torrent and at the top of an unscaleable cliff, and could only be admired across the width of the valley through field-glasses, or when the seeds of the brilliant azure blue *Meconopsis speciosa* germinated badly and the few seedlings raised in Britain failed to survive.

Many of his expeditions took place during the winter months when the rivers were at their lowest, but the weather was extremely cold at altitudes of 8,000 ft. or more, or during the autumn when mountains and valleys were often shrouded in mist or heavy rain and everything was perpetually wet. He describes long walks and arduous climbs in these circumstances, ending in primitive huts or uncomfortable camps at night, and it requires little effort on the part of the reader to imagine the monotonous food and the considerable amount of work in camp each night in recording, packing and preserving the seeds and plants found on each day's walk. There is also a description of the 1950 Assam earthquake, in which he and his wife and the porters narrowly escaped injury by a fortunate change of plans.

The author includes some most interesting comment and discussion of the

problem of discontinuous species, such as *Primula prolifera* in the Khasi Hills of Assam, and *P. imperialis*, which are so much alike that for many years they were considered to be the same species, although the latter occurs some 2,500 miles away in Java, and neither is found anywhere in between. His explanation is that since the group of islands off the south-east coast of Asia was probably at one time joined to the mainland, these primulas could have been continuous over the whole area during the Sino-Himalayan ice-age, and with the retreat of the ice the climate over much of the area became unfavourable to them, and they were isolated on these two mountains where conditions still suited them.

The book contains an introduction and lists of Kingdon-Ward's expeditions and publications by Mr. W. T. Stearn of the British Museum (Natural History), and a considerable number of excellent photographs. The author had achieved unusual success in the difficult art of making good and informative photographs of individual plants growing in their natural conditions. There are, as well, a number of more general views.

A. C. WESTERN.

Englishmen in Tibet from Bogle to Gould. By Sir Olaf Caroe. The Tibet Society of the United Kingdom. Pp. 12. Illus. 2s. 6d.

This reprint of an address given by Sir Olaf Caroe to the Tibet Society makes an admirably concise and readable pamphlet. The five Englishmen are Bogle, Manning, Younghusband, Bell and Gould. Few men are better equipped than the author, with his own fine record of service, to have written of these Englishmen and few, if any, would have done it so well.

FRANCIS N. BEAUFORT-PALMER.

Tibet in Revolt. By George N. Patterson. Faber and Faber. Pp. 197. 18 Illustrations; map. 21s. net.

A good many students of current events probably feel that about Tibet through the past few years there has been rather a plethora of books and special articles insufficiently authoritative to provide adequate trustworthy information. Here is a new book by an author who writes from several years' friendly and intimate acquaintance of Tibet and its people and provides a well-balanced and thoroughly trustworthy review of events. An experienced newspaper correspondent (of *The Daily Telegraph*), he is fairly described by its publishers as possessing such long association with Tibetans of all classes, from the Dalai Lama's family to the Khamba muleteers, and such close friendship with them, as have given him a unique position for obtaining information concerning events in their country through the past ten years of Chinese occupation. He begins by briefly sketching the history of Tibet-China relations for more than 1,000 years and thus, without boring his readers, provides a spring-point that conveniently assists understanding of modern developments.

The story of these leaves no doubt of the deliberate Chinese aim to reduce Tibet and its people to complete absorption. The artifice with which this policy has steadily been followed is shown to have been very clever and sometimes so much so that to read of its pursuit is almost amusing. This comment specially applies to the Government of India's repeated allegations of sensational untruth in Mr. Patterson's and some other correspondents' despatches from Kalimpong describing Chinese barbarities in Tibet in the not far distant past. The verification of those despatches to which he can now point leaves one astonished by the poverty of the Indian Government's own service of information in those days and by their facile acceptance of diplomatic Chinese explanations. Mr. Patterson declares that "more than any other single person the Indian Ambassador to Peking, Sardar K. M. Pannikar, was responsible for the loss of Tibet and the unpreparedness of India to meet the situation" which arose from Chinese aggression there, and he tells us his reason for that conclusion.

Another point he makes, and this on the strength of his deliberations with the Tibetan authorities when they sought his help, is that "broadly speaking, the

Russian attitude seemed to be that while they preferred a communist occupation of Tibet to a 'feudal' or 'imperialist' one, both Russia and China were suspicious of each other's growing influence on High Asia and both were out to shift the balance of power in their own favour, China openly and Russia by more subtle methods." There is an amusing illustration of United States diplomacy. The Tibetans ached for help from India, from Britain, from the United States, against the murderous aggression of the Chinese, and the Americans when they saw China in occupation of Lhasa sent word that they were considering stopping all wool trade with Tibet in accordance with their "policy of not trading with any communist country or its satellite." As 80 per cent. of Tibetan wool was sent to America "this was a crippling blow to the Tibetans."

The author's account of the practical imprisonment in which the Government of India secluded the Dalai Lama after his flight into their country, and the cleverness with which the Chinese strove to trick Tibetans into divisions among themselves are also illuminating. The whole book, in short, most usefully lights up what has been, and is, happening on the other side of the Indian border, where non-interference by any threatening foreign power is of vital Indian concern.

A. H. B.

Britain and Chinese Central Asia. By Alastair Lamb. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960. Pp. 387. Sketch-maps, index, bibliography. 42s.

Tibet, the last mystery land in a fast contracting world, now competes with Africa as a focal point of world interest. No longer a shadowy citadel of Buddhism, isolated by its situation on "the roof of the world," Tibet has become an advanced point of Chinese expansion and a base for bringing pressure to bear on India, Pakistan and the non-communist lands of south-eastern and western Asia.

For ages hidden from prying eyes by natural barriers as well as by the jealous guardianship of her theocratic rulers, the curtain only partly lifted for short periods during the past sixty years, Tibet has been brought into the arena of world affairs, not as an independent or semi-independent state, but as a province of the aggressive industrialized Communist China that has emerged as the dominant power in the East within the space of a decade.

Although the curtain has descended once more, enough is known of developments since the Chinese take-over in 1958 to make it clear that it is not a case of reasserting old claims of suzerainty, but that Chinese control is complete, with all the implications that this means for the border lands, and ultimately to India and Pakistan.

In his comprehensive study of British relations with Tibet (the first of three volumes dealing with the history of the north-east frontier region of India and Burma), Alastair Lamb traces the development of British policy towards Lhasa from the early days of the British East India Company to the aftermath of the abortive Younghusband expedition in 1904. A concluding chapter brings, in outline, the story up to the time of recent events along the Himalayan borders of India.

As he has drawn extensively on unpublished records of the India Office and the Foreign Office, as well as many important secondary sources, Alastair Lamb's very lucid and well-documented account of British attempts to establish relations with the Buddhist rulers of this strange yet fascinating land makes available a fund of new material, not only for the student of Asian affairs but also for the general reader.

While the diplomacy of Hastings in the last decade of the eighteenth century and of his successors up to the '40s of the last century was chiefly based on the desire to open up trade with Tibet and at the same time to find a route to the markets of Central Asia and Western China, these efforts and the minor wars in the Himalayan frontier region which ensued, inevitably led to difficulties with China, and, in fact, provided many of the historical arguments now presented by the Chinese government to justify their own recent action in that area. The Chinese claimed suzerainty over Tibet and regarded any attempt to put pressure on the Tibetans as an attack on themselves. Very little was achieved by the Company's agents in developing trade with the border states or with Tibet.

After 1860, in which year a British diplomatic mission was established for the first time in Peking, there was a revival of the agitation for the opening up of trade with Tibet, but despite improvements in communications with the frontier region undertaken by the Indian government, and much diplomatic exchange with Peking, no real progress was made. Mr. Lamb describes these developments in considerable detail and shows how illusory were the assumptions regarding Tibetan wishes that were entertained by the promoters of these schemes to deal directly with Lhasa.

By 1886, the Indian government abandoned its efforts to deal directly with the Tibetans and turned to the Chinese. But, in doing so, the government became more deeply involved than hitherto in disputes concerning Tibetan and Chinese claims in regard to the frontier states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. However, an agreement with Peking, providing for a trade mart at Yatung, a few miles beyond the Sikkim border, was reached in 1893 after much negotiation. As the Tibetans' wishes were not consulted in this arrangement, it is not altogether surprising that little trade developed.

It is not unlikely that the whole question of trade relations with Tibet would have dragged on interminably, but for wider diplomatic issues between Britain and Russia and the extension of Russian influence in the Far East. The appointment of Lord Curzon as Viceroy is now seen as the important factor in the situation that began to develop shortly after his arrival in India. Obsessed as he was (not without reason) with the reality of the Russian threat against British India, Curzon seized on a number of relatively minor incidents and on reports of Russian intrigue in Tibet to launch the adventurous policy which was to culminate in the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904. The story of this invasion and of the subsequent repudiation of Younghusband by the home government for diplomatic reasons is related by the author of *Britain and Chinese Central Asia* with fairness and objectivity.

Although it has become fashionable to decry Curzon's deep suspicion of Russian aims and his own rôle in the "Great Game" of nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian relations in Asia, recent events in Tibet and along the Himalayan frontier bear witness to his foresight in matters relating to the defence of India. His attitude towards Russia had been largely conditioned by his study of Russian expansion in Central Asia and the Far East. At that time, it could hardly have been foreseen that the threat to India was less likely to come from Russia than from China, a China that was then in an apparent state of political and territorial dissolution.

Mr. Lamb's study throws much light on British policy in India where the defence of Indian frontiers was concerned. It also helps to clarify the present policy and actions of Peking, since these are often based on claims about which much was heard in the past century but which had been largely forgotten—except in Peking.

Subsequent volumes of this history of the north-east frontier region will deal with British relations with Sinkiang and Yunnan.

C. H. ELLIS.

The Way and the Mountain. By Marco Pallis. Peter Owen, Ltd., London. Pp. 216. Illus. and appendices. 30s.

This very remarkable but difficult book is a series of connected essays, representing Mr. Pallis's new testament on the Mahayana, the Greater Vehicle of Tibetan Buddhism. It falls aptly at this crisis for Tibet. In a sense it is a sequel to his *Peaks and Lamas*, written twenty years ago. The title and theme of the introductory essay, which gives name to the book, shows that for him the climber's vision of the peak of his desire and attainment remains the symbol of spiritual values. The author still moves in an atmosphere at once as stimulating and rarefied as the Tibetan uplands which inspire him. But to those outside the mystery the path is arduous, too deep or too inaccessible for a wayfarer unwilling to make the half-intuitive effort needed to apprehend the language of transcendentalism. It may be that such writing needs the penetration of a mind attuned to systems of Hindu religious thought transposed to a Western idiom; at least, the effort to grasp the full significance has left this reviewer gasping in a state of mingled humility and aspiration.

If it is permissible to jest about spiritual values—and there is authority here for a divine “sportiveness” at the heart of the Spirit active in the Buddha and the Bodhisattva—there will be readers who, confronted with the conceptions here given of the Contemplative Life, the Active Life, and the Life of Pleasure, will sadly, but in honesty, recognize in themselves the attributes only of the last!

But Mr. Pallis's thought, even dimly perceived, has an astonishingly arresting quality. If one who, as at present, sees but through a glass darkly, may dare to attempt a summary, the claim would be that the Mahayana has the power to reveal to the initiate an ultimate transcendental reality, beyond and above the *form* of each religion, a region of formless Unity and Truth, the seat of freedom and universality. But this formless mystery is not to be won either by denying the truth of form, or through an eclectic synthesis of religious forms—far from it. On the contrary, form in any one tradition is an indispensable prelude to any adventure on to the larger path of non-formal knowledge. The rule of each tradition must first be followed. Thus the Christian, the Muslim, the Hindu is each on the Way; the ultimate initiation coming only by a realization at a level which transcends form and is the very heart of holiness.

Thus, on a worldly level, it is possible for one who has lived long in the shadow and the splendour of the Himalaya to be dimly aware that revelations of the Divine are not exclusive to the followers of one Way, Christian or other.

Mr. Pallis's language imposes a most rigorous discipline; it is as if he were transposing the abstractions of Sanskrit religious speculation into the Greek and Latin idiom of Europe. Words such as “intellection” or “syzyge” raise a wry smile in one who has just been assured that “true intelligence flies straight to the mark.” Yet, again and again, his writing half opens a curtain to let us view the Divine Comedy, much as the mists unsettled for a space before they washed once more round the half-glimpsed turrets of Francis Thompson's vision in *The Hound of Heaven*.

There is, too, more than one evocative and beautiful passage, perhaps the most appealing to the uninitiate being that on pp. 112-3, where the author with a *guru's* sure touch calls up the scenic glory of the Himalaya, and the vast noiselessness of the plateau beyond, as having the power to open that inward eye which is the bliss of solitude. A quotation will suffice for the many who have been subject to that spell:

“It is this same flavour . . . which is immediately sensed by anyone who has even a partially awakened perception of such things . . . a lost horizon . . . something not to be uttered, something that can only remain an object of the unbroken silence of the soul.

“One became conscious of a peculiar quality of transparency affecting the whole atmosphere of the place; it was as if the obstacles to the passage of certain influences had been thinned down to something quite light and tenuous, obstacles which in the outer world remained dense and opaque. The Himalayan ranges through which one approaches, mounting through their deep-cut gorges, awaken in the mind an ever-changing series of vividly separate sense-impressions which are deeply stirring; it would be an insensitive person who did not yield to the magical beauty of slopes all covered with rhododendrons from the midst of which mecanopsis poppies raise aloft their crown of flowers. But once out on the plateau all this is forgotten, for there one finds oneself in a landscape of such ineffable contemplative serenity that all separate impressions coalesce into a single feeling of—how to describe it?—yes, of impartiality. It is this quality of the Tibetan landscape which made one call it ‘transparent’; it preaches the essential emptiness of *things* and the compassion which is born of an awareness of their vacuity.”

The author goes on to suggest that this spiritual influence is a question pertaining to what may well be called the Science of Sacred Geography. All lovers of the Himalayan region will know what he means by this. And for visual aid he supports his prose by two haunting pictures, one of the quiet Tibetan solitude, and another of a wayside *stupa* set against the axis of dark jagged peaks that suggest the challenges on the difficult way to the Buddhist Olympus.

The savaging of the Tibetan tradition by modern China renders these expositions timely. Nor has Mr. Pallis neglected to include an essay on the spiritual values

lying behind the concept of the Dalai Lama in which he probes the popular conception of rebirth and gives weight to the human factor. And for those who faint on this difficult way there is a delightful essay on "Do clothes make the man?" the raiment being treated, as it were, as a sort of halo of the personality.

Many, laying down this book, will feel that their thought, like that of Flecker's pilgrim, has been stretched further than the limited mind can bear—they are shown a promised land, a pilgrim's bourne, half-glimpsed, then lost again.

O spiritual pilgrim rise: the night has grown her single horn:

The voices of the souls unborn are half adream with Paradise.

To Meccah thou hast turned in prayer with aching heart and eyes that burn:

Ah Hajji, whither wilt thou turn when thou art there, when thou art there?

O. C.

Russia and China. By J. V. Davidson-Houston. Robert Hale, Ltd., London. 1960. Pp. 200. Maps, index. Illus. 21s.

Davidson-Houston's wide experience as a soldier and a diplomat, his linguistic gifts and his extensive travels in Russia, China and the border lands of Central Asia and the Far East, have abundantly equipped him for the task he has undertaken in this most timely and valuable study of Russo-Chinese relations. His book, which is clearly the outcome of much study and research, covers the whole period from the early incursions of Hun and Mongol-Tatar tribes westwards from the plains of Mongolia, until the present day. In a sweeping outline of the history of both Russia and China, and a somewhat concentrated account of the devastating invasions of the Mongol and Turko-Tatar hordes into the Russian Steppe lands, Central Asia and what is now known as the Middle East, the author draws the reader's attention to the lasting influence upon the local populations of these invasions.

It is too often forgotten that Russia is an Asiatic as well as a European power. For more than two-thirds of her recorded history, her closest contacts and the external influences brought to bear on the Russian people, were Asian rather than European. More than three-quarters of Russian territory is in Asia, and her borders with China and the buffer state of Mongolia are over 4,000 miles in length. Thirty per cent. of the population of the Soviet Union are of Asian race. Many millions more are of mixed strains—Tatar, Mongol and Finn blended with Slav and Balt.

Russia had diplomatic relations with China long before any other great power was accorded this privilege. Envoys from St. Petersburg were in Peking as early as 1567, and a Chinese ambassador was appointed to the Russian capital in 1730. Russian expansion through Siberia towards the Pacific brought the two peoples into close touch in the middle of the sixteenth century, but the influence on the Russians of Chinese ideas of administration, diplomacy and social usage, and even costume and cuisine, through the agency of the Tatars, long preceded these contacts.

From the time of the emergence of the small Slav trading towns along the banks of the Dnieper in the seventh century until the middle of the fifteenth century, the principal external contacts of the Russian people were with the Asian tribes on the northern shores of the Black and Caspian seas, and the nomad hordes from the Empire of the Great Khan and his successors. Kiev, it is true, was in touch with Byzantium, and in the north, Novgorod and Pskov traded with the Hansa towns and with German, Lithuanian and Polish merchants, but the great pressures came from the east, culminating in the disastrous invasion by Genghiz Khan in the thirteenth century.

It was not until the latter part of the fifteenth century that the first Tsar of all the Russias, Ivan III, was able to free the unified and growing Russian state from the overlordship of Mongol-Tatar suzerainty, and embark on the Russian expansionist policy which has lasted until the present day. Despite the defeat of the Tatars, large settlements of the descendants of the invading hordes remained in Kazan, along the banks of the Volga and in the vast region extending from the northern shores of the Black Sea, through the North Caucasus, along the northern and eastern shores of the Caspian to the steppes and deserts of Central Asia. Tatar suzerainty came to an end, but Tatar influence on their former subject people, both ruler and ruled, remained.

The civil administration of the Tatars had been largely borrowed from China, and Chinese influence had been absorbed by the Khans and their officers. The impact of these habits of thought and pattern of behaviour has left permanent marks on the Russian character. Although modified to some extent by the westernizing reforms of Peter the Great, many of these influences remain, and combined with other external influences, notably those of Byzantium and Greek Orthodoxy, are still dominant factors in the Russian character and national outlook.

Submission to authority, alternating with periods of violent change, disregard of humanity in government measures, and ruthlessness on the part of those in authority in dealing with any deviation from the established order—all these were characteristics of the Tatar overlords which seem to have left their mark on the Russian people, and are often to be seen in conflict with the good-natured and easy-going mentality of the true Slav.

While drawing attention to the similarity of certain Chinese and Russian characteristics, the author does not over-stress the point. Byzantine influences, through the agency of the Church, and cultural ideas derived from the Orthodox Greek tradition, are equally potent, and most Russian historians are disposed to regard these as of greater significance than those derived from the East.

There seems to be little doubt that Russians and Chinese find less difficulty in understanding each other than is the case with Western nations and the Chinese. In spite of many conflicts over frontiers, and Russian encroachment on Chinese territory or on spheres of influence in the nineteenth and the early part of the present century, Russo-Chinese relations have remained close, culminating in the present intimate association. From the time of the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1685 until the recent post-war agreements between Moscow and Peking, relations between the two countries have been conducted on a realistic basis, and while it seems likely that Chinese suspicion and dislike of foreigners in general extends to Russians, the two peoples, with a long common background, are less strange to each other than other European foreigners in their midst appear to be.

The author's account of the break-up of the traditional China, and of events leading to the Chinese and Russian revolutions, is comprehensive, although described with less detail than his exposition of the earlier period. The late nineteenth century imperialist Russian drive towards the Pacific, with its tortuous diplomacy, and the growth of Russian influence in Mongolia and Manchuria, are graphically depicted. The even more tortuous and seemingly erratic Soviet Russian diplomacy towards the China of the Kuomintang, leading to eventual all-out Soviet support of the Chinese Communists, is lucidly explained, and conveys a clear picture of the opportunism, as well as the subtlety and realism of Moscow's diplomacy and strategy in promoting Soviet world aims.

Despite the wide range of common interests between Moscow and Peking, many potential causes of dispute remain, notably the future development of the great frontier province of Sinkiang and the effect of these changes across the border, the rôle of Mongolia, and Russian interests in Korea and Manchuria. The rapid growth of the already enormous population of China, and the relatively empty lands of Siberia and Kazakhstan are also factors which may produce stresses and strains between the two countries in the future. At present united by common hostility towards the West, and by Chinese economic, and to a certain extent, military dependence on the Soviet Union, their fundamental national interests are likely to diverge from time to time. The new China seems likely to assert her own independent leadership and influence in Asia, and even in Africa, while Russia continues to be confronted with the many problems arising from the largely artificial structure of security along her western frontiers.

Davidson-Houston refrains from making any firm prognostications regarding future developments. Strains are already appearing in the Russo-Chinese common front, but it is clearly in their mutual interests at present to prevent these developing into open dispute. The cement that holds the two countries so closely together at the present time is World Communism. Should this weaken, other forces will reassert themselves and latent antagonisms may develop to outweigh factors which now operate in favour of collaboration. Chinese-Russian relations involve many issues, some unsolved, and have deeper roots than the theories of Marx and Lenin, just as the

Russian Revolution is rooted in the facts of Russian history, and not on the shallow and false perspective that Soviet publicists and propagandists would impose on the world.

C. H. ELLIS.

Les Mouvements Nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie: le "Sultangalievisme" au Tatarstan. By Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay. Mouton and Co. Paris. 1960.

This is the first volume of a series undertaken by the Section of Economic and Social Sciences of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes at the Sorbonne University. The authors are young orientalists of a type all too rare in the West, and particularly in Britain: familiar not only with the relevant Asian languages, but with Russian, they have concentrated their attention on nationalist movements during the past century among the Muslims of Russia and on Soviet attempts to reconcile these movements with the Communist doctrine of state unity under the ægis of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party.

The authors have clearly chosen to begin the series with a study of Tatar nationalism not because the Tatar A.S.S.R. is the largest or most important Muslim national unit in the U.S.S.R., but because Sultan Galiyev, or Mir Sayyid Sultan Aliogly, to give him his correct name, was not only the main exponent of Tatar nationalism, but the initiator of an ideology which up to 1936 and even later was to be "the doctrinal weapon of all Muslim resistance to the centralism of Moscow" (p. 176). Mr. Bennigsen has more than once during the past few years stated the view which is here repeated (p. 18) that "Sultangaliyevism, so far from being dead, still represents the opposition of the Muslim Communist leaders, knowing as they do the colonial world and its specific characteristics, to those of the centre, who wish to control the destiny of that world without understanding it so well as the Muslims themselves."

The present work consists of two main parts, the first dealing with nationalism before and the second with nationalism after the Russian Revolution. A concluding chapter of great interest is followed by a series of appendices consisting of six extracts from Sultan Galiyev's own writing and the text of several speeches and resolutions connected with the repudiation of his movement and his eventual condemnation. There is a bibliography and a map.

The interest of this scholarly and sympathetic account of the growth of a nationalist movement extends far beyond the study of the Soviet nationalities policy. The nationalist movements among the Muslims of Russia have their counterpart in many similar movements in Asia and in Africa. For several reasons—among them geographical contiguity—the Russians were able to apply a solution of the colonial problem quite different from that applied by the Western imperial powers. This Russian or Soviet solution—the unified state embracing all the national minorities within a federal framework—differs radically from the gradually staged progress towards full independence advocated by the Western powers; it has the appearance of finality, that is to say, no further change is contemplated by the paramount power. Bennigsen and Quelquejay, however, believe that this finality is by no means accepted by the Muslim intelligentsia of the U.S.S.R. They also believe that by implicitly admitting that the industrial West now constitutes a terrain less favourable for the expansion of Communism than pre-capitalist Asia, the Communist Party seems to recognize that the future of Communism now lies in Asia and Africa. This was precisely the contention of Sultan Galiyev, with the difference that he maintained that the Russian version of German marxism was unacceptable to Asia, and particularly to Muslim Asia, and that accordingly a new form of Communism would have to be devised. It was this that brought about his downfall, but, so Bennigsen and his collaborator contend, Communist recognition of the importance of Asia and Africa have caused the intelligentsia of the Soviet Muslim republics to hark back not so much to the external as to the internal features of Sultan Galiyev's ideology. They are now less concerned with the future of Communism outside the U.S.S.R. than with the possibility of harnessing Communism to their own particular idea of nationalism. For those of them who are convinced Communists "nationalism is no longer a survival of the 'capitalist mentality' or of pre-Revolutionary bourgeois tradition, but the expression of a political and cultural particularism which dif-

ferentiates them from their Russian comrades, whom they can sometimes also oppose" (p. 198). There can be little doubt that something of this kind is in the minds of educated Central Asians, Azerbaijanis and Tatars, today. They can hardly have failed to notice Khrushchev's insistence that local Communist parties are the strongest supporters of Middle East nationalism. And if of Middle East nationalism, why not of Muslim nationalism inside the U.S.S.R.? It is quite clear from Soviet writing that the Party authorities are aware and apprehensive of such dangerous notions. How far those notions are capable of being translated into action is quite another matter.

The present study is concerned with the nationalist aspirations of a people who have been an integral part of the Russian empire since the middle of the sixteenth century and whose capital Kazan is barely five hundred miles from Moscow. Future studies will be of the Muslim republics bordering on foreign countries—on China, Afghanistan and Persia, and in the capable hands of the present authors will contain matters of equal if not of greater interest.

G. E. WHEELER.

Neither War Nor Peace. By Hugh Seton-Watson. Methuen and Co., London. 1960. Pp. 504. 35s.

Professor Seton-Watson already has three important books to his credit on Eastern Europe, Russia and Communism as well as hundreds of penetrating articles and reviews in journals and magazines in Britain, Europe and America, but his latest book is still, by far, his best. It is the fruit of a keen, mature, compassionate, well-informed mind conscientiously set to work to derive pattern and meaning from the events of the past fifteen years. The author could not sort out the cross-currents of recent history so successfully if he were not so thoroughly steeped in earlier history, especially that of Russia and Eastern Europe and of totalitarian and revolutionary movements everywhere; and if he had not been such an alert observer and occasional participant in many of the developments and processes in various parts of the world of which he writes. In his introduction he says he feels he learned most from his early travels in the Balkans: "whose combination of intellectual subtlety and crudity, of tortuous intrigue and honest courage revealed more truths about the political animal man than are to be found in most textbooks of political science" (p. 15).

I know of no survey of "the struggle for power in the postwar world" (subtitle of the book) which treats its subject with such breadth, depth and awareness of all the political, economic, social and scientific inter-actions which come into play on the world scene. *Neither War Nor Peace* is both a descriptive and an analytical book. It is filled with sweeping, though often carefully qualified, generalizations as well as pertinent and valuable detail. One can find the names of all the principal Syrian political leaders, e.g., a description of French government mechanisms for aid to underdeveloped areas, an account of the genesis of the A.P.R.A. in Latin America, as well as much relevant detail on the power struggle in the U.S.S.R., the satellites and China. In the four solid chapters which make up "Part Two: Forces of Revolution," Professor Seton-Watson discusses "Land and Peasants," "Workers and Bourgeoisie," "The Intelligentsia" and "The Seizure of Power," drawing on examples from every corner of the globe. These chapters form the theoretical core of the book. Concepts such as "the state machine," "the state bourgeoisie" and the importance of revolutionary élites will be familiar to those who have read what Professor Seton-Watson has written earlier. He is especially to be congratulated for his insistence upon the importance of the intelligentsia. It has often been difficult for Englishmen and Americans, with their practical orientation towards politics, to understand the importance of this group because it has seldom been concretely distinguishable in Anglo-Saxon society. The term "intelligentsia" serves the most useful purpose when it is understood in its Russian sense, which is the way Professor Seton-Watson uses it. It is the group from which revolutionary élites in the Middle East, in South Asia, in Africa and Latin America spring. It is an easy group to ignore on a short-term basis, as Westerners have done in many parts of the world. This is ironic, because in the last analysis practically all revolutionary élites, like the intelligentsia from which they evolve, are bent upon westernizing their own societies.

No friend of Communism in any form, Professor Seton-Watson is far too perceptive an analyst to dismiss Communism as a hodgepodge of untruth or a mere system of rule by force and intimidation. Nor, on the other hand, does he see the future in simple terms of struggle between Communism and the forces of anti-Communism. He penetrates to the deeper roots of totalitarianism: Communism and Fascism, extreme nationalist and tenacious imperialist ideologies, far from being opposed to each other in essence, all contain within them varying proportions of the same basic ingredients. Russian Communist imperialism represents one of the most persistent and successful combinations of these forces we face, but we will fail to understand what is happening to the rest of the world and the kind of decisions we need to make in respect to these developments if we see them only in the context of East-West competition. This is the principal moral of *Neither War nor Peace* and Professor Seton-Watson does not shy away from stating it over and over again. It is not a startling conclusion, but it has seldom been as well put and as well buttressed by solid socio-political analysis as it is here.

PAUL B. HENZE.

Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941. By George F. Kennan. Van Nostrand, New York. 1960. Pp. 191. \$1.25.

It is one of the most distinctive features of the history of nations that, of the various aspects of national policy which are subject to change over time, foreign policy in its fundamentals tends to change least and most slowly. This is particularly true of large imperial agglomerations, which are likely to change their internal administrative structure, their economic relationships, their social, religious and cultural policies sooner than their foreign policy. This is only another way of saying that the facts of geography, particularly for large states, tend to set the requirements of foreign policy in a way which it is difficult for any government to ignore or alter. The Soviet Empire, successor to the Russian Empire, has been an outstanding example of these principles in operation.

It has become a favourite pastime to talk of change in the Soviet Union. That there has been change since the death of Stalin there can be no doubt. Important changes have occurred in the U.S.S.R. itself and even more so in the East European satrapies of the Soviet Empire. The operative question is not whether there has been change, but what the significance of the change is. Those who know the Soviet Union well are almost unanimous in their view that the changes which have occurred in the Soviet Empire in the past eight years are significant mostly because they have strengthened the Soviet Union. They do not add up to a change in the fundamental character of the Soviet régime. Partly because it is now a more benevolent despotism, it is a more efficient despotism. Because it has become more efficient, it is also in a position to continue to become more benevolent.

Current Soviet foreign policy differs only in tactics, in scope of application and in efficiency of implementation from previous phases of Soviet foreign policy. Soviet foreign policy is still not always effectively formulated or skilfully applied. There are contradictions, cross-purposes, conflicts of interest. Totalitarian states claim to be omniscient, super-efficient, inherently logical in their policy prescriptions and actions. Obviously they are not, but because they make their claims so often, we sometimes give them more credence than they deserve. In totalitarian as well as freer political systems, allowance must always be made for human shortcomings and failures. The Soviet Union is not dealing with a world which it can manipulate, shape and influence as it pleases any more than the United States is.

In many ways, the Soviet leaders are prisoners of their totalitarian ideology. Even if they come to desire agreement with the West on certain issues, the inner logic of their own system may prevent them from achieving it. The basic aims of Soviet foreign policy have changed but little during the nearly half century that the Soviet Union has existed as a state. The currents of continuity with the policies of Imperial Russia have risen more clearly to the surface as the U.S.S.R. has matured into the Soviet Empire. But the international milieu in which Soviet foreign policy operates has changed in many respects. As the world has become increasingly smaller, the U.S.S.R. and the United States have emerged as super-powers and contenders for

world leadership. The foreign and domestic policies of all states, large and small, have become increasingly intertwined. It is attested to by the prominence of foreign policy issues in recent elections in Britain and America and by the ever-increasing flow of more or less learned writing on the interactions between national and international affairs in all major nations. That the same development has been taking place in the Soviet Union is less generally recognized, but doubtlessly true. The nature of the totalitarian system makes it unlikely, however, that the process has proceeded so far in the U.S.S.R. as it has in the West. At any rate, it would be dangerous, given the present state of our knowledge of the factors that come into play in Kremlin debates, to overrate the influence of foreign policy considerations on internal party affairs. But whatever its present level, this influence is likely to become more important.

The study of Soviet foreign policy is a problem in keeping essential continuities and basic patterns in focus while assessing the significance of tactical shifts and changes in emphasis, tempo of activity and areas of concentration. George Kennan's slender volume provides a hundred pages of brilliant summary of the first twenty-four years of Soviet foreign policy. Seventy more pages of basic documents and references round out the book. Four pages of succinct conclusions are introduced by the simple statement: "The dominant motive of Soviet statesmanship over the period under review was the preservation of the integrity of Soviet power within Russia." Terribly obvious? Yes. But many of the disengagement schemes and plans for East-West *détente* as well as a good deal of the general discussion of the advantages of summitry in recent years give the impression that this was assumed no longer to be true.

Mr. Kennan gives the Soviets due credit for the energy and resourcefulness with which they conducted their foreign policy during the 1920s and 1930s, but he also takes pains to point out that it was not merely because Soviet foreign policy was cleverly conducted that its basic aim was achieved. At crucial junctures the U.S.S.R. found itself well served by the actions and inactions of other major powers. Mr. Kennan correctly stresses the fact that many of the problems with which Soviet foreign policy had to cope in the pre-World War II era were self-created or self-exacerbated. The nature of the Soviet totalitarian system saddled it with foreign policy problems which it could neither escape nor settle.

Everything which Mr. Kennan has to say about foreign policy during the first twenty-four years of the Soviet Union's existence has relevance to an understanding of Soviet foreign policy in more recent years. The dominant aim of Soviet statesmanship remains the preservation of the integrity of Soviet power, primarily within Russia but also throughout the Soviet Empire and the Communist Bloc. The concept of preserving Soviet power is now understood to require more dynamic measures to extend Soviet influence to all parts of the world. Where one method fails, another will be tried; when opportunities in one part of the world are limited, other areas will become primary targets.

PAUL B. HENZE.

Özbekcha-Ruscha Lughat/Uzbeksko-Russkiy Slovar'. (Uzbek-Russian Dictionary.) Compiled by the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek S.S.R. Chief Editor, Professor A. K. Borovkov. State Dictionary Publishing House, Moscow. 1959. Pp. 839. 27 Rubles.

The Uzbeks are the most numerous and culturally the most advanced of the Central Asian peoples. Their language is the most direct heir of the Chagatay language of late medieval times. It was first given literary form by the great poet, Alishir Nevayi, and by the Sultan Babur in his memoirs. In more recent times, it was primarily among the Uzbeks that a movement to establish a common Turkistani literary language arose. Under other circumstances than those which actually came to pass, Uzbek would probably have prevailed as the basic element in a modern common Turkistani language in much the same way that Castilian became the basis of Spanish, Tuscan of Italian or Saxon of German. But Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy decreed otherwise. The result is that Uzbek and the other modern literary

languages established in Central Asia during the Soviet period have had a rather confused history. Written first in reformed Arabic script, then changed to Latin and finally, on the eve of World War II, to Cyrillic, these languages have still not achieved a completely settled written form. The alphabet changes have caused relatively minor problems compared to shifting decisions on choice of dialects as basis for pronunciation and exact determination of word meaning, on rules for treatment of foreign words, on methods of forming new words for modern concepts and even on important rules of grammar. From 1929 to 1940 literary Uzbek had *nine* vowel sounds; it now has only *six*! In the light of such linguistic disarray, one can easily develop sympathy for the compilers of dictionaries. In view of the circumstances, it is not surprising that the present dictionary is the first of its kind to appear since 1941. The Uzbek Academy of Sciences issued a compendious Russian-Uzbek dictionary in 1954. The dictionary under review benefits from the passage of time that has elapsed since the appearance of this companion volume not only by being printed on better-quality paper, but from improvement in scholarly standards meanwhile as well.

Like most dictionaries published in the Soviet Union, this one is designed primarily to serve an immediate practical purpose: translation. Etymologies and comparisons with other languages are not given; fine points of meaning are not dwelt upon. On the other hand, word definitions are more extensive than is usually the rule in Soviet dictionaries. Variations in meaning are illustrated by quotations from current writing. For common words which recur frequently in idioms and proverbs, these are very comprehensive. Three columns, *e.g.*, are devoted to idioms, proverbs and special phrases containing the word *köz*, "eye."

Leafing through this thick volume, one is impressed by the large number of local words referring to animals, agriculture, names of plants and flowers and special words and phrases characteristic of Central Asian life. The dictionary is said to contain more than 40,000 words. Five to ten per cent. of these appear to be Russian international borrowings; a few examples from page 341: *reabilitatsiya*, *reaktsion*, *realizm*, *realist*, *revansh*, *revizion*, *revmatizm*, *revol'ver*, *revolyutsion*. But on the whole the number of such words included as part of the Uzbek vocabulary does not seem to be as large as in the current written forms of many of the lesser Turkic languages of the U.S.S.R. The older Arabic and Persian words for political, social, economic and scientific concepts have held their own and appear to be very much alive: *iktisod* (economy), *maktab* (school), *ma'rifat* (education), *millat* (nation), *adabiyot* (literature), *khayriyat* (well-being), *khukumat* (government). The basic word-building particles which Uzbek shares (in almost identical form) with the other Turkic languages are combined with recently borrowed words to produce some curious hybrids: *partiyaviylik* (party spirit; the Russian Communist *partiynost'*), *shofyorlik* (the chauffeur's profession), *kharakterlanmokh* (to be characterized), *fil'trlamokh* (to filter). But most of these are not, after all, much more curious than many of the hybrids that have found their way into languages developing free of Communist influence: Turkish, *e.g.*

In the eight pages of geographical names it is evident that Russian forms have come to predominate except for a few names from areas immediately contiguous to Central Asia: *Dajla* (the river Tigris; Turkish *Dicle*), *Frot* (the river Euphrates), *Khindiston* (India), and *Bakhri Khazar*, noted as a colloquial form for *Kaspii Dengizi* (Caspian Sea).

The chief editor, A. K. Borovkov, devotes thirty-six pages to a discussion of the grammar of contemporary Uzbek. This section is followed by a comprehensive list of all the affixes which play a rôle in Uzbek word formation.

The final hundred-odd pages of the dictionary are devoted to a very helpful feature which up until recently was officially frowned upon (and therefore seldom present) in Soviet dictionaries of Central Asian and Caucasian languages: an Arabic "Key." This section lists nearly 20,000 words and variant forms as they were written from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. A brief introduction provides notes explaining the effect of the reform of the Arabic script carried out in the early 1920s. The Arabic Key has been added, its compiler A. T. Khodzhanov states in his introduction, "to provide opportunity for reading examples of Uzbek literature published before the change to the Latin alphabet."

In sum, it can be said that this new Uzbek-Russian dictionary is a most impressive production, by far the best of its kind yet to appear. Since it has been published in an edition of 53,000, it will undoubtedly be widely used in the U.S.S.R. It will also be of immense value to those outside the Soviet Union who are making an effort to become better acquainted with the Uzbeks, their language and their cultural traditions.

PAUL B. HENZE.

An Introduction to the Turkmen Language. By G. K. Dulling. Published by Central Asian Research Centre. Pp. 48. Price 15s.

Unlike some other Turkic languages, such as ancient Turkic, Chagatay, Osmanli, Yakut and others, Türkmen has not yet been dealt with in a monograph. This is particularly surprising, for Türkmen possesses a number of features, archaic as well as recent, which render it all the more attractive for a comparative and historical analysis. Two of the reasons for this seeming lack of interest are the scarcity of source material—literature is only in an embryo state and the rich folk-literature, even if collected, has not yet been published—and the inaccessibility of the area within which Türkmen is spoken. Thus, every publication on the Türkmen, their language, literature, and folklore has its merits, provided it is not simply amateurish or a mere description of facts which have already been known for some time.

An Introduction to the Turkmen Language, by G. K. Dulling, tries to serve the purpose of guiding those having "at least a nodding acquaintance with modern Osmanli," or, at least, "a knowledge of the underlying linguistic principles of the Altaic group as a whole," as the author says in his Preface, through the reading of Türkmen texts, so that the only further requirement would be a dictionary. But in view of the brevity and sketchiness of the "Introduction," a good, if not thorough, knowledge of modern Osmanli is a necessary pre-requisite as the entire work is based on the differences between Türkmen and Osmanli. As long as Turkological studies in Western countries continue to centre around the Osmanli-Turkish language, this approach is the most practical one. From the viewpoint of comparative and historical grammar, one would choose a different approach, of course.

The history of the different orthographies, used for Türkmen and its Phonetics are treated on the first eight pages, and the Morphology on pp. 9-35. Pp. 37-47 contain reproductions of texts in the various orthographies, with the main emphasis, of course, on those in the last, the cyrillic. The most valuable piece of text is the beginning of Kerbabayev's novel *Ayghyly ädim*. At the end of the pamphlet, a sketch-map of Türkmenistan and adjacent lands is attached. It is not clear why the Türkmen language area is shown as extending far into the Ustyurt and North of the Kara-Bogaz in the direction of the estuary of the Emba and Ural rivers.

Both the Phonetics and the Morphology sections have been done in a plain descriptive way, illustrated, however, by comparisons with Osmanli. Since there is no special section on Syntax, the morphological part would have gained very much if a greater number of examples had been added, especially some consisting of entire sentences; this in view of the fact that in the Altaic and especially in the Turkic languages, it is here that the greatest difficulties for the Western student lie. The great majority of the grammatical forms diverging from Osmanli have been listed, but, I think that the typical Türkmen compound verbal forms of the type *gelyendekleri* "their actually having come, the fact that they actually came, did come" should have been included.

The terms "prefix" and "infix" should not be used in respect of languages like Altaic that do not possess either. On occasional mistakes or inaccuracies of a minor order I shall not dwell. The author now and then refers to variants in the different Türkmen dialects of both Persia and the U.S.S.R. It might occasionally have been worth while to know which sources the author has used. As far as Persia is concerned, he made his own observations. Thus, of particular interest is his remark concerning the survival, in Göklän, dialects, of an old quadragesimal counting system. This is neither of Altaic, nor Iranian origin, but must have been acquired through contacts with Caucaso-Mediterranean languages: cf. e.g. the typical

Basko-Iberian vi=gesimal counting in Karachay and Balkar (O. Pritsak, in *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta*, pp. 356 f.).

The 10 pages of texts appended at the end are a valuable addition; but both in view of the scarcity of Türkmen texts and for practical reasons I should have considered the addition of translations advisable.

Notwithstanding some shortcomings, this résumé of the major digressions of Türkmen from Osmanli serves a good practical purpose. It starts from a standpoint completely different from the all too brief general description of Türkmen in the *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta* (Wiesbaden, 1959), pp. 308-317, but, on the other hand, it is unfortunately not richer in the material presented—with the exception of the texts. The author has apparently not made use of the *Fundamenta*, possibly because of the relatively short time which elapsed between the respective publications.

KARL H. MENGES.

The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1958. By T. J. Hughes and D. E. T. Luard. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, O.U.P. 1959. Pp. 223. Maps and index. 22s. 6d.

Here is a wholly admirable little book on a most difficult, complex and, at times, almost incomprehensible subject, about which it is extremely difficult to write with insight as these two authors clearly have done. T. J. Hughes is an economist and a former Treasury and M.E.W. official; D. E. T. Luard is a research fellow at St. Anthony's College, Oxford.

They have divided their task into the five headings: "The First Tasks of the New Government," the "Five-Year Plans," the "Transformation of the Economic Framework," the "Projects for the Future." The last also embodies "Conclusions" and a statistical appendix, and there is a well-chosen and up-to-date bibliography.

In particular, the very last paragraph is well worth quoting as an epitome of the book:

"The prospects for the future development of the Chinese economy depend largely on the successful limitation of the population's growth, on the capacity of the Chinese to acquire and develop modern industrial techniques, and on the success of the Government in holding in check the demands of the consumer while the capital resources of the country are being built up. There can, however, already be little doubt that the industry and intelligence of the Chinese people, together with the overwhelming weight of their numbers, are likely to create in the Chinese economy a force that will have a rapidly increasing impact on the world in the years to come."

The work is a masterpiece of compression with a remarkable tenseness of style which argues great powers of assimilation and digestion on the part of the authors, since it is clear from their choice of source material that a great effort must have been made in wading through a mass of facts and figures and the desperately repetitive and verbose meanderings of New China's writers and speakers, whose fecundity of words is remarkable.

The process by which they describe the transformation of the late Iron Age economy of China in 1949 into the gargantuan, fully industrialized science-based and research-endowed superstate of the day after tomorrow is recounted in terms of planning and achievement, and the posture and worth of both are thoughtfully weighed.

Readers of this book are, however, well advised to bear in mind that it is primarily an economic and not a political work, that it cannot present a really conclusive view and that the ultimate consequences, political and otherwise, of China's "forced draught" economics have yet to make themselves publicly known. That they will do so before long is certain, and this book is a useful contribution to the more general field of literature on which to base an assessment of the most formidable and menacing process of our time.

A. H. S. CANDLIN.

Han Fei-Tzu. Works from the Chinese. By W. K. Liao. Probsthain's Oriental Series, Vols. XXV and XXVI. U.N.E.S.C.O. Collection of Representative Works—Chinese Series. Pp. 309 and 338. 30s. and 42s. respectively.

This is a translation of the complete works of Han Fei-Tzu (*circa* 230 B.C.) collated by the Changsha scholar Wang Hsien-shen in 1895. The first volume which was originally issued in 1939, is now reprinted, but the second volume remained unpublished until 1959, when unfortunately the translator was no longer alive.

Only a sage and a sinologue would be competent to comment on the literary quality of this eminently erudite collection of official memorials, philosophic and political commentary, and complementary treatises. As regards the translation, one cannot but endorse the principle propounded by Dr. Liao in his "Methodological Introduction" that a translation should never be a mechanical rendering of words, least of all in the case of Chinese, which he considers to be far more concise and less precise than English. He has thus sought to retain Chinese native colour within the limits of intelligibility to the average English reader. Though one might cavil at the resultant adoption of "All-under-Heaven" and "Hundred Names" as the appropriate versions of T'ien Hsia and Pai Hsing, this objective has been satisfactorily achieved, while recognition of names and Chinese quotations in the copious foot-notes, no less than in the actual text, has been greatly facilitated by the use of Wade's system of Romanization.

The philosophical treatises indicate a leaning towards Taoist rather than Confucian doctrines, for, though not disposed to accept in their entirety the mystical ambiguities of Lao Tze, Han indulges in disparaging references to Confucius and Mo Ti and their respective schools of "Literati" and "Mohists." The former are too attached to traditional ritual and the latter too nonconformist. Moreover, scholars are chided for counselling and practising nothing but righteousness, favour and love.

This last phrase perhaps provides the key to Han Fei-Tzu's basic concern, the principles of sovereign power. Though the fact that he was "purged" by poison for political motives (in 233 B.C. at the instigation of jealous factions in the court of the dictator, later to style himself Ch'in Shih Huang-Ti) invites the analogy of Socrates, a more appropriate comparison might be drawn with Machiavelli. In an era of warring states, with consequent economic and political disruption, Han devoted special attention to the arts of "hegemony" by one state, or more correctly, perhaps, by the ruler of one state. While men of remote antiquity, he comments, strove to be known as moral and virtuous and those of the middle period struggled to be known as wise and resourceful, the present generation fought for the reputation of being vigorous and powerful. Hegemony, however, could only be attained by the establishment and maintenance of internal control and stability. In this context, as befits a prominent "legalist," Han decries the advocates of leniency and reliance on the fundamental goodness of man. He argues that on the contrary effective rule depends upon the "two handles of chastisement and commendation," the consistent enforcement of maximum punishment as the efficacious deterrent, but rewards at calculated discretion. Han is scornful of the political theories of "learned gentlemen" who favour the distribution of property to the landless, for, he claims, if money is levied from the rich in order to distribute alms among the poor, the result is that the diligent and frugal are robbed and the extravagant and lazy are rewarded. At the same time, Han is opposed to taxing the farmer and coddling the drone class of "literati" and courtiers in view of the detrimental influence upon food production. A chapter dealing with the Five Vermin who infest the body politic reveals an interesting note of anxiety about the food situation in the face of increasing population. Nowadays, he observes, people do not regard five children as many, so families multiply rapidly and consequently "toil has become hard and provisions meagre."

Despite such solicitude for the welfare of the masses, Han attaches greater importance to their subordination by the state administration. Under an "enlightened" ruler there would be no scope for "dialectic" in the guise of opposition by word or deed to the decrees of the sovereign in whose hands rested the regulation of the likes and dislikes of his people. This could be secured by the system of "Basic Fives," whereby groups of five families, and even the entire population of the hamlet, would be held collectively responsible for even trivial faults and would be obliged to "watch one another in their hidden affairs" with a view to personal denunciation.

This has a curiously topical note, as has also the advice that every subordinate should be under the surveillance of his immediate superior and that spies should be freely used not only abroad but also at home, particularly to watch the activities of the ruler's own ministers, of whom as a class Han held a remarkably low opinion.

While concentrating his attention upon internal administration Han by no means ignores foreign relations. An item of particular interest to the comparative historian is his discussion of the relative merits of a "Horizontal Alliance" and a "Perpendicular Union." The former, involving an attachment to a powerful state in order to conquer a group of smaller states, he regarded as in effect putting the state seal in pawn in return for military help, while the latter, entailing combination with a number of weaker states in order to oppose one particularly strong power, was tantamount to seeking advantage abroad by virtue of prestige at home. Han, who recognizes that both policies entail risks, clearly favours the latter, with its central rôle among satellites or tributary states.

Only passing reference can be made in a condensed review to the wealth of historical and literary allusions quoted in support of the author's political theories, or to the intriguing, albeit often devious, passages of philosophical commentary and disputation. The nature of Han Fei-Tzu's mode of writing, no less than of his political attitudes, may perhaps be underlined by his aphorisms—"Govern a big country as you would fry small fish" and "Men (*e.g.*, in China of *circa* 230 B.C.) rarely see living elephants"—if they can be correctly interpreted as an admonition to the ruler to maintain a steady hand and to keep his eye on the ball regardless of mirages.

L. H. L.

Ballads and Stories from Tun-Huang. By Arthur Waley. Published by George Allen and Unwin. Pp. 266. Index. 25s.

The author in his "Afterword," which takes the place of the more usual preface, describes his book as a literary anthology intended for the general reader. This general reader, however, must be something of a specialist in Eastern lore. These manuscripts, as translated, come from a hidden library discovered in 1900 by Wang Yüan-Lu in one of the Caves of the Thousand Buddhas at Tun-Huang in the north-west of China. They are dated between A.D. 406 and A.D. 996, and include Taoist texts, Manichean and Nestorian Christian in Chinese, also some in Tibetan Uighur Turkish and other languages. Sir Aurel Stein brought home many of these, which can be seen in the British Museum, and the author quite rightly criticizes the morality of acquiring these unique records of a past civilization for the proverbial mess of pottage. These transactions are much criticized in China today, just as the removal of the fossilized dinosaur eggs from Outer Mongolia by an American expedition are in that country.

If the removal of these documents may be criticized on moral grounds, nothing but praise can be given to the translator. His work shows great erudition and considerable charm. The book will give pleasure to a much wider public than might be expected.

H. St. C. S.

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Copies of the following have been received :

“ Resurgent China ” by Sir Alwyne Ogden, K.B.E., C.M.G.

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“ Large and Loving Privileges ” by Sir Reader Bullard, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E.

“ The Morienhur : A Mongolian Fiddle ” by Mrs. J. L. Jenkins.

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- "The Beaver." Winter, 1960.
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 Bulgaria Today. November, December, 1960; January, 1961.
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 and other periodicals, booklists and bibliographies.

The following books have been added to the library :

- E. Backhouse and J. O. P. Bland : *Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking*.
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- Liao, W. K. (translator) : *The Complete works of Han Fei Tzu.*
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- Oliver, Robert T. : *Syngman Rhee, the Man Behind the Myth.*
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The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service are connected with one of the countries of Central, Western, and South-east Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

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JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. XLVIII

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PARTS III & IV

CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL	- - - - -	218
NOTICES AND IN MEMORIAM	- - - - -	219
CENTRAL ASIAN YOUTH GROWS UP	- - - - -	221
THE KING OF THE WEAVING MOUNTAIN	- - - - -	229
INDIA AND PAKISTAN TODAY	- - - - -	238
THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.	- - - - -	253
CORRESPONDENCE	- - - - -	263
PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA IN ASIA		264
ANNUAL MEETING	- - - - -	274
THAILAND TODAY	- - - - -	282
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, OLD AND NEW	- - - - -	289
THE SIKHS	- - - - -	299
FRANÇOISE DE GRUNNE	- - - - -	306
IRAQ'S "CLAIM" TO KUWAIT	- - - - -	309
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	- - - - -	353
New Books added to the Library	- - - - -	354
REVIEWS:		
Curzon: The End of an Epoch, 312	Towards Universal Man, 330	
Record of an Ascent, 313	The Yellow Scarf, 331	
Hussein of Jordan, 313	India: Mirage and Reality, 332	
Mission For My Country, 314	Britain in India, 333	
The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities, 315	India and the United States, 335	
Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, 316	Himalayan Pilgrimage, 335	
Struggle for Arab Independence, 317	The India-Chinese Boundary Dis- pute, 336	
Short Political Guide to the Arab World, 318	North from Kabul, 337	
Balfour Declaration, 318	Afghanistan Between East and West, 338	
March Arabesque, 319	Bayonets to Lhasa, 339	
Bedouin Tribes of the Negev, 320	The Silent War in Tibet, 340	
War in the Desert, 320	The Flight of the Dalai Lama, 341	
Slaves of Timbuktu, 321	Tibet is my Country, 342	
Muhammad, Prophet and States- man, 322	Tiger Trails in Assam, 342	
Islam and the Integration of Society, 322	Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, 343	
The Holy Sword, 324	Eastern Windows, 343	
The Poet and the Spae-Wife, 324	Marco Polo's Asia, 344	
The Camels Must Go, 326	Sources of Chinese Tradition, 344	
Three Kings in Baghdad, 328	China's Entrance into the Family of Nations, 346	
Orta Doğu, 329	The Anthill, 347	
The Indus Civilization, 330	Japan, 349	
	A Curse of Blossom, 350	
	A Study of History, 351	

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CHANGE OF ADDRESS

The Society's offices and library will move to the second floor, 12 Orange Street, Haymarket, W.C.2, on December 18, 1961. Telephone Whitehall 4823.

AFTERNOON PARTY

The Society's first Afternoon Party was held in lovely weather on July 20 at Hurlingham. Some 150 members of the R.C.A.S. were joined by some 130 members of the Anglo-Iraqi Society, and by members of the Anglo-Arab Association and members of the China Society, and there were many reunions with old friends. The Salon Orchestra of the Central Band of the Royal Air Force played during the party, which proved such a success that it is proposed to repeat it again next July.

ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner will take place this year on Wednesday, December 13, at the Hyde Park Hotel, Knightsbridge. Notices were sent out to members in September.

THE LAWRENCE OF ARABIA MEMORIAL MEDAL

The LAWRENCE OF ARABIA MEMORIAL MEDAL was presented to Mrs. Violet Dickson, M.B.E., by the President, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir William Dickson, on Wednesday, July 26, at the Royal Society of Arts. A large number of members and friends including Dr. M. R. Lawrence, brother of T. E. Lawrence, were present.

IN MEMORIAM

SIR PERCY LORAINE, Bt., P.C., G.C.M.G.

SIR PERCY LORAINE, who died on May 23, 1961, had been a member of the Royal Central Asian Society since 1926. He joined while serving as British Minister in Teheran, and from then until his death 35 years later, showed a continuing interest in the work of the Society. Several of the posts which he held with such distinction were in countries with which the Society is deeply concerned—Persia, China, Egypt and Turkey—and many members who met him, or learnt of his work, in one or other of the capitals in which he exerted a telling influence, will regret his passing.

MR. E. M. GULL

THE Society has suffered a loss in the death of Emanuel Gull who had been a member since 1927. He had a deep knowledge of China and the Chinese acquired during the years that he served in the Chinese Customs Service in the days of Sir Robert Hart and Sir Robert Bredin. He was the elder son of A. M. Gull of Petropolis and Rio de Janeiro. After leaving the Chinese Customs Service, he became Secretary of the Associated British Chamber of Commerce in China and Hong Kong. His travels in China took him to Outer Mongolia and the Gobi Desert as well as the better-known parts of China. He returned to this country in 1926 and was Secretary of the China Association until he retired from that office in 1943. He was well known as a lecturer and writer on Chinese matters and was responsible for *Facets of the Chinese Question and British Economic Interests in the Far East*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Gull lost his wife some years ago and recently had been in indifferent health.

H. ST. C. S.

CENTRAL ASIAN YOUTH GROWS UP

By LIEUT.-COLONEL FOX HOLMES, F.R.G.S.

Meeting held at The Royal Society's Hall on Wednesday, January 11, 1961, General Sir Richard Gale, Chairman of Council, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to start by wishing you a very happy New Year, and particularly the youngsters. I cannot say, as the Chairman of the Council, what a pleasure it is to me to see the younger generation here. I am quite certain that they will be extremely interested in this afternoon's lecture. It gives me the greatest pleasure to introduce Colonel Fox Holmes to you. He has lived a long time in Chinese Turkistan. I think he went out there first for seven years as a missionary; and from my little knowledge of Asia I would say that if anybody really gets under the skin of people, and gets to know the country, it is the missionary. He was a medical missionary and that is, in more ways than one, an excellent way of getting under the skin of people!

Later on he spent three years as His Majesty's Consul General in that part of the world, until the Communists put him in "jug." I believe that he had eventually to be flown out with his family. Since then he has been to Turkey to collect material on the Kazakhs, and he is working for the Royal Geographical Society of which he is a Fellow. Those are a few remarks about a very experienced man, and I will now ask Colonel Fox Holmes to give us his talk. (*Applause.*)

IT is a great privilege to be here today, and also to have some members of my family present. I am glad to say the younger end of the family shared our experiences when my wife and I travelled through the Gobi Desert, and later at the British Consulate in Urumchi. I thought of no better way to introduce my subject than to show you slides revealing something of the country through which one must pass in order to reach that great border area which lies between China and Russia. The political conditions are always significant; today, as for centuries long, Chinese and Russian power grind against one another, with the young people about whom we are to hear this afternoon, between them, as grain between the upper and nether millstones.

On the eastern side there are the Chinese, wedded to an all-embracing ideology, diligent, hard working and producing much in the way of material results. To the west there are the Russians, using their own forceful methods, more than convinced of their superiority in handling the border people. Unfortunately these cannot avoid the attentions of two differing political systems, nor can their personal lives fail to be influenced by totalitarian methods, which both sides fervently adopt as the sole key to progress.

At this point I would like to thank Colonel Wheeler for so kindly lending the slides of the Russian side of the border, without these the comparison I seek to make would have been poorly illustrated.

As you will see from the map, China covers a very large area, and the Chinese race has a great deal to do with the future of what we like to call Central Asia, but which they strongly maintain is an integral part of China. We must also remember that on the coast of China there is much

over-population, with people living in very cramped conditions, whereas even now over in the Far West there are vast areas completely unpopulated.


Besides this population pressure there is another pertinent factor for the Chinese to reckon with. The area adjacent to the Russian border is populated by many diverse races, not Chinese in origin, nor do they speak some dialect of the Chinese language, even less do they look with favour on the Chinese way of life. Turki, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Mongol, and Tajik alike are proud of their own long histories and cultural backgrounds. For years they have responded feebly to the facilities the Chinese have given for their children to attend Chinese schools. Apart from the Mongols most of them are Muslim and hotly resent being classed as Chinese whom they regard as the worst kind of idolators. Indeed, the word "Khitai" was a term of abuse until 1950, though it has no other meaning than "Chinese."

On the Russian side of the border there are the same races sharing a common group of languages and culture. To the north, the Mongols. To the west, the Kazakhs; in the south-west, the Kirghiz; while the Tajiks of both sides speak their common language based on Persian. On the map you will see large administrative divisions classified as Autonomous Republics, but I am afraid this is not a very fair representation, for, on neither side of the border may these ancient races develop along their own cultural lines as they would wish.

From the Chinese coastal cities there is this mass movement of population, measured in tens of thousands, to offset the fact that only a few years ago the racial Chinese were but 9 per cent. of the population. Into Central Asia from the Russian side is a never-ending flow of European Russians, spreading out and settling in this land of the great Khans, in many places they now form 50 per cent. of the local population.

Now a Kazakh youth on the Russian side learns Russian as his second language, frequently wears adaptations of Russian clothing, and is indoctrinated in the Russian manner. His cousin on the Chinese side, born at the same time, has to learn Chinese as his second language, and will wear the shapeless baggy, padded clothes of the Chinese cadre, his indoctrination will be in accord with principles of Mao Tse Tung. Those of us who have lived for any length of time in those parts realize what a poor substitute either way of life can be for their own wonderful culture stretching back to the days of Timurlane, and their own clothing, both colourful and well suited to the climate and life of their traditional homelands. Someone may well ask, "Isn't Communism a great leveller so that both sides will become one?" On the contrary, this process of assimilation swallows up the identity of the border races as a palatable plate of food before two hungry hunters. Unfortunately when the meal is over there is nothing left but a Russian bear facing a Chinese dragon over an empty plate.

Now for a brief description of the long route that links China with Russia. Soon the railway line will be the main vital link, but generally speaking, if you would travel across the Gobi Desert the main form of transport is the motor truck. This carries a heavy commercial load besides the petrol and other things that will be needed on the journey. In my day, the driver gauged his load by inserting two fingers in between the rear



MAP OF FRONTIER ALIGNMENT



MAP SHOWING CENTRAL ASIA IN RELATION TO THE REST OF THE U.S.S.R.



LAB-I-HAUZ AND FORMER MOSQUE

wheels and the mudguards, just allowing sufficient clearance for the wheels to turn when bouncing over the ill-made track. Thus a five-ton truck would be loaded with seven tons, and the passengers rode on the top of a swaying nightmare, from which people frequently fell and were seriously hurt.

When you set out along the ancient road through Kansu Province of China's North-West one soon comes to the Great Wall, which was purposely built to keep out the very tribes which are now claimed to be Chinese. This wall was once reckoned as the boundary of civilization beyond which lived the barbarians. Indeed, far-away Ili on the Russian border was the ultimate banishment from which offenders against the Imperial Court seldom, if ever, returned. In these days many hundreds of trucks roll up and down this long road from China to Russia, yet in many long arid stretches stone for surfacing the roads is so scarce that if the track is washed away, the drivers merely seek an easier way round the churned-up mud.

By many the Gobi is thought to be a waterless area where it never rains; actually the rainfall averages about 2 inches a year, and when it does rain the brown barren landscape swiftly assumes the nature of an inland sea. Frothy brown waves billow all round the truck, and should one muff a gear or stall the engine, at once the truck sinks to the axles. Having traversed the Gobi some eight times when something equally dramatic has happened on each occasion, there is this to be said for it—infinite variety never allows the same thing to happen twice. For the most part travel through the Gobi is monotonous. In the summer, the small clouds in the sky give no shelter from the blazing sun; should one have a following wind the radiator boils, slowing progress while the trucks are turned into the wind to cool off. In the winter an icy blast sweeps close to the ground, with the roar of a lion, the truck or driver not properly protected can freeze to death in a few hours.

Perhaps it would be wrong to particularize as the track varies greatly with the nature of the terrain. One may pass swiftly from man-made metalled surface, through clogging sand and even sand dunes, along some ancient dry river bed to the Black Gobi where one may hurtle along a smooth surfaced plateau at fifty miles per hour. Not a few people have lost their lives in this way, for a washout may suddenly appear almost underneath the bonnet, then the only resource, swerving, may turn the vehicle over on its side. Up in the deep gorges of the Tien Shan the road is virtually a cart track from which one still has to stop to remove heavy boulders. The route is the same that was followed hundreds of years ago, dry bones of man and beast indicate that catastrophe overtook some weary traveller *en route*. The views in the high mountains, and above all, journey's end, make light of the hardships encountered. We need to remind ourselves that thousands of Central Asians and hordes of Chinese have pitted themselves against nature to lay a railway track through one of the most feared deserts in the world. Central Asian youth grows up the hard way, death overtaking the weaker ones in the process.

Though motor trucks are the commonest means of transport for long distances, it is quite usual to meet long camel trains anywhere *en route*.

Heavily laden donkeys trot for incredible distances with a load too heavy for man to carry, often driven by a man so careful of his own boot leather that his boots are carried slung round his neck. Horse carts in long convoys pass by clanging their metallic cacophony produced by large bells slung beneath each horse's neck. With only one driver to ten carts he can at once determine that a horse has stopped, and leap from his leading cart to find the reason why. Perhaps the most thrilling sight of all is to see a whole Kazakh tribe in migration; tents, utensils, household goods and all the members of the family carried on numerous animals; even the sheep and goats carrying their share of the load. The acrid dust, shouts and whistles used to guide such a large body of men and beasts form an indelible memory of a land with ways unchanged even from the time of Abraham.

I would like to turn now from people in the mass to individuals, and these feeling the wind of change sweeping across their lives. First, let us look at where they live. Wherever there is sufficient water supply large towns are found. Sometimes there is much less water than is needed, yet roads converge and strategic reasons call for guard posts with a few houses nearby, forming isolated hamlets. Many of the larger towns have existed in some form or another over the last five hundred years. The buildings of the town are not likely to be the same as in the original township, for more likely than not it will have been burnt and looted scores of times. Indeed, with periodic frequency, war has devastated the land following the pattern of Attila the Hun, who liked to leave no enemies behind him. Even so, some of the mosques and bazaars are of great antiquity, and the actual buildings being made of mud brick with wooden framework follow fairly regular patterns. Since 1950 the Chinese have built many public buildings, even new towns; and like the Russians on their side, emphasis has been on three things—schools, hospitals and a large hotel in each place. The walls of such buildings are very thick to keep out the intense cold of winter. Both Russian and Chinese architecture have this problem that is never adequately solved; hence the solid blocks of buildings rectangular in shape, unvaried and unseemly, infinitely lacking in grace compared with the soaring mosques that proclaim an older and more gracious culture.

Many of the present officials in Central Asia have received their training at the University of Tashkent. Whatever the course of study followed, the students are introduced to political science, which forms the main theme of their future life. If you should meet young men and women trained in this place, and know them intimately as I have done, you will perceive there has been made a major attempt to form in their minds an impression that the Russians are right in everything they do, and theirs the only successful way of life. The Chinese for their part are also training young people in the same science, their textbooks however are biased towards the Chinese way of life; the outcome is that their graduates too firmly believe that they have the only right methods, even to regarding the Russians as unorthodox in certain things. A clash between two such inflexible and doughty proponents of "The only successful world system" is inevitable, and may be seen already over the issue of co-existence with the West, or the more direct method of war, favoured by Russia and China

respectively. Nor may the Chinese forget that graduates of Tashkent, previously selected from rich traders' sons, and trained in subversion, were used to overthrow the Chinese government of previous régimes in Sinkiang by spreading hatred of all things Chinese. It may have been this policy which has caused the Chinese Communists, when selecting their trainees from among the minority races, to take only the poorest of the poor. It would be interesting to know the proportion of Han (Chinese by race) students to the total number of Uighur, Kazakh and Uzbek now attending Tashkent. It may soon be Chinese policy to allow the minority racial students only to attend Chinese universities.

I promised to speak of individuals feeling the wind of change. One such stands out very clearly in my mind. He was the son of a very wealthy Urumchi merchant selected for training in Tashkent when in his early teens. After a few years of training he was sent back into Sinkiang and became the Circuit Judge of Kucha, one of the largest towns in the south. He had complete power of life and death over all the people who passed through or resided in his county; and this before he reached the age of twenty. No merchant or traveller could move along the main road without his personal seal on the Road Permit. Even though I had my papers issued by the Governor of Sinkiang, it was essential for my onward journey to seek an audience with him before I could even leave the town. I must point out this incident happened in 1937 as I rode from Urumchi to Kashgar. Presenting myself in native garb at the main gate of the yamen I was knocked down by a rifle butt, as one of the guards gave me the treatment meted out to the local population who sought admission. Being advised by the innkeeper to don Russian clothes and try again, I did so. This time the same guard who had knocked me down, saluted me, and escorted me into the presence. Here I was warmly received, until having had my passport endorsed and all legal matters completed I informed the official of my nationality, and also of my friendship with his father in Urumchi. I think you can see why today the Chinese prefer to have Eighth Route Army veterans near the border rather than minority officials who lean over backwards to please the Russians having been trained by them.

In matters of religion there have been tremendous changes brought about by both the Chinese and Russian rulers of Central Asia. For centuries past Tashkent and Bukhara turned out the most honoured of Muslim clerics. On both sides of the border Islamic law governed all the rites to do with birth, marriage and death. Then the schools for Muslim boys were part of the building of a mosque, teaching given was chiefly religious in nature, the secular part being confined to the three R's. Today's youth has completely secular teaching and attendance at the mosque is ridiculed. Teachers have powers to fail in their examinations such as are prepared to display the temerity of risking their displeasure by regular attendance at religious functions. On both sides of the border there are severe penalties to those who seek to spread religious propaganda among young people. There is this to be said for the Russians that they have the more liberal attitude, the Chinese still displaying a militant, relentless and implacable will to persecute anything that is linked with "The opiate of the people."

Chinese youth is trained to report on the religious practices of parents

and relatives; failure to do so is visited with severe penalties, and not least the risk that their efforts at school will be unrewarded by a position in the state machine. On the other side of the picture we must not forget that whereas girls and boys now mix freely together, play games together, work together in the fields or collective farms, less than twelve years ago in Sinkiang young girls were often married and divorced several times before they were twenty; few went to school, all were reckoned without civic rights and some were actual slaves to wealthy families. The emancipation of womanhood is probably one of the most noticeable changes affecting Central Asian youth as it grows up.

It may be thought by some that inevitably a liberalizing tendency will assert itself, that excesses and over-zealous applications of force will cease, allowing the better life to supervene. This makes no mention of those who die in the process. We have actually seen with our own eyes students made to haul heavy stones along frozen roads until some dropped dead with fatigue. Nor may we easily forget the young man who was killed outside the British Consulate in Urumchi, his body being left outside our children's window for a whole day. This type of thing, done for the "encouragement of others," still goes on in China, even though it doesn't seemingly merit the attention of the press. Yes! When roads are made in Tibet, a railway line laid through the Gobi, desert land brought under cultivation for the first time, new irrigation canals dug for endless miles—all in the name of material progress—we should remember the Communists publish no figures of the cost in human life. One official told me quite sincerely that China's only real exportable surplus is manpower. Hence, the readiness of the Chinese to supply "Volunteers" in any number as required. Indeed, it is one thing to hear of the survival of the fittest as an idea in a textbook, quite a different thing if it is a deliberate policy of government affecting you or your loved ones. There is a lesson in it for ourselves, for competing in world markets against the Communists, not merely for the purpose of making money, but far more, for our own economic survival; as a nation at work, we shall have to do far more than go out on strike at frequent intervals. Their young people work harder for longer hours, on less food, than we do—but let us remember they dare not do otherwise. As we value our freedom we shall need to take this lesson to heart.

Quite briefly I would like to turn to another aspect of the way of life affecting Central Asian Youth growing up in this modern world. Many travellers in these parts find the young people most interested in world affairs; not that they think themselves ignorant of what is going on, on the contrary, they seek to correct the "perverted views" put forward by the visitors. Why does this happen? The reason is not far to seek. Central Asian newspapers in many languages give news under topical headings from London and Rome, Paris and New York. But, for instance, news coming from London emanates from the *Daily Worker*, thus the bias is put into reporting, before the local editor is called upon to give a further twist. Sitting in Urumchi with only the local press to read, it is easy to believe the whole world has gone Communist, and that the few remaining "reactionary" elements in the West will speedily give way to the inevit-

able. History books are re-written, ancient plays revived, but again in the new form. Even modern plays may only feature such thoughts as faithfully mirror the current party line. Indeed, the whole cultural background has but one theme and one aim, so we may not marvel that the young people are affected by it.

Perhaps we should notice more than the bias of the press and cultural publications, the planned lack of privacy so that young folk grow up in herds rather than as individuals. So much of the day's activity is planned for group participation. Indeed, this is an article of faith to the Chinese Communists with their Communes. The lessons that International Communism learnt from Hungary have been taken to heart, for there it was the young people who struck a blow for freedom, there too that Russian tanks had to be used to put down a popular movement for a liberal government. The young men and women of Central Asia do not lack courage, but leadership that is truly "Of the people." They do not lack the will for freedom, but the opportunity to exercise it. The present rulers, Russian and Chinese, are doing their utmost to keep it that way.

Finally I would put forward my personal view based on thirty years' acquaintance with Central Asian Youth. They are of fine material, capable of independent thought and action, courageous and determined. Whatever the trammels set on their thought and action by the present régimes, youth is bound to assert itself. When that time comes it will go hard with the present rulers, for the revolutionary tactics and methods held up for admiration and adoption will be used against the very people who have taught them.

I hope our younger members of this Society will continue their present interest in their opposite numbers in Central Asia; that opportunity will come to them to travel widely in those parts. When Central Asian students visit England to see for themselves what we are like, may we show them the hospitality and consideration that alone will help them to correct their bias, and ultimately, to share our liberty.

DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: The lecturer would be happy to answer any questions young members of the audience may have.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: I was told the other day that the carpet industry of Bokhara, which was wonderful, has completely disappeared. Can the Colonel confirm or refute that?

Lieut.-Colonel Fox HOLMES: I believe it is not only so in Bokhara but in other parts of Turkistan. The carpet industries have all been taken over by people with "Go get them" ideas of production. The old carpets were turned out very slowly. The designs were considered to be taking too much time, and so they have been scrapped. That is what I have been told and believe to be true.

A MEMBER: Could the lecturer say whether the Gobi Desert is natural or man-made, and whether there is any possibility of irrigating it?

Lieut.-Colonel Fox HOLMES: I would say it is natural. I cannot imagine any man having the power to create such devastation. I believe that the Gobi Desert was once an inland sea. I believe it is possible to

cultivate the Gobi Desert. Today the Communists are using large tracts of the desert for bringing new crops into being because water exists quite deep down.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: May I ask the lecturer's permission to add something to that? Botanists have found all sorts of relics of animals and plants, so at one time the desert was most certainly not a desert but a very fertile place. There is no doubt that it was once a heavily afforested place with a great deal of reptile life.

A MEMBER: Has the Great Wall of China been preserved by the Chinese or left to disintegrate?

Lieut.-Colonel FOX HOLMES: The parts I have seen have largely been left to disintegrate, but I think you will find great stretches kept in some form of repair. It varies according to the district through which the Wall passes.

The CHAIRMAN: It only remains for me to thank our lecturer very much for a most stimulating and interesting discourse with some excellent pictures. I think that many of you young people will go away with thoughts on wanting to read and study more about this part of the world. I hope that a sense of adventure will make you want to visit it. I can assure you that it is only when you have travelled in these wonderful countries and met these astonishing people that you really taste the breath of life. You do not do it on the tarmac and pavements of England. Thank you very much. (*Applause.*)

THE KING OF THE WEAVING MOUNTAIN

By E. MICHAEL MENDELSON, M.A., Ph.D.

THE driver of the family with whom I spent, in Rangoon, about half of a recent eighteen months' stay in Burma, was called *Saya* (Master or Expert) by the other servants and obviously had a reputation for some kind of magical power.¹ To this, at first, I paid little attention, being concerned with the sociology of Burmese monasteries and the Buddhist Order's relations with the Government, whose programmes of ecclesiastical reform had been widely discussed at the time of the great Sixth Buddhist Council. Feeling that I ought to begin concerning myself with the less formal manifestations of Burmese religion, I allowed him one day to lead me off to his little hut at the end of the garden. Here he showed me his rough-and-ready alchemist's oven and bellows and the ritual paraphernalia in his room: pictures of the Buddha, of a variety of *nats* (spirits)—some of whom he discounted as weaklings, others whom he appeared to fear and propitiate—and offerings of coconuts and bananas: the conventional Burmese *ḱadaupwe*. From the ceiling hung a canopy of cloth, inscribed with *ins* (cabbalistic squares containing letters and figures) and hung with gilt cardboard leaves, also inscribed with *ins*. He claimed to sit under this every night for at least two hours, telling beads, repeating Buddhist formulæ and "directing his inner thoughts on 'pagoda,'" by which he meant religion in general and, more specifically, *paya*, a word describing the Buddha, Buddha images, pagodas and very important people such as kings and great monks. We talked for a while about his alchemy and his claims that it had brought him certain powers. He told me that he was invulnerable to pain and asked me to bang as hard as I could on his arm, with a hard instrument if necessary. Much later, after I had left Burma, I heard that he had refused help for snake bite and had only just been saved, at the last moment, by being forcibly removed to the hospital.

My attention was eventually drawn to some photographs on the altar. Most of them were formal portraits of a middle-aged man dressed in a velvet "royal" robe, with gold fringes, and a Burmese crown. There was another photo of the same person as a young man and some more as a very old man. The driver told me that all these were of his own *saya* Bo Min Gaung who could change, at will, from one physical appearance to another. He spoke at least twelve foreign languages and had travelled to many countries in his dreams or in his trances. His exploits were varied. Once, he had cut the top pieces off his index and little fingers—at the Shwedagon, in full sight of many observers—had then gone off into the "jungle" for some weeks and grown them again. My host, who followed this individual with great devotion and sometimes received him in the compound when he left his own place near Moulmein, declared that the *saya* would become King of Burma at the end of 2,500 years, though whether this

referred to the first part of the 5,000-year span of Gotama's religion or the second was not clear at the time.

At first, I thought of all this as mere eccentricity. In the intervening ten months between this first episode of my story and the next, I was to learn, mainly in Upper Burma, a great deal more about such *sayas*. I came to know that, besides the two components of Burmese religion described by previous authors—Buddhism proper and the cult of *nats*—there was a third component to which very few scholars had ever paid systematic attention. This component concerned the activities of *weikzas*. A *weikza* is a person who has achieved supremacy in one of a number of arts: astrology, alchemy, cabbalistic signs, *mantras* (magical formulæ) and medicine. The student works for long years on his chosen discipline, imposing abstinences on himself, seeking the advice of living or "dead" masters and attempting to gain control over powerful spirits whose help is necessary to the completion of his task. The final stage usually requires a drastic self-initiation, by which the power inherent in the perfected product of his researches is made to pass into his own body. An alchemist, for instance, is buried for a number of days in a secret place. The key is entrusted to a disciple who must prevent all disturbances and, at the end of the appointed time, the buried man rises as a fully fledged *weikza*. He can now fly through the air, journey underground, make himself invisible, assume various shapes and, above all, live for very great periods of time, long enough, indeed, to witness the coming of the next Buddha, Maitreya, and listen to his saving predications.

Leaving aside the problem of whether such persons really exist or not, we can say that the idea of the *weikza* is a very powerful one in Burmese religious thinking and some familiarity with the subject makes me certain that it cannot be dismissed as a merely "popular" or "rustic" phenomenon. The *weikza*, while not immortal—nothing is in a Buddhist context—is not subjected to the normal human process of transmigration, life following life with intervals of dying. The *weikza*, if he "dies" at all, only seems to "die"—like a snake shedding his skin and growing a new one—no mere mortal can say for sure how old he is, what is "death" and what is voluntary change of appearance. While a specific person can, then, be identified as a "*weikza*" at any specific time, room is left for the imagination to construct what it will: whole lineages of "*weikzas*" are elaborated and seen now as "different" persons, at other times merely as aspects of the same person. The field is obviously open to any individual to test his authority by making his claims and awaiting the arrival of disciples.

Time is a highly paradoxical concept in Buddhist thought. On the one hand the cosmology inherited from Hinduism speaks of immense spans of time, vast world-cycles interrupted by cosmic conflagrations; on the other hand Buddhist philosophy, carried to its ultimate conclusions, sees time as only relative: in the absolute it does not exist. The *weikza* can be seen as a personification of this paradox, pure duration triumphing in the relative mind over its unimaginable opposite. Likewise, there is a paradox in the idea of *Nirvāna* where the fullest extension of being is no different from the complete extinction of being. This paradox has always been at the heart of Buddhism, a religion whose very basis is the notion that different

people are set on different rungs of the ladder of understanding. Those who are set on all rungs but the very highest must see that highest rung as the fullest extension of being; that is as the highest development of human power. The *weikza* is again the personification of this idea. Buddhism, in opposition to Hinduism, has stressed the negative side—the idea of No-Time as opposed to the Great-Time, the idea of extinction as opposed to full extension of being, but Hinduism has left its mark on Buddhism and the frailty of the human imagination is on its side. The notion of power brings with it the notion of salvation and the *weikza* is looked up to as a benevolent, ever-present guide in all forms of tribulation. While he in turn must bow to the next Buddha, ordinary mankind, in the great intervals between Buddhas, turns to the *weikza* for advice along the way.

In short, the Burmese, long subjected to Hinduism and *Mahāyāna* Buddhism before the consolidation of their own *Theravāda* Buddhism, have preserved in their *weikza* lore much that is relatively unorthodox. The picture is not simply one of an austere faith, tolerant of human beliefs in spirits who rule over fields too mean to be regarded as its concern and which can always be relegated into the background as mere survivals of a pre-Buddhist state of things—rather it is one of a continuum in which the whole range of worldly desires is expressed before all desire is finally allowed to be extinguished, one in which power first controls the individual (as in the case of the *nat* possessing the medium), in which power is then, in ever more refined degrees, controlled by the individual (as in the case of the *weikza*) in which power is finally extinguished in the knowledge that there is no individual to enjoy it (as in the case of the Buddhist proper). Shall we persist in reserving the term Buddhism for the higher aspects of this continuum and relegate the rest to “Magic,” “Animism” and such dubious categories or shall we keep closer to the facts, abandon our notion of a “pure” Buddhism and grant this latter term to a whole religion practised by a whole people in one place and one time? Progress both in the study of Buddhism and in that of religion will depend on our answer to this question.

But we have strayed from our *weikzas*, whose task, I submitted, is concerned with the promotion of the well-being of the religion and its believers in the periods between the appearance of Buddhas. I have said that the prime aim of the *weikzas* is to ensure that they will be themselves, with all their powers, when Maitreya comes and not go astray, or run the risk of going astray, in the endless cycles of transmigration.² In the orthodox view, as expressed for instance in the *Caṅkavati Sihanāda Suttanta* of the *Digha Nikāya*, Maitreya will arrive at the end of a very long process of decrease and then increase in the human life span, a time far longer than the original 5,000 years' span allotted to Gotama Buddha's religion in other scriptures. Furthermore, Maitreya was designated by Gotama as the next Buddha and has been awaiting his time in the *Tusita* heaven ever since. The *Digha Nikāya* says that a *caṅkavartin* (a great ruler by the power of faith) will appear in order to look after Maitreya and tidy up the land so that he may preach his religion in peace.

Some Burmese appear to have tampered with this orthodoxy and I am not far from thinking that this tampering has been determined by beliefs

connected with *weikzas*. To begin with, while the *weikza* is indeed the symbol of duration, human patience is short and will seek to identify the man on the spot, the *weikza* it has at hand, with the *summum bonum* or an embryo-form thereof. Human patience being short, the long span of time before Maitreya's coming will also be reduced and 5,000 years will be accepted as the period when one religion ending will give way to another. Finally, a king, influenced by the custom whereby royalty in Burma was dignified with the titles of *cakravartin* and embryo-Buddha, appears to have claimed, in his impatience and desire for great power, that he was Maitreya come to earth at the end of such a 5,000-year span. This king was Bodawpaya (1782-1819).³

It is no coincidence perhaps that the first appearance of an embryo-form of the *cakravartin* who is to precede Maitreya is situated in Burmese legend in the time of Bodawpaya.⁴ This king is said to have had a relative whom he wished to drown and the relative was saved by a famous *weikza* Bo Bo Aung. The latter saved him from drowning and sent him to dwell in a spirit heaven until such time as he should be ready to descend to earth. On January 25 last, I described to the Society an association formed in an Upper Burma town whose leader, described as an incarnation of another *weikza* Bo Min Gaung who had died at Popa around 1952, was regarded as the coming *Setkyamin* (the Burmese form of the word *cakravartin*). It was hinted furthermore that this leader might also be an embryo-form of Maitreya Buddha, though this claim was no more than a hint.⁵

At the time I investigated this association, I remembered that my Rangoon driver had referred to his *saya* as Bo Min Gaung. A monk in the same town as the association, on seeming to recognize the latter as the true one, was confronted with my data on the association and then opined that, for all he knew, the spirit of Bo Min Gaung might have passed into more than one person. I had my own ideas about this and was not surprised, on visiting the Moulmein *saya*, to be told that he and he only was the true Bo Min Gaung. But I anticipate.

Some time later, on my return from Upper Burma, I discovered that our driver would be taking a holiday in the shape of a visit to his *saya* and promptly arranged to meet him there. Shortly after arriving at Moulmein I secured a rickety truck and set out towards Mudon. About five miles from here my companion and I were welcomed in a small village by our driver and a small band of people. We were shown into the hut and into the presence of a plump man, somewhere between his forties and fifties with a soft charm of manner which must have been an important factor in his charismatic authority. He behaved throughout with simplicity though he had obviously made up his mind long ago to live his part to the hilt and was probably convinced of his own powers. At first things did not go too well owing to the disrespectful attitude of my companion which irked the disciples of the *Bodaw*, a term reserved for such personages and also used of the Upper Burma *saya*. I eventually succeeded in conveying the need to conform and after this all went well.

I was told that the *Bodaw* had originally come from Popa-Taungalat, the place where Bo Min Gaung had died, and asked if I had seen him there. He had chosen this place because it was opposite a hill called the

“Weaving Mountain.” The *outtazaungs*—beings usually in the shape of pretty girls who guard treasures, often for the sake of the coming Buddha—were weaving there and moving their treasure constantly about. This could be heard at night and meant that whatever good works would be performed here would be heard all over the world. His object was “to spread Buddhism and to enable all beings to go to *Nirvāna*.” Encouraged by his good will towards me I pressed home some questions of importance. Was he the only Bo Min Gaung? Yes was the answer to this; any others I might have heard of were charlatans and pretenders. Was he the *Setkyamin*? This he was less forthright about, but I was given to understand that Bo Min Gaung and *Setkyamin* were one being. Further, I was most excited to hear that “*Setkyamin* is the king who will become the future Buddha Maitreya. They are not two different persons. After being *Setkyamin*, he must go to *Tusita* heaven.” This *saya* did not hold the view that Maitreya would come at the end of Gotama’s 5,000 years; rather, he kept to the orthodox interpretation that “one full up-and-down movement of the human life span, an *antraḥa*” (from Pali: *antara-kappa*) “would have to take place before Maitreya’s coming.” There were sixty-four of these periods altogether in this *ḥaba* or world epoch—we are in the twelfth—after these the world would be destroyed by fire, wind or water. In this time there would be Maitreya and ten other Buddhas.⁶ Would there be Buddhas in the worlds after? The answer to this was that “Where there are men there are Buddhas,” and that *Byammamin* (the Burmanized Brahma) kept a record of the passing worlds.

When questioned about his birth, the *Bodaw* merely said that he had come from *Tusita* heaven; there had been many comings—not all of them in Burma, some, even, in England. Some of these comings had been as kings, and he gave a list in the following, rather erratic, order: Inwa Mingaung, Pegu Dhammazedī Mingaung, Prome Duttabaung, Alaungsithu Mingaung, Abiyaza Mingaung, Dili Mingaung of India, Bo Min Gaung. I unfortunately missed asking him whether the list included Bo Bo Aung. He was reluctant to discuss the process of these “comings,” but eventually said that his *winyin* (cf. Pali: *Viññāṇa*), that is: spirit or consciousness, would pass into another person on the *Bodaw*’s pretended “death,” and that the other person’s *winyin* would go into one of the higher *nats*: a *nat-weikza*. He further claimed to be the only person alive capable of doing this.

These explanations, similar to those I had been given in Upper Burma and additional to them in some cases, suggest that the *Setkyamin* episode of the legend is only part of a cycle, for we remember that Bo Bo Aung sent his spirit into a *nat* heaven. While such *Bodaws* are wary of admitting to foreigners that they will be the great *cakravartin* of Maitreya and perhaps Maitreya himself, there is little doubt that they claim this to their disciples or allow them to claim it for them. I shall do no more than mention in passing that such ideas remind me strongly of the so-called “Living Buddhas” of countries to the north of Burma.

Of himself he declared “Staying in this body there are many,” and of *weikzas* in general, of which he claimed to be the king, he said that some changed their body form when old, while others always appeared in the

shape of a *nat-weikza*. *Nirvāna* he declined to discuss, stating merely that those who can go straight there should do so. In Maitreya's time, those who would want to go could do so; others might prefer to stay. I had previously been told that *weikzas* had to await Maitreya because they were unable to achieve *Nirvāna* by themselves. It seemed to me listening to this *Bodaw* and from other evidence, however, that *weikzas* might wish to achieve *Nirvāna* not as laymen but as one of the grades of Buddhas or Buddha's disciples.⁷ Here again were some suggestions that the *Bodhisattva* ideal of the *Mahāyāna* may well have left its traces in this *Theravāda* land.

This *saya* claimed to prefer meditation techniques to any of the others, although our driver told me that he had become interested in alchemy of late and had consulted him in these matters. Without meditation on the different precepts and the Buddha's virtues, "none of the other things work." When I began to ask about *ins*, however, the *Bodaw* showed some excitement, edged over to the table I had been given and began making a few drawings from which, however, I gathered that he was no great expert in this field. He stated that an *in-weikza* "had to get the *sa-da-ba-wa* in straight and then bury himself like an alchemist." There are many interpretations of this famous *in*, made up of the four Burmese letters *sa*, *da*, *ba* and *wa*, the two he offered being: *sa*: the "four promises," *da*: the *Dhamma* or *Tripitaka*, *ba*: "the whole of Learning" and *wa*: *weikza*.⁸ The letters could also stand for the Four Buddhas of this *ḷaba* before Maitreya.

To close the interview, the *Bodaw* declared that he would bless us and lit a couple of cigarettes. He looked very absorbed while puffing at these, and muttered a few words in a sort of hidden language very similar to that I had heard used by other people of his kind. I believe this to be a mixture of Pali, Hindi and nonsense with which such *sayas* pretend to have the gift of tongues. His "English" was made manifest in such ejaculations as "Yes, sir!" and "All right!" After puffing for a while, he transferred the cigarettes to us and told us to smoke them through. They were mentholated cigarettes and must have given his villager disciples the illusion that they contained some potent medicine.

On the way back, my companion, an educated Mon gentleman, told me that he had heard the villagers refer to the *Bodaw* as *Setkyamin*, *Alaungdaw* and *Payalaung*—all terms of the highest respect which can be applied to a future king or Buddha. I had seen that they always prostrated themselves to him on coming in and going out. He had also gathered that the *Bodaw* had married the young daughter of the house he lived in, claiming that he had been king and she the queen of China in previous existences. Someone, presumably an unbeliever, had added that the *Bodaw* had been chased out of Yenangyaung before coming here by the *Yahanbyo*, a strongly disciplined association of monks with headquarters in Mandalay.

Commenting on our visit, my companion added that such people worked through the charm they exerted over simple people, and "if they can make men love them, you cannot imagine what they do to women!" Women frequently went to such *sayas* to get back the love of an erring husband, and after a while fell for the *saya*. One such Indian *saya* in a town

near Mandalay was now living with the wife of one of Rangoon's richest merchants.

What kind of picture does the sociologist obtain of Burmese religion from phenomena such as these? He is struck, above all, by the lack of any very marked formal organization in these matters: this cult, if we may call it so, has no church, no organized body of priests, no regular congregation, no system of parishes, no written body of laws and sanctions from which anyone can derive a clear idea of what can and what cannot be done by either master or disciple. Nor is there much history to go on: while we can trace the first *Setkyamin* to the time of Bodawpaya, while we can show that the famous rebel of the 1930s, Saya San, set himself up as a *Setkyamin*, while our research showed evidence of at least two claimants to this position in 1958-59, there is no evidence for or against such claimants having existed throughout Burmese history, although ideas about *cakravartins* and Maitreya have a long and respectable ancestry. At the most, we can say that such claims appear to be modelled on the type of kingship which Burma derived at an early date from India and that, since the end of the Burmese kingship, they have been associated at times with nativistic movements and nationalist upheavals against the British. In so far as they continue after the achievement of Burmese Independence, however, we can safely admit that their religious aspects are at least as important as their political implications.

We notice at the same time that the other two components of Burmese religion are also loosely organized. The Order of monks draws its unity from a way of life laid down in the first "Basket" of the Scriptures, but it is not a church with a head over it enjoying absolute authority: in the last resort each monk is his own master and each layman follows the dictates of a monk or monks only in so far as he finds them useful in pursuing his own path. No one can tell who is "in" and who is "out" of Buddhism; all that can be offered is advice that such a path will lead to a goal and another will not. Likewise, the cult of *nats*, who appear predominantly as hereditary and residential spirits, is securely tied to particular localities, and mediums bear no responsibility either to superiors or to those who come to consult them.

While Buddhism as a "higher" way, then, sets the tone of Burmese religious life and gives it a goal towards which it can strive, there is room for a wide variety of individual choice according to the level of understanding reached by any particular person. Groups, such as there are, form and dissolve solely on the basis of the authority and power of conviction of particular individuals and this is as true of particular sects and associations within the Order of monks—despite the fact that a great monastery can carry on for some length of time the system of discipline laid down by a great monk—as it is of associations in the other spheres. What, then, holds the system together? The force which lifts Burmese religion from a medley of small local cults to the semblance of a national religion is not so much the Buddhist Order itself as the idea of hierarchy, of levels of understanding, built into Buddhism as a philosophical system. While an individual's claims to leadership are theoretically absolute for those who can be persuaded to follow him, the very existence of higher levels of power and

understanding limits the leader's claims in so far as he himself is concerned and ensures that he will never obtain the allegiance of too great a number of followers. Once we understand this we can see the true role of the monks: not as priests, not as intermediaries between individuals and the supernatural, but as those who live the highest type of religious life on behalf, as it were, of the less gifted and more world-involved majority of the society. Closely associated with this is, of course, the idea of *karma* according to which each individual bears the sole responsibility for improving himself while, at the same time, this responsibility is anchored to the level of understanding he has been able to achieve as securely as a Hindu is theoretically tied to the caste in which he was born. "Given my limitations, what can I do and to whom can I turn for help?" is the question of the average Burmese Buddhist, and not "What is Buddhism and are my practices within it or outside of it?" "Buddhism" is the sum total of all available practices in the country at the time, and only for the very sophisticated, with a historically educated frame of mind, does the second question tend to appear.

Such ways of thinking favour individual autonomy and do not make for successful administrative systems. It is curious that Burmese political history yields the same kind of picture. Theoretically the king was absolute in his power and authority, yet in practice his power was often sadly limited. A successful and strong king extended his frontiers by war, but his weak successor would lose them just as rapidly and rebellion from border princes was a staple factor in Burma's history. Here again a balance within the system itself ensured against the rigours of the total application of a theory. An alternative way would have been for royalty to establish a strong administration in conquered territories and thus ensure both the stability of the empire and the happiness of well-governed subjects. This way was not followed, however, any more in politics than in religion.⁹

It is thus perhaps not very strange that the original aberrations of ideas about the *cakravartin* and Maitreya can be found in the sphere of royalty. The king's authority required a powerful backing, all the more so when ecclesiastics could so easily point to the defects of a vainglorious and short-lived policy of conquest. What better justification for conquest than to assimilate it to the policy of a great conqueror and defender of the faith such as Asoka had been? And what better still than to become the ruler of the very Order which criticized one's policy? We cannot enter now into the mind and motives of such a king as Bodawpaya, but it may not be entirely fruitless to suggest that such ideas may have been at least partly responsible for our driver's would-be king in his village of the Weaving Mountain.

One further point may be worth making. While we frequently refer to *Mahāyāna* "survivals" in a *Theravāda* land, we find, on many fronts, that the differences between the two great branches of Buddhism appear more and more elusive. Looked at in a certain way, the various *Mahāyāna* *sūtras* which form the basis of various schools within the Greater Vehicle can appear as efforts to establish hierarchies, with the adherents of the particular school in question in each text claiming to achieve a deeper level of doctrinal understanding than that of adherents of other sects. While

much research remains to be done into the sociology of Buddhism in general, it may be worth asking whether these inducements to potential disciples are very different from those we find among the competing religious personalities in an altogether less developed system such as that which prevails in Burma.

FOOTNOTES

¹ My anthropological field-work, sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, was done in Burma between June, 1958 and November, 1959.

² There is considerable evidence from the oldest inscriptions onwards for thinking that many, if not most Burmese prayed for a human birth in the time of Maitreya Buddha. One must distinguish, however, between such prayers and deliberate attempts to escape death altogether.

³ See Sangermano: *A Description of the Burmese Empire*, Rangoon, 1924, p. 61, and compare with p. 87.

⁴ In history, as opposed to legend, the first *Setkyamin* now remembered would seem to have been a "Prince Tsakyamen" in the reign of Bagyidaw (1819-37). See W. Desai: *History of the British Residency in Burma 1826-1840*, Rangoon, 1939, especially p. 335. Some informants and some texts ascribe the legendary *Setkyamin* to this reign.

⁵ Many slides were shown with this talk, and a report would have been maimed without them. Since this material will be very fully published with full references, footnotes, plans and photographs, in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIV, part 3, October, 1961, I have preferred to offer here further evidence of the same kind and degree of interest.

⁶ The interpretation of these time periods varies: some would hold that, as there are only five Buddhas in this *ḡaba*, the ten Buddhas after Maitreya would appear in subsequent *ḡabas*. . . For references to the idea of ten future Buddhas, see Minayeff's edition of the *Anāgataḡamsa*, Journal of the Pali Text Society, 1886; Than Tun *Mahāḡassapa and his Tradition*, Journal of the Burma Research Society, XLII, 2, 1959, p. 117; Luce and Pe Maung Tin: *The Glass Palace Chronicles*, London, 1923, p. 160 and Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism*, III, p. 84; and *Ceylon Journal of Science*, section g, Vol. II, Colombo, 1928-1933 p. 67.

Certain contemporary texts on the *Setkyamin* (identified or not with Bo Min Gaung), argue whether the prince is the embryo Maitreya or the embryo Rāma and come to different conclusions. Now Rāma is the first of the Buddhas after Maitreya in the above lists. I shall present these texts elsewhere.

⁷ An old Mandalay informant referred to the following classes of people (not necessarily *weikzas*). I give the Pali equivalents of his classes, but stress that his interpretations are not necessarily the same as our dictionaries'. I also leave out his time periods as they are open to question: they decrease from 1 to 5. 1. *Samasam buddha*: a *Payalaung*, one who prays to become a Buddha or *Payagyi*. 2. *Pacceḡa Buddha*: one who will become a *Payagale*, a Silent Buddha when there is no religion on earth. 3. *Agga sāvaḡa*: one who will become a disciple of the right or left side like Sariputta or Mogallana. 4. *Mahā sāvaḡa*: one who has a firm prediction from a Buddha as to when he will be a disciple of right or left. 5. *Paḡati sāvaḡa*: one who can through meditation come to *Nirvāna* in this *ḡaba* but will not become a Buddha. The latter class is divided into 1. *Ugghaḡitaññū*: One who can become an *arahat* at a glance. 2. *Vipañcitaññū*: one who has to work very hard to become an *arahat*. 3. *Neyyapuggala*: one who must work day and night to become an *arahat*. 4. *Pada-parama*: one who must sacrifice his life to obtain *arahatship* in his existence.

Note that in his system, since all other classes than five involve *ḡabas* after this one, Maitreya is not involved.

⁸ More precisely: the four truths: *duḡḡha sacca*, *samudaya s.*, *nirodha s.*, *magga s.*; *a-tat* (Burm.)—*paññā* (Pali): Learning, Knowledge.

⁹ For further elaboration see this author's *Religion and Authority in Modern Burma*, The World Today, Chatham House, March, 1960, and *The Uses of Religious Scepticism in Modern Burma*: forthcoming in Diogenes.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN TODAY

By SIR PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS, C.I.E., I.C.S.(RETD.)

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, February 8, 1961, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, we have the great pleasure of having Sir Percival Griffiths to talk to us today, and I will say a word about him in a moment—not, indeed, that that is necessary to this audience. But I would like first to suggest that we might stand for a moment in silence in respect to the memory of Lord Zetland, who died a couple of days ago, who was so very well known to many of us here, having been a founder member of this society, and one of its Vice-Presidents for many years. Lord Zetland was a distinguished Governor of Bengal, and, after that, Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for India and Burma.

(The meeting stood in silence as a tribute to the memory of the late Marquess of Zetland.)

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are fortunate, as I said just now, in having Sir Percival Griffiths to talk to us today about developments in the sub-continent. He is so well known to you all that there is very little I need say. He had, as we all know, a very distinguished, and at times a very difficult career in the Indian Civil Service in Bengal; he has for many years, since 1947, been to and fro, two or three times yearly, to India and to Pakistan, where he has so many friends, in connection with business and commercial interests, and there is no one who is in a position to give us a truer and more faithful, or more balanced account of the position and of the developments that there have been than Sir Percival.

I need not take up more of your time by saying more, but I will at once invite Sir Percival to be kind enough to address us.

LADIES and Gentlemen, I think I must have been in a very rash mood when I said that I would talk about India and Pakistan in the short space of some forty to forty-five minutes. Quite clearly, all I can do is to pick out a few of the highlights, to select a few major topics rather arbitrarily and to jump from one to another, without wasting any time on frills or connecting links.

In the case of India, I propose to say something about India's external affairs, perhaps the most spectacular aspect of her position today. I shall go on to say a few words about the position of the Communists there, and shall mention the main outlines of the third Five-Year Plan, and India's economic problems. Having done that, I shall say a few words about India's relationship with Pakistan.

Then I shall go on to Pakistan, where I shall talk about the revolution of two years ago, the problems that now face Pakistan in getting back to some form of representative government, and finally her economic problems; and you will forgive me if I skip from topic to topic and talk rather fast.

I begin with India and her external affairs. If one goes round India as frequently as I do, I think the thing that strikes one most today is the tremendous metamorphosis in the thinking of the ordinary man—I am not speaking of the people at the top, but the ordinary man—towards that great country of China. In the early days after the transfer of power, you found a tremendous warmth of affection in India for China. It was per-

haps based on four different factors: first, both those countries had recently secured their independence from one form or another of foreign domination; secondly, they were linked in that sense of Asian solidarity which is perhaps one of the strongest factors in the modern world; thirdly, they felt that they had had comparable problems to face—each country had its problem of raising the standard of living, and doing it quickly. With these three common links, a belief was built up in India, perhaps exaggerated in some ways, in the age-long cultural relations between India and China; and all these things together generated a tremendous warmth of feeling towards China.

If you go round India today, you find that warmth has entirely disappeared—here again I am not talking about top-level people, but the ordinary man. That warmth has gone, and has been replaced by suspicion, a certain amount of fear, and a profound conviction that China has behaved and is behaving thoroughly badly. What is even more interesting is that you do not find that feeling just in the danger areas in the north and north-east; if you go to Madras, or anywhere in south India—there, too, you find this same feeling amongst ordinary educated people.

Now, why has this happened? I think one must go back briefly to 1950. One must remember that, when the Chinese first invaded Tibet in 1950, Mr. Nehru, representing the Government of India, did, indeed make a protest. That protest was treated with scant courtesy by the Chinese Government—in fact, they sent an extremely sharp reply, and the matter was rather dropped for some time, because, to be quite frank, the Indian public was not then very interested. The feeling was that Tibet was a long way away, and nobody knew much about it, and there was a vague half-idea that perhaps China had some rights in Tibet after all.

The years passed without any great development in the Indian attitude. Then came 1954, when a Treaty was drawn up between India and China dealing with the Chinese occupation of Tibet; that gave rise to some murmurings amongst the intelligentsia of India, but those murmurings were lost in the general approval of the *Panch Shila* or five principles of co-existence enunciated with the utmost fervour and sincerity by Mr. Nehru as being the principles which would guide the relations between India and China.

Things stayed much like that for another two or three years, until the flight of the Dalai Lama into India. That flight had two effects. In the first place, the Dalai Lama, as you all know, is a very much venerated figure in India, and people were shocked that this head of a great religion had had to leave Tibet because of the tyranny and brutality of the Chinese. But, besides producing shock, it also released a great flood of knowledge. People began to know what was happening. Their eyes were opened as to the way the Chinese had been behaving in Tibet, in typically Communist fashion. Anger began to grow.

Then came the encroachments on the Indian frontier. These encroachments, from the purely practical point of view, did not matter much; the territory is barren for the most part, of little practical significance to either country; but there is a tremendous emotional significance about frontier encroachment, and when that came, as it did, on top of the revol-

sion against Chinese behaviour in Tibet, it stirred up very strong feelings.

Shortly after that, there were Chinese troop movements and other developments on the North-East Frontier which were interpreted, and rightly interpreted in my opinion, as meaning a threat to those three strange barrier countries, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, which lie along the North-East Frontier of India. Then public opinion really was roused. A great many foolish things were said. Mr. Nehru was criticized, quite unreasonably, because he would not take a tough line—of course, the people who attacked him never suggested what the tough line might have been—but they were extremely critical. Mr. Nehru kept his head; he was not hustled into taking unwise action; but, when the proper moment came, he spoke bluntly and unmistakably with regard to China's action. He accused China of aggression, expressed profound regret that they had torn up the *Panch Shila*, and he said that any attack by China on Bhutan, Sikkim or Nepal would be regarded as an attack on India, and India would take appropriate measures to defend herself and those countries against it. That was a very blunt statement indeed, perhaps the bluntest statement on foreign affairs that Mr. Nehru has ever made. It restored public confidence, which, for a short time, it had seemed he might lose.

But nervousness on the part of the public in regard to this has not yet been entirely removed. When Mr. Chou-En lai visited India some months ago there was a great deal of anxiety in the public mind; there was some fear that those close to Mr. Nehru might press for a compromise, giving up a bit of the frontier here in exchange for a guarantee of the frontier there. I was in Delhi myself at the time, and there was great nervousness. Nothing happened at all, no compromise was reached, and the public relief at that fact was quite unmistakable.

I have not time to talk about the significance of China's operations on the North-East Frontier, nor am I very capable of doing so, because none of us knows what is going on in the minds of those governing China today; but it does seem to many of our Indian friends, and to me, that this is not just a little frontier squabble, but that China really is on the march in Asia. We may have to look forward to a very long period of tension, to put it at the least, between India and China.

Be that as it may, the honeymoon is at an end. The *Panch Shila*, in the minds of ordinary men, have been shattered.

Now, this has had a rather curious effect in ways one might not have expected. Here again I am talking not about people on government level, but about the ordinary educated man. It has had a curious effect on his point of view towards Russia. It seems to me that the warmth which had existed in the minds of Indians towards Russia had begun to cool off some years ago, very noticeably after the Hungary affair. Then, for the first time, the immorality and brutality of the Russian methods had been brought home to India, and so the cooling-off process started. I think, since the China episode, that process has, to some extent, stopped; it may even have been put into reverse. Russia has played her cards very skilfully; she has let it be known, without ever saying so, that she does not approve of what China is doing on the North-East Frontier. At the same time, the rift often talked about in the free world between Russia and China is exag-

gerated in India, and many people are beginning to feel: "We need not be too afraid of China, because Russia does not approve of what the Chinese are doing and, if the worst came to the worst, we might expect a certain amount of help from Russia." And so I notice, as I go round India today, that there is this slight warming up again towards Russia.

We find, therefore, that India, whose policy was and is still neutralism, has had that neutralism modified in two directions; first, modified in the direction of becoming a member of the Commonwealth, linking herself to Britain and the other nations of the Commonwealth; secondly, modified by the revulsion of feeling against China that has taken place recently. She is still neutral, but, as a friend of mine says, her neutralism is a bit less neutral.

Now I skip on to the question of Communism. The reason I want to talk about Communism is that I find, over the years, people in this country have had exaggerated ideas about the Communist menace in India, and it is worth while to get this into perspective. I have not time to talk generalities, nor to remind you that there are predisposing factors to Communism in Asia—the poverty of the people, the fact that they are awaking now to a new sense of their rights. All this can be exploited by the Communists. There are, on the other hand, the resistance factors of devotion to private property, and the belief in God; these are resistance factors and I am not able to weigh up one against the other.

The Communists started to work in India soon after the First World War. They went about it the wrong way. They emphasized aspects of their teachings like atheism and disbelief in private property, aspects least calculated to go down with the Indian people. On the whole they failed, and up to the beginning of the Second World War they made no impact on the people as a whole. That war gave them the chance to rehabilitate themselves. They did propaganda amongst labour in support of the war effort; they helped to keep production steady. All this gave them a secure position.

After the war, they started on a new tack. They did not bother about abstractions—private property and the like; they looked for areas where people had grievances, and they made those grievances their own. Some areas were obviously suitable for their attention. They concentrated on Hyderabad, the areas round Andhra, and on Kerala, and of course they continued to give attention to Calcutta.

Hyderabad was a promising area for them because, in those days, she had not made up her mind whether she was coming into the Indian Union or would stay out of it, and great struggles were going on over what she was going to do.

Next, they turned their attention to what is now the State of Andhra and was then part of Madras. The Telegus in that State resented their inclusion in the Madras State where they felt their interests were swamped by those of the Tamils and other communities. They demanded the formation of a separate Telegu-speaking State. The Communists took up this demand and made it their battle cry. In that particular area, in the 1952 elections, the Communists romped home by skilful use of the slogan "Andhra for the Telegus." By the time of the next elections, this issue

had been disposed of and the Communists had no issue to exploit. They therefore did relatively badly.

Then they selected Kerala. There were several reasons why they should choose that area. First of all, it was a State with a very, very high degree of literacy. I have quoted on several occasions, in other meetings, something that was said to me by C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar when he was Dewan of Travancore a good many years ago. He said to me, with a great deal of pride: "In my State, even the bus drivers are Graduates." And I said: "With respect, sir, in your State even the Graduates are bus drivers." And this is a very, very real factor, in Kerala—the very high level of education, not accompanied by the existence of a sufficient number of jobs of the right kind for educated men; and there is no better field of operations for Communists than a field in which that kind of thing prevails.

There were also other reasons. The Congress Party there was the worst organized and least satisfactory Congress Party in India; it was torn into factions; you had factions between the Hindus and the Christians, you had factions between the Tamils and the Malayalis. It was divided in every possible way, and its Ministers had not a very high reputation, either for public spirit or for industry. On the whole, it would be true to say that what gave the Communists success in the elections two years ago was not so much any great popular faith in Communism as general fed-upness with the Kerala Government; and one must not forget, in any part of the world, that when Communists come to power it is on the strength of public fed-upness with someone else.

They did come to power and, at first, they behaved with a certain propriety, but, as soon as they began to feel their feet, they behaved quite differently; they paralysed the services, and told the police that it was not their obligation to hold the scales evenly between one section of the community and another; they used force to suppress non-Communist Trade Unions; and embarked upon a big campaign with public funds for Communist indoctrination. There were said to be 8,000 village welfare workers at this time, and I think 6,000 were members of the Communist Party. So they behaved as all Communists say, quite frankly, they should do: "If you get hold of a Government, it is your business to paralyse the services, it is your business to indoctrinate the public, so that you can never get turned out."

But it did not work that way. They went too far; they interfered with things the public would not have upset. They took over the schools; that upset the Christians; at the same time, it upset the Hindus, and of course it upset the Moslems, and gradually this built up a resentment, and the resentment expressed itself in a good deal of disorder. The disorder went on, and became so serious that at last the Government of India intervened. It was a difficult problem for the Government of India to decide when to intervene. If they intervened too soon, they would make martyrs of the Communists, and be accused of riding roughshod over democracy. If they intervened too late, the Communists would be too firmly entrenched. Their timing was admirable. They intervened, took over the government, and had Governor's rule for a time. Then elections took place and, though the Communists did quite well as far as votes were concerned (I think they

actually had more than previously), they were not in a majority. The other Parties by then had got together and formed a coalition. So that a non-Communist Government came into existence, and it is still in existence, though some observers are, from time to time, anxious as to whether the coalition might break down.

I think the importance of these events is not in the details of the elections, but in the fact that the Government of India were determined that the Communists were not going to get hold of India and, when the time was ripe, they had no hesitation in intervening; and, in intervening, they had the approval of the people all over India. So, if one is apt to get worried about the Communist menace in India, or the other parts of Asia, it is well to remember that the Government is anti-Communist, and has power to intervene, that the Army is sound, completely untouched by political taint, and that the public as a whole will defend the Government when its action becomes necessary.

I do not propose to talk about Communism in Calcutta, because it is not true Communism at all. Calcutta is and always has been a very emotional and disorderly place; it is not often that a day passes in Calcutta without there being a row about something, and naturally the Communists do not fail to make use of that emotional atmosphere.

Even before the Chinese episode, I was not myself nervous about the threat of Communism in spite of Calcutta. I am still less nervous now, because China has done the Communists a great disservice in two ways. First, they have quarrelled amongst themselves. Some have said: "We must support the action of Communist China," and the others have behaved like good nationalists and condemned China roundly.

At the same time, these events have made the public realize the tremendous danger of having in your midst a political party one section of which owes its allegiance to an outside country. Those who were in a wavering frame of mind have swung right over against the Communists, who are now on a more difficult wicket than they have been before.

I must switch from that to India's economic affairs. Here I have to be very brief indeed.

India's economic progress is all focused around planning. One must understand the philosophy of her planning. When India became independent, she took stock of the situation, and was horrified to find how poor she was, and to realize the low standard of living of the bulk of the community. That had to be put right. It was not commensurate with India's national dignity and pride. She was also conscious that she could not maintain her independence in the modern world without a high economic level. Her leaders also felt that unless they gave the ordinary man a good deal, and gave it to him soon, the Communists would gain power. So there had to be rapid progress. It is possible that that progress could have been most quickly achieved by purely private enterprise, and by giving encouragement to businessmen to go ahead; but India's leaders said: "If we do that, the increase in the production may be greater, but the economic gulf between rich and poor will grow wider. We shall have all the horrors that befell Britain in the nineteenth century, or at the end of the eighteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution was in its in-

fancy. We can only avoid that," they said, "and yet achieve rapid progress by directing all the resources of the economy into channels which are good not only for the particular industrialist, but for the country as a whole."

So, with India, as in most of the newly independent countries, planning is an article of faith. But the danger with planning is that you have to produce results quickly. Once the government has made itself responsible, you cannot turn to people and say: "We are sorry; we are going to build lots and lots of factories, and in the years to come you will be better off, but meantime you must be patient." You cannot do that. You have to produce quick results, and so your planners are always under pressure to go faster than the economic strength of the country warrants. That applies to all the newly developed African and Asian countries.

That leads to crises; and India today is in a very difficult position indeed as regards her balance of payments. Her reserves are lower today (the last figure I saw was about a month ago) than they were even at their lowest in 1958 or 1959. And what is worrying India is this: that her current earnings of foreign exchange today are not sufficient to meet her current needs, let alone any question of development.

India's development has been fantastic in the last ten or twelve years. It is unbelievable, the progress that has been made, but if you develop your industry, you do not cut down your immediate need for foreign exchange; you increase it. People seem to think that if you make something in the country that was previously produced elsewhere, you reduce your foreign exchange needs proportionately; but you do not. You are in need of raw materials, spare parts, all sorts of things, and your needs are greater than before. So, today, without foreign aid, without foreign exchange, India could not maintain her existing industry at its proper level. And there is no reason to expect an immediate improvement in the position; there is no spectacular increase in exports round the corner, no source from which India can greatly increase her export earnings in the near future. She is going to cut down some of her import expenditure, but she will not be able to move out of a position of extreme tightness as far as foreign exchange is concerned.

So it is extremely vital that the outside world should continue to give the maximum possible aid to the development of India. Without that aid, India would stagnate—yet the quantity of aid required is very great indeed. India's third Five-Year Plan has been examined very carefully by the World Bank. They have said that it is not a silly plan, not too much for the country; but it requires £2,400 million of outside help. That is a lot of money, by any standards. £2,400 million is a very great deal of money indeed. It is no good making guesses as to what Britain, American, Western Germany (because they are in this, too) and other countries can do. All one can say is that it is vital that the maximum possible shall be done.

And India is a country in which the money is not, on the whole, wasted. I am going to qualify that. I am not a very great lover of government enterprises anywhere in the world: I believe that governments always waste money. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, it is fair to say that the money which has been lent, or in some cases given, to India for develop-

ment has, in the main, been well spent, and you can see the result of it as you go round the countryside.

India has got two other main headaches. The first is food. Although she has increased her food production by 50 per cent. in the last ten years (I speak subject to some correction, but I think that is the figure—about 50 per cent. in the last ten years), she still cannot keep pace with two causes of increased demand; one is the growth of population, which is extremely rapid, and the other is the fact that standards of living are going up—people are eating better than they were ten years ago. When you take those two together, the growth of population and the rise in the standard of living, production cannot keep pace. One might say that India's difficulty is a measure of her success: if her standards had not improved, she could still have fed her people at the old level. Luckily, she is getting a lot of help from the outside world; cereals from U.S.A. under P.L. 480 have filled the gap.

And the other headache is unemployment, and particularly middle-class unemployment. There is a large educated population, growing all the time, for whom there are not enough jobs. In spite of all the industrialization going on in India, there are still not enough jobs for the middle classes. That is understandable. You build a big steel factory, costing, say, £100 million; it does not give employment to many people.

So though India has made tremendous progress, she has those three headaches—foreign exchange, food, unemployment. All I can say is, if I had been told in 1947 that India would by now have made the fantastic progress that she has made, I would not have believed it. You only have to go round the country to feel the whole place vibrating with new life.

Relations between India and Pakistan are not happy. They are not as bad as in 1948-49, but not happy. As you know, after the initial troubles were over, there were two or three problems outstanding—1, Kashmir; 2, the Indus Valley water dispute; 3, evacuee property. The only one I have time to mention in any detail is the Indus Valley water dispute. The settlement of that dispute by the World Bank is, I think, one of the most remarkable achievements of any international body since the war. It was a most intractable problem. Much of Pakistan's irrigation had to come from the eastern group of the Indus Valley rivers. That group flows through and is to some extent under the control of India. That had two drawbacks. First, Pakistan was always afraid that India might cut off her water supply; secondly, India needed much of the water herself, and, if India went ahead with her perfectly legitimate development schemes, with no thought of harming Pakistan, Pakistan might still have been harmed because the water would have been taken.

The only solution was to let Pakistan start drawing her needs from the western group. That sounds simple, but it meant constructing link canals, water works of all kinds, at a fabulous cost. It was agreed at an early stage that both countries should share in the cost. Well it is one thing to agree in principle, but when several hundred million pounds are involved, it is another thing to decide who should pay what, and for several years the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development have been nagging away at this problem. The Bank has succeeded, and if I

were asked who was the one man who had done most to improve relations between the two countries, I would say Bill Iliff.

Another thorny problem is that of Kashmir. I am not going to talk about that. I personally do not see any solution of it round the corner at all, and I have always held the view that a private Englishman is not likely to help by ventilating his views about the rights or wrongs of it. I only say I do not foresee any solution in the near future.

Now let me pass on briefly to Pakistan itself. First of all, the 1958 revolution; I use the word "revolution," because there is no other, but it is not a very appropriate word to describe a change carried out without a single shot being fired—one of the most remarkable transitions of our time, not started by any political party, but brought about by the Army, acting in sympathy with general public feeling. It gave a shock to the outside world, especially to us in this country. We do not like to see a democracy being thrown over. But those of us acquainted with Pakistan, and visit it as frequently as I do (I have been there forty-two times since the transfer of power) were not so shocked. I was neither surprised nor shocked: I thought it was inevitable. Pakistan was moving very rapidly to moral and financial bankruptcy under the old régime. There were no real leaders. East Pakistan had no national leaders. West Pakistan had too many leaders; they could never get together; you had struggles going on all the time, one pitting his influence against another. Politics soon developed into a sordid scramble for jobs. Those Pakistanis who stood outside this business were disgusted to see the way the parliamentary system was being prostituted. Politicians changed parties overnight when it suited their purpose; parties changed policies overnight, because it would fit in better. It was a depressing, disheartening situation to watch, to people like myself, as fond of Pakistan as I am of India.

It also led to public corruption. Jobs began to be bought and sold, import licences were bought and sold, and altogether public life was getting wholly corrupt. The people were, if I may use a colloquialism, getting fed up to the back teeth.

The Army, which had kept itself aloof from these influences, decided to intervene. It did intervene. I have not time to explain why the first President was replaced by another President; the important fact is that the Army put the President in his position, and gave him solid support. The public as a whole, after the first shock was over, felt a great sense of relief. At last there was someone in the position of government who was interested in the business of the country and not just in feathering his own nest.

The results have been remarkable. Though, naturally, in the abstract I like a parliamentary method of government, I have no hesitation in saying that Pakistan is a far better place today than two years ago. The people are lucky to have a very remarkable man at their head. Field-Marshal Ayub Khan is one of the most remarkable men I have met. I do not mean he is a man of great intellect, but he has sincerity, integrity, strength of character, and, unlike most dictators (for he is a dictator), he is not grasping for power, not seeing how long he can hold on to it. He has cleaned up the administration tremendously. I am not saying there is no corruption now, but there is nothing like the corruption there was two years ago. He has put

new heart into those of the Civil Service who had not themselves become corrupted. He has restored public respect for the government; and, equally important, his administration, through Mr. Shoaib, the Finance Minister, an extremely able man, has taken in hand the economy of Pakistan and made some sense out of it.

Pakistan was rushing into financial bankruptcy before. That has been stopped.

But Field-Marshal Ayub Khan is far too wise to think that this kind of régime can go on for ever. He says: "We have to find some means of bringing the people back into government; we cannot have this gulf for ever." Therefore, he evolved his theory of basic democracies. His theory is something like this: The ordinary man in the village knows nothing about financial affairs, he knows nothing about economics, but he is capable of choosing a good man from amongst the people he knows. So Ayub has gone back to an elaboration of the old Panchayat system; each group of villages elects a Council from amongst the people who live in that group of villages; you might call it a rural district council. The rural district councils elect something like a county council, and so on, and a pyramid is gradually built up. What happens at the top of the pyramid has not yet been finally decided. A Constitutional Committee is studying it at the moment, but the President's idea is that the President and legislature will be at the top of the pyramid. Each body will elect the body above it, until you build up, right at the top, your top-level tier of the President and the legislature. The village part of the business is now working. It is too early to judge whether it is going to work well or not. One is a little disturbed to see that, in some areas, men of real standing have been holding aloof from it. The kind of men who would be willing to enter local government, who would be willing to stand for parliament, do not seem very willing, in some cases, to enter into these relatively humble bodies. One has to watch that with some anxiety.

But the President is determined to go ahead; he is determined that the Constitution shall be framed this year. He wants the elections to be held for the top level either at the end of this year or the beginning of next year.

That must give one a certain amount of apprehension. It is absolutely right that the President should try to get back to some kind of public representation, but of course there is the fear that, somehow or other, the old gang may creep back through these methods, and the old corruption begin to take hold once more.

There are two problems to be settled. One is the relationship between the President and the legislature. What happens if they disagree? Is the President to have an overriding power? There is much discussion going on between the President and his immediate advisers on this. Some say it would make the President a complete dictator; others say unless the President has some overriding power the administration will go down the drain.

Another thing to be settled is this: You have the two wings of Pakistan—East Pakistan and West Pakistan—1,100 miles apart, inhabited by different kinds of people; can you run them as a unitary country with one legislature, possibly in Rawalpindi, or must there be a separate legislature for the Province of East Pakistan? The President is obviously in favour of

one legislature running the country on unitary lines. Many of us, including myself, have considerable doubts whether that is practicable with an area of the size of Pakistan, with the two wings separated by this vast distance, and the great difference between the people in the two wings. All that has to be settled.

The President has accomplished with tremendous skill and sincerity the business of moving from a parliamentary form of government which did not work to what is, in effect, a dictatorship. He has now ahead of him the far, far harder task of putting the process in reverse, and neither he nor any of us would dare to make prophecies as to how it will work.

Now a word as to Pakistan's economic affairs. As in India, planning was taken to be inevitable. It was, in some ways, even more necessary than it was in India, because Pakistan started from scratch. The effects of geography were such as to make development more urgent, for Pakistan began with no industry at all, and she was determined not to stay long in that position.

It was a foregone conclusion that Pakistan would try to go too fast, and the result has been a curious one. On the one hand, development has been remarkable; factories have sprung up all over the place; Pakistan can practically clothe her people with coarse cotton cloth today; she has some of the finest jute textile mills in the world. She has done all that; she has gone ahead; but she has run herself, as a result, into almost continuous foreign exchange and financial difficulties.

When the present régime came to power, Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves were really practically nothing. I think the actual figure of her total foreign exchange reserves at that time was about £37 million, and she had a backlog of foreign exchange commitments beyond that. She was in a negative position as regards foreign exchange reserves when the new régime took over. The new régime got down to business at once, and they started cutting their coat according to their cloth. They stopped foreign expenditure, where it could be avoided. That decision was a painful one, because it meant that, for a time, you had to go without the raw materials to run your business, and many of the factories had to run on one-third of their capacity for some time. But this had to be gone through, and, as a result, Pakistan has now got some kind of a balance between her expenditure and her earnings in the way of foreign exchange.

Now, it would be very misleading to leave the story like that, because, although she has cut down her expenditure enormously, the only reason why a balance has been possible is that the world outside has been giving substantial aid to Pakistan in one form or other. The real difference between the present administration and the old régime is that the old régime said: "This is what we want; we must have it," and the new régime says: "This is how much money we have got; this is what we can get from outside; this is what we can do." It does insist on living within its foreign exchange budget.

But that must not make one forget the long-term difficulties which Pakistan has to face. As in the case of India, I do not see any immediate expectation of any rapid increase in Pakistan's earnings from exports. She has achieved an increase, but most economic observers think there is not now much more scope for a further increase in the near future; she will

have to go on managing on foreign exchange earnings of rather less than £200 million, and she has to make do. So, as in the case of India, but even more so, Pakistan depends on outside help. I think I would put the matter like this: that, if foreign aid were to be discontinued to India, India would not collapse but she would stagnate; but if foreign aid were discontinued to Pakistan, Pakistan would collapse.

That, again, is recognized by the outside world, but there are one or two special difficulties. One is that short-term loans, repayable in three to four years, are completely useless to Pakistan. That conclusion has been arrived at by the Consortium of five countries which is concerned in this business of lending money to Pakistan. What she needs is long-term loans, at least fifteen to twenty years; and I am glad to say that, in regard to the first loan, the first small, token loan Britain has made to Pakistan for purposes of her next Plan, Britain has accepted that view and the loan is to be for twenty years.

Pakistan's Second Plan is a sensible plan, it is flexible; she says: "It is no good talking about an irreducible minimum or hard core; we can only do what we have the money to do." And the Plan can proceed step by step according to available funds.

She has her major headaches, which are not very different from those of India. One is food production. This is a great problem, even more so than in India, because, whereas India has managed to increase food production by 50 per cent. in the last ten to eleven years, food production in Pakistan has virtually stood still. I think the claim is that it has increased by 4 per cent. in the last five years, and that is not much with a country where the population is growing as fast as it is in Pakistan.

She has also physical difficulties to face. Waterlogging and salination are taking place on a tremendous scale in West Pakistan. The official government figure is that 80,000 acres of land every year are going out of cultivation in Pakistan. I have discussed this with agricultural friends; they think the real loss is higher than the official figure; it is probably near 100,000 acres. At present a great experiment is being carried out with the aid of finance from the Development Loan Fund. Tube wells and pumps are being installed all over the place to try to pump the water out, and lower the water tables. It is an experiment and it is said to be very hopeful, but no one yet knows definitely the technical solution to the problem. If the experiment succeeds, then Pakistan has to face the problem of finding the tremendous sums of money required to reclaim the vast areas which have become waterlogged and to stop fresh land from becoming waterlogged. She has a first-class headache ahead of her.

When one tries to assess the general position, it is good to go back to 1947, to remember that Pakistan started from scratch, and to take off one's hat to her inasmuch as she was not overwhelmed by the difficulties facing her then, and has gone ahead in a way no one could have dreamed possible.

Whatever the rest of the world thinks of India and Pakistan, we in this country must be particularly interested, for selfish as well as for unselfish reasons. Our own business depends on the development of those countries; and, furthermore, they are in the Commonwealth.

I like harking back to 1947. I do not think anybody in this room, not

even Sir Gilbert, would have dared to guess then that India and Pakistan would both decide to stay inside the Commonwealth. It is unbelievable, a tremendous thing, and the ties between those countries and ourselves have grown yet closer, year by year; and I suppose that the closeness of those ties has never been better symbolized than by the incredible reception the Queen is receiving in both countries today. There is nothing like it in history. I am not an historian, but I can think of no historical parallel where a great country has deliberately abandoned ruling over another people and, where twelve or thirteen years afterwards, relations have been so good that the Head of the former Ruling State would be received with thrilled delight.

When I was in India and Pakistan just before Christmas I was much impressed by the eagerness of everybody to know about the Queen's visit. Again, I do not refer only to people at the top; I like talking to humble folk, taxi drivers, bus drivers, people to whom one has to talk in their own language. All these people wanted to know: "Are we going to see the Queen?" The excitement was something that one could feel.

Since then, I have had private reports—I distrust newspaper reports—but all of what has been said in the Press about the reception the Queen has had is in no way exaggerated. It has been a tremendous success. I would go so far as to say that, in a world where perhaps most things are depressing, where it is difficult to feel optimistic about the future of the human race, one of the most hopeful signs is this drawing together of three countries—India, Pakistan and Great Britain—where the pundits would have said a few years ago it could not happen. But it has happened. The ties between us are strong, and every one of us in this room, I am quite sure, is determined to see that they grow stronger.

DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions? Sir Percival has been kind enough to say he would be glad to answer questions if there are any.

Mr. JARDINE: Mr. Chairman, I understand that in Kerala the only thing that holds together the parties which are opposed to Communism is that they are opposed to Communism; so, in that situation, it is possible that the Communists might be re-elected. Is that a possible thing? And would that not be a very awkward situation if it happened?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: It is perfectly possible. It would be a very brave man who would say that that coalition would hold together for a very long time. All one can say at this particular moment is that it does not appear to be breaking up. I am not in a position to say whether the indoctrination by the Communists of the people has been stopped or not, whether this 6,000 or 7,000 people are carrying on their operations or not. But it would be foolish to state that the Coalition will hold together, or that the Communists might not get in again. My main comfort is in the firmness of the Government of India and the courage it had to intervene when the situation made it necessary.

Judge AMIR ALI: There was a very interesting article recently about the economic situation of the new India—not Pakistan, but the new India; and one of the things that struck an unprofessional observer was the insistence

that quite a few of these new enterprises in India were concentrating perhaps too much upon high-cost products; that the cost of producing X, Y, Z—a lathe, or machine tool, or something like that, was about four times, in one of these new plants, what it was in a former manufacturing country. Is that so? And could a clamping down upon these high-cost products and a diversion to something of more general utility, in more general demand, rather ease the problem of foreign assistance?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: Yes, there is a good deal of truth in the statement that high-cost manufacture is characteristic of quite a number of the important new industries of India today. There, as here, of course, labour is becoming more and more powerful; the pressure for increased wages is going on the whole time; and you have a situation where wages are not low, as they used to be, and at the same time productivity is low. Take an old-established thing like a jute mill, for example: you cannot compare the output of a jute mill in India with one in Dundee; there is no comparison at all.

And now that all wages have gone up, costs of manufacture are high, and there is a serious risk of India finding herself priced out of the export markets. I have some experience, for example, of the tea industry. East Africa today can land tea in the London market for about 1s. 6d. per pound less than India.

Some people think that it would be better for India to give up heavy industry, to a great extent, and concentrate on light industry. But apart from economic considerations there is a great emotional urge to develop heavy industry.

Pakistan presents a similar situation. She is determined to go on with plans for steel; but she could get her steel from abroad and the costs would probably be less. This is a matter of emotional feelings and national prestige. But I share your doubts about the balance of industry.

Mr. WHITE: Could Sir Percival say something about the position of the English language in India and Pakistan, and whether it strikes him as having deteriorated much since 1947?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: You are thinking of the standards of English speaking? I should say the deterioration is very great indeed. One sees it not only in speech but in the office notes. You very rarely get beautifully written office notes now, except from that very, very small and rapidly dwindling element of the old I.C.S. who wrote notes in correct and polished English. You do not often get that today. It is generally agreed that in the schools and universities the standard of English teaching has gone down. The British Council is doing an extraordinarily good job, trying to counteract that tendency. I have enormous respect for the way they are trying to fight this kind of thing. But the standard has gone down.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no more questions, I would like, on your behalf, to thank Sir Percival most warmly for what has really been a fascinating analysis of the principal problems that confront those two great countries. I would agree strongly with what he has said, that none of us could have foreseen what has actually happened. First of all, certainly thirty or forty years ago, we should have been happy and very much surprised if we had been able to think that, thirty years after, they would have

been members of the Commonwealth, welcoming the Queen with the spontaneity and enthusiasm that has been so characteristic wherever she has gone, and which will, I am sure, continue to characterize the remainder of her tour in both countries.

I say nothing about external relations, though what Sir Percival has said in the case of India, about China, and in the case of India, also, his analysis of Communism, is of the greatest interest and importance. But both countries are confronted by two similar problems, the problem of population and the problem of food supplies, and by a third—not a problem, but an inevitable ambition, the anxious desire of any newly independent country to make itself economically self-sufficient. Any new country that starts off is bound to stretch itself, and I would agree with Sir Percival that, had it not been for the financial assistance that has been so readily given from outside—and I am very glad to think that we, within our comparatively small means, have made a great contribution in that way—without that financial assistance, it would not have been possible for India or for Pakistan to develop on the basis of their Five-Year Plans in the astonishing way that they have so far done.

What is happening in these countries is going to demand leadership, which they have got, and great sacrifices on the part of the inhabitants, both in India and in Pakistan. So far, there has been an encouraging realization of that fact, and there has been an immense progress in India; but I would agree with what Sir Percival has said about the stimulating effect in Pakistan of the strong atmosphere of austerity that has been introduced by Field-Marshal Ayub Khan's administration.

As it is late in the afternoon, I do not want to enter into any other detail. I would like first, if I might, to associate myself with Sir Percival's tribute to the work of the World Bank and particularly that of Bill Liff, who was knighted yesterday by the Queen Mother in some recognition of the contribution of himself and of the Bank; and also to associate myself with what he has said about an improvement in relations which those of us who have served in the sub-continent in the old days, when there were great strains and great difficulties, would hardly have believed possible.

I never remember, in forty years' experience of the sub-continent, a time when there was greater friendliness, greater mutual understanding, greater admiration on both sides; because our friends in the sub-continent accept now that we did a great job in our day, and we are filled with admiration by what they have done in their day. These countries have built themselves up, and it is a great happiness to us to see that happen and to make any contribution to it that we can.

But nothing could be more encouraging, encouraging from the point of view of the Commonwealth as well as from the point of view of the relations between these three countries, than the way in which these things have developed.

I do not propose, Ladies and Gentlemen, to take any more of your time, but I would like to ask you to express in the usual way your gratitude to Sir Percival Griffiths who has kindly come to give us today so illuminating and fascinating an address.

(The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation.)

THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

This is the ninth in a series of reviews of new Soviet literature on the six Muslim republics of the U.S.S.R. and the countries bordering on them. The present article deals with books received between December, 1960 and the end of April, 1961. It is contributed by the Central Asian Research Centre in collaboration with the Soviet Affairs Study Group of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

I. CENTRAL ASIA

History of Central Asian Literature

THE creation of national literatures has been one of the principal aims of the many cultural reforms instituted by the Soviet régime in Central Asia. Before the revolution, the literature of the Central Asian peoples was to a large extent oral and consisted mainly of poetry in the form of traditional epics and songs, and of picaresque tales narrated by professional story-tellers. The rapid advance of popular education as well as the need for a written propaganda medium required the creation of more formal literatures, and it is not surprising that these in the main followed Russian models. The task of the authorities was a formidable one: they had on the one hand to create literatures which were "national in form," that is to say written in the newly systematized national languages and reflecting local colour and national characteristics; while on the other they had to ensure that all the literatures conformed to certain ideological and stylistic standards which were stipulated for Soviet literature throughout the Union.

Hitherto, Soviet writing on the history of Central Asian literature has been confined to articles and short books on the literature of the various republics. A much more comprehensive work has now appeared in the shape of *The History of the Literatures of the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan* (Istoriya literatur narodov Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana. Publishing House of Moscow University, Moscow, 1960. 491 pp.). This book is edited by M. I. Bogdanova, who also wrote the introduction, and is one of a series of study aids now being prepared about the various groups of people making up the Soviet Union and designed to show the similarity in their "historical destiny" as well as their ethnic and linguistic peculiarities. According to the introduction, the literatures of the Tadzhik, Uzbek, Karakalpak, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirgiz peoples are united by a general economic, social and historical past, as well as by geographic proximity. All these peoples are Turkic, except for the Tadzhiks, whose literature has, however, been included in this survey since, although it is in an Iranian language, it has long been in close association with the Turkic language literatures of Central Asia.

The peoples of Central Asia are not regarded as equal in historical

development. Some of the formerly nomadic people such as the Kirgiz had no written language of their own before the Revolution. Nevertheless, Bogdanova finds that the literatures of all the peoples have three things in common: first, the important part played by oral poetry in their cultural life; secondly, the dominating position of poetry itself, with prose and the drama hardly appearing before the Revolution; and lastly, the mutual and varied interaction which these literatures have had on each other. Originally this interaction was brought about both by the direct intercourse among the poets of the various peoples as well as by the extent to which they all drew on the literatures of other peoples of the Near and Middle East. Another factor contributing to similarity was "the similar conditions of life and custom, the common religion of Islam, the social and national yoke, and especially the yoke of feudalism." Great emphasis in the book is placed on the influence of the Russians on Central Asian literature, particularly in respect of "humanist and freedom-loving ideals, which have helped the development of realistic tendencies." Progressive writers are described as having played an important part in the demand for economic reform and for links with "advanced Russian culture and education." In dealing with such literature as existed in the nineteenth century an interesting and unusual reference is made to the advantage of the universal use of the Arabic script. The fact that this script was written without vowels obscured the many phonetic differences among the Turkic languages and thus enabled the various peoples to read each other's language without difficulty.

The development of literature under the Soviet régime, and the introduction of new genres such as prose, drama and literary criticism, is naturally given great prominence. The new Central Asian literatures are described as part of the "multi-national Soviet literature, developing under Communist ideas of Soviet patriotism, internationalism, friendship of peoples and the moral and political unity of the peoples of the U.S.S.R." The general object underlying this book seems to be to minimize the individuality of national cultures in the U.S.S.R. and to lay increased emphasis on Soviet culture as a whole. Although each national literature is treated historically, their development in different periods is described in political terms with the result that all are seen to have been subjected to the same influences. For example, the section on Tadzhik literature is divided as follows: 1, Oral national poetic work; 2, Ancient Tadzhik literature (the period of slave-owning society); 3, Literature from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries (the period of the development of feudalism); 4, Literature from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries (the decline of feudalism); and 5, Modern Tadzhik literature (after the union of Central Asia with Russia). Great emphasis is given in each section to the influence of Russia and particularly to Soviet influence and ends with a summary showing recent progress in the construction of schools, numbers of students, and newspapers, magazines and books in the native languages and in Russian.

A collection of studies by Turkic and Mongolian scholars has been published under the title of *Turkic and Mongolian Linguistics and Folklore* (Tyurko-mongol'skoye yazykoznaniye i fol'kloristika, Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1960. 350 pp.). The first group

of studies is on linguistic problems of the Turkic and Mongolian languages, including one by V. D. Artamoshina on the formation and peculiarities of the language of the Central Asian poets, and another by G. F. Blagova on the Chagatay language as it was at the end of the fifteenth century. The latter discusses the languages of Central Asia, especially the early development of the Uzbek literary language. Studies by P. I. Kuznetsov and E. A. Grunina are about grammatical points in the Turkic languages, and M. N. Orlovskaya writes of degrees of comparison in the Mongolian language. Other studies on the Turkic languages are presented by R. R. Yusipova, A. A. Rozhanskiy and R. A. Aganin. The studies on folklore are confined to Mongolian. B. Kh. Todayeva writes on the folklore of the Sinkiang Mongols, G. I. Mikhaylov on the evolution of the Mongolian heroic epos, and G. D. Sanzheyev on the Kyzyl manuscript of the Mongolian epic tale *Khan-Kharanguy*. A final article by A. A. Valitova describes a Tatar version of the famous epos *Alpamysh*. This epos is also the subject of a book by V. M. Zhirmunskiy, *Legends of the Alpamysh and the Bogatyr Tale* (Skazaniye ob Alpamysh i bogatyrskaya skazka, Institute of Eastern Studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1960. 334 pp.). The author sees in this famous poem a living example of the epic creative work of the peoples of Central Asia. The *Alpamysh* dates back at least to the ninth or tenth century, and in this book Zhirmunskiy describes a number of different versions of it, including those of Kungrat, Oguz, Kipchak and Altay.

Archæological Discoveries

Archæological Monuments of the Southern Rayons of the Osh Oblast (Arkeologicheskkiye pamyatniki yuzhnykh rayonov Oshskoy oblasti, Institute of History of Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1960. 174 pp.) by Yu. A. Zadneprovskiy, describes ancient archæological relics of the agricultural population of the southern areas of Osh Oblast. This is not an independent historical and cultural area, but lies on the periphery of the Fergana Valley. The book gives an account of the many expeditions made there, and of the ceramics discovered. There is a description of the settlements of the ancient farmers, with diagrams of excavations, towns, skeletons and other indications of the culture of the time. Material is supplied for the composition of an archæological map of southern Kirgizia, and there is a detailed list of the discoveries made, accompanied by a map. Much of this data was gathered in expeditions taking place between 1954 and 1958.

Data on the history of the material culture and art of Tokharistan, the mediæval name of an area straddling the Amu-Dar'ya River east of Tecmez, form the subject of a book entitled *Balalyk-Tepe* (Institute of History and Archæology of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Tashkent, 1960. 228 pp.) by L. I. Al'baum. It is devoted to a study of the archæological monuments of Tokharistan, and is based on new research done by the author in the Angor rayon of the Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast. It is intended both for specialists in archæology and history, and for the general reader interested in the history of the culture and art of Central Asia. It is an attractively presented book; the type is large and clear and many

pictures and diagrams are included. The research was done by the author in 1950-55, and the excavations made by him are the only source of information on the third and fourth centuries in this area. A detailed map of the area is given, and there are reproductions of murals. Some of these are of human figures and are very well reproduced, with the outline discovered on one side of the page, and the same outline filled in in colour on the other.

Science and Production in Kazakhstan

Science in Soviet Kazakhstan from 1920-60 (Nauka sovetskogo Kazakhstana, 1920-60, Alma-Ata, 1960. 691 pp.). Broadly speaking, this book is devoted to a description of scientific research and achievements in Kazakhstan during the past 40 years with special reference to their effect on production. As everywhere in the Soviet Union the term science covers a very wide field ranging from physics and mathematics to ethnography, linguistics and even philosophy. In Kazakhstan there are now 55 scientific institutions, including 25 research institutes, and these provide work for nearly 5,000 people. Among the employees are two active members of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, 39 academicians and 36 candidate members of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, 98 Doctors and 517 "science candidates." Justifiable pride is taken in the progress of scientific research in Kazakhstan, but for Western readers the book has an unmistakable propaganda flavour. K. I. Satpayev, President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, contributes a 17-page article on the work and scope of the Academy itself. There are four main categories of research—mineral resources, physics and mathematical sciences, biology and medical sciences, and social sciences. The latter embraces five institutes, i.e., history, archæology and ethnography, economics, language study, literature and art, and philosophy and law. In discussing the future extension of the Academy's work, Satpayev lays particular stress on the development of new aids to industrial and agricultural production and the discovery of new raw materials. Many of the other articles are on such subjects as geochemical research, ferrous metals, fuel oils, metallurgy, chemistry, astronomy and agriculture. There is a long article on the development of historical studies in Kazakhstan. Although these are said to have begun in the 1930s, their systematization is a comparatively recent development. It will be recalled that the comprehensive history of the Kazakh people which first appeared in 1943 later came under severe official criticism and had to be completely revised and partially re-written. The book contains shorter studies on archæology, music, the publishing activity of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences and the Central Scientific Library. The majority of the contributors have Kazakh or other Asian names, but it should be remembered that less than 30 per cent. of the republic's population is now Kazakh.

Government and Geography

The Pearl of Central Asia (Zhemchuzhina Sredney Azii, State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, Moscow, 1960. 76 pp.). This

is a study of the Fergana Valley, the most thickly populated area of Central Asia, which includes parts of present-day Uzbekistan (Andizhan and Fergana oblasts), Kirgizia (Osh oblast) and Tadzhikistan (Leninabad oblast). The area is one of the most important cotton and silk-growing areas in the U.S.S.R. The author, Z. Akramov, gives a brief history of the area, including the standard reference to the benefits accruing from union with Russia: "Only the union of the Fergana Valley with Russia in 1876 cut short the internecine war. Despite the reactionary policy of the Tsarist government, the union of Central Asia with Russia played a progressive rôle in its life and soon led to profound political, economic and social changes in the territory of the former Turkestan Kray." In 1959, according to Akramov, 3,837,000 people were living in the Fergana Valley, which represents 28 per cent. of the entire population of the Central Asian republics. Further information on the population, culture, climate, economy in general, heavy industry, light, and food industry, transportation and communications, the cities of the valley (Fergana, Andizhan, Namangan, Osh, Dzhahalal-abad, Leninabad, Kokand) and the planned development of the area is given in separate chapters. Several maps are included, showing the distribution of industrial enterprises in the valley, the administrative divisions, and the irrigation scheme of the area, with locations of areas where cotton is grown and where gardens, vineyards and forests are situated.

The Development of the Soviet State System in Tadzhikistan (Razvitiye sovetskoy gosudarstvennosti v Tadzhikistane, State Publishing House of Juridical Literature, Moscow, 1960. 164 pp.) by N. D. Degtyarenko, treats mainly of the development of the state apparatus in Tadzhikistan since the October Revolution. It includes a 16-page section summarizing the previous history of the area and pointing out that before the Revolution it was not a separate state, the area being divided among different states in Central Asia, all with a low degree of social, economic and political development. In 1865 the Turkestan Territory was formed, including some of what is now Tadzhikistan. In 1868, by a treaty of the Kokand Khanate with Russia, this territory was joined by the Fergana oblast. In June of that year Bukhara became dependent on Russia. The majority of the Tadzhiks, according to Degtyarenko, including two-thirds of present-day Tadzhikistan, only became free from their "feudal and despotic yoke" in 1920. The rest of the book describes the establishment of Soviet power in Turkestan and Bukhara, the state demarcation of Central Asia according to nationalities and the formation of the Tadzhik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and later the development of the Tadzhik S.S.R. There is an analysis of the republican constitution and an account of the development of the state apparatus.

Two short books have recently been published dealing with the development of collectivized agriculture and co-operatives. The first, *The Implementation of the Leninist Co-operative Plan in Turkmenistan* (Osushchestvleniye leninskogo kooperativnogo plana v Turkmenistane, Turkmen State Publishing House, Ashkhabad, 1960. 46 pp.) by K. Karadzhaev describes the pre-Soviet agricultural system and the growth of collectivization and co-operatives in Turkmenistan after the Revolu-

tion. The second, *Co-operation Among the Dungans of Kirgizia and Kazakhstan*, 1923-30 (Kooperirovaniye sredi dungan Kirgizii i Kazakhstana, 1923-30, Institute of Language and Literature of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1960, 59 pp.) by I. Yusupov is of greater interest. According to Yusupov, the collective farm movement developed spontaneously up to 1930 in Kirgizia. This resulted in the organization of new collective farms without any previous planning. The book describes how reforms were introduced and progress eventually made towards complete collectivization. It is significant that during the past two years a great deal of Soviet material has been devoted to this small community of Chinese Muslims, about 21,000 in number, who settled in Semirech'ye towards the end of the last century. Both Kirgizia and Kazakhstan, where the community is located, border on Singkiang, whose 5,000,000 Muslim population includes the largest concentration of Dungans in the whole of China. In the present indeterminate state of Sino-Soviet relations, it is natural that the Soviet authorities should wish to draw attention to the extent to which these Chinese expatriates have become associated with the Soviet régime. (For a detailed description of the Dungans see *Central Asian Review*, Vol. IX, No. 2.)

II. AZERBAJDZHAN

Historical and Notable Places of Azerbaydzhani (Azerbaydzhani-istoricheskkiye i dostoprimechatel'nyye mesta, Publishing House of the Azerbaydzhani Academy of Sciences, Baku, 1960, 147 pp.), edited by M. A. Kaziyev, is a kind of guide to the history, archæology, architecture and art of Azerbaydzhani. The book begins with a 22-page historical sketch of the Republic, and then goes into a more detailed study of the country's places of interest by geographic areas: Baku and Apsheron, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and other districts. There are also 70 pages of pictures in black and white, showing monuments, museums, theatres, fortresses and many other places described in the book.

The History of Karabakh (Istoriya Karabaga, Baku, 1959, 208 pp.), is a reprint of the original manuscript work by Mirza Jamal Javanshir Karabaghi (his name is Russianized to read Mirza Dzhamal Dzhevanshir Karabagskiy), who originally held the post of vezir in the independent khanate of Karabakh in Azerbaydzhani. After the liquidation of the khanate by the Russians, he was appointed to the provincial administration (1822-40), and died in 1853. He originally wrote his history in Persian, and it is now published in Azerbaydzhani for the first time. The present edition contains the original Persian as well as Azerbaydzhani and Russian versions. It consists of seven main chapters, thirteen smaller sections and a conclusion, and is in effect a short political history of Karabakh from ancient times up to 1828. In the introduction contributed by the Azerbaydzhani Academy of Sciences it is described as one of the most valuable primary sources of Azerbaydzhani history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The author was one of the best educated people of his time and, in

addition to knowing many languages, had studied astronomy, history, geography, and medicine. Apart from describing the political history of the khanate, the author also gives information on the irrigation system, crops, the situation of the peasants and the nomadic tribes, the system of taxation, military organization, and many other social and economic subjects.

III. THE BORDERLANDS

Indian Economy

The Economy of Modern India (Ekonomika sovremennoy Indii, Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1960, 421 pp.) contains a number of essays by the leading Soviet specialists on India on the social and economic development of India since she gained her independence in 1947. In the introduction, apparently by the editorial board (A. M. D'yakov, A. I. Levkovskiy and S. M. Mel'man), the book claims that the British left India with a backward agricultural system, "dominated by feudal survivals," and an under-developed industrial system. The need to dispose of this legacy in order to make a fresh start has, according to the authors, limited India's progress since 1947, but some successes are noted. This book deals with such problems as agrarian reforms and the general agricultural situation, changes occurring in the role of foreign capital in Indian economy "and its new forms of penetration," the significance and peculiarities of state capitalism, Indian private capitalist enterprise, and the position of the working class. There are sections on the state and development of heavy and light industry, transport, the Indian tax system and foreign trade relations. Mention is made of the aid given by the Soviet Union to India, considered by the authors as having been of great service to the country's economic development. A chapter by R. P. Gurvich is devoted to India's agricultural problems and particularly to state measures taken in developing agriculture and its technical side. Other subjects dealt with are the significance of agricultural co-operatives, communal projects, the development of commercial agriculture and capitalist relations, and consumer goods production. A number of tables on agricultural output during the past ten years, per capita production, and the volume of grain imports are given. R. A. Ul'yanovskiy describes agrarian reforms in India, which began in 1946 in an area covering over half of the land area of the country, but claims that much still remains to be done. S. M. Mel'man is the author of an article on "Foreign Monopolistic Capital in the Indian Economy," with special reference to the influence of British, American and Pakistani capital. In 1956 Britain was still the largest investor of foreign private capital in the Indian economy—that is to say, she contributed 82.6 per cent. of all foreign private long-term investments, or 4,060.8 million rupees. According to Mel'man, American private investments are mainly in American companies operating in India. State capitalism and private capitalist ownership in India are the subject of an article by A. I. Levkovskiy. He says that the policy of the Indian state, especially its economic policy, is directed towards the strengthening and expansion of state capitalism, and he quotes Indian official documents to this effect. In some fields (coal, steel production, shipbuilding, aircraft, etc.) new enterprises can only

be founded by the state. R. N. Dolnykova writes of factory production in India, and gives statistics on its growth. In 1947, for example, there were 14,576 factories in India, employing 2,274,000 workers. By 1955 there were 30,147 factories, with 2,690,403 workers. Many tables showing the development of various fields of production are supplied. There is a description by M. N. Yegorova of the industrial proletariat, with statistics of the various industries and their location. Other articles in this book include L. B. Alayev's article on light industry; and studies by G. K. Shirokov, T. I. Shevtsova and A. L. Batalov on the tax system, foreign trade and the development of transport in India.

On the whole, this book succeeds in what appears to be its primary aim of presenting a fairly thorough study of the present-day economy of India. It has, however, a secondary aim of presenting British and American participation in India's industrial growth in the worst possible light. It is characteristic of the whole Soviet approach to the subject of aid to underdeveloped countries that it can attribute no credit whatever to any measures taken by countries outside the Eastern bloc. This is the second substantial work on modern Indian affairs published in the U.S.S.R. since 1959, the first being *The History of Modern India* (Noveyshaya Istoriya Indii 1922-55, Moscow, 1959, 757 pp.), of which the forthcoming appearance of an English translation was announced by Moscow radio last April. It seems highly probable that the work under review will also be translated in due course.

Another shorter work on the Indian economy is *India's Economic Independence and American Credits* (Ekonomicheskaya nezavisimost' Indii i amerikanskiye kredity, Institute of Oriental Studies of U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1960, 93 pp.), by P. I. Pavlov. In this the author examines the relationships of the various classes of Indian society to the problem of the country's economic independence, describing political and economic achievements as well as the difficulties still to be faced. He says that the workers and the national bourgeoisie have a common interest in gaining economic independence for India, but that they have different views on the further development of the country, especially on methods and sources of financing economic progress and on their ultimate aims. In the Marxist sense, this makes them antagonistic classes. Competition between the two main economic systems in India is discussed, as well as the rate of economic development, the accumulation of capital, foreign investments, etc. According to Pavlov, America would not help India if it were not for the threat from Communism. Charts are given of the loans, credits and grants given India by the capitalist countries, along with what the author calls the significance of India's collaboration with the socialist countries. In a review of this book appearing in *Problemy Vostokovedeniya* (1961, No. 1, pp. 188-9), the author is criticized for speaking of competition between two systems—that is, socialism and capitalism—in India, because India is really following only the road of capitalist development. Pavlov is also criticized for not making it clear that his references to planning are confined to Government planning. The greater part of the heavy industry of the country remains in private hands, and is not subject to any centralized planning at all.

Persia

The Persian Educational System (Sistdema prosveshcheniya v Irane. Institute of Eastern Studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1959, 83 pp.), by Ye. A. Doroshenko, reviews the history and current state of Persian education. Until 1870 theology was the basis of all education in Persia, but even after then, according to the author, Muslim dogma continued to play an important part. Doroshenko gives a brief history of the development of the various types of education—primary, middle, higher, professional, etc., asserting that although universal primary education is now obligatory for all Persian children, 90 per cent. of the Persian population are still illiterate. He is especially critical of the Americans; although he gives them credit for having established many of the schools now existing, and for having helped in the necessary reforms of the educational system, he claims that all this was done for the purpose of “Americanizing” the Persian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. The author is also most critical of the emphasis on the past glories of Persian culture and history and of the treatment of the people as a single ethnic entity. The Persian “ruling circles” are accused of following a determined programme of “Iranization” of the whole country, and of treating all the inhabitants of the country as belonging to one culture, without taking into consideration the existence of national minorities.

Sinkiang

A series of articles presented as a joint work of the Institute of Geography of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and the Sinkiang Combined Expedition of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has recently been published as a book under the title of *Natural Conditions of Sinkiang* (Prirodnnye usloviya Sin'tszyana, Publishing House of U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1960, 194 pp.). In 1957 the Chinese Academy of Sciences organized a scientific expedition in Sinkiang to study the climate and other natural conditions of this part of north-western China. The Chinese invited a number of Soviet scholars acquainted with the natural conditions of the desert areas of the U.S.S.R. to participate in this undertaking, known as the Sinkiang Combined Expedition. The results are recorded in the present book, which is being simultaneously published in Chinese by the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The articles are technical and deal with the formation of surface flow and underground waters, the regularity of soil and vegetation covers, geomorphological peculiarities, the paleographic past of some of the large areas of Sinkiang, and data on land reclamation projects. The Expedition hoped that as a result of its studies of the conditions and resources of Sinkiang, expanded agricultural production in a previously barren part of China would be possible. A more detailed report of this book and the separate articles in it is appearing in *Central Asian Review*, Vol. IX, No. 3.

Russian-Chinese Relations in the 17th Century (Russkokitayskiye otnosheniya v XVII v., Siberian Section of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1960, 238 pp.), by V. G. Shcheben'kov, of the Far Eastern Branch of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, is based on archive

material and special historical literature published in Russian, Chinese, Japanese and the Western European languages, much of it now being used for the first time. The book begins with a detailed survey of the source material used and this occupies nearly one-quarter of the whole work. The source material is divided into three main groups: The classics of Marxism and Leninism; archives, works of travel, and government reports in Russian, Chinese and West European languages; and finally, historical literature published in various countries. In introducing his subject, the author reviews what he calls the "prerequisites" of the origin and development of relations between countries. He rejects the opinion expressed by some historians that relations between Russia and China had their origin merely in the fact that the two countries adjoined each other territorially. While not denying the various territorial disputes in the Amur region he advances the view that the establishment of official relations was determined mainly by political and economic conditions in the two countries in the seventeenth century. At the beginning of the century Russia's condition was serious, as a result of wars, bad harvests, famine and the class struggle. The later development of a monetary economy, the mass peasant migration to Siberia and the foundation of Russia's large cities had the natural consequence of developing trade relations with the East. These relations were further stimulated by a fall in the demand for Russian furs in Europe owing to the development of the British woollen industry and the import of furs from North America. The book goes on to trace the course of the development of Russo-Chinese relations from the visit of the first Russian Ambassador to China in 1619 to the missions of Baykov in 1654 and of Spafariy in 1675 and culminating in the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689, which was the first treaty signed by a European power with China. The book ends with a ten-page bibliography with the items given in their original languages.

ALAN BERSON.

CORRESPONDENCE

CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCH CENTRE,
66B, KING'S ROAD,
LONDON, S.W.3.

May 4, 1961.

To the Editor.

DEAR SIR,

In replying to Squadron Leader Long's letter in the last issue of the Journal, I should like first of all to assure him that his expression of appreciation of this Centre's feature on the Muslim Republics of the Soviet Union is most welcome, and that so far from resenting his criticisms we have given them the most careful consideration.

On balance, I think Squadron Leader Long's first criticism must be considered a valid one. Justification for the inclusion of these general examples of Party ideology can, however, be found in the fact that the interests of the great majority of the Journal's readers lie in Asian affairs and that they are not necessarily familiar with Marxist-Leninist ideological precepts. Pronouncements which may be familiar and platitudinous to sovietologists are not so to everyone.

I must admit to being much less appreciative of Squadron Leader Long's second point of criticism. If he would read the book in question—which I venture to believe he has not yet done—he would see that the title *In Search of Light* (in the sense of enlightenment) is quite appropriate, whereas "In Search of the World" would be quite inappropriate. I am, indeed, constrained to wonder what "In Search of the World" could mean in any conceivable context.

The Russians are aware of the ambiguity which may arise from having a word which may mean both "light" and "world," and another word "mir" which may mean both "world" and "peace." If for some curious reason a writer wished to convey the idea of "In Search of the World" in a title, he would certainly use a qualificative in order to avoid misunderstanding. For instance, he would write "V Poiskakh Novogo (or Starogo) Sveta." More probably, however, he would use the word "mir," also with a qualificative, say "Pogibshego" or "Neizvestnogo." "V Poiskakh Mira" would simply mean "In Search of Peace."

I should not, of course, have ventured to pontificate on this point without first consulting the very highest academic authorities as well as a number of other educated Russians. I think Squadron Leader Long would have been well advised to do the same before writing his letter.

Yours truly,
G. E. WHEELER.

PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA IN ASIA

By LIEUT.-COLONEL G. E. WHEELER, C.I.E., C.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, April 12, 1961, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Whitworth Jones, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen: First of all, I have to convey to you, and to our lecturer today, our Chairman's regret that he cannot be here this afternoon. He wishes me to express his apologies to you and to Colonel Wheeler, and to say how sorry he is to miss this lecture.

Well, I do not have to introduce Colonel Wheeler to you, Ladies and Gentlemen—one of the most senior members of the Society and one of our Vice-Presidents. He is going to talk to you today about Propaganda and Counter Propaganda in Asia, and I think it is difficult to conceive what more elusive, difficult and important subject there is for us to think about than that.

I will not stand between you and the lecturer any longer, but will ask Colonel Wheeler to address us.

In this the antique and well-noted face
Of plain old form is much disfigured;
And, like a shifted wind unto a sail,
It makes the course of thoughts to fetch about,
Startles and frights consideration,
Makes sound opinion sick and truth suspected.

SHAKESPEARE was not thinking of propaganda when he wrote these lines, but I think they describe quite well the effect that propaganda is supposed to have in Asia and which, in certain circumstances, it may have. My purpose today is neither to attempt a general treatise on propaganda, nor what is so often done, to say how bad and ineffective our own propaganda is by comparison with, say, Soviet propaganda. All I propose to do, after touching briefly on some of the basic factors and principles of propaganda, is to consider the circumstances which have had a bearing on the conduct and effectiveness of propaganda in Asia in the recent past and which still affect it today. Finally, I shall deal with some of the differences between Communist propaganda resources and methods and our own.

I should like to make it clear at the outset that although I have had a prolonged experience of propaganda in the past, I have no connection with it now, and that, like the majority of this audience, I have no detailed knowledge of the propaganda operations at present directed towards the peoples of Asia by Britain. If I occasionally emphasize the necessity of certain methods and actions, this should not be taken as implying that they are not already in operation.

The history of organized propaganda in Asia is a very short one. First in the field was the Soviet Union, which began the training of Asian

propagandists and the printing of propaganda literature in Asian languages in the early 1920's. The main agency for the distribution of this propaganda was the Komintern, whose representatives were to be found on the staffs of all Soviet missions and consulates in Asian countries. With the growth of the Nazi régime, Germany began to pay a great deal of attention to propaganda in Asia and particularly in the Middle East. In the early part of the war, German radio propaganda in Persian, Arabic and Turkish was extremely effective, as was some of the German printed propaganda, notably the multi-lingual illustrated magazine *Signal*.

Britain, whose propaganda during the First World War had been highly successful in Europe, had never attempted any organized propaganda in Asia and, except for a limited amount of broadcasting, did not do so till the Second World War was well under way. Even then and for many years to come there was much scepticism about the utility of propaganda, and when its necessity was at last reluctantly conceded, it was regarded for a time as a disreputable and almost menial activity not to be engaged in or even recognized by career diplomats.

Like Britain, the United States had never concerned itself with propaganda in Asia. It did not in fact do so until it entered the war, and it then confined its attention largely to the Far East.

Since the end of the last shooting war, the propaganda war in Asia has been, broadly speaking, divided into two camps with the Soviet Union on one side and the United States and Britain on the other, and all three powers have greatly developed their propaganda organizations. More recently the situation has been complicated by the entry into the field of China, whose interests now seem to coincide less and less with those of the Soviet Union. The Asian target, to use propaganda jargon, may be said to consist of three elements: countries within the orbit of or inclined towards the West; those within the orbit of or inclined towards the U.S.S.R.; and the so-called "neutralist" countries which aim at resisting the blandishments of both the power blocs while accepting any material benefits which either may have to offer.

There are many recognized factors and principals which govern propaganda, but I only want to refer to three now. The first is that people can be brought to believe only what they want to believe, or what they are forced to believe. "Want" must be taken to include ambition and fear. People can be "forced" to believe something in two ways: either their access to information can be so controlled that only one conclusion is to be drawn from the available data; or they are given compelling proof of every statement made to them. The second factor is one which propaganda has in common with advertising. In many Asian countries the importance of a foreign power is assessed not so much by the quality as by the extent of its propaganda effort. A country which does no propaganda, like a firm which does no advertising, may be thought of in Asian countries as being without any policy or as being in low water financially. The third factor or principle is one in which propaganda differs from advertising. Commercial firms must confine themselves to extolling the merits of their own wares; they cannot openly attack each other. But a nation must nail down and defeat hostile propaganda about itself. In other words, it must con-

duct counter-propaganda. There is of course nothing new about these factors, but they are often lost sight of by the public, who alternately believe that propaganda can do everything or nothing.

Let us now consider the circumstances, or rather, perhaps it would be better to say, the climate of opinion, at present prevailing in Asia, because it is on these circumstances and climate that the effectiveness of propaganda will depend. If it is true, as is so often claimed, that Soviet propaganda is far more effective than our own, we have to decide how much this is due to the superiority of Soviet resources and methods, and how much to the current climate of opinion being more favourable to Soviet arguments and blandishments than to those of the West. If we decide that the climate is more favourable to the Russians than to ourselves, how has this come about? Can it be changed by propaganda or any other method?

In considering this matter of the climate of opinion, I think it is necessary to bear in mind the following. Of all the countries of the Middle East, and of South and South-East Asia, only Persia has any first-hand experience of Russian or Soviet occupation, or with a few exceptions, of the Soviet system of government. On the other hand, nearly all these countries have had long experience of Western, and particularly of British, military occupation, economic control and political and cultural mentorship. And nearly all of them have found it expedient to favour the Western rather than the Soviet notion of democracy, without, however, necessarily believing in it as the system best suited to their requirements. Secondly, in nearly all these countries, possible exceptions being Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, there is a left-wing intelligentsia which is opposed to the existing system of government and regards Communism or the Soviet system either as a desirable alternative, or as a convenient weapon with which to fight the present "ruling class" and Western influence. Thirdly, none of the countries in question is entirely immune from, or impervious to, Soviet propaganda. In many of them it circulates freely and has a considerable vogue among young people. In some, such as Persia, its currency may be restricted by force, but latent opposition to existing régimes is inclined to make its clandestine appeal more effective. In others, such as Afghanistan, its circulation and appeal are relatively small, but perhaps no smaller than those of Western propaganda.

To sum up, South, South-West and South-East Asia have long been familiar with Western armies, Western oil companies and what they have come to think of as Western exploitation, whereas, except for Persia, they are only now beginning to have first-hand experience of the Russians, and of the Russians in what seems to be a very generous and accommodating mood. Even if the Russians had never done any propaganda at all in Asia, it would have been quite natural for the countries of Asia to attribute all their ills and misfortunes to the ever-present and all-pervading West and to look hopefully for assistance from what they have no difficulty in recognizing as the West's rival—namely, the Soviet Union. The saying, "The devil you know is better than the devil you don't know," hardly applies in Asia. It is from the newcomer to the Asian scene that salvation is expected, especially if the newcomer's propaganda pattern includes colourful abuse of previous performers.

So far I have dealt only with what the West calls the free countries, where people believe what they "want" to believe, whether from ambition, fear, or from genuine conviction. There is also the question of the Communist or Communist-controlled countries of Asia, where the authorities to a greater or lesser degree "force" people to believe what they wish them to believe by controlling their access to information. The exclusion from these countries of the facts about the free world may not now be so complete as it was in the past, but it is complete enough to prevent people from making any comparison between their own official propaganda and the truth. Soviet education, segregation and thought-conditioning during the past forty-four years have been so thorough that even when they encounter the truth presented from non-Communist sources, most people now instinctively reject it because they know or sense that it is unacceptable to the authorities. This is true of all Soviet citizens and particularly of Asians brought up under the Soviet régime.

I think you may agree with me that both outside and inside the Communist world, circumstances and the climate of opinion are, generally speaking, favourable to Communist and particularly to Soviet propaganda. Before going on to consider what can be done to change this climate of opinion, I should like to refer briefly to the question of Soviet propaganda technique and methods, which are widely supposed to be far better than our own. Early Soviet attempts to influence Asian opinion by propaganda were as ill-judged as those of the West. We thought that the peoples of Asia were interested in the British way of life, in British justice and in cottages nestling in the Cotswolds. The Russians thought that the drab equality of the proletarian revolution must have an attraction for the "toiling masses" of Asia. Both sides have learnt much by experience. Both, of course, still make frequent mistakes, but on the whole I should say that on both sides the psychological and practical understanding of Asian opinion is now fairly good. Both sides use the same established propaganda media—radio, films, and the written word, possibly with equivalent effect. The great difference between East and West is that whereas in the Communist world all potential instruments of propaganda such as trade, science, public utterance, scholarship, literature and the fine arts are geared to the government machine, in the West they are not only not geared to the government machine, but may, and sometimes do, either unconsciously or deliberately, sabotage it. In war-time there are ways of dealing with those who from motives of treachery, personal gain, and occasionally from sincere if misguided conviction, act against the interests of their country. The fact, however, must be faced that in peace-time or in the cold war the Western democracies have no means of dealing with such people and that they cannot mobilize all their forces in the same way as the totalitarian countries can. But this does not mean either that the Communist use of what may be called their non-technical propaganda resources is always intelligent and successful, or that much more could not be done by the West in using the same resources without in any way jeopardizing its democratic freedom.

A great deal could, of course, be said on each of the activities I have just mentioned, on the work done by business firms in promoting British policy

and prestige and by the British Council in projecting British culture. I shall, however, only deal with two: first, public utterance in the sense of public statements by prominent persons; and second, scholarship in the sense of what are still known as oriental studies.

It is common practice in the West to decry the use by Communist leaders as what is called "a forum for propaganda," of such public national and international assemblies as Parliaments, International Conferences and the United Nations. What is less often emphasized is the extraordinary effectiveness of such propaganda. There is also a feeling in some quarters that for Western statesmen to do the same would not only be in bad taste, but useless, or worse, for it might irritate the Communists unnecessarily. I think it is possible that there may be some serious misunderstanding here. Let us take the single example of colonialism. The fact that the word colonialism is now constantly on the lips of almost every Asian and African nationalist leader and that it is always taken as applying to the West and never to the Communists, is the result not so much of Communist radio broadcasts, films and propaganda pamphlets, as of the statements condemning Western colonialism which are constantly made by Soviet leaders both in their own country and abroad, statements which always receive the fullest publicity all over the world. In Britain we have become hardened to such utterances. The Americans were at first inclined to agree with any condemnation of European colonialism; in fact, I believe they introduced the Russians to the word colonialism, which is not to be found in any Russian dictionary. When the charge was extended with added fury to the United States they began to think differently, but they too are now inclined to dismiss it as routine propaganda. But in Asia and in Africa where nationalist leaders not only have to find someone to blame for their material distresses, but also someone to help in relieving them, Soviet utterances are as manna from heaven. And they turn a deaf ear and a blind eye to all the many Western broadcasts and publications exposing the grim history of Soviet colonialism.

It is interesting to speculate what would happen if Soviet colonialism were as strongly and constantly denounced by Western statesmen and other public figures as Western colonialism is by the Russians. Quite apart from any effect which this might have on Asian opinion the effect on Communist governments would, I believe, be startling. It so happens that during the past six months there have been, perhaps more by coincidence than anything else, certain pronouncements by Western statesmen which have drawn attention to the facts of Soviet colonialism. Although extremely mild by comparison with Soviet utterances, these pronouncements produced instant and violent Soviet reaction, a clear indication of Soviet sensitiveness on the subject. On October 2 last year the U.S. Under Secretary of State, Mr. Dillon, delivered a speech in Chicago in which he spoke of Soviet colonialism in the Baltic states and in Kazakhstan. On October 28 *Pravda* devoted a long article to explaining the great advantages which the Baltic states had derived from their entry into the Soviet empire and to giving most unconvincing reasons why the proportion of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan had fallen from 57 per cent. in 1939 to 30 per cent. in 1959. This was followed by a number of articles in the Kazakh press vilifying

Mr. Dillon and extolling the Soviet Régime. In November, Mr. Diefenbaker, the Prime Minister of Canada, in a brief reply to one of Khrushchev's violent anti-colonialist tirades in the U.N. Assembly, referred to Soviet colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe and also in the Ukraine. To counteract what the Soviet government evidently thought might be the ill-effects of this brief statement, an elaborate and sustained propaganda campaign was launched. It began with a speech by Podgorny, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in the United Nations Assembly, exalting the independence, liberty and progress enjoyed by the Ukraine as a member of the Soviet Union. This was followed by innumerable articles in the Ukrainian press denouncing Mr. Diefenbaker's "calumnies." The cry was taken up by all the many Ukrainian broadcasting stations. Then came a flood of letters of protest against Mr. Diefenbaker, both in the press and broadcast by radio. Finally, there were meetings all over the republic designed to reassert the freedom and independence of the Ukraine on which Mr. Diefenbaker had cast doubt in a brief sentence.

At the end of November, the British Minister of State, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, also in the United Nations Assembly, recalled the simple fact that in the same period that 500,000,000 people in Asia and Africa had gained their independence, 22,000,000 people of formerly independent countries had been incorporated by force in the Soviet Union. He also mentioned the deportation and probable partial extermination of nearly 1,000,000 Soviet Muslim inhabitants of the North Caucasus and the Volga region during the last war. This met with the most violent reaction from the Soviet delegation and a formal protest by Comrade Zorin that Mr. Ormsby-Gore was guilty of "interference in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R." and of "trying to re-start the cold war." Since then there has been a marked increase in the Central Asian press of praise of Soviet achievements in the Muslim republics. I believe you will agree that there is something highly significant about the tremendous broadsides with which the Soviet ship of state has felt it necessary to reply to these relatively small calibre and almost random shots fired across her bows.

I now pass to the matter of oriental studies. Here the Soviet Union is in a particularly advantageous position by comparison with the West where oriental studies still consist largely in the study of the remote past, of the history and culture of ancient Asian civilizations. Soviet leaders, on the other hand, realized in the early days of the Revolution that one of the surest ways of convincing Asian peoples of Soviet sympathy for, and understanding of, their nationalist aspirations and so-called national liberation movements, was to show interest, not only in their cultural heritage, but also in their modern problems and achievements. While in the West orientalists are still mainly concerned with the past, in the Soviet Union the emphasis has shifted to the present, to the study and teaching of the modern rather than the ancient forms of Asian languages, to the analysis, always on Marxist lines, of current economic, political and agrarian problems, and to the rewriting—again on Marxist lines—of what they call the imperialist period of Asian history. It is not only that Western orientalists are themselves largely wrapped up in the past; they are—and apparently

intend to remain—supremely ignorant of what Soviet scholars are doing about modern Asia. They evidently do not realize that while most modern Asian history published in the West has been written from the imperialist point of view, the work of Soviet historians is invariably written from the extreme Asian nationalist point of view, and is specially designed to show the nations of the West in the worst possible light.

In the Soviet Union, of course, oriental studies—or Asian studies as they have now sensibly decided to call them—are paid for, planned and organized by the Soviet Government. There is naturally no question of a Soviet orientalist simply being a specialist in his own favourite subject and still less of his criticizing his government's Eastern policies or of attributing any but the basest motives and actions to the Western democracies. In Britain, on the other hand, the cost of oriental studies, apart from a few foundations and trusts, is met by the State—that is, by the taxpayer—but planning and organization are left to the universities, or more often to individuals. Those individuals may, if they wish, and they sometimes do, indulge in violent criticism of British policies and trading operations and in fulsome eulogies of Soviet policies and attitudes towards Asian peoples. The Soviet authorities, it is hardly necessary to mention, seize on the works of such individuals with glee, and often translate them in full.

In my opinion, the public, and all but a small section of the press, is quite unaware of the importance of this matter. Please do not misunderstand me here. I am not trying to belittle the study of ancient Asian civilizations or to suggest that it be abandoned. Its educational value is as undoubted as that of the civilizations of Greece and Rome. Nor am I suggesting that we should develop our study of Asia as a political instrument in the same way as the Russians have done. What I am suggesting is that by continuing to concentrate on the past and by largely ignoring not only modern Asia itself but the Soviet Union's approach to it, we are leaving the field open for the advance of Communism. "Who could have believed only a decade ago," wrote a correspondent in the *Economist* recently, "that the Marxist version of oriental history might one day be within sight of acceptance by the peoples of Asia and Africa as the only authentic one."

I said earlier that the effectiveness of propaganda depended to a large extent on the climate of opinion in which it had to operate, and I advanced the view that the present climate was favourable to the Communist powers. I do not myself believe that this climate of opinion is due to any superiority of Communist propaganda over our own. The real causes lie far deeper. I do not propose to discuss them here except to say that they relate to defects of policy rather than of propaganda. Propaganda is after all at best a servant of policy: it can never be a substitute for it. In the face of circumstances—and these include not only our own mistakes but Soviet dynamism and nerve—we have had to make many adjustments in our Asian policies, particularly during the past fifteen years. Sometimes these adjustments have had to be made quickly and under pressure and it may be that our propaganda has not always been suitably adjusted accordingly. If it had been, it is possible that our stock might not have fallen quite so low as it did, for instance, in 1956; but no propaganda could have made our

Asian policy at that time more attractive to the Asians than Soviet policy. But if propaganda is not the prime factor in creating the climate of opinion or in changing it, it can be of great importance when the climate begins to change for other reasons. It is not only the West which has to make adjustments of policy and it is not only the West which makes mistakes. The Soviet government made a resounding mistake in Persia in 1946, but Western propaganda failed to take full advantage of it. Again, the Soviet government made a fundamental adjustment of its Eastern policies at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, which called for a drastic overhaul of Western propaganda techniques. It is at times like this, when the opponent is recovering from a serious error or when his policy is undergoing revision, when the wind is shifting, that propaganda can be made most effective, when it can indeed "startle and fright consideration" and "make the course of thoughts to fetch about." Asian opinion has without doubt been greatly impressed of late by the rapid growth of Soviet wealth and power and by Soviet dynamism, nerve and persistence. But it is very far from being convinced of the inevitability either of the ultimate victory of Communism or of the collapse of Western economy and culture.

My own impression is that during the past five years British policy in Asia has been wise and has exposed little surface for criticism. It has been largely and necessarily a defensive policy, and I believe it should remain so in the sense that it does not strive to regain Britain's former position of political and economic tutelage in the face of Asian neutralism. This does not mean that we should not resist by every means in our power Soviet attempts to fill the vacuum which we may have left. There are already indications that many Asian countries would be ready to accept Western help in resisting Soviet encroachment if they could be more convinced of Western respect for their desire to remain neutral. This is a theme which should, and no doubt does, play a prominent part in British propaganda. The matter is one of some delicacy and the following statement which I saw in an American publication of 1960 is not calculated to improve matters: "As Soviet influence grew in the Middle East and India, it was definitely in the interests of the United States to operate so as to preserve Afghan independence and to deflect Afghan policies from directions favourable to the Soviet interests."

In conclusion, I should like to recapitulate some of the points I have tried to make. Except in totalitarian countries, the effectiveness of propaganda is largely conditioned by the prevailing climate of opinion. In peace-time or in the cold war propaganda cannot change this climate of opinion, but skilful counter-propaganda may prevent the other side from taking the fullest advantage of it. Totalitarian countries will always have an advantage over the Western democracies in the matter of propaganda because they can mobilize all social, commercial and cultural activities in the service of the state. But the democracies could do much more to promote their interests and to defend themselves if they understood more about Soviet and Communist sensitiveness to criticism and about the nature of the Communist appeal to Asian peoples. This does not at all mean that organized propaganda through the established written, visual and oral media is a waste of effort. On the contrary, it should be maintained in a

state of the highest possible efficiency and should constantly seek for new ways of reflecting British policy, of sustaining British prestige and of countering hostile propaganda.

REPORT OF DISCUSSION

In the discussion which followed two questions relating to China were asked. One member enquired in what way the Soviet and Chinese attitudes towards Asia differed, and another what the Russian attitude was towards what the Indians regarded as Chinese aggression on their north-west frontier. In reply the lecturer said that not much was known about the Chinese attitude towards Asia since they published very little specialized literature on the subject. While there was probably not yet any specific difference between the Soviet and Chinese Communist ideologies, their policies were beginning to be affected by purely national interests. There was a definite conflict of interests in some parts of the world such as Mongolia. This suggested an eventual struggle for power between the U.S.S.R. and China. He said that the Russian attitude towards Chinese aggression on India had been very cautious. They had advanced no independent views, merely repeating the reports of the Chinese News Agency. The Soviet press did not make any mention of anti-Chinese demonstrations in India over Chinese attacks either on India or on Tibet. On the subject of Chinese rivalry with the U.S.S.R. another member mentioned the existence of Chinese maps in which the whole of Russia was marked as part of Chinese territory.

In reply to a question on how far the Russians had got in their efforts to persuade the East-West Committee of U.N.E.S.C.O. to accept their version of Asian history, the lecturer said he had no definite information about the present state of this Committee, but did not think it had decided on anything definite.

Referring to the lecturer's reference to Soviet sensitiveness on the subject of colonialism, a member asked whether more aggressive criticism by the West of Communist colonialism might not be appropriate. The lecturer strongly supported this view, but added that in exposing the facts of Soviet colonialism the West should take care to avoid making unfounded charges about the economy and standard of living in Soviet Asia. Russian material achievement in her colonial empire was considerable and no good could be done by denying it.

A member commented that Soviet colonialism was by no means confined to Asia; it also operated in Eastern Europe. While agreeing with this, the lecturer thought there was a great difference between the reactions of the Eastern European and Muslim Asian peoples to Soviet colonialism. The former had a long previous tradition of independence, whereas the latter had not. The same member disputed this statement on the grounds that the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia, particularly the Turkmen, had put up strong resistance to Russian encroachment on their independent existence. The lecturer replied that while he did not deny the existence of tribal independence, which often amounted to refusal to submit to any kind of government, he drew a distinction between that and

national independence of the kind which had existed in Poland, Hungary and Rumania.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, I fear we are coming up to time and it is my unfortunate duty to bring the proceedings to a close, just when they were warming up so nicely. It is very fortunate that not a pin dropped here during Colonel Wheeler's talk; if it had, the noise it made would have reverberated all round the room, to such an extent had Colonel Wheeler captured our interest and attention.

I am sure we are all extremely grateful to you, Sir, for the trouble you have taken to give us this very valuable and interesting lecture.

ANNUAL MEETING

The Annual General Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society was held in the Hall of the Royal Society, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1, on Wednesday, June 14, 1961.

The President, Marshal of the R.A.F., Sir William Dickson, was in the chair, and the Anniversary Lecture was given by H.R.H. Prince Chula of Thailand, who spoke on "Thailand Today."

OPENING OF PROCEEDINGS BY THE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDENT: Before passing to the business of this Annual General Meeting, I have to convey the apologies of General Sir Richard Gale, the Chairman of the Council, who is unable to be present. I think you would like me to express to him our regret that he has had to have this operation, and our best wishes for a quick recovery.

Also I have to express our thanks to Sir Philip Southwell, who has filled the breach again and has volunteered his services as Acting Chairman while Sir Richard is ill. I am sure the Society would like me to take this opportunity of thanking Sir Philip most warmly for his devotion to the Society's interests and for all the hard work that he has put in during his Chairmanship over the last two years.

I now call upon Group-Captain Smallwood to present the Honorary Secretaries' Report.

HONORARY SECRETARIES' REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1960-61

Group-Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: During the year 1960-61 the Society has fully maintained its active work of stimulating interest in developments in Asian countries. Nineteen mid-day and two evening lectures have been held, ranging from Israel and Turkey, across Arabia and Persia, India and Pakistan to Malaya, Burma and China.

The *Journal*, in its three annual issues, has published some 22 lectures and articles and 93 book reviews. We hope to augment its interest by publishing excerpts from letters from overseas members and notes on functions in London to which the Society's representatives are invited. In addition to the copies sent to members, there are over 320 *Journal* subscribers, such as Libraries, Universities and Institutes, in no less than 39 different countries. Of these, the largest number, over 100, go to the U.S.A.: to China, 23; to India, 21; Pakistan, 17; U.S.S.R., 14; and Japan and Germany 10 each. We regret the necessity of having to raise the cost of the *Journal* to these subscribers next year.

Membership of the Society stands at approximately 1,600. During the year 72 new members joined, which is better than the previous year, but I cannot stress too strongly the Council's hope that all members will try to encourage friends with similar interests to join the Society and thus help us

to maintain the standard of both lectures and *Journal* in this era of rising costs. In this connection also I would like to emphasize the value to the Society of Covenants, by means of which members can pay their subscriptions at no extra cost to themselves, but at considerable gain to the Society. Twenty members have taken advantage of the new Rule allowing for Life Membership which you passed at the last annual meeting.

Since then, we have lost 26 members by death, and 28 by resignation. Of the former, special mention must be made of the late Marquess of Zetland, who was a founder member of the Society and always took the keenest interest in its activities; also of Mr. H. St. John Philby, whose knowledge of Arabia was unrivalled, and Sir Percy Loraine, who died only a month ago and who had been a member of the Society for 36 years. On June 9, Mr. E. M. Gull died; he had been a member since 1927. He was a former member of Council and rendered valuable services in that capacity. He served in the old Chinese Customs Service under Sir Robert Hart and Sir Robert Bredin and was Secretary of the China Association. He crossed the Gobi Desert over 45 years ago.

Before the end of the year we hope to have printed and circulated a revised Members' List. Members have been asked, in the *Journal*, to cooperate by ensuring that the Secretary is in possession of their correct titles and permanent addresses.

The Library of the Society contains some 4,500 books and a large number of journals, reports and pamphlets on Asian affairs. Since last year 260 new books have been added, which figure includes a generous gift of 150 books on the Far East given by Brigadier E. V. Bowra in memory of his father and grandfather.

Our new Honorary Librarian, Mr. de Halpert, has, on professional advice, put in hand a simplified method of classification and cataloguing of the books. A grant of £50 has been allotted to the Library for this work, and paid part-time help has been augmented by much spare-time work put in by Mrs. Ruth Hanner, Miss Mary Rowlatt, Mrs. Joy Phipps and Mrs. Ryle Hodges. Also a Siamese lady student, Miss Sirivadhana, has helped us—which I think it is rather appropriate to announce, as H.R.H. Prince Chula of Thailand is speaking to us today. Our sincere thanks are due to these ladies and to Mr. de Halpert for all the hours of voluntary help given in the Library.

Recently, the Council decided to give the Secretary and Assistant Secretary some relief by authorizing the employment of an additional clerical assistant.

Finally, on my fellow Honorary Secretaries, I have to report that Colonel G. M. Routh is convalescing after a severe illness, and we hope he will soon be able again to take an active part in the work of the Society. Mr. J. M. Cook has taken up an appointment on the staff of the Administrative Staff College, Henley and, as he can only attend meetings at irregular intervals, the Chairman has reluctantly accepted his resignation. I should like here to pay tribute to the considerable contribution Mr. Cook has made to the Society, both as a Local Hon. Secretary when he was in the Persian Gulf and as an Honorary Secretary while in London. He has been very active in introducing new members and in organizing lectures

and film shows and we are glad to know that we can still count on his help in these matters.

Mr. Colin Rees Jenkins has signified his willingness to stand for election as an Honorary Secretary and you will have the opportunity to vote on this later in the proceedings.

Finally, may I remind members of the Garden Party, the first one we have ever had, which will take place at Hurlingham on July 20.

THE HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT

In the absence of Major E. Ainger, Honorary Treasurer, the financial statement, as audited, and the Honorary Treasurer's report were presented by Group-Captain SMALLWOOD, as follows:

I shall not be so long about this, because, Major Ainger being away in America, I have not nearly so many details.

The Balance Sheet and the Income and Expenditure Account have been in members' hands for some little time. The general position appears to be satisfactory. Securities held stood at £11,832 at December 31, 1960; the cost to the Society was £11,070 5s. 2d., and so there is the best part of £800 to the good. The Reserve for Contingencies stands at £4,386 8s. This sum should be adequate for payment of the premium on new premises, their furnishing, and provision of additional library and office equipment, and also for the publication of the revised Members' List which has already been promised to members.

As announced last year, the repayment of tax on Covenants has been cleared up and perhaps I may be permitted to reiterate the urgent desirability of members executing Covenants. Both your Treasurer and your Secretary are at one there.

The adoption of the accounts for the year ended December 31, 1960, was formally proposed by Lieut.-Col. WHEELER and seconded by Sir Gilbert LAITHWAITE. There being no questions or comments, the President, on a show of hands, declared the accounts duly adopted.

ELECTION OF COUNCIL AND OFFICERS FOR 1961-62

The PRESIDENT announced that the Council had re-elected for the ensuing year: as Chairman of the Council, General Sir Richard Gale; and elected as Vice-President, Sir Esler Dening, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., Brigadier Longrigg, O.B.E., D.Litt. and Sir Charles Belgrave, K.B.E.

The PRESIDENT next gave the recommendations of the Council for the re-election of Major Ainger as Hon. Treasurer, of Group-Captain Smallwood and Colonel G. M. Routh as Honorary Secretaries, and of Mr. F. de Halpert as Hon. Librarian; and for the election of Mr. Colin Rees Jenkins as Honorary Secretary in place of Mr. Cook, and of Sir Ferguson Crawford, K.B.E., C.M.G. and Mr. Harold Musker, O.B.E., M.C., as members of Council; and of Lord Nathan, P.C., T.D., D.L., F.S.A., as an Honorary Member; also for the reappointment of Messrs. Williams, Dyson, Jones and Co. as Auditors.

Colonel ELLIS proposed that these recommendations be approved *en bloc*.

Mr. DE CANDOLE formally seconded the motion.

The PRESIDENT put the proposal to the meeting and it was carried unanimously.

ANNOUNCEMENTS BY THE ACTING CHAIRMAN

Sir PHILIP SOUTHWELL: First of all, I should like to say how much I appreciate your remarks, Mr. President, and the kind reception given to me here; I do not know of any Society which it is pleasanter or more stimulating to assist.

Of course, I am sorry that I have to act today in place of Sir Richard Gale. Since taking over the Chairmanship he has given a great deal of thought to the Society and has been most anxious that it should not suffer by his enforced absence. We very much hope that he will soon be better and back among us.

At the Annual Dinner, Sir William Dickson took over the office of President from Lord Scarbrough, and I should very much like to take this opportunity of thanking Sir William for all he has done during the last year, specially his willingness to help whenever called upon to undertake any work for the Society.

There are one or two other important matters:

NEW PREMISES

First, the new premises. As explained at the Special General Meeting held on January 25, and subsequently announced in the April *Journal*, our agreement with the Palestine Exploration Fund, whereby our offices are housed at 2 Hinde Street, will be terminated before the end of the year. I think most of you know the story, but, for those who may not, I must explain that the Palestine Exploration Fund are taking the opportunity of terminating our lease in order to get increased remuneration for the premises and thus benefit their exploration activities in Palestine. Our problem of looking for alternative premises was in the hands of a small committee appointed for that purpose and it has been very difficult to find something suitable. A selection has now been made of accommodation in a small street leading off the Haymarket, and which is, therefore, in what you might call "Clubland," or near the area of Clubs, and in a central position for the Society's Library and administrative activities. We have been able to obtain a lease for ten years at a cost which we feel we can face. The actual date of the move has not been settled but will, of course, be notified to members. Arrangements have to be made for making shelves and so on for the Library; but everything is now in progress for the move.

We, as a Society, like all other small Societies, do not have ample funds to provide for modern accommodation in the middle of the main area in London, but there are possibilities that may arise in future years of fitting into schemes for—not amalgamation, but for enjoying common facilities in certain directions. In the meantime, and for ten years if need be, we will be housed at a cost which is reasonably adjusted to our purse—this is rather important.

REVISED RULES

Now, when this question of obtaining new premises came to be ventilated, the Hon. Treasurer brought to the notice of the Council the desirability of a revision of the Rules. The financial and legal implications of buying or leasing new premises made it desirable that they should be modified in certain respects. This was put into the hands of our Honorary Solicitors and a very careful redrafting of the Rules was made in order to meet the problem of premises. The draft had then to be sent to the Inland Revenue, because it was necessary to obtain their blessing from the point of view of taxation, and to the Charity Commissioners for similar reasons. It was also sent to our Bankers and to our Auditors, for their approval.

We took the opportunity of including in the Revision one or two other changes in the Rules in order to strengthen the Society, especially as it is hoped to introduce a Junior membership and an Affiliated membership.

Unfortunately, there was not time to get these Rules through all the stages of approval, printing and circulation, etc., before this meeting, and so we propose to call a Special General Meeting in the autumn or winter, to approve them after members have had the opportunity of studying them.

AFTERNOON PARTY

I should like to make mention of the Afternoon Party. As you know, the Council decided to change the date of the Dinner from the summer to the late autumn this year and to have a Summer Garden Party. There are many people home from overseas in the summer who may not be able to come to the Dinner but who, on the other hand, would be able to come to a Garden Party. The Party is to be held on July 20 at Hurlingham. It will be a joint Party with certain other Societies with more or less similar interests. Applications for tickets should be made by June 30 and we hope that it will be very well patronized.

PRESENTATION OF THE LAWRENCE OF ARABIA MEDAL

The presentation of the Lawrence of Arabia Medal is something to which I should like to draw your attention. As you know, it was awarded last year by the Council to Mrs. Violet Dickson for her work in Arabia, but owing to her absence in Kuwait we have had to postpone the presentation until this year. Mrs. Dickson has spent many years studying the Bedouin of Arabia and is, of course, a well-known botanist and naturalist. She has published a book on the flora of Arabia.

We believe that many members will be interested to hear a paper which Mrs. Dickson will read to the Society on July 26, after which the presentation will take place.

ANNUAL DINNER

Finally, may I say a word about the Annual Dinner. Last year, at Claridges, there were 220 people. This year, it has been arranged that the Dinner will be held at the Hyde Park Hotel on Wednesday, December 13, and we hope that you will all make a note of the date, because there is a

particular reason this year for having as many people as possible. It is the anniversary of the first meeting of the Society, 60 years ago. That is a good healthy age for a Society, and it is rather pleasant to have the 1961 Dinner on the anniversary of the date of the first meeting. The principal guest will be the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, and, of course, we are all hoping that his Ministerial duties will permit him to be present. He has indicated to the President that he will come if he possibly can.

I think, Sir, that concludes all I have to say, and I hope that I have done all that Sir Richard wanted me to do.

VOTES OF THANKS AND CLOSURE OF MEETING

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Philip, very much. That concludes our formal agenda.

I think, Ladies and Gentlemen, before we end, you would like me to say what no member of Council could say for himself—that is, to thank the Council of this Society for their very hard work in the last twelve months. It has been a busier year than usual and the Revision of the Rules, the search for new premises, and other problems have produced much extra labour for the Council. Their meetings are very well attended; they have a big agenda and having taken the Chair on one occasion, I can vouch for the extent to which they look into every detail. They do work extremely hard. So I think you would like me to thank them very much. (*Applause.*)

And I should also like to offer our thanks to Group-Captain Smallwood. You have heard that Colonel Routh and Mr. Cook have not been able to carry on as Honorary Secretaries, and he has not sought any extra help, but has done the work of all three of them himself. He has worked extremely hard and we do thank him very much. (*Applause.*)

Also we want to thank Major Ainger, the Honorary Treasurer, who is at present abroad; most of the extra work that has occurred this year has needed careful financial sorting by the Hon. Treasurer, and I would like to thank him very much indeed for all he has done. (*Applause.*)

And last, but by no means least, our staff, headed by our charming and capable Secretary, Miss Marsh; they, too, have carried the burden of this extra work, and have worked very hard indeed, especially on the production of the *Journal*, and we do thank them very much for all they have done. (*Applause.*)

So with your permission, Ladies and Gentlemen, I now declare this Annual General Meeting closed.

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.

BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1960.

1959 £	LIABILITIES	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	1959 £	ASSETS	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
	I. Capital Funds:				I. Capital Fund Investments (at cost):		
	Life Subscription Account	407 5 0			5½% Exchequer Stock 1966		
	<i>Add:</i> Amounts recd. 1960	35 0 0			£5,975 15s. 1d.	5,903 7 2	
		442 5 0			Hertfordshire County £400 5½% Redeemable Stock 1965	393 0 0	
	Entrance Fee Account	1,731 8 0			Metal Box Co. Ltd. £18 Ordinary Stock	—	
	<i>Add:</i> Amounts recd. 1960	46 0 0			Second Gt. Nthn. Investment Trust Ltd. £300 Ordinary Stock	1,141 1 6	
		1,777 8 0			Selection Trust Ltd.—£200 Ordinary Stock	960 4 0	
	Legacy Account	850 0 0			Steel Company of Wales Ltd. 350 £1 Ordinary Shares	861 19 0	
	Lawrence of Arabia Medal Fund	70 0 9			Westinghouse Brake and Signal Co. Ltd. 350 £1 Units Ordinary Stock	904 0 3	
	Persia Fund	578 4 10			Witan Investment Co. Ltd. £450 Ordinary Stock	906 13 3	
	Sykes Medal Fund	150 0 0				11,070 5 2	
	<i>Add:</i> Accum. Interest	20 12 3			P.O.S.B. No. 2 Account	—	
		170 12 3				11,070 5 2	
3,817		3,888 10 10		9,089			
	II. Income and Expenditure Account:			429			
	Balance, 1st January, 1960	1,964 12 11					
	<i>Add:</i> Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year	106 17 2		9,518			
		2,071 10 1			Note: The Market Value of the above Investments at 31st December, 1960, was approximately £11,832.		
1,965		2,071 10 1			II. Fixed Assets:		
	III. Reserve for Contingencies:				174 Society Premises Account:		173 14 3
	Balance 1st January, 1960	4,370 0 0			III. Current Assets:		
	<i>Add:</i> Surplus on Library Sales	16 8 0			Income Tax Repayment Claims	623 1 11	
		4,386 8 0			Debtors and Payments in Advance	93 13 5	
4,370		4,386 8 0			Cash:		
	IV. Investment Reserve:				At Bank and in Hand	661 7 6	
	Net Profit to date on Realisation of					1,378 2 10	
	160 Investments	1,108 18 10		3,344		12,622 2 3	
	V. Liabilities:						
	2,724 Sundry Creditors	1,166 14 6		13,036			
		1,166 14 6					
13,036		12,622 2 3					

AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

We have examined the above Balance Sheet and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us and as shown by the books of the Society.

WILLIAMS, DYSON, JONES & CO.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED, DECEMBER 31, 1960.

1959	EXPENDITURE	£	s.	d.	1959	INCOME	£	s.	d.
£	<i>Office Expenses:</i>				£				
1,680	Salaries and National Insurance	1,639	5	7	2,252	Subscriptions	2,295	9	11
202	Rent, Rates, Light and Heat	206	19	3	711	Journal Subscriptions and Sales	513	5	6
28	Telephone	30	13	6		Dividends and Interest Received:			
113	Stationery and Printing	148	2	0	39	Without deduction of Income Tax	18	19	8
85	Postages	83	19	6	199	After deduction of Income Tax	263	10	0
261	Cleaning and Upkeep of Premises	282	0	7			282	9	8
11	Audit Fee	10	10	0		Income Tax Repayment Claims:			
6	Insurances	6	7	2	101	On Interest and Dividends Received	121	11	2
17	Bank Charges and Cheque Books	18	18	7	97	On Covenanted Donations	88	11	2
73	Sundry Expenses	144	16	2	300	On Covenanted Membership Subscriptions (estimated)	250	0	0
							460	2	4
2,476		2,571	12	4	929	Uncovenanted Donations Received	1,117	8	8
	<i>Less:</i>								
205	Contribution from Palestine Exploration Fund	216	5	3					
2,271		2,355	7	1					
—	Presentation to Mrs. Putnam on retirement	68	10	0					
—	Donation—Tibet Relief Fund	25	0	0					
	<i>Journal:</i>								
1,276	Printing	1,411	7	0					
146	Postages	144	7	5					
105	Reporting	138	18	2					
		1,694	12	7					
—	Expenses of Delegate to Conference of Orientalists	100	0	0					
203	Lectures and Study Groups	274	18	3					
2	Library	—							
42	Legal and Professional Charges	42	0	0					
1	Subscription to "Iraq"	1	11	0					
500	Transfer to Reserve for Contingencies	—							
4,546		4,561	18	11					
82	Excess of Income over Expenditure, carried to Balance Sheet	106	17	2					
4,628		£4,668	16	1	4,628		£4,668	16	1

THAILAND TODAY

By HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
PRINCE CHULA OF THAILAND, G.C.V.O.

Report of the Anniversary Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, June 14, 1961, Sir William Dickson in the chair.

The PRESIDENT: Your Royal Highness, Your Excellencies, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have the honour to introduce to you our Anniversary Lecturer, His Royal Highness Prince Chula of Thailand. We are honoured, and very grateful and fortunate to have His Royal Highness with us this afternoon to talk about his country. It does occupy, as you know, and always has done, a key position in South-East Asia.

His Royal Highness is, of course, extremely well-known to all of us, and is a very popular figure in England; an intrepid racing motorist, an author, and a speaker on the television and radio; Her Royal Highness the Princess, who could not be here this afternoon, is an English lady; one of their homes is in Cornwall, and, amongst other things, they are Freemen of the City of Bodmin. So we know a great deal about His Royal Highness in England. In Thailand, as you know, he has very special connections; he is first cousin to His Majesty the King of Thailand, and is his special A.D.C.

Naturally, he is an authority on his own country, but his lecture to us this afternoon is of special interest and importance, firstly, because we have a very close and very old friendly relationship, interest and sympathy with, and love and understanding for Thailand, and anything we hear about it is of great interest, and secondly, because His Royal Highness has only just come back from a visit there and will be able to give us an up-to-date account of conditions of life in Thailand as it is today.

H.R.H. PRINCE CHULA of Thailand: Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen: it is a very great privilege for me to be addressing you once again, after the occasion, a few years ago, when I came to talk to you about my country. At that time you had just a talk; today I have been asked by the Council of your Society to bring a film. But, before we go on to the film, may I just say a few words with, perhaps, some fresh information, further to what some of you, if you were present then, may have heard at my last talk.

The size of our country has not increased; we are still approximately 200,000 square miles, or about, say, the size of France, or four times the size of England and Wales; but our population has greatly increased and, at the census of April, 1960, it was found that we have a population of 26½ million. That is a very big increase indeed for us. Until recently our population was increasing at the rate of three-quarters of a million a year, and now we find, not entirely to our satisfaction, that we are increasing at the rate of a million a year; and, although our area should be capable of supporting a population of 55 to 60 millions, it will not be as comfortable as it is now, and there may be very serious difficulties—so much so that even very important Government spokesmen, such as the Minister of Finance,

recently spoke about the serious necessity of some form of birth control if we are to maintain the standard of living which we have.

Despite the increase in the population, we are still largely an agricultural community. Over 75 per cent. of our people are still agriculturalists, and, of course, the main crop, and almost the only really important crop from the point of view of export, is rice.

Now, the growing of rice by something like over 75 per cent. of our population has got a strangely important social import, and that is that, unlike most countries in Asia—I am not saying this in any way against any of our friendly neighbours, but I repeat—unlike many of our neighbours in Asia, Thailand and the Thai people have always enjoyed almost complete equality between men and women. There has never been a *purdah* in Thailand; there have never been any disadvantages for women. I think this is due to two things; one is the Buddhist religion, which most of us practise—95 per cent., if not more of our people are practising Buddhists; and the other is this rice-growing, for, despite the immense advances made by the West in machinery, I am informed by experts (of which I am not one) that no machine has yet been invented that can sow rice into the field during the flood season (because rice, you know, is put into the land with about 8 inches of water; that is why we have to have paddy fields with little 12-inch or 18-inch banks to keep the water in), no machine has yet been invented that can supplant the fair hands of women to plant the rice. Therefore in our country, in the most important part of our country, the farmers, the men and women, work side by side; and that may be responsible for the equality in the status of Thai women with men.

In the past, we did have polygamy, and a man could have as many wives as he could afford. I would say that polygamy was an undemocratic system, because you have to be fairly well off, even in Thailand, to keep more than one woman, and I think that an ordinary farmer would be quite hard put to it to manage even a little bit of bigamy; so that polygamy was restricted to the upper and more well-off classes. I myself never had the pleasure, or the disadvantage, of practising it, because—whether it was done especially to thwart me or to help me I would not know—polygamy was officially abolished in Thailand three years before I was married.


As far as education is concerned, the thirst for education is growing and growing and growing; in fact, we are unable at the moment really to cope with it. When I was there, for the examination for some 700 places in Chulalongkorn University (which you will see in the film) for first-year students there were 10,000 candidates, and it is the same with the Military College, the same with everything; there is a fabulous thirst for education amongst our young people, and that applies to the men and the women, and, educationally, our men and women are equal. Today the women of Thailand, the well-educated ones—(I am not talking about the farmers' wives, they work in the fields with their men)—also work, and it is now a rare family where the wife does not go out to work. In an average upper middle-class family (if I may use a very old-fashioned term; shall I say, upper middle-income-group family) in Thailand today the husband and wife meet for breakfast, then they go away and each do their work, and often lunch apart, and meet in the evening. We have women who are

lawyers, surgeons, every kind of job; nurses, we have had for years; and we even now have women Civil Service officials, even in the Foreign Service, where, as yet, no woman has reached the rank of Minister or Ambassador (whether His Excellency is relieved by that I could not say), but already they have become Second Secretary, Third Secretary, and so on.

Politically we have gone back a bit, if you regard getting away from parliamentary election as a retrograde step; we have gone back since I last talked to you, because it was found, in 1958, that our attempts since 1932 to have some form of parliamentary government were not very successful, and, in my opinion (and I am absolutely independent of the Government or of any official backing whatsoever: I speak as an individual Thai person), I think what happened was that although when the Constitution was brought in in 1932 we had always had a half-nominated and half-elected Parliament, and although our people understood very well their rights to elect M.P.s, what I think they did not understand was the responsibility connected with it. Therefore it was possible for a candidate to appeal to the people for the benefit of a particular locality; a candidate who was willing to come along and say: "You need a new school; when I get into Parliament I will give you a new school. If you need a new bridge, I will see to it that you get a new bridge," was liable to be elected. Thus, there was a case where rights divorced from responsibility did not work, and therefore we had a great bulge in the middle of Parliament of Independent M.P.s. Something like 60 per cent. were Independents, and the Government Party was about 20 per cent. on the one side, and the official Opposition about 20 per cent. on the other. The Independent members would say: "We will work for you if you give us a portfolio," and of course the Government could not give them all a portfolio, nor could the Opposition have got in. Therefore it was necessary, I think, for Field-Marshal Sarit Dhanarat to make the Revolution in 1958.

I do claim to be a historian, though probably not a very good one, but I think it is most unusual to have a Revolution not against a monarchy, not against a class, not against a government, but against the Constitution itself. Field-Marshal Sarit Dhanarat felt that it was impossible for that situation to continue; therefore he made the Revolution, and the country is now being governed by a Government which is based on an emergency, and the gist of it is that the Assembly is a nominated one for the time being, which exercises its legislative functions, and at the same time its main job is to try to enact a new Constitution that will be suitable to us.

Now, when that will happen, I do not know. Our only foreign policy is our adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and our membership of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, which has its headquarters in Bangkok, and whose Secretary-General is a Thai, Mr. Pote Sarasin, a former Prime Minister. I think it would be wrong to disguise from you that, when I was there, with this Laotian crisis, we were disappointed and depressed by the failure of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization to take any firm action. I had the privilege, as a Major-General in the Thai Army, of being present at the S.E.A.T.O. exercise, shortly before the really serious turn of the Laotian situation, which was carried out in the north-east part of our country, and it was the first time that we had



a S.E.A.T.O. exercise where we had a joint command and joint staff between ourselves, the United States and the British Commonwealth, and it went extremely well, and the welding of the staff work was quite astonishing. But it would not be fair to you, as serious observers of affairs in Asia, to keep from you the fact that the complete failure to take any action in Laos has had a very depressing effect in that part of Asia, particularly in our armed forces, who are very keen, very well trained, and, until then, very optimistic.

Financially, the budget, if you look at it without carefully scrutinizing it, seems to show a deficit, but I have had a very serious, long talk with the Finance Minister, who is a friend of mine, and the budget really is quite strong, because in current expenditure we have included capital expenditure. We do have quite a comfortable surplus and, if the budget shows a deficit, it is because we are very honest in our budgeting and we have put capital expenditure (and, despite the fact that we are helped by the World Bank and the United States and the Colombo Plan, we have also put in a great deal of capital expenditure ourselves), we have put the capital expenditure into the budget as part of ordinary expenditure. That is why, if you look casually at the budget, you will think we are in deficit, but actually we are not. Our natural resources are immense, according to the World Bank and other authorities, and I am happy to say that I think we are alright financially and should be for some time.

The happiest thing that has happened in Thailand in the last year has been the visits of our King and Queen to an enormous number of countries outside the Iron Curtain, where they have been most wonderfully well received, and they themselves have, I think, put up a wonderful show. We are told that we have the most beautiful Queen in the world—by that, I mean a Queen Consort, not a Queen Sovereign like yours, so there is no competition there. We are told—we do not say it—that we have the most beautiful Queen in the world and that she gave wonderful support to the King, and they have had a most marvellous reception everywhere.

But what is even more important to you, as observers of South-East Asia, or Central Asia, is that we had a Revolution. The Thai people are very polite, as you know, and we prefer to call it a change of régime, but actually we had a Revolution in 1932 when the Royal Family, to which I have the honour to belong, were ousted from power. Since then the power has passed into other hands, but, unlike many other Royal Families, the Royal Family of Thailand has remained on the throne—and for a time—with a certain amount of difficulty, anxiety, and awkwardness, which is only natural after such a big change. But I am happy to say that, since the Royal visits, the prestige of our King, now that he has come back, has risen beyond all expectations (*Applause*), and today he and the Queen enjoy tremendous respect and popularity, as I have seen for myself. I have had the privilege of walking behind them when they go to various ceremonies and they are greeted and followed with tremendous enthusiasm, which I personally had not seen for many years.

That is, more or less, the state of our country, and I have been asked to illustrate my talk with this film, which will give you an idea of Thailand today; not a hundred per cent. picture, because how could one do that of a



PRINCE CHULA AT HIS DESK AT TREDETHY, BODMIN, CORNWALL



PART OF CHULA CONGKORN UNIVERSITY



THE MARBLE TEMPLE, BANGKOK

country of $26\frac{1}{2}$ million people and 200,000 square miles? And may I remind you that Bangkok, our present capital, is a very new city compared with London. It was founded by my great-great-great-grandfather, only in 1782, that is barely 180 years ago, after we had had a disastrous defeat at the hands of our then enemies, but now our friends, the Burmese. Therefore there is nothing in Bangkok which is over 180 years old.

I thank you very much for your kind attention, and I will speak about the film while it is being shown.

(The lecturer then gave a commentary on his film, in the course of which he drew attention to the following points of interest):

Bangkok is a large city, 22 miles long from north to south and 12 miles broad; it is also a big seaport, 750 ships entering and leaving its harbours during a year. Many of its fine buildings, including the so-called Marble Temple (built with marble brought from Carrara in 1897) were erected in the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868 to 1910), who also made the many very broad roads. After his death, the money collected for his memorial was used to found a university.

Thailand is a Buddhist country, but there is complete religious toleration. Seventy-four per cent. of the people are literate, compulsory education having been in operation since 1926. One foreign language is obligatory in the schools, and 95 per cent. of the pupils choose English, which is used extensively in dealing with foreigners. Thailand has its own written language, the Thai script having been invented in 1293.

National dress is no longer general, but is worn for special occasions. Thailand has retained its traditional music, but has also adopted Western music, both for ordinary orchestras and for its military bands. It tries to preserve ancient rituals and traditions, while at the same time seeking to progress.

No coal or oil is found in Thailand, but wood fuel is used, even for the trains, with one exception—that, for long-distance trains, diesel engines are used.

The farmers are the backbone of the country. There are about 18 million of them, nearly all freeholders, owning perhaps 5 to 25 acres, each living on the land and selling the surplus. They should not be susceptible to possible Communist propaganda, because they are free, and they are property owners; and they are the most stabilizing influence in the country.

The other great stabilizing factor is the Army, which has 100,000 men and contributes to S.E.A.T.O. They had 10,000 troops in Korea during the Korean war, and lost 1,000 men. Every part of the Army, including the troops one sees in ceremonial parades, is a fighting unit; the equipment is American, supplied through S.E.A.T.O. The men are drawn largely from among the farmers, and are quick to learn. They have two years' training, but without waiting to finish that course they can, if they wish, apply to go to an Officers' Training Unit. The days when South-East Asian troops were thought of as cannon fodder are gone; today the men are well educated, properly fed and clothed, and much welfare work is carried out among them.

The PRESIDENT: Your Excellencies, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I know I speak for all of you when I offer my very sincere congratulations and our great thanks for a remarkable Anniversary Lecture. Speaking for myself, I found it fascinating from beginning to end; an interesting introduction about life today in Thailand, and its problems, brilliantly presented, and then the film.

So we thank you very much indeed, Your Royal Highness, and particularly for that peep into a truly remarkable family album.

(The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation and the meeting then ended.)

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, OLD AND NEW

By SIR OLAF CAROE, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, April 26, 1961. Chairman: Group-Captain H. St. C. Smallwood, O.B.E.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am the bearer of an apology from the Chairman of the Council, Sir Richard Gale, who has unfortunately had to go to hospital today. He said if it was possible he would come on, but he has not been able to come and I am afraid I will have to ask you to put up with me in his place.

We are extraordinarily fortunate to have today Sir Olaf Caroe, who does not need introduction to anybody except the very newest member of this Society. He has been a member of the Society for thirty-three years and is a member of the Council, and his advice and help are of immense assistance to the Society. He has addressed you on several occasions; the most recent was in October, 1959, when he stepped into the breach to talk instead of Mr. Hugh Richardson on Tibet, the latter having been called at short notice to represent the Tibetans at the United Nations.

Sir Olaf will speak on the North-West Frontier he knew from 1916 to 1947, and also about the Frontier as it is today. Few men speak with greater authority on a subject which is not well known enough to members of this Society. The size of the audience shows how much importance everybody attaches to this lecture. Sir Olaf, who was a District Officer, then Viceroy's Secretary, and then Governor of the N.W. Frontier Province, went back there on a visit four years ago. I will now call upon him to address you.

MR. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen, we as a nation have not been associated with the North-West Frontier now for about fifteen years, and to start with I want to show you a map showing its position in relation to the Punjab and Afghanistan.*

Pathans or Afghans? Which is it and what is the difference? From the sketch-map you will see that the Afghans and Pathans dwell in a territory intersected by an international frontier, the Durand line, drawn in 1893. In Afghanistan they occupy a far larger area, but in Pakistan they are much thicker on the ground. Before 1747, when the great Ahmad Shah Abdali founded it, there was no such country as Afghanistan; the territories inhabited by people of Afghan stock were divided between the Persian and the Mughal Empires. The results of this political division, which endured for more than two centuries, was that the Western Afghans of whom Ahmad's tribe, the Abdalis—called Durranis from this time—were the leaders, developed with a Persian bias and became Persianized, even to their language. Even today Persian is preferred to Pashtu in Kabul. The Eastern Afghans—now mainly Pakistani subjects—on the other hand developed a bias towards Delhi, over which (as we shall see) they three times ruled as Sultans before the Mughals came. They kept their Pashtu. Thus the Persian designation *Afghan* was applied to Western tribes, while *Pathan*, a Hindi form of the native name Pakhtun, was used

* See page 295.

for the Eastern tribes who looked towards India. So Pakistan is heir not only to the British, but to a much older Mughal association in its dealings with its Afghan tribes.

Here let me interpose a comment on a remark made about me by my friend the Afghan Ambassador. For giving expression to these facts of history he calls me in *The Times* a somnaloquist—a new coinage for which he deserves the fullest marks! But even he, were he here today, would be unable to deny the Persian affinities of the Durrani rulers of Kabul, and the orientation of the Pakhtun (Pathan) tribes towards Peshawar and the Indus.

It would be a good analogy to state that all Pathans are equally entitled to the name *Afghan*, wherever they live, just as Highlanders are all Scots. But all Afghans are not entitled to be known as *Pakhtana* or *Pashtana*, any more than all Scots can claim to be Gaels. It is only those who live by Pashtu who may aim so high; it is necessary to live by a highland code. And Pashtu means far more than the language; it implies a code of chivalry and a way of life from which those who dwell in cities are apt to be estranged.


There is, however, another distinction deep in the people's minds. There is no race in the world more conscious of descent and affinity than the Afghans. On the chart you will see a much simplified family tree. Its beginnings are shrouded in myth, for Qais himself and his three sons are said to be descended from Saul in the thirty-seventh generation and their very existence is only part of a fable. But the table does reflect what the tribes themselves believe to be their relationship one to another; it sorts out and categorizes affinities and disparities traceable today in the appearance, habit, dress, language and so on, of this whole group of societies.

Note that in this genealogy all the hill tribes are shown as of doubtful ancestry. This is surprising for they include what are, to us at least, the most famous names, Afridis and Orakzais of Tirah, Mahsuds and Wazirs, the finest guerillas in the world, Khataks, so steady under fire or at their leisure whirling in the dance, sword in hand beneath the stars. It is certain that this tradition enshrines a truth that the hill tribes spring from a much older and indigenous stock, never disturbed in their mountain homes. They are the true Pakhtuns or Pashtuns—the difference here is one of dialect—as opposed to the Afghans of the open plains, descended from a mixed Turco-Iranian strain of later invaders.

Let us complete this initial survey by looking at a map showing tribal locations, and see how the various branches are distributed. It will be observed that the heartlands of the Pathans are in the central area of which Thal on the Kurram River is the nodal point. These are the hill tribes, the Karlanris, and they include Afridis, Orakzais, Khataks, Turis, Wazirs and Mahsuds. They are interposed between the Persianized Durrans and the Ghalji Afghans to the west, and the Peshawar tribes, Yusufzais, Mohmands and so on, to the east.

We have no time here to refer at length to the great question of the origin of the Pathans and their place in history. It must suffice to say that before the Moghul conquest of India in 1526 two Pathan dynasties had ruled northern India from Delhi; and after the Moghuls came they were

GENEALOGY OF AFGHANS AND PATHANS
(Affinity by descent, not according to citizenship)



Pathans

Afghans

ousted from power for a period of some fifteen years by the Pathan dynasty founded by the man who was probably the greatest of all this race, Sher Shah, who built the Old Fort—the Purana Qila—at Delhi and the magnificent mosque within it. The slides will give some idea of the splendour of the Pathan heritage dating from those great days of empire.

The glory of Muslim architecture, brought into India by the Pathans, has always been the arch and the dome. These pictures will show you in what a functional manner these features are developed during the Pathan period—in a style to my mind much better suited as an inspiration for modern days than the onion domes and pretty pinnacles of the Moghul period which lend themselves to meretricious treatment and plaster copy-work reminiscent of that horror, the Pavilion at Brighton! It is for reasons such as this that I have suggested in a letter to President Ayub that it would be a pity if the architects of the new Pakistan capital, proudly named Islamabad, were to omit from their designs those features of the Islamic heritage, the arch and the dome. And since these appear in their most functional form in the old Pathan masterpieces, let those be the inspiration. Let me say, that the President's reaction has been most encouraging.

Here, too, you can see a picture of the Tomb of that very great man, the co-founder of the Islamic College at Peshawar, Sir Abdul Qayyum. It is simply built in marble within a wooden-arched cloister in admirable taste. Sir Abdul Qayyum was a very great man, and above all others of his people was responsible for impressing on a wide circle the important place to which the Pathan character and attainments entitle them in the sub-continent. There is a delightful story about him. When it was suggested in London at a Round-Table Conference that the N.W. Frontier was too small a place for representative government or a governor, he replied in his inimitable way that a flea might be a small creature, but in his country they found it very inconvenient inside their trousers!

Here let me say something about the Pathan character. The first thing to realize about them is that they are free men, first and always. One of the wonders about them is that they have preserved their independence all through the ages up to the present time, that is to say, even now there is no writ of law running in the tribal part of their country, no revenue, and they can pursue their blood feuds if they want to—and do. They regard that as the best way of maintaining law and order amongst themselves. They never have been administered in many areas, even by the Moghuls who tried to conquer them; not by the Sikhs, and not by the British, and Pakistan has wisely not attempted to extend its administration though it is extending things like education in the tribal areas.

I would like to take this opportunity of thanking Sir Evelyn Howell, who is here today, for some slides he has prepared. He was, ten years before me, the Viceroy's Foreign Secretary. I also have some extraordinarily good slides which have been lent me by Ian Stephens, once editor of the *Statesman*.

I must go back to the Pathans as a people. They are, as I say, very attractive, and no people in the world have a higher standard of good looks. They are hospitable to a fault. In the words of Mountstuart

Elphinstone, written in 1809, and which are as true today: "Their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity and obstinacy. On the other hand they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependants, hospitable to a fault, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious and prudent." Could one help liking such a man? It even makes one like his vices. It would be dreadful to have people without vices. Those few words show what the Pathans were then and are still.

Their language, Pakhto or Pashto, is very pithy and very expressive, but has been unkindly compared to the rattling of stones in a pot. The Prophet is said to have remarked, "Arabic is certainly the language of heaven, but yours is the language of hell." But even prophets may be prejudiced, and there is no doubt it is a very delightful language to learn and express oneself in. Sir Evelyn Howell and I have been engaged in trying to translate into English verse some of the verses of the Pashto poet, Khushhal Khan. I do not think the Royal Society's hall would be the right place for me to give you recitations of love lyrics, although Charles II—on the wall behind me—is obviously waiting and anxious to hear them! I can assure you they are the most admirable and moving poetry, a great deal nearer our English idea of verse than the Persian.

The Pathans live against a wonderful background of scenic splendour. The late Lord Zetland said of people who walked and talked on the Frontier that "the circumstances of their lives were such that they frequently experienced that species of spiritual exaltation induced by solitude amid the grandeur of nature."

A great friend of mine, Sir Basil Gould, now passed, as the Tibetans say, to the heavenly fields, said "no man can recall without emotion his first vision of rosy-fingered dawn or the setting rays of the sun as they gild the coronet of hills which hems the vale of Peshawar." With its wonderful surrounding coronet of jagged peaks in the foreground and behind them the everlasting snows, this grand scene depends to a great extent on its contrasts of greenery and aridity, the astonishing difference between winter and summer. The Peshawar Vale, or Swat, or Kurram and other places, both highland and lowland, have their own beauty.

I have shown you the great imperial and architectural past. For 200 years the Moghuls were the nominal rulers of this country, but they never conquered all the tribes. Moghul rule on the Frontier was brought to an end in 1739 by Nadir Shah of Persia when he captured Delhi and took away from the Moghuls all these regions. Nadir Shah was murdered a few years later in his tent. Ahmad Shah, the Durrani Captain of his body-guard, got away with the treasure, including the Koh-i-noor diamond, which is now in the Queen's crown, and with this treasure for the first time he set up an Afghan Kingdom in 1747. He succeeded—and it lasted through his son's life—in combining the Afghan tribes under one rule. Ahmad Shah's dynasty began to break up round about 1800, and the Eastern Afghans, that is to say the Pathans around Peshawar, reverted to their eastward look.

There is a great deal of Soviet propaganda, the British being accused again and again of having torn the Eastern Afghans away from Kabul and having brought them under their control. That criticism should be ad-


dressed to the ghost of Ranjit Singh, the founder of the Sikh kingdom, who took Peshawar from Ahmad's successor in the early years of the nineteenth century. The British, thirty years later, succeeded to the Sikh position on this frontier. They were in control for about 100 years, from 1846 to 1947, and it is justifiable for Englishmen to say that the Pathans as well as the British have benefited from our mutual association, and neither of us forget the 100 years of British rule.

Now Pakistan has succeeded to that heritage. You might like to hear something of what happened in 1946-7 when I was Governor in Peshawar. I had a very strange government for a Muslim province. It was affiliated to a Congress almost entirely Hindu, led locally by a remarkable man, Dr. Khan Sahib, a most lovable man whose memory I cherish, a man of immense charm, with all the Pathan virtues as well as some of their vices. He was a very difficult man to have as Premier in a Muslim province, with power about to be handed over, with a government which bore allegiance to Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Nehru.

The Pathans did not believe for a long time that the British were really going, but when it became certain they were, the idea of a Hindu-affiliated government was inconceivable to them. Khan Sahib still maintained his sincere conviction in favour of the unity of India, and I respected it. His idea was that as the Pathans had ruled in India in the past, why should they not rule in the whole of India in the future? As time went on it became evident with the two streams, the Hindu stream and the Muslim stream, a unified India could not survive, and there must be some sort of partition. The two streams ran parallel and would never converge, so partition was at that time and in those circumstances inevitable. For that reason I urged on Lord Mountbatten it was absolutely essential to have some sort of test of public opinion, either by a fresh election or by referendum, otherwise there would be civil war; unless there was some test of public opinion, it would not be possible to hand over power at all.

The one positive thing that was done by the British government before partition was to hold this referendum, with the result that, although the elections were boycotted by the Congress Party, more than half the registered electors voted to come into Pakistan. It was possible to hand over the North-West Frontier in good order, with stability and without turmoil, and that I regard as the best thing I ever did politically.

I must go back a little and say that in 1900 the late Lord Curzon had created the North-West Frontier Province by carving it out of the Punjab. There was a tremendous hooaha about it. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Mackworth Young, was very much opposed to it, and Curzon, being Curzon, a man fated by character to do the right thing in the wrong way, did not consult him properly. He did it because he was thinking of defence against Russia and so on. The real reason why he should have done it, and the reason why what he did was right, was that the new creation led to contentment and a feeling of self-esteem among the people, for the Pathans could now hold up their heads and say they were not only a province but in direct relations with the centre. They were in some ways the most important province in India. As another result of the partition it was possible to put the new province under the specialized care of officers



who could remain there, instead of being transferred to districts close to Delhi every other year. There is no doubt the experiment was on the whole a success.

People in the Punjab used to say our administrative standards had deteriorated. I do not agree, and I served in both Provinces. I think our administrative standards were quite as high on the North-West Frontier as in the Punjab. All of us, more or less, were good linguists; we could speak the language and talk to the people direct. You have to know the language well enough to be able to make a speech in it and take up a running argument; if you surrender yourself to your subordinates you generally get into trouble, so it was very important there should be a specialized corps of officers.

Coming on to the Pakistan period, in 1955 the Pakistan government decided they would not only re-amalgamate the North-West Frontier with the Punjab but would include all the Indus Provinces into one large Province of West Pakistan. They wanted to get over what they called "provincialism." I do not say for one moment that what was right when Curzon did it in 1900 would still have been right in 1955. There is no doubt a great deal to be said for what was called "One-unit," but it has led to a good deal of discontent among the Pathans.

Dr. Khan Sahib's surviving brother, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, started his own form of a Pakhtunistan movement in that part of the world. (This was a version different from the Kabul version which I will deal with later on.) Abdul Ghaffar's idea was there should be a separate Pakhtun (Pathan) Province in loose relations with India and Pakistan and Afghanistan. He did not think out the implications of an association like that or where it would get its money. As a practical politician he is hopeless. He is a man of great personality and very impressive to look at, but he has remained outside responsibility and his advice does not carry anybody very far ever.

When I was there a few years ago, I was asked if I saw great differences in the Frontier I then saw, as compared with the frontier I remembered. Certainly not in the people, not in the villages so much, but a good deal in the field of education. The college in Peshawar, a fine institution founded by Sir Abdul Qayyum and Sir George Roos-Keppel, had been turned into the University of Peshawar. There were many more schools, a great many of which were in the tribal areas. There had been very considerable extension of consumer industries in the way of processing local products. The Peshawar district is a wonderful garden and produces immense quantities of cane, tobacco and fruit. Two or three large sugar factories have been started.

They also process tobacco on a large scale. The local tobacco when I was there was used only for snuff, but it is now used for cigarettes. They also process woollens, and a great deal of beautiful fruit is grown there—oranges in winter—and who can forget those golden lamps glowing as in the garden of the Hesperides?—and in the spring all the stone fruits, peaches and plums; it is too hot for apples.

You will have heard a good deal about the Warsak Dam. At the point where the Kabul River issues from the mountains they have made a large

dam, with the dual purpose of providing hydro-electric power and irrigation. One great danger is that the Kabul River carries an enormous quantity of red silt, brought down from its tributary the Surkhrud in Afghan territory; and I am very much afraid as time goes on, the reservoir behind the dam will silt up quite quickly, or if the silt is carried down it may damage the turbines in the hydro-electric works.

It does not seem to me to be a good thing to praise all these works as if they were the most marvellous things. If one is really friendly to a country, one should sound a note of warning, if necessary, as well. Nevertheless, here the Pakistan government have been extremely energetic and have done a lot to extend irrigation, to make more power available, and to support the processing of local products.

Now for the Afghan version of Pakhtunistan. Politically, the Afghan theory is that the Pathans (Pakhtuns) should form a separate State to be known as Pakhtunistan, and in due course amalgamate with their blood brothers in Afghanistan. I have given the reason earlier why a theory which sounds quite reasonable on ethnic grounds is not really workable. The Eastern Afghans and the Western Afghans have always looked in different directions, and that is something the Afghans must realize.

There is another point which shows up this Afghan scheme for what it really is. They also claim Chitral and Gilgit, neither of which are Pathan countries, and the whole of Baluchistan down to the sea as part of the new State. The great bulk of Baluchistan south of Quetta is not Pathan either; it is inhabited by Baluch and Brahui tribes. In fact, they are really trying to wrench away the whole of the Trans-Indus portion of Western Pakistan from Pakistan—and most dishonestly, because their case is not solidly based on ethnic grounds. This propaganda is strongly echoed in all the Soviet material that comes out about British and other imperialism and, at the same time, owing to the estrangement of the Afghan government from the West and from Pakistan, the Soviets have made great inroads into Afghanistan. The Afghan Army is supplied with Russian arms and Russian technicians, and generally the Afghans are receiving full support in this attitude against Pakistan.

Among the Pathans all this cuts very little ice—the nearer you get to the scene the less you hear about it—but as a means of international pressure against Pakistan it is most dangerous. China is pressing on the Himalaya through Tibet; Russia is pressing on Pakistan through Afghanistan, always under the ægis of this absurd beam in the eye, imperialism, whereas in truth the Russians and Chinese of today are the most ruthless imperialists there have ever been since history began.

This heavy Soviet infiltration in Afghanistan, and the pressure on the Pakistan government, is one of the reasons why the North-West Frontier is a vitally important place still. It is one of the touchstones in the whole of the world scene. The Pakistan government have been extremely wise in dealing with the tribes. They have done much better than we did over education. They have done extremely well over the organization of the Scouts, the irregular forces to keep order in those places, and have not had to use force very much. There are certain parts of tribal territory, Bajaur is one, where there has never been any occupation in British times, and

not until recently in Pakistan times, and these places are very touchy. I was shocked to hear some months ago that the Pakistan government had arrested my old friend, the Nawab of Dir, because they said he was dealing with the Afghans. I know the Dir Chief very well, and I find it hard to credit that he would be dealing with the Afghans. I think he was troubled about the position between himself and Swat, and the reactions of this old rivalry on the chiefs in the neighbouring Bajaur area. Neither of them has been averse from getting the other into trouble. How much of the background do the young Political Officers know? Dir is more important than Swat in many respects, for one reason because the road to Chitral goes through the former. One of the results is that there has been trouble in Bajaur, in which an old firebrand Badshahgul, son of the Haji of Turangzai, has come out as an Afghan agent, and his headquarters has been bombed. There is going to be a good deal of difficulty when the Pakistan government have to take action, as we had to do before them, to extend their authority in areas of tribal territory hitherto unoccupied.

Finally, let me say that the most moving thing that has happened to me in my life was when I was invited to go out again to the North-West Frontier and visit my old friends and make new ones. One went round the villages and small towns seeing one's old friends or their sons, and everywhere there was the most marvellous welcome, which was absolutely real and true. With the Pathans, once a friend always a friend. It was a most extraordinary experience and moved me very deeply. Others who have gone back have felt the same.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, you all realize we have to vacate this room at this time, therefore it precludes the possibility of any questions, hundreds of which I see trembling on the lips of the ex-officers of that part of the world. I do assure Sir Olaf we have had a most wonderful hour. I am sure there is a large proportion of people who have looked at these pictures and heard him talk with the greatest feeling of nostalgia. Next time we must ask for an edition of two volumes; it is impossible for him to get all he has to say into the time available. May I thank him very much on your behalf for giving us such a brilliant talk. (*Applause.*)

THE SIKHS

By MAJOR J. McL. SHORT

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, May 10, 1961. Chairman: Sir Olaf Caroe, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, I find it a little piquant that, a fortnight ago having talked to you about the Pathans, I should be asked now to take the chair to a speaker on the Sikhs, considering the Pathans and Sikhs have been antipathetic one to the other. But before I had anything to do with the Pathans, the first District I went to, in what was then India, and still is India, was Amritsar, the homeland of the Sikhs, and they are an extremely formidable and important people, as you are shortly going to hear.

Major Short has just reminded me we first met in 1916 in quite a small block-house. Although I have not seen very much of him since then, he has always impinged on one's conscience as a man who really does know his subject, and has his heart in the people with whom he has dealt for so many years. He was in the famous Sikh Regiment, the 47th, wholly Sikh until it was mingled with the Punjabi Mussulman. He was also Liaison Officer with the Sikhs during the war, and somewhat surprisingly also came out with Sir Stafford Cripps' mission to India.

There you are, Ladies and Gentlemen, and you are going to hear something of extreme interest.

LADIES and Gentlemen, I am sensible of the honour you do me, and I thank you for it. I have only dared to accept it, and stand up here before you today, because I feel that too much blood has been shed, and is still likely to be shed, for lack of a closer and deeper study of Sikhism and the Sikhs; and because I endure in the hope of provoking such study.

I am particularly glad to have Sir Olaf at my elbow, ready to prod me when I falter and fail, and to pull me by my coat tails, and sharply to order me off my feet, when I have nothing more to say, or begin to say too much. Since 1947, I cannot remember a single comment on the Sikh that seemed to me to make sense, except his the other day in *The Times*. After you have heard me, you may say that that bouquet is what the Marquis of Wellesely might have called a "gilt potato." So let me now tell you that one of our most distinguished ex-Civil Servants of India has contributed to it.

Nearly five hundred years ago, north of the Sutlej, in the Manja or middle tract of the Central Punjab, in the Lahore and Amritsar districts, a firm but gentle protest against Hinduism and Hinduised Islam was made by a native of those parts, one Nanak, and his supporters were called disciples or Sikhs; but rather disciples of truth than disciples of Nanak, who at all times and in all places gave all the glory to his God, who was neither the God of Hinduism nor the God of Islam, or of any one sect or people, but a Universal Deity.

Some two hundred and fifty years ago these Sikhs had begun to call themselves individually Lions or Singhs, and collectively the Khalsa or the Liberated, and to signify their calling notably by remaining unshaven and unshorn: and their Sikhism had come to be based on Amritsar, and had grown into the militant protestantism of a rude free-lance Sikh *imperium*.

in imperio, siding as freely with Muslim as with Hindu, now serving, now harassing, the tottering Muslim Moghul Empire, now favoured, now harassed, by its failing and faltering rulers.

Some one hundred and forty years ago, another native of the Manja, a Sikh Chieftain, one Ranjit Singh, nicknamed One Eye, for he had but one and that most single, largely by estimating our strength correctly and avoiding any breach with us, and by employing European officers and impartially picking his servants for their ability to serve him well, had consolidated a Sikh Empire north of the Sutlej, based on the Manja, astride the Indus river, up to the Khyber, and embracing Kashmir—a remarkable feat considering the times. That Empire's spiritual capital was Amritsar, and its secular capital was Lahore.

Some one hundred years or so ago, Ranjit Singh having been dead for some eighteen years, after an apparently leaderless and obviously misled Sikh people had twice tried their strength with us, and twice proved themselves the stoutest opponents we had ever had in India, they so ungrudgingly acknowledged themselves fairly defeated by us that they became our stoutest Indian allies, notably in the Mutiny.

Thereafter and up to August, 1947, they earned a series of unsolicited testimonials from us for valour, manly independence, self-reliance, self-help, honesty, industry, resilience, enterprise; and were repeatedly hailed as India's leading farmers, soldiers, athletes and colonizers; and were also more and more readily prescribed by us as the most dangerously subversive and unreliable of all Indians.

Since August, 1947, no Indian has lost so much well-farmed land; or has revenged himself so terribly for his losses; or has been so self-helpful or so successful in repairing his fortunes; or has been so fearlessly charitable to his past rulers and critical of his present ones; or has been so freely jailed for his pains and has so fairly outstripped the Indian Congress's record for jail-hours; or has so carelessly and cheerfully and effectively enhanced his unpopularity in Hindustan and retrieved his popularity in Pakistan.

Today these Sikhs still account for a bare 2 per cent. of the population of the Indian sub-continent. They are still almost all natives of the Punjab. One-third of them is still an amalgam of several Indian races, two of whom, the Khatri and his bar-sinister racial cousin the Arora, but especially the Khatri, have served Sikhism well.

The remaining two-thirds of them are still Juts of the Central Punjab. It is these Juts of the Central Punjab who are, I suggest, the core of Sikhism.

South of the Sutlej, in the Malwa or Green tract of the Central Punjab, they are thicker on the ground than north of it in the Manja. But it is in the Manja, and especially in the Amritsar and Lahore districts, that Sikhism goes deepest and runs strongest. Sikhism began there: Ranjit Singh was a Manja Jut: he built his empire essentially with the Manja Jut and it excluded the Malwa.

To come to grips with Anglicanism you must come to grips with the mere English. To come to grips with Sikhism, you must grasp the significance of the Manja Jut Sikh.

Racially his genesis is as dark and mysterious as the generation of eels. Probably he derives from those Scythians, who, either some time just before or after the birth of our Lord, seem to have migrated from the banks of the Oxus, pressed through the Bolan Pass, spread out over northern India from Hazara to Scind and the Jumna Valley, and duly became India's Jāts, except in the Punjab where they came to be called Juts.

Be that as it may, what is certain is that while these Jats or Juts generally are more or less Indianized, the Punjabi Jut who is a Sikh is not only strikingly unlike the Punjabi Jut who is not one, but the Jut Sikh, very specially the Manja Jut Sikh, is the most strikingly unIndian of all Indians.

It may be that he is so *sui generis* because he is Sikh. But I believe it to be the other way round. I believe his Sikhism to be as much his natural outlet and sustenance as Anglicanism is the natural outlet and sustenance of us mere English.

Anyway, there he is, despite the wear and tear of centuries of Central Asian and Indian history, as brightly and briskly distinct and unIndian as ever.

Physically, Indians are generally much as their sculptors and artists depict them. This Sikh Jut, but for his greater length of leg, is very much Michelangelo's Moses and David, his women recline in Michelangelo's Medici Mausoleum, and something very like them and their young adorn the vault of the Sistine.

Mr. Nehru has recently said that the Indian is a singularly feminine character. This Jut Sikh is an out-and-out male.

All in all, I would sum him up as the nearest thing in India to our genuine rustic and yeoman: except in one respect: when feeling utterly baffled his savagery is utterly foreign to his English opposite number.

All of which is truest of the Manja Jut Sikh, who, as I have already said, is the core of Sikhism. It is he who has called the tune and paid the piper of spiritual and temporal Sikhism. And he will continue to do so as long as he finds Sikhism serves his spiritual and temporal needs. And I see no signs of his ceasing to do so.

When before the first Sikh war we thought the Sikh army a "rabble," and before the second were convinced that the Sikh soldiery "would be swept like dust before a regiment even of Sepoys," it was this Manja Jut Sikh we so grievously underestimated.

Since 1949, at least, we have clung to the notion that Sikhs are Hindus, and are being swallowed up by Hinduism under our eyes. I have yet to hear of or meet the Manja Jut Sikh who has entertained such a notion, or who could be any more classified a Hindu than an Anglican could be classified a Roman Catholic. Only from Khatri Sikhs have I found support for the idea, and I suggest there is good reason for that. As Campbell reminds us in his *Ethnology of India*, while the Khatri is very much a natural public servant, it is curious he has rendered Sikhism such distinguished public service, since he is also so very much a natural Hindu. I suggest that the record of the Khatri Sikh shows that his Hinduism will out, and when he is not accorded a leading role in Sikhism he naturally tends to become its leading defeatist and loudest crypto-Hindu.

We also cling to the legend, overlooking that it grew up while the

Khattris were the appointed leaders of the Sikhs, that Sikhism's most terrible persecutors were the Muslim Moghuls. In fact, the Moghuls only harassed the Sikh when he was a political nuisance, and freely employed him when he was not being one.

We overlook, too, that the Manja Sikh is not only a good loser, as he showed after the two Sikh wars, but also a good winner. After he had overset Muslim power, he freely employed distinguished Muslims in key stations, and his firmest friendships in the Manja have been with his Muslim and not his Hindu neighbours there.

We also overlook that, if Sikh and Muslim rivalry has recently revived, it was our policy that revived it, and that it is essentially political and not religious, and not least because the Manja Jut Sikh is in no sense a religious fanatic. I remember a very distinguished Manja Jut Sikh officer rebuking me for my wanting to promote a man whom he held to be far too religious to make a good non-commissioned officer. The Manja Jut Sikh's attitude to religion is very similar to that of the Englishman. He neither nurses religious grievances, nor does he indulge in religious fanaticism. His Sikhism, in short, like our Anglicanism, is a house of many mansions and as broad as it is long.

After the Great War, we were slow to grasp that the Sikh revivalist movement called the Gurdwara movement was prompted by the genuine desire of the Sikh, and above all of the Manja Sikh, to put his spiritual house in better order.

Nor did we ever fully grasp how often and completely our frequent suspicions of Sikh loyalty were falsified. In Peshawar, on one occasion, we were sure a Sikh regiment there was unreliable, and that another regiment there without a Sikh in it was not. When called out in aid of the civil power, the Sikh regiment was staunch, and the other regiment broke. That was the sort of thing that often happened. Again and again serving Sikhs were suspected of being subversive and dangerous. Time and again the suspicion proved unwarranted.

But least of all did we grasp how much we owed it to the Manja Jut Sikh that our suspicions of Sikh Jut treachery were so frequently and flatly falsified. To his deep attachment to us, to his profound conviction that our destinies and his own are interlocked, we remained steadfastly insensitive.

So it is not surprising that we never really conceded that the Sikh reluctance to fight for us in the last war stemmed from the Manja Jut Sikh's genuine foreboding that our victory and policy must make him a subject of his previous subjects: or that after this last war, having persuaded the Sikh to fight for us and told him we would stand by him, we were all too inclined to accept the assurances of Hindu and Muslim public men that the Sikh, and notably the Manja Jut Sikh, was no longer the force he used to be, but a materialistic opportunist who could be safely handed over to them.

When, in 1947, we took too little practical heed of the effect on the Sikh of the March massacre of his weaker brethren on the periphery of Sikhdom, again it was above all the Manja Jut Sikh we were most grievously underestimating.

We also signally demonstrated in 1947 our failure to appreciate that, however ill-led, or misled, or apparently leaderless, the Manja Jut Sikh can be as savagely terrible when he feels himself baffled, as he can be splendid when he feels himself fairly brought to bay.

As August, 1947, drew upon him, thanks to all the aforesaid affronts to his sensibilities, he felt more and more baffled, chiefly by us. His mood became one of govern-or-get-out, while in his heart of hearts he wished we would govern him properly and stay. His ideal of government had become the personal and direct rule of a Henry Lawrence, and he realized we were in no mood to give him that. He had long sensed we were soon going, yet he hoped forlornly on that we might stay just a little longer and put him where he wanted to be.

In 1942 he had suggested—and perhaps some of you are aware of this—that we might give the Punjab, for war services already rendered, an immediate reward of dominion status, with the treaty rights of an Indian state, provided only he and other Punjabis coalesced to ask for it. But we were not forthcoming: although he and leading Punjabi Muslims and Hindus pleaded for such a step, and reminded us that it might give a new and healthier twist to politics in India.

From then on he wanted some sort of Sikhistan, which would include, as well as the Manja tract, as much as possible of the Punjab north of the Sutlej, and notably his cherished and flourishing colonies.

Up to the bitter end he clung to the hope that we might somehow or other wrest something of the sort for him. He opted for modern India in that hope, believing that thereby he and we would be in a stronger position to get him what he wanted.

As the upshot became clear to him, he reaffirmed the truth, in his own terrible way, of Coleridge's

. . . to be wroth with one we love
Doth work like madness in the brain.

Yet he could not, even in his dire dementia, turn on us. Instead he turned upon those whom he regarded as our chief aiders and abettors in the despoilment of his beloved Punjab.

When that madness had passed, characteristically he set to to repair his losses; at first individually and unobtrusively; and when he felt them sufficiently restored, more and more collectively and less and less unobtrusively.

What he now wants is to govern himself in his undoctinaire and strictly practical fashion; which may be described as a Sikh version of the Henry Lawrence method of governing, for which there is no modern label that is remotely fitting, chiefly because it is essentially government of the individualist, by the individualist and for the individualist. In order to become an *imperium in imperio* of that sort, he is as ready as ever to employ servants and masters without regard to race or creed, provided only they forward his interests as he sees them; and he draws as freely as ever upon the services of his small minority of many races, and at present rather upon his Aroras than upon their grander racial relations, his Khattris.

Meanwhile his protestantism, his Sikhism that is to say, seems to be running as strongly as ever.

But, if his own and Indian blood generally is not to be tragically spilled again, his present rulers must estimate him more accurately than it would seem they now do. They seem now to be all too steeped in our own misconceptions of the Sikh and his Sikhism. God grant they may grow out of them, and be spared the terrible and tragic upshot we were not spared, and were deservedly not spared—that of a death roll of, putting it at its very lowest, one and a half million.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is a wonderful address and has shown us something of the great Sikh problem. The Sikhs suffered more than anybody else in 1947 because their territories and lands were cleft by the partition. Hundreds of thousands of them had to march from Pakistan to India, and you all know what happened.

I would like to say two things: one is very much to endorse what Major Short said about the affinity between Jut Muslims and Jut Sikhs. The Jut Muslims who lived in Amritsar had a great likeness to the Jut Sikhs. The second is what he said about the Sikhs in Peshawar city, where I was in 1930 and saw that battalion stand when another battalion had broken, and I remember only too well the reassurance one got when watching these magnificent-looking men.

I hope you have some questions to ask on this very inspiring address.

Sir EVELYN HOWELL: If I may I would like to offer a very brief reminiscence. During the first cold weather I was in India I was out on observation duty. I met an old man, a Muslim, who told me he himself had seen the great Ranjit Singh, so there you have a link with the past.

Mr. L. W. JARDINE: Can the speaker tell us whether the Sikhs are increasing in number or not? In 1959 I was in Delhi and Lucknow, and I noticed a tremendous number of Sikhs.

Major SHORT: I do not really know. I have not been out there for such a long time. But I would say not. It is interesting that you should ask this, because only the other day someone back from Calcutta remarked that it might now be a Sikh city.

Mr. JARDINE: Has the speaker any knowledge whether Sikhs in California retain the characteristics they have in the Punjab.

Major SHORT: We know one of them, a Jut Sikh girl. This girl speaks Canadian English fluently and beautifully. She told us that for three generations her family has been settled round about California and has prospered there; that their lands there are now considerable; that great grandparents, grandparents and parents have all insisted on their children going back to the Punjab to find Jut Sikh wives and husbands: and that they have as a family remained orthodox Sikhs. I believe that to be typical.

Sir OLAF CAROE: I wonder if the lecturer could tell us a little more about the religious inspirations of Sikhdom and what it owes to the monotheistic inspiration of Islam.

Major SHORT: It owes much to Kabir and other Muslims. Its debt to Islam goes very deep. Then there is the testimony of that famous missionary of the Punjab, Canon Guildford. He always maintained Sikhism had a curiously Christian quality. Certainly there were Nestorian heretics on

the west coast of India at the time when Sikhism was growing up. Whispers of Christianity might well have come from that quarter, as well as via Islam, and influenced Sikhism.

Sir OLAF CAROE: The lecturer said a great deal about those magnificent people, the Jut Sikhs. He did not mention Hari Singh Nulwa, the great Khatri Sikh general. I have heard Pathan women saying: "Hari Singh Nulwa is here" to quieten their children. I heard that said 120 years after Hari Singh had died.

The Khatri and Aroras, the urban members of the Sikh community, have had a tremendous influence in formulating Sikhism on the political side.

Major SHORT: Formulating is the word. Campbell says in effect that the Khatri is a remarkably sensitive civil servant and administrator. Which is to say that he is remarkably sensitive to current political trends and apt at finding popular formulas for them.

Mrs. THURPP: What would be the Sikh contribution to the arts, literature, and so on?

Major SHORT: It is very hard to estimate that. Their Sikh Book or Bible is rather remarkable. It has the virtue of simplicity. It is in the language of their people. I would say their artistic output otherwise, by my standards, is a little startling. It is bold and not sophisticated. I know of no outstanding Sikh artists.

QUESTIONER: Could I ask the speaker whether he would advocate a Sikh State, or what path he thinks the Indian Government should follow.

Major SHORT: I personally think unless something like a Sikh State is set up there will not be much peace in India, and certainly not on her Pakistan border.

QUESTIONER: Is there Sikh representation in the Indian parliament?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think it is Sikh on a communal basis. In the old days before 1947 there was representation, and all over India where Muslims were in a minority they had separate representation and elected their own people, and the same in the Punjab for Sikhs, but I do not think that has been carried on.

Mr. GUPTA: There is no communal representation. There are Sikhs in Parliament.

The CHAIRMAN: They would get there as natural leaders of that part of the country.

We have had a good deal of reminiscence and some very pertinent questions, and I think all of us will carry away the thought that however feminine India's leaders may say the Indian character is, here is one of the most virile and masculine people in Asia, if not in the world, and India, if it is to aspire to the true heights of which it is capable, will obviously have to and will wish to keep those people in a position where their qualities will have free play.

We are most grateful to Major Short for the moving and experienced picture he has given us of this great people.

FRANÇOISE DE GRUNNE—1927-60

IN the annals of exploration and mountaineering of that great mountain complex made up of the western Himalaya, Karakoram, Hindu-Kush and Pamir, the names of few women stand out. Fanny Bullock-Workman, Jenny Visser-Hooft and E. O. Lorimer will be remembered for their written contributions and personalities; and in another category the names of Ella Maillart, Jean Shor and Barbara Mons should also not go unnoticed. But possibly in a category by itself stands the name of Françoise de Grunne, whose recent disappearance on Mount Dobani in Gilgit removes from the scene one of the most remarkable women ever to have ventured among these giants of the earth's surface.

Born in Brussels on October 20, 1927, daughter of the late Comte Xavier de Henricourt de Grunne, Miss de Grunne was educated in convent schools and the University of Louvain. Early in life she became interested in travel and mountaineering, and following her formal education she travelled widely in Italy, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Greece. During these travels, which were usually undertaken alone and often by the most primitive means, she acquired a strong interest in Byzantine and Eastern art.

In 1957, accepting an opportunity to extend her travels farther east, she arrived in Pakistan to begin a teaching assignment at Peshawar University. She quickly became interested in Gandharan art, that peculiar blending of Greek and Indian Buddhist influences, of which the Peshawar and Swat valleys are such rich repositories. In addition, she lost no time in finding out what the opportunities were for travel and climbing in the adjacent tribal areas and frontier states; the lure of their semi-restricted character probably acting as an additional incentive. By dint of a singular combination of adroitness, charm and perseverance, she invariably succeeded in her efforts to get permission, and for the next three years—during every university recess and vacation—embarked on one after another enterprising trip into the remote confines of these areas, often becoming a thorn in the side of officials responsible for the safety of foreigners travelling therein.

Although she made some forays into the area south of Peshawar—*e.g.*, Kurram, and also in Afghanistan—the bulk of her travels were to the north—in Swat, Chitral and Gilgit, and she came to know this country as few other contemporary foreigners have known it. Her incredible physical stamina, fearlessness and ability to travel lightly soon made her the object of numerous stories amongst the local population. One of the most widely known of these concerned a horse-back ride she made from Astor to Gilgit, a distance of some eighty miles, in one night; this over a mountain track usually covered in six to eight day stages—a truly phenomenal feat and one which was later narrated with wonder in the drawing-rooms of Lahore and Karachi.

In the summer of 1958, she spent some two months trekking in the Astor, Punial and Yasin areas of Gilgit Agency. During this time she crossed several passes over 14,000 feet, including the historic Darkot Pass (15,400 feet) near the Wakhan Corridor where, 1,200 years before, the Korean general Kao Hsien-chih had led 10,000 Chinese troops down into Gilgit to drive a wedge between the advancing Tibetans and Arabs.

During the following year (1959), she persuaded officialdom to allow her to go through Darel and Tangir which, until 1953, were virtually entirely unadministered tribal territories. Only two foreigners are believed to have been there before: Sir Aurel Stein in 1913 and Dr. Karl Jettmar in 1956. There she observed unusual and highly interesting aspects of the culture—women's costumes, dances and mosque decoration. Following her return from Darel and Tangir, she proceeded to Chitral, where she joined a group from the Karakoram Club in an attempt on Tirich Mir (25,263 feet). For various reasons, including her highly individualistic character, this arrangement did not work out and she soon broke away and proceeded to another nearby mountain. Accompanied by one porter, she climbed to a vantage point of about 18,000 feet from where she viewed with great excitement the spectacular sight of the dozens of towering ice-clad peaks lying to the west and north.

In 1960, so far as can be determined from her notebook, she followed a route from Drosh in Chitral through Swat Kohistan to Laspur, then across Kuh-Ghizar and Punial to Gilgit. From there she gathered porters and went on to Dobani, some thirty miles to the east, where, on September 14, 1960, in a solo attempt on the 20,126-foot peak, she disappeared in a snow-storm. Later search parties found traces of a slip, and she is presumed to have been swept away by an avalanche.

Miss de Grunne combined the qualities of adventurer, "seeker after truth" and prospective student—a combination which, coupled with her fierce determination to accomplish goals set, did not endear her to many, and in fact earned her the reputation of an eccentric or worse. But eccentrics have played important roles in human affairs—not least of all in British India, and there is sufficient reason to believe that she might well have followed in that tradition. Unfortunately, she never published her observations or experiences. That there was a need for knowledge and observations of this type to be worked up is amply demonstrated in Dr. Jettmar's article, "Urgent Tasks of Research among the Dardic Peoples of Eastern Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan." In this article Dr. Jettmar particularly emphasized the rich field awaiting the student of art history. In another direction there also remains much work to be done on the relationships between the Gandharan art of this area and Mediterranean or Greek art. With her keen eye for art forms and her deep interest in Western and Byzantine art generally, the conclusion is unmistakable that whatever she might have written would have been of considerable interest to scholars of the area.

But for her passion for mountains then, we might have still had among us this unique individual singularly endowed by experience to fulfil a needed task. It may be, on the other hand, that the end she found was not out of keeping with the idea she was pursuing—a kind of Alpine mysti-

cism. The grasp this idea had on her imagination is clearly revealed in a number of poetic passages penned in her last notebook, some of considerable beauty and evocative power.

As an English philosopher once wrote of those who turn to mountains for spiritual satisfaction, she "caught the reflection of eternal beauty in the temporal hills."

J. H.

IRAQ'S "CLAIM" TO KUWAIT*

By BRIG. STEPHEN LONGRIGG

Turkish suzerainty is about the only historic link between Iraq and Kuwait, and even that was formally repudiated by the emirate in 1914.

THE fact that an Iraqi claim to Kuwait was made, however briefly and unofficially, by Iraqi politicians in the 'twenties, and by King Ghazi's private broadcasting station in 1938, shows that the pretension, thus antedating Kuwait's fantastic present oil-wealth, is no sudden aggressive brain-child of General Kassem.

The claim now so brusquely renewed could rely for its validity only, it seems, on facts of geography, or of racial or tribal affinity, or of history—or, more convincingly, on a clear self-determination in the indicated sense by the population concerned. Do any of these considerations in fact support it?

Geography can help very little, since the Kuwait emirate lies definitely outside Iraq's well-marked southern approaches and must, if politically connected, form an awkward extraneous appendage.

Are the Kuwaitis, nevertheless, in some sense Iraqi on lines of shared origins in clan, tribe, or community? The answer here is certainly negative; the entry of some thousands of Iraqis into Kuwait territory, for work in oilfields and public projects, belongs only to the past fifteen years.

RULING FAMILY

Before this the emirate's population was composed of settled families from a dozen Arabian tribes. The claim that these are nothing but Iraqis longing for reunion with their homeland seems of quite singular ineptness.

Nor have these folk, in town or tribe, ever questioned the continuous authority of their original and sole ruling dynasty, that of the Arabian (Aniza) family of al-Subah.

Support for the present claim must depend on quite other considerations; and these must be of remarkable potency if they can outweigh the stark fact that the Iraqi State, since its foundation in 1920, forty-two years ago, with a specific content and boundaries, has at no time included Kuwait.

Such inclusion must, at any period, have been highly surprising, so dissimilar were, and are, the two States in their society, orientation, and form of government.

A series of European visitors to the emirate in the nineteenth century

* Reprinted by kind permission of the author and of the Editor of the *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*. This article appeared in that paper on Tuesday, July 11, 1961.

describe the changeless, mediæval Arab society of the place: the guards and entourage of the sheikhly ruler, his primitive fiscal arrangements, his personal administration of justice, his use of trusted slaves as his highest officials, his interventions in Najdi politics.

From all this apparatus and spirit of native Kuwaiti society and government nothing could seem remoter than those of its northern neighbour, the Turkish province of Basra, with its codes and courts, its horde of police and *zaptiyé* and seedy Turkish-speaking effendis, its developed hierarchy, its beys and pashas.

FOR PRESTIGE

Yet a link existed; it was the common acceptance for some decades before 1914, of Turkish suzerainty. The Ottoman government occupied Iraq in the mid-sixteenth century, but made no move to incorporate eastern Arabia until 1870.

In that year sufficient military flag-showing was carried out, south and west of Iraq, to justify the Turks, in their own eyes, in claiming dominion over vast tracts of Arabia; and princely or sheikhly potentates from Riyadh to the Gulf found themselves designated in Ottoman calendars (which they could not read) as Qaimaqams or Mutasarrifs.

The arrangement, designed for prestige, was totally unreal, and was confirmed on the spot by no vestige of Turkish administration except for tiny garrisons left in four or five coastal villages. These were expelled from eastern Arabia by the Saudis in 1913; from Qatar the military post vanished in 1913; in Kuwait (honorifically visited by the great Midhat Pasha in 1871) no single Turkish soldier appeared at all, and the al-Subah Sheikh, designated in Stambuli lists as Qaimaqam of Kuwait, continued to rule with the undisputed allegiance of his people and without the smallest intervention, at any level, of his purely nominal suzerain.

It is, however, indisputable that such suzerainty was in some measure acknowledged by successive rulers of the principality from 1871 to 1914; and more than one, seeing in the Basra pashas the wielders of the sole military force in the region, and persons of power and consequence, were not unwilling to send them an occasional present in cash or kind. Upon this rests the whole of the Iraqi case.

The unreality of their claim that Kuwait had thus become "part of the Basra *vilayet*" is, objectively viewed, apparent; and it is emphasized by yet another element in the fortunes of the emirate before 1914.

In 1899 the vigilant British in the Gulf, who had twice rejected approaches by the Kuwaiti ruler for protection against possible Turkish exigencies, agreed at last, in view of the potential or threatened use of Kuwait as terminus for the (German) Baghdad Railway, to safeguard it by a written agreement or treaty with Sheikh Mubarak in his capacity as sovereign ruler of the territory.

The provisions of the January, 1899 Treaty, guaranteeing Kuwait's integrity need not here be detailed; its conclusion with an outside, European, Power proved the effective validity of the Sheikh's independence. Later Anglo-Turkish discussions in 1909-13, and the resulting agreement

between these powers (ratification of which was prevented by the outbreak of war), made explicit the Turkish acceptance of this position even while they maintained their claim to suzerainty.

THE LAST REMNANT

The last remnant of this tenuous link vanished in 1914 by formal sheikhly repudiation, approved by Britain—six years before an Iraqi State came to birth.

As to the feelings of Kuwaiti citizens today—as distinct from recent, perhaps temporary, immigrants—it is unimaginable that any reasonable test would show them willing to exchange their present proud status of independence, great wealth, extraordinary recent development, and high hopes, for the role of sub-district in an unhappy, distracted neighbouring country under military dictatorship.

The United Nations should not find this simple issue too difficult to settle decisively. Such a settlement should by its terms take into account and provide for one specific future probability: that is, of a further claim similar to Iraq's, not less insistent and not less baseless, this time from the vast and rich neighbouring kingdom which has already announced that Kuwait and itself are "one country"—Saudi Arabia.

REVIEWS

Curzon: The End of an Epoch. By Leonard Mosley. Longmans, London, 1960. Pp. 301. 12 illustrations. 30s. net.

The author of this considerable volume was twelve years old when, in 1925, Lord Curzon died. At eighteen, he tells us, he went to Canada in a cattle boat and there took to journalism. In that profession he progressed through a series of adventures on the Canadian, United States and British press and visited several other countries, including some in Europe and others, during war time, in Africa. He has already written other books. In this case, he tells us in an introductory note, he set out not to write a political biography, nor to present Lord Curzon "simply as a man, but to show him as a whole human being, complex, temperamental, in sickness and (rarely in this case) health, in happiness and misery, in moments of private joy and public triumph, in the midst of terrible domestic stress and profound humiliation." For his facts, he says, he went first to the great mass of papers that Lord Curzon left behind him and enjoyed sole access to them for nearly two years. Those papers, in boxes, tin trunks, and so on, filled two whole rooms. Ah, but Curzon destroyed those letters which, he felt, might "spoil the picture of himself which he was anxious for posterity to have of him," therefore "for information about these I have had to go elsewhere." And so, while Mr. Mosley declares the late peer to have been "almost certainly the most fascinating character of major importance to have figured in English politics since the days of Sir George Savile, first Marquess of Halifax (1633-95)," he adds that "each loved to hear the sound of his own voice or read the copious emanations from his own pen and neither of them ever hesitated to go back on a solemn pledge if the contingencies of the political situation made such a reversal necessary to preserve his advantage." Both, he says, earned hatred for what was considered their "turnabout perfidiousness."

It is only to be expected that with this picture of his subject in his own understanding Mr. Mosley gives us a story that builds up to it. Thus, "there are some who will say that what his assumption of the Under Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs added to Curzon's character was not flexibility but deviousness, and certainly under a chief with such an outlook as Lord Salisbury's a subordinate needed to learn how to twist and turn if he was to make anything of his office."

But what can the uninformed reader think of the author and his report of the great struggle between Lord Curzon, as Viceroy in India, and Lord Kitchener, as Commander-in-Chief there, when, at its commencement, we read that "all through the crisis . . . there was always an opportunity, even up to the eleventh hour, for Curzon to save the situation by the exercise of a little tact or diplomacy, but these were qualities which were not in his make-up," but find, a few pages later, that Curzon welcomed K's arrival in India and "blandly ignored any hints from his friends that he was taking a viper to his bosom," that at one stage Kitchener "promised that he would give the system (which he had been trying to overturn) a year's trial—a promise which . . . he had no intention of keeping" and that the Viceroy first got news of this breach of faith when Lord George Hamilton told him that Kitchener was writing secret letters to the War Office in support of his own case, that while at one stage the Viceroy "made repeated efforts to get the relationship between him and his opponent back on the basis of friendship and understanding," "this was the moment when Kitchener's intrigues were bubbling most furiously."

And thus the tale goes on until we read of how, in the moments when Curzon was feeling certain that the King was about to call upon him to be Prime Minister, other politicians, in the highest positions, were deliberately deceiving and tricking His Majesty into sending for somebody else.

It is all a racy story that aims to provide new information, but also carries within itself reasons for serious doubts.

A. H. B.

Record of an Ascent. By P. L-S. Published by Dillons University Bookshop, 1961. Pp. 43. Illus. 10s. 6d.

This sensitive and attractive book commemorates Sir Richmond Ritchie, who was Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India from 1909 till his premature death at 54 in 1912. The first member of the India Office to rise to its headship. A great public servant, with a legendary skill in draftsmanship, to whom Curzon (on his appointment as Viceroy) had offered the Indian Political Secretaryship, which Ritchie, who did not reciprocate his admiration, declined; he was for many years the trusted adviser of successive Secretaries of State for India, whose tributes to him, to his wisdom and to his independence of judgment, are recorded here. Ritchie was a shrewd and far-seeing counsellor in the difficult days of the Morley/Minto reforms, and of the revocation of the partition of Bengal. In the external field he was closely concerned with the negotiations over Tibet which followed the Younghusband expedition of 1904, and with the still more significant discussions which led up to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. But his interests were far from purely official. Married to Thackeray's daughter, he was throughout his life associated with literary and artistic circles in London. His skill as a conversationalist and a scholar, his sardonic wit, and his humanity, accessibility (perhaps at a cost to himself which he did not realize) and kindness are well brought out by this little book. A photograph showing him under the portrait of Charles Lamb in front of the Adam fireplace in the Under-Secretary of State's room in the India Office, will revive many memories for the dwindling number of survivors of the staff of that great office of which he was so distinguished a chief.

GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

Hussein of Jordan. By Gerald Sparrow. George Harrap. Pp. 154. Indexed and illus. 15s.

The visitor or journalist who spends a few weeks in a country and then writes a book, revealing for the first time the real truth, is a commonplace of our time. Judge Sparrow, however, has written not one but two books, as a result of his visit. In chapter 3 of *Hussein of Jordan*, he claims that he obtained completely authentic information, unobtainable to anyone else, and now no longer obtainable in Jordan.

This claim to a monopoly of omniscience is somewhat tarnished by the fact that the majority of the dates and figures given in the book are wrong and that most of the names of places and people are misspelt. For the remainder, the views expressed are generally superficial. In other instances, they are often banal, as where the author writes, "It is too often forgotten that what the new nations of the Near and Middle East most ardently want is absolute freedom."

Minor errors of detail are innumerable, many of them apparently the result of carelessness rather than ignorance. Such statements as that Amman is north of Jerusalem, that Glubb Pasha commanded 60,000 men (the Arab Legion was in reality 24,000) or that the Arab Legion band wears kilts, seem merely due to indifference. Little local knowledge would have been necessary to check these ridiculous statements.

Few will believe the suggestion that Glubb Pasha attempted to rig the elections. Indeed, Judge Sparrow himself admits that such statements are "obviously partial and distorted." Yet he goes on to say that there was remarkable uniformity of voting in army camps during the elections, and that the camps returned Glubb's men to parliament. In fact voting was, of course, by secret ballot and the camps returned no candidates of their own. Soldiers voted in the constituencies in which they happened to be, as is presumably the practice in all democratic countries.

In brief, Judge Sparrow fails in either book to use his critical faculty at all. He appears to have written down what he was told unquestioningly. Indeed his statements often appear contradictory. On page 41 of *Hussein of Jordan*, Ali abu Nuwar is described as an able officer of the new school. Only nine pages later, he appears as a traitor. On page 52, the Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion is said to have been "Haaza Majali," an apparent confusion with the Prime Minister, whose name was Hazza Majali.

In spite of this hotchpotch of inaccuracies, however, the books do contain certain points worthy of emphasis. The author, for example, mentions the fact that the Jordans are lively, active and energetic, in marked contrast with certain other countries of the Middle East. We are, indeed, too apt to lump many peoples together as Arabs or Orientals, forgetting the immense differences between them. He is probably right in claiming that Jordan could be made self-supporting, but he does not sufficiently underline the fact that what the country needs above all else is capital, to be used for development.

Judge Sparrow skims over the Arab-Israel problem with a few generalities, though he rashly remarks that "this burning question must force Western leaders to take some action very soon." He does not suggest what action he advocates. In blaming the United Nations for their neglect of the Arab refugee problem, however, he is on firmer ground, though once again he does not make any practical suggestions for its solution.

Few will disagree with our author's tribute to the personal courage and initiative of King Hussein, though some may question his wisdom and statesmanship.

Jordan and its people deserve well of Britain. They are loyal, charming and most lovable and rendered gallant aid to the allied cause in the Second World War. It is a pity that they and King Hussein could not find a more able advocate.

Mission For My Country. By His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Published by Hutchinson. Pp. 336. 30s.

When the Head of a State goes into print about his duties, or what he conceives them to be, he forfeits the claims of etiquette, for he does what those whom etiquette protects do not as a rule attempt. When it puts its name to a work too controversial to be classified with a record of days in the Highlands of Scotland, or first impressions of Europe, Majesty destroys the fences of awe by which it is normally surrounded. Part of this awe resides in the sense that kings need offer no explanations of themselves or their conduct. When such explanations are given, a sense of failure may be thought by some to be evinced; while others might ask, referring to Article 36 (as amended December 12, 1925) of the Iranian Supplementary Constitutional Law of October 8, 1907, how it is that a Constitutional Monarch should consider it appropriate to write a book not only about himself and his private life, but also dealing with aspects of his public life and criticizing certain political personalities who have, during his reign, been called to office. This work does not suggest that the precedent set by some war-time leaders, of publishing memoirs only after they have relinquished their responsibilities, is one to be abandoned lightly.

In a short notice it is impossible to go into details. The kind of awkwardness which is a feature of the book may perhaps be indicated by a reference to some of the passages dealing with the Premiership of Dr. Muşaddiq. On page 88 occurs a reference to the National Front Party which is worth bearing in mind when (in May, 1961) there is so much evidence of that party's continued vitality: "After the war Mossadegh (*sic*) busied himself with organizing a group of extreme so-called nationalists known as the National Front." With the book's tantalizing blend of truth, half-truth and bias, this passage continues with the incontrovertible statement that Muşaddiq "attracted a varied assortment of followers. . . ."

To come to the actual premiership of Muşaddiq (it would be interesting to count the number of times this name crops up in the book), having been told that the scantiness of a proffered American loan constituted "a serious setback to our hopes," so that "many of my people" being convinced that the United States "had deserted them," "anti-American sentiment developed, with a corresponding strengthening of the National Front Party" (page 89), we learn on page 91 that Muşaddiq on first becoming Prime Minister "was to enjoy my full support for a year and my toleration—agonizing though it was for me—during many months after." Then on page 95 we are informed that "By an overwhelming majority and with my consent, Parliament, in January, 1953, granted Mossadegh an extension of his emergency powers. I

wanted to give him every opportunity to develop a constructive oil policy"—still, in January, 1953? (There was, of course, also the matter of the "overwhelming majority" in Parliament.)

The first period, of "full support," which was "for a year," must have ended about half way through 1952; by January, 1953, the period of reluctant toleration must have begun; but on page 97 our question is to some extent articulated for us, and answered. "You may ask, if I knew this (Muşaddiq's alleged aim to destroy or at least discredit the dynasty) why didn't I act against him? The answer is that I wanted to give him a full chance to succeed in securing the national aims."

The book will have to be used by future historians of this period of the history of Iran. Doubtless they will have other sources to study in conjunction with it. Perhaps they will see it as a sincere effort at self-justification, by a man of good intentions and high aspirations, placed by the accident of birth in a most difficult position.

P. W. A.

The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. and their Linguistic Problems. By Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay. Translated from the French by Geoffrey Wheeler. Central Asian Research Centre, London. 1961. 12s. 6d.

The study of nationality as applied to the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is one of great complexity; not only is detailed up-to-date information difficult of access, but imprecise definitions and differences in terminology between Western and Soviet scholars render existing difficulties more difficult. Any careful and objective study on even part of this vast subject is, therefore, to be welcomed.

This short monograph on the Muslim Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. by Bennigsen and Quelquejay, translated most felicitously by Geoffrey Wheeler, is excellent.

Having indicated the nature of the terms nation and *narodnost'* as used by Soviet politicians the authors wisely keep to these terms throughout. The first main section, dealing with the evolution of the Muslim peoples before the Revolution, clearly and concisely indicates the balance between the lack of territorial, linguistic and social unity on the one hand, and the religious and intellectual forces tending to promote unity on the other. The second section deals with post-Revolutionary evolution. Here the theoretical basis of the Soviet nationalities policy—the promotion of national languages based on living dialects and the division of the country into national units coinciding as far as possible with linguistic limits—is clearly shown to have been subordinated to other political ends. National feeling in an ethnic group may be encouraged or it may be suppressed: it is an instrument of Soviet policy.

One example must suffice here. At the beginning of the century the Abkhaz, numbering 72,000, had little prospect of evolving into a *narodnost'*. They were saved from extinction when the Abkhaz A.S.S.R. was formed in 1921, even though they formed only about one-fifth of the total population of the republic. But the literary language came into being only in 1925, and the Latin alphabet was changed to the Georgian alphabet in 1938. In 1956 it was revealed that "a policy tending towards the liquidation of the national culture of the Abkhaz with the object of achieving their compulsory assimilation" had been long pursued (p. 51). Nevertheless, some 70,000 Abkhaz are still numbered among the 400,000 inhabitants of the republic.

The authors regard only the Tatars, Azeris, Uzbeks and Kazakhs as consolidated "nation states" (p. 36). One wonders, however, what the future holds for the Kazakh S.S.R.; Kazakhs now form only 30 per cent. (as against 43 per cent. Russians) of the total population, and only in the south do they predominate. It is thus only in the south that there exists the territorial basis which is postulated as a condition of nationality.

One point which, unfortunately, does not receive ample treatment is the extent to which Russification of the minority languages in vocabulary (and even in syntax and morphology) is being carried out and the extent to which it is being consciously

opposed; nor do the authors indicate the extent to which Islam still has any vital force at the present time.

The notes are copious, partly explanatory of the text and partly bibliographical. It is rather a pity that sources of more of the statements in the text were not included.

One error should be noted. The Lezgins in Azerbaydzhan now number 98,000 according to the 1959 census.

This stimulating book deserves a wide circulation.

C. G. SIMPSON.

Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism. By John Marlowe. The Cresset Press. 1961. Pp. 220. Index and bibliography. 30s. net.

This is an admirable book. It is well written and concise, although it covers the whole history of Arab nationalism. It describes, better than in any book which I have read, the emergence of Jamal Abdul Nasr as a leader whose ambition was—and still is—to establish Egypt's supremacy in the Arab world under the cloak of Arab nationalism. It is an important addition to the books which have recently been written about political developments in the Middle East. But it is not an "easy" book, it requires a good deal of concentration.

The author describes the growth of Arab nationalism which stemmed from liberal ideas of democracy introduced from Western Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. He traces the growth of nationalism after the carving up of the Turkish dominions, criticizing the British for breaking their pledge to King Hussein and for sponsoring the Jewish National Home "as a means of securing the transfer of Palestine from French to British hands."

His opinion of the Arab League is that it is still an ineffectual organization which has become "a branch of the propaganda section of the Egyptian Foreign Office."

He traces the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq, under the régime of Nuri Said, "the principal protagonist of Arab unity." He emphasizes the fact that Nasr has been unable to consolidate his political successes owing to lack of adequate military force, similarly the British, since the loss of the Suez base, are, in his opinion, without the means of effective intervention. The military intervention in Kuwait seems, however, to belie this theory.

The chapter on Suez is one of the most interesting in the book. The author does not minimize the harm which was done to British prestige in the Middle East by the failure of the attack which was due to opposition from America, slowness in carrying out the military landings and the attitude of the British Labour Opposition. He regards the Russian threat to attack London and the promise to send volunteers to Egypt as the least important of the pressures put on Britain because he believes that the Russian threat was made with the knowledge that it would never have to be carried out. He points out how the Russians, once again, without taking any action, "succeeded in convincing the Arabs that it was they and not the Americans who had been instrumental in bringing the Anglo-French invasion to an end." His reference to the "incredibly inept propaganda emanating from the Sharg al Adna broadcasting station at Cyprus," after it was taken over by the British Government, is a remark with which anyone who was in the Middle East at that time will agree.

In describing the British attitude to the Iraq revolution the author says "Public regrets and reproaches for the butchery of King Faisal and Nuri Said were so perfunctory as to be almost indecent, considering the long-standing British relations with the old régime." This is a sentiment which will find many echoes among people who knew the Middle East. He suggests that the Iraq revolution led to a reappraisal of American relations with Nasr due to the State Department "taking a more pessimistic view than the Foreign Office about the menace of Communism in Iraq."

The author suggests that Communism is attractive to many of the subjects of the Sheikhs of the Persian Gulf who therefore sympathize with Qasim. On this point I disagree with him. Few people in the Gulf, not even the Intelligentsia, whose ideology is described as "the confused imprecision of Arab nationalist middle-class

youth," are attracted by Communism or drawn towards Qasim. Most of the Arabs of the Gulf states are of the Sunni sect, they regard Iraq as a Shia state and for this reason propaganda from Baghdad has little effect upon them, furthermore, the recent Kuwait affair has strengthened the opposition in the Gulf towards Iraq.

CHARLES BELGRAVE.

The Struggle for Arab Independence. Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria. By Zeine N. Zeine. Khayats. Beirut, 1960. Pp. xiii + 297. Maps, etc. 40s.

This book tells the often-told story of the promises made to the Arabs during the developments which led to the First World War and deals with the struggle of King Faisal in the face of British and French attitudes up to the time he had to leave Syria in 1920. The treatment of these events fills nine chapters and is far from being redundant. It is scholarly and well documented, thoroughly objective and interesting. The next two chapters interpret the "promises" made by the British and French, and find ample justification for regretting that the moral law played no part in regulating the relations of the powers with the Arabs. A postscript summarizes briefly the issues that still confront the Arabs in their struggle for independence—power politics, Palestine, Communism, oil, economic reconstruction, the strategic value of the Middle East, liberal democracy, the future of Islam, Arab unity and growing secularism. The author's interpretation of the allied "promises" is outstandingly generous and very convincing. The treatment of the Arabs cannot be condoned but, in the light of the respective characters of the peoples concerned and the situation in which they found themselves, the outcome was as inevitable as that of a Greek tragedy.

Professor Zeine confines his study to this one period in the relations between the West and the Arabs, but the lessons to be learnt from it are common to the whole history of the conflict between them. I could have wished, therefore, for an introduction dealing with the past, just as his postscript deals with the future: there might have been more chance of his bringing these lessons home and thus contributing to a saner approach in Western policy towards the Arab world than has been evidenced in the last forty years.

"Nationalism in Europe," writes Professor Zeine, "was originally the outcome of liberal doctrines: nationalism in the near East asserted itself after the First World War as an intense reaction to Western domination of the area." Arab Nationalism was active in various regional guises long before the First World War and although it had a much wider significance after it, it was not essentially different. I wonder if we do not have to go back much farther than that. Do we not obscure the lesson of how to conduct our inescapable relations with the Arab world by restricting our interpretation of Arab Nationalism to the post-Napoleon period when Arabs began to assert their independence of Europe by copying Western nationalism? Surely the essential thing is that Arabs since time immemorial have always shown "an intense reaction against Western domination" and indeed any other non-Arab domination?

Even today the expression "the Arab Nation" has an inner significance considerably different from the meaning the West gives to the word "Nation." Moreover, although the West seems blissfully to assume that the liberal nationalism of the nineteenth century, so closely associated with democracy, is normal for all people, its currency has been very much limited since the Franco-Prussian war and it has certainly never really taken root in the Arab world.

The exuberance of Nationalism in the Arab world, Asia and Africa seems to show that what peoples hold in common about it is far less in the field of constructive, liberal nationalism, rare even in Europe, than in that of opposition to domination. How far nationalism of this kind appeals to them seems to depend on their social and economic environment: the poorer it is the more intense is the nationalism.

I think that if one grasps that, Professor Zeine's admirable book shows very clearly that attempts to rule Arabs, to impose Western institutions on them, or to set up Anglo-Arabian "independent" states are foredoomed to failure.

HAROLD INGRAMS.

A Short Political Guide to the Arab World. By Peter Partner. London: Pall Mall Press. 1960. Pp. 141. Index, bibliography. 16s. 6d.

The young author of this small book is a history master at Winchester who has a particular interest in the economic development of the Arab world and theories of Arab nationalism.

A new book on an old subject is always welcome and this lives up to expectations by summarizing the history of Arab nationalism without much partisanship. It is concise, factual and informative and will serve those well who do not need to wade through Antonius and other more up-to-date and more biased tomes.

ERIC MACRO.

The Balfour Declaration. By Leonard Stein. Published by Valentine Mitchell. 63s.

What led the British Government to issue the Balfour Declaration? The question has often been asked and often partially answered. Mr. Leonard Stein has now produced a work which may be described as definitive. There are a few odd points that even he cannot entirely clear up—for example, why President Wilson nearly stopped the statement being made at all in 1917 and then changed his mind. But it can be safely asserted that there is now very little more to be said on the subject. Mr Stein has told the whole story in meticulous detail and with remarkable objectivity.

His book should be read by all who are fascinated by the study of political behaviour. One is shown the many cross-currents that influenced the British Government as well as the single-minded determination with which the Zionists pursued their aim. Of course, their task was a comparatively simple one. They had one purpose only on which they could concentrate to the exclusion of everything else. Their only concern was to devise the best means of attaining it. That is not to say that they were not faced with formidable problems. In the first place there was bitter opposition from Jews themselves, and those the most influential. For the most part the leading and wealthy Jews, whether in Britain or France or America, were hostile. Zionism was primarily a movement of the masses, though in Russia there was even an active Jewish socialist movement opposed to Zionism. Then, despite the opposition of leading British Jews, the British Government had to be won over. Here the Zionists were lucky in that after the fall of Asquith its members were mostly sympathetic. Even so, it took a great deal to bring their sympathy to the point of positive action. Nor were the British the only people who needed to be considered. There were the French who were either indifferent or suspicious of any plan fostered by Britain in the Near East. There were the Americans not yet under Zionist influence and in no way disposed to support a movement that seemed bound up with British imperialism. There were the Italians who, though late in the field, hoped to have a finger in the pie. There was the Vatican with its traditional interest in the Holy Land. There were again the Germans who, as allies of the Turks, the then rulers of Palestine, could not be ignored, especially while the outcome of the war was in the balance. There was also the local Arab population, though its probable reactions were for long largely ignored by all parties. Through this maze of conflicting interests the Zionists threaded their way, never, it seems, doubting in their hearts that they would come out successfully in the end. "Some Jews and some non-Jews," wrote Dr. Weizmann, "do not seem to realize the fundamental fact that, whatever happens, we shall get to Palestine." The Zionists pinned their faith above all on the British Government, believing that under British rule Palestine would fall more easily into their lap than under the rule of any other power.

For the British, with their world-wide interests and the war with Germany on their hands, the issues were far less simple. There were those, Asquith among them, who regarded the whole conception of Zionism as moonshine. Lloyd George and, of course, Balfour as well as others in the Lloyd George government, thought differently. Perhaps Balfour was the only leading figure—at any rate the most prominent figure—who was inspired by a genuine belief in Zionism as something worth supporting for its own sake. But it was not the single-minded issue to "give the Jews their rightful place in the world" that was the guiding motive of the British

Government during the long discussions that ended in the issue of the Declaration. Long-term interests of strategy as well as the short-term interest of winning the war were throughout in their minds, with the emphasis sometimes on one point, sometimes on another. Their most active adviser throughout seems to have been that extraordinary figure, Sir Mark Sykes, some of whose dreams read very oddly today.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the whole affair is the extent to which rivalry with France played its part. It was apparently an axiom of thought in British circles that the French must be kept as far away from Egypt as possible. This meant keeping them out of Palestine. But in 1914 the French were already claiming Palestine for themselves, as part of Syria in which their special interest was generally recognized. The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 went some way to satisfy British preoccupations by envisaging a condominium. Even so, it was not good enough and so one finds the British Government encouraging the Zionists to proclaim that only a British Palestine would satisfy Jewish aspirations. It would clearly help any future negotiations with the French to be able to say that the Jews wanted the British and only the British to govern Palestine. It was Lloyd George who finally persuaded Clemenceau to accept defeat on most issues. By then British armies were in occupation and Clemenceau no doubt saw that he could do nothing to dislodge them. Even so one can understand how Britain has won the reputation for perfidy in French eyes. It is indeed a little odd to sign an agreement with an ally in one year and then in the next year to use a third party to help in upsetting it.

There is a certain irony in the fact that two of the main considerations that finally persuaded the British Government to take the plunge and sign the Declaration were, it seems, founded on faulty intelligence. The first was the belief, or hope, that it would have an effect upon the situation on the Russian front, either by keeping Russia in the war or at least by preventing the Germans from exploiting Russian resources. Jewish influence in Russia, it was thought, would tell in either respect. But Mr. Stein shows that Zionist influence in Russia was, in fact, then negligible. Similarly, it was hoped that the Declaration would forestall a similar declaration by the German Government, but here again Mr. Stein shows that the danger was almost non-existent, as the Germans would never have dared so to upset their Turkish allies.

It is only possible in a review to point to a few of the issues that are discussed at length in this volume. The whole story is of exceptional interest. British governments are often accused of having no policy in the Middle East. Here, at any rate, they did produce a policy, though equally clearly they never thought out its implications. Based, as the Declaration was, on a fatal contradiction, it would have been a miracle if it had not ended in disaster and Lord Balfour alone seems to have had clearly in mind what he wanted and been prepared to accept the consequences. "Zionism," he wrote, "be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present need, in future hopes of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land." So little was he thinking in terms of British imperialist interests that he would have preferred the mandate to go to the United States. For him Zionism was an end in itself.

J. M. T.

March Arabesque. By Emile Bustani. Robert Hale. Pp. 216. Illus. and indexed. 21s. net.

For long it seemed that George Antonius' classic, *The Arab Awakening*, was to remain a swallow without a summer. But of late years a number of Arabs, many of them from Lebanon, have allayed that fear. At last we can learn about the Arabs and their hopes from their own spokesmen, instead of from outsiders of varying degrees of ability and goodwill. No one adorns the contemporary scene in the Levant with more versatile skill than Mr. Emile Bustani. His economic and industrial interests span the Arab world and impinge on the West. As a statesman and author he is a consistent advocate of co-operation between his own people and their Western friends, on terms of reciprocity, not exploitation. His *Doubts and Dynamite* published in 1958 gave many Western readers for the first time "an interior view"

of the problems of the Arab world: his *March Arabesque* continues the personally conducted tour.

It presents a balanced review of his world as it is today, with a forecast of what it may become in the future. The first section of the book is a summary of Arab history as it appears to an Arab. This is valuable. It is comprehensive, lucid, documented and dated. Then we have a section on the Arabs today, with a penetrating and judicial appraisal of their problems, from A to Z, Algeria to Zionism. The misdeeds of both East and West are fairly, moderately and—how refreshing—humorously stated. The compulsion of nationalism is honestly set forth, together with its corollary, dislike and distrust of Western patronage. But in Arab-West relations, the old adage holds: *nec tecum possum vivere, nec sine te*. And so Mr. Bustani ends as those who know him would expect him to end, on a note of wistful optimism: "The time is drawing nigh when Arab-Western co-operation will be full and fruitful. There will come a day when the twain *shall* meet, and I hope to be present, and cheering." So do we. A friendly, useful book this, to be read by East and West alike.

STEWART PEROWNE.

The Bedouin Tribes of the Negev. By Dr. Touvia Askenazi. Pamphlet. Published by Weizman Science Press of Israel. February, 1961. Illus. Map.

Dr. Askenazi has made for many years a special study of the Bedouin tribes, who live in the Negev of Israel and are a part of the Nomad population of what was Mandated Palestine. He acknowledges his debt to the Arab Aref El Aref who was the District Commissioner in Beersheba during the Mandate. This study was contributed to the scientific periodical *Mada*, which is published quarterly by the Weizmann Press of the Institute of Science at Rehovot. He tells how 21,000 Bedouin have remained out of the estimated 90,000 in Palestine. Of these, 15,000 are in the Negev and the rest almost entirely in Galilee. He describes what has been done by the Government of Israel to extend to them social services, and to assist them to turn to regular cultivation in a fixed place. They are today only partially Nomads. The detailed account of their tribal organization, their institutions and their economy follows; and he tells also of a plan to set up a model village for the traditional Bedou, keeping to the traditional form of their habitation. The conclusion, however, is that the extravagant form of pastoral life in the Negev cannot endure much longer. He recommends that the Bedou shall be integrated into the agricultural life of Israel.

The pamphlet is excellently illustrated and has a good Arabic map.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

War in the Desert. By Lieutenant-General Sir John Glubb, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 344. Maps, illus. and index. 25s.

In his latest addition to a series of outstanding contributions to our knowledge of the Middle East, General Glubb has uncovered a corner of history of which little is ever heard. As is his habit, the historical background leads into his own rich experiences of eight years of the 1920s. With the focus on the emergence of Iraq itself as a nation, little was heard of the state of affairs on her western and southern frontiers where the aftermath of war had left a legacy of tribal chaos. The Dhafeer, moving to the Euphrates in the summer and on the fringes of the Nejd in the winter, had found themselves coming under the control of the tempestuous Sadoon Ibn Sadoon of the Muntifiq tribal Confederation, an outlaw from the Turks who had fled to the desert and dug himself in at Abu Ghar, where the Turks were prepared to leave him. Iraqi indecision in dealing with his grandson, Yusuf Ibn Sadoon, was the background to the situation when Glubb arrived at Nasiriya in April, 1922. In unravelling the subsequent confusion, the author's ability to probe into the complicated moves of Shaikhs in jealous rivalry is a measure of his complete understanding of the Arab mind.

As a young officer of the Army, Glubb had been posted to the Royal Air Force

where his knowledge of Arabic and Arabs was to prove invaluable. The period was one in which the Air Force Command was seeking to prove the ability of pilots in aeroplanes to control tribal insurrection. Economy of time and force were undeniable advantages. But, as on the Indian Frontier, there were heavy penalties such as an inability to make any permanent impact through personal contact. We are constantly aware that Glubb himself was in no small measure able to correct these tendencies.

The days have long vanished when the perennial feud between the Hashimite Dynasty and the House of Saud governed all alliances and loyalties in the Middle East. Nevertheless, some of the modern entanglements may be regarded as a "hang-over" from the past; and we should be grateful for a clear and compact historical sketch of the rise of Wahhabi power, its eventual encounter with Sharif Hussain and, in repercussion, Ibn Saud's elimination of the Rasheed Dynasty in the winter of 1921.

It was not until September, 1928, that the author saw the birth of a command for which his particular genius was admirably suited. The Southern Desert Camel Corps took the stage with 70 camelmen and 30 machine gunners in trucks. To set them up had been a long struggle; and Glubb's impatience with the Air Officer Commanding and the Inspector-General of the Iraq Police is discernable through his usual generous tolerance of all men at all times. At this point we are aware of his unique professional skill as a student and master of battle in the desert. The comment, "I devoted all the time I could to a study of Ikwhan warfare," hides a long story of the making of the man who years later was to mould the finest Arab fighting force in the Middle East.

The narrative of the war of the Ikwhan and Iraqi tribes is brought to an end in February, 1930, with the two monarchs, Ibn Saud and Feisal of Iraq, coming together on a British battleship in the Persian Gulf, lying discreetly out of sight of land, so that neither of the two kings could claim an unfair advantage over the other. It was hardly an easy encounter. But, such as it was, it represented a triumph for British diplomacy. Typically, the photograph presents a cheerful and unobtrusive author peering through from behind a row of celebrities.

Soldiers no less than diplomats will enjoy this very readable and complete account of an obscure episode in our Middle East relationships.

BIRDWOOD.

The Slaves of Timbuktu. By Robin Maugham. Published by Longmans. Pp. 234. Illus. and indexed. Maps. 25s.

In 1958 Lord Maugham, having decided that the subject of slavery offered interesting possibilities, attempted to visit the Trucial Coast with the object of investigating reports of an active and growing slave trade across the Persian Gulf. For reasons which are not entirely clear, he was refused visas, and turned his attention instead to the region of Timbuktu. After an uncomfortable, if not particularly difficult, journey, he and a companion reached that legendary city, got in touch with slave-owning Tourag in the vicinity, and succeeded in buying a slave, whom they freed before leaving for home.

The book is partly a travel story; partly a compendium of historical accounts of the African slave trade and of early visits to Timbuktu; and partly an anti-slavery tract: three themes which do not mix very well. The journey, despite inevitable trivialities, contains many passages of vivid description and is illustrated by some excellent photographs by the author. The historical excerpts, while they bear tribute to the thoroughness of his researches and in many cases are of great interest to the general reader as well as to the student of Saharan travel, are rather too numerous and of uneven quality; and their interpolation in the text, and their frequent references back to notes buried in an appendix, tend to make for difficult reading.

It is, however, by the passages on slavery today that the book stands or falls. The prevalence of domestic slavery in the Arabian Peninsula, and its existence in the Sahara, were, of course, already well established; and the author's avowed purpose was to prove the existence of an active traffic in slaves. This he can hardly be said to have achieved. His contention that frequent convoys of children are brought into Saudi Arabia by plane from the Persian Gulf side for enslavement is necessarily based

on second-hand evidence, which is not altogether convincing, and some rather lurid passages on the mutilation of young slaves turn out to be mainly quotations from material dating back to 1888. It sounds, in fact, as though no more conclusive evidence exists today of a widespread traffic in slaves into Arabia than was produced to the present reviewer when he sought to obtain it in Jeddah twenty years ago. The suggestion quoted by Lord Maugham that a recent increase in slave prices indicates increased slave trading is surely contrary to normal economic laws; it seems far more likely to represent scarcity values, due to a failure of the accretions to the slave stock (by birth, and by importations or enslavements so far as they exist) to keep pace with the wastage caused not only by deaths but by the various forms of manumission allowable by law and constantly practised.

As for the Sahara, Lord Maugham certainly established that the laws of the French Sudan could be flouted with impunity by two visiting Englishmen in receipt of official courtesy, but not that this could be done, at least to any extent, by the Touareg. He is on firmer ground when he argues, on the strength of the fears expressed to him by Bela that they would be re-enslaved by the Touareg once the protecting hand of the French was withdrawn, that independence could bring about a resurgence of this traffic. With the author's conclusion that the only effective deterrent lies in international supervision of the working of the Anti-Slavery conventions there can be only sympathy, mingled with regretful doubts as to how far national pride, existing or emergent, can ever be brought to admit so outstanding a derogation of national sovereignty

G. W. FURLONGE.

Muhammad, Prophet and Statesman. By W. Montgomery Watt. O.U.P. 1961. Pp. 250. 2 maps. 25s.

Islam and the Integration of Society. By W. Montgomery Watt. (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.) Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1961. Pp. 293. 32s.

Of these two books the second repeats in greater detail the earlier part of the first; both try to show why things happened as they did. Islam began because the time, the place, and the man met. In Mecca, where nomads had turned into sedentary traders, tribal morality had broken down and nothing had taken its place. In the desert, the chief with the aid of his tribe looked after the weaker members; in the town the successful merchant looked after himself and the orphan and widow were neglected. It was easy for Muhammad to preach one God for a vague monotheism was in the air and the judgment, when men would stand as individuals before God, was his answer to the "get rich quick" attitude at Mecca. Muhammad succeeded because he knew what he wanted. When success came, he did not suffer from swelled head and, when he could not get all that he wanted, he was content with small mercies and silenced the doubts of his followers by contriving some other gain to help them forget their disappointment. He wanted force behind him and found it in Medina; he wanted to conquer Mecca and did so by disrupting her trade and making friends with neighbouring tribes. Next, he spread his influence over much of Arabia and saw that he must send the Arabs outwards if the brotherhood of Islam was to exist in Arabia. That he did all this proves that he was a statesman. He had no new political ideas; the Muslim community was an enlarged tribe or federation, the members having equal rights and all had the duty of defending the whole or any individual in it. His own position as leader was sanctioned by religion and so was his attempt to lessen the ferocity of the blood feud. While many of Muhammad's ideas belonged to the Jewish-Christian environment, in some things he went contrary to it; the summons to worship, the direction in which the worshipper faced, and the fast were made different from Jewish and Christian practices. In his private life Muhammad was a typical elderly husband with a young wife but this did not interfere with his statecraft.

Muhammad, Prophet and Statesman is a sober account of a great man. Perhaps some generalizations are too wide; the Jews of Yemen may well have looked to Persia for support against the Christians of Ethiopia but it does not follow that the farmers

and craftsmen of Medina also looked to Persia. Muhammad created a society which united the Arabs and enabled them to make vast conquests. Did this society succeed in making its conquests part of this unity? This is the subject of the second book. It must be said at once that parts of it are written in a horrid jargon of which "the actional complement of ideation" is a sample. "Ideology" is a neutral word which may have a good or a bad sense but here it always has a bad sense, that a man or a system is not equal to the demands made upon him or it. The book is not a history, though the beginnings of Islam and some later incidents are told at length. The first part repeats in detail the early sections of the life of Muhammad discussing the effect of the material situation on man's behaviour, the power of ideas to change society, and the interaction of the two. For a short time Muhammad succeeded in forming a harmonious society but it soon broke up; ambition was too strong for religion. The first breach was due to the struggle for power, though it was given a religious colouring as has always happened in Islam. Religion was stronger in the Khawarij who are shown as nomads, horrified by the laxity of the townsmen, who "came out" in protest, some going so far as to say that the ordinary Muslim was worse than an unbeliever. The Arab conquerors looked down on the conquered peoples, so resentment made many turn against the government and throw in their lot with those who promised them a fair deal. When the Abbasids were firmly established, the distinction between Arab and non-Arab was largely forgotten and a common mentality evolved which let a traveller feel almost at home anywhere, yet did not prevent the existence of local differences. West Africa shows how Islam spread in a land untouched by Roman or Persian civilization; it began with trade, was continued by alliances of native rulers with traders and later by Muslim rulers and religious orders.

The influence of Islam is discussed under three heads, political institutions, manners and customs, and intellectual life. Details about the second show how the subject is treated. Islam was a protest against pagan ideas and practices, so it threw them over and the opposition thus aroused made the Muslims draw closer together and emphasize their difference from the pagans. In Medina this process was enlarged to exclude Jews and Christians. The Muslims took over everything Arab they could; the pilgrimage is Arab paganism circumscribed into Islam. With the conquests the new society was exposed to foreign influence which was especially strong in the field of administration, systems of taxation were borrowed and an Abbasid caliph was the lineal descendant of the Sasanian kings. The worship of saints and the rituals of the sufi brotherhoods owe much to foreign sources. Shi'ism with its semi-divine imam welcomed the "suffering saviour" with a passion play and ritual mourning. Other branches of Islam, which believed in an elected imam, crystallized their ideal in the canon law. This was not the work of a ruler, nor imposed by him, but was the work of men who studied their religion and often had no experience of a court of law. Rulers ignored parts of it (with monotonous regularity historians tell that a new ruler abolished uncanonical taxes) but the rest of it controlled the lives of all, including the ruler, and created unity in spite of superficial diversity. Under the surface many foreign usages may endure; in Malaya marriage customs and rules of inheritance are not Islamic but the people consider themselves good Muslims. In the past Islam has assimilated much foreign material. Can it assimilate modern ideas, especially science? In most Muslim countries the sacred law no longer rules the whole of life, among the educated classes native dress has largely given way to Western clothing, and the basic idea of science denies the Muslim belief that God creates the world afresh every instant and may at any moment change His mind and make something else. If Islam is to hold its own, it must admit the facts of its origin as the heir of an earlier religious tradition and of previous civilizations; it must revise its ideas about the relative importance of religious and cultural facts in its history; it must be ready to learn from outsiders even in matters religious; it must learn that Islam was not always all-important in world history and distinguish between what is essential and what is accidental and of temporary application.

Both books have indices.

A. S. TRITTON.

The Holy Sword. By Robert Payne. Published by Robert Hale. Pp. 266. Glossary, chronological table, bibliography, index, map and photographs. 35s.

The Holy Sword of the title was that of Muhammed and of his successors; these, rather than the average Arab, form the material of this readable history. The author touches on some very interesting points of Islamic history: for instance, he tells of the fourth-century philosopher, Ibn Khaldun, who studied the processes of corruption in civilization. On such things as this, we would pronounce the book wholly admirable but for a statement of aim in the Introduction; the author says, "As far as I know, it is the first attempt to write a reasonably complete cultural history of the Arab conquests from the beginnings to the present day."

Surely the fact that this book does go up to the present day will not count in its favour in a year or so. But there is a more important objection to regarding this book as a complete cultural history. Mr. Payne gives us a short list of the Arabic words used in English but we do not hear enough of the scientific contributions of Islam to mathematics, astrology, chemistry and medicine; after all, there was an age when a European, to become cultured, needed Arabic (in which language the book makes some mistakes).

Mr. Payne brings out most clearly the high regard that Moslems have for Jesus Christ, and he quotes many of Jesus' words that survive to us in Arabic texts only. "The world is a bridge; therefore pass over it lightly, and do not pause on the way" seems to have the true ring; perhaps it is worth remembering that the words seem to suit the Near Eastern way of thought rather than the Western way.

The author includes in his last chapter the examination of two thoughts that are basic to Jamal abd al Nasser. The first is quoted as "the duty of Egypt is to create an immense power which will be able to drive the African countries into revolution" and the second is the aim of pan-Islam, under Egypt. We may well be convinced of the reality of these motives, but less ready to accept Mr. Payne's conclusion that "the story of Islam is already over." This is a neat termination to a book rather than the final verdict of history.

J. M. C.

The Poet and the Spae-Wife. By W. E. D. Allen. Published by Allen Figgis and Co., Dublin. 1960. Pp. 102.

Strife, the interplay of contending forces on one plane or another, mental, moral or physical, is fundamental to the universe and there was never yet book written, from *Genesis* and the *Iliad* to *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and the latest tale of tycoons and take-over bids, but had conflict of some kind and the outcome thereof as its main theme. This deceptively slim little volume is certainly no exception. It has only seven pages of text, elucidated by no less than ninety-five of commentary and notes, but it provides a platform whereon mighty opposites engage—man and woman in the never-ending duel of the sexes; rival wits, after the fashion of Solomon and Bilkis, Queen of Sheba; East and West, or rather in this instance, since the traditional roles are reversed, we had better call them Asia and Europe; Islam and Christianity, with paganism in the corner of the ring down, but not altogether out—as indeed it never is.

The *dramatis personæ* charged with this great burden are Yahya bin Hakam—surnamed Al Ghazāl on account of his personal beauty—poet, wit and courtier in the entourage of the Umayyad Amir of Cordova, Abdur Rahmān II (A.D. 822-852), and a lady named Nud the consort of a Viking chieftain. How they came to meet and what passed between them is the story outlined in the text and eked out with considerations of when and where in the commentary and notes which, I may say, display an erudition and diligence of research fit for the compilation of an encyclopedia.

The text is a translation by Professor Bernard Lewis of London University from an Arabic MS. which has been in the British Museum since 1866 and has been more than once before translated into various European languages. It is the work of a man known as ibn Dihya who lived about 300 years after the events which it records, but is based upon notes taken down from the lips of Al Ghazāl himself by a very notable man called Tammām ibn Alqāma. Its authenticity was never questioned

either by later Arab writers nor by Reinhart Dozy and other European Arabists until 1937, when Lévi Provençal discovered another MS. at Fez in Morocco which tells almost exactly the same story about the same man, only in another place, Constantinople, and in relation with another lady, Theodora the wife of the Emperor Theophilus (A.D. 821-842). Lévi Provençal thereupon, perhaps as it seems in a fit of petulance, declared that the Viking story was nothing but a "contamination postérieure" of the Constantinople story and that consequently no mission ever went from Cordova to seek the headquarters of the Vikings, wherever in northern Europe that may have been. This view gains support from the fact that there is no other mention of it, whereas the mission to Constantinople is a well-attested historical event. Lévi Provençal even hazarded the conjecture that by a mistake in transliteration, common enough in Arabic MSS., the name Nud had been substituted for Tud, which might have been what the Arabs called Theodora. These contentions Mr. Allen seeks strenuously to rebut and plumps for Ireland as the scene of the meeting. He labours the point with much learning, but for members of the Royal Central Asian Society this is largely beside the mark. They are indeed interested to know whether any mission from Cordova did in fact ever go to northern Europe, but if it did, the details of time and place and the exact identity of the opposite party are not primarily their concern. We will, however, return to this, when we have given the outline of the story, which deserves repetition.

In the year A.D. 844, Viking raiders in Andalusia, who had sacked Seville, gathered much plunder and taken many prisoners, came to grief and suffered defeat. So they sued the Amir Abdur Rahmān for peace. He was inclined to accept their proposals and despatched Al Ghazāl and another envoy also named Yahya to the place whence the raiders came. This second envoy was also a remarkable man and also had a surname. He was called Sahib Al-Munaikila (the master of the little clock) which, it may be supposed, means that he was a mathematician and an astronomer. They embarked at Silvēs, which the Arabs called Shilb, just east of Cape St. Vincent and put out to sea. When they were "opposite the great cape that juts out into the sea and is the westernmost limit of Spain, that is the mountain known as Aluwiyah," they encountered a mighty storm. They weathered the storm and carried on till they came to a great island (or peninsula) which is three days' sail from the mainland. Here was a great settlement of the Vikings. They landed and were hospitably received. In due course they were invited to audience. Then, of course, arose the perennial question of etiquette—must they kowtow or be excused? The same difficulty has often cropped up both before and since. It is first recorded by Herodotus as having arisen about the year 484 B.C., when Spartan envoys craved audience of Xerxes, and has recurred at intervals through the ages in such countries as Persia, India and China. There was a signal instance in 1821 in Peking when the British envoy Lord Amherst came away from China *re infecta* because he would not submit to the prescribed ritual.

On the occasion with which we are now concerned the Viking chieftain thought to gain his point by guile and caused the entry to his hall to be made so low that Al Ghazāl would perforce have to bow down. But Al Ghazāl was equal to the situation. He did not bow but dropped down on his hunkers and putting his feet out in front of him shuffled through on his backside. The chieftain was so struck by his ingenuity that he overlooked the insult. When the Queen heard of Al Ghazāl, she sent for him and no doubt dressed herself up to look her best. Admitted to her presence Al Ghazāl either was or feigned to be utterly overpowered by her beauty and flattered her outrageously in improvised poems (two of which are recorded) with such success that she soon gave orders that "her door was not to be shut to him whenever he should call." After many days spent in her company and many disputes in her presence with her wise men, all of whom he outmatched, Al Ghazāl was warned by his companions to be careful. He told the Queen of the warning whereupon she laughed and said "We do not have such things in our religion, nor do we have jealousy. Our women are with our men only of their own choice. A woman stays with her husband only as long as it pleases her." Tammām ibn Al Qāma then goes on to say that "It was the custom of the Vikings (whom he calls Majūs, confounding them with the Persian Magi), before the religion of Rome reached them, that no woman refused any man, except that if a noblewoman accepted

a man of humble status her family blamed her and kept them apart." Questioned by Tammām after his return as to the sincerity of his passion for Nud, Al Ghazāl answered "By your father, she had some charm, but by talking in this way I won her good graces and obtained from her more than I desired."

After an absence of twenty months Al Ghazāl reappeared at Cordova. The mission had returned by way of St. James of Compostella in the north-west corner of Spain, which the Arabs called Shent Ya'qūb. That is the only place named in the narrative other than those already mentioned. Some experts think that this omission, like the absence of other mention in contemporary records, suffices to cast doubt upon the whole story. But there are other and perhaps stronger considerations that tell in its favour. The places that are named are such as would naturally occur in any account of a journey to the north. The Arabs in Spain certainly did have ships on the Atlantic coast in the ninth century, and for such a journey (though not for Constantinople) Silvēs was a natural point of departure and Compostella of return. The mountain known as Aluwiyah has, rather surprisingly, not been identified by our experts, but can scarcely have been other than the Cabo da Roca, where the lofty Cintra range comes down to the sea, just north of the mouth of the Tagus, in a bold headland. As the text says, it is the most westerly point in the Iberian peninsula, and it has always been a great landmark. It exactly fits the description.

Apart from these geographical considerations the despatch of such a mission is probable on political and historical grounds. There had already been one a few years before to Constantinople and, even if that had as yet produced no tangible results, it had not yet had time to prove itself a failure. The Amir may well have thought a second shot worth while. The Viking raids had been, at the lowest estimate, a serious nuisance and the Vikings too had cause to regret their most recent enterprise. They seem to have been revising their tactics too about that time. In July, 846, they evacuated and indeed destroyed their base at Noirmoutier at the mouth of the Loire and not long after, having suffered two bloody defeats in England, overstayed the winter there for the first time, in the Isle of Sheppey. It is not till 859 or perhaps a year or two later that we hear of them again in southern Spain.

As for the place where the mission was received, as we have said, to us it does not greatly matter. We may agree that Mr. Allen has made out a good case for Ireland, where Norsemen were well established at the time, but we are not called upon to decide. And whether the chieftain concerned was Ragnar Lodbrok or another is not our business. To Lévi Provençal's "contamination postérieure" theory we may concede that rigid etiquette is more likely to have regulated proceedings at Constantinople than in the hall, which was presumably constructed of wood, of a northern adventurer. On the other hand it would be easier to make a quick job of lowering a wooden lintel than to tamper with an arch in a Byzantine palace, and it certainly does tax credulity to suppose that two royal ladies fell for Al Ghazāl, whose speech they could not understand, and succumbed in the same way to the same bait in such very rapid succession. Maybe a clue is to be found in the title which heads the Arabic text "Al mutrib min ash'ar ahli'l maghrib" which is translated as "An amusing (book) from poetical works of the West." Probably then there were two missions, both conducted by Al Ghazāl, and the rest in the immortal words of Pooh-Bah is for one of them "merely corroborative detail intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative."

In conclusion we must regret that Mr. Allen thought fit to call his heroine a spaw-wife. The text furnishes no hint that Nud had any Delphic pretensions or relied on anything but her native wit and charm, the age-old weapons of her sex.

E. B. H.

The Camels Must Go: An Autobiography. By Sir Reader Bullard. Faber and Faber. Pp. 300. Illus. and indexed. 25s.

"Whenever I could I visited our consular posts, and in every provincial capital I met Persians of standing who seemed to take a genuine pride in their city. There was, they would say, no place like Meshed, or Tabriz, or Shiraz. . . . I began to ask

whether local patriotism could not be harnessed to some useful public work through the provincial councils which were envisaged in the Constitution."

Ancient fear of the instability resulting from the acquisition of too much power by the *mulūk at-tavā'* may have contributed to the theory than Iran needs a strong central authority who shall override, if not eliminate altogether, powers more local. There is also the objective of maintaining Iran as an integrated, single state; an objective the more intensely pursued because so frequently difficult to attain. But tendencies to break away, which are in fact the expression of the rejection of despotic centralizing tendencies, militate against the concept of federation, even if such a concept were entertained. Apparently, with the exception of a very few among whom Sir Reader does not count because he is a foreigner, the idea of federation as a solution to the problem of ruling Iran has not been accepted. Sir Reader performs a service to history in reminding his readers that, nevertheless, the concept of municipal councils with a considerable degree of autonomy was not entirely alien to the thinking of the Constitutionalist reformers at the beginning of this century. Indeed, the gallant Tabriz liberals, in spite of and perhaps partly because of the pressures of a siege, in 1908 did go some way towards getting municipal autonomy on a working basis. They achieved enough to show what might be done. At the same time, however, the dangers inherent in such an experiment, in Iranian conditions, also emerged: the risk of others using an embryonic provincial autonomy in matters of purely local concern to achieve separation from the rest of the state became clear and has led to a twice repeated, Russian-aided attempt at dismemberment.

On the other hand, were local councils to be encouraged after a sound federative institution had been established, then the threat of dismemberment of the Iranian state would pale, if not disappear altogether. The first step is to replace the ancient and once historically explicable, if not valid, institution of central autocracy by the concept of federation, within the framework of which the harnessing of "local patriotism" into local administrative units would subsequently proceed.

This is not the place to continue an essay in Iranian political problems with tentative suggestions about their ultimate solution; but one of the most interesting chapters in Sir Reader Bullard's book is, as might have been expected, the one on his Persian experiences between 1939 and 1946. This chapter should be translated into Persian. Then as many Iranians as possible would be able to read the honest narrative of a man who tried so scrupulously to honour their sovereignty and the engagements between his country and theirs which were his principal guide during what must surely have been one of the most difficult embassies to have fallen to the lot of any Ambassador. Iranians in Tehran political circles have not always done Sir Reader Bullard justice. Gratitude is no doubt the last thing a diplomat should expect, either from strangers or even from his own kith and kin! But when it is obviously due, it is regrettable that less than justice should be done. Both England and Iran were fortunate that chance should have conspired to keep this man at Tehran during those fateful six years. It is a pity that a great drama should have left the word "honourable" slightly tarnished with irony, for looking back on Sir Reader's performance of duty in Tehran brings to the lips the sentence "He was an honourable man." The sentence may be allowed to stand now it is out: Shakespeare was also aware of the tragedy of being honourable in a dishonourable world.

Besides the rather special humour which informs the book (and which may escape those who do not have the pleasure of knowing the author), independence of judgment and refusal to be blackmailed into accepting currently popular attitudes and opinions are also marked features of it. We learn that nothing came easily or readily-made to Sir Reader's hands. Education and bread both had to be gained the hard way, through his own efforts. Here must lie the origin of his honesty and independence. What refreshing reading those early chapters make in an age when so many people expect things to be made easy for them! Sir Reader recalls to us how values are lessened, the less the effort to obtain things of value. His upbringing gave him a gift which many people nowadays utterly lack: the gift of knowing the value and the price of what is good, with its corollary of understanding failure and weakness.

On the last page he says, "It may be that some small good we did not aim at or even foresee came out of our efforts." The great good which comes out of his autobiography is renewal of appreciation of honesty and honourable dealing. In 1961,

to one near enough to the young to see the effects of welfare, and close enough to the old to admire the calibre of men of Sir Reader's generation, this renewed comprehension of values is almost awe inspiring; the young should read this book.

Discretion has perhaps done its business a little too well. Sir Reader is at times tantalizingly silent on issues which he could illuminate better than most. He says Lord Strang has covered the Metro-Vickers affair, but his version would have been welcome, too. His observations of Russian life are enlightening because he has the knack of conveying what it was like to be an ordinary Russian between 1930 and 1934. His hero, Samuel Johnson, is reported once to have said, "Sir, I like the ordinary man." Liking the ordinary man is a great talent and means that you understand the ordinary man also. This understanding is what makes Sir Reader's autobiography distinguished, and it distinguishes its author.

Students of modern history will have to read this book and they must not be put out because, characteristically, the author keeps within his terms of reference: he is writing an autobiography, not a history. Students will be looking for the latter, but if they are worth their salt they will find an enhancing humanity as well, and that will probably do them more good in the end.

P. W. AVERY.

Three Kings in Baghdad. By Gerald de Gaury. London: Hutchinson, 1961. Pp. 223. Illustrations. Chronology, index, map. 25s.

Colonel de Gaury first went to Iraq in 1924. It did not take him long to make for himself a significant niche in Baghdad society and to win the trust and confidence, not only of leading politicians like Ja'far al-Askari and Nuri as-Sa'id, but of King Faisal I himself. He was able to preserve and enhance this relationship with Faisal's successors, more especially with the Regent Abdul Ilah, whose period of direct responsibility, fourteen years, was longer than that of any of the three Kings and in practice continued for five more years after he had handed over the royal prerogatives to young Faisal II.

In his foreword the author disclaims any intention of writing the full history of the monarchy in Iraq; it is rather "to evoke the characters of the three Kings and of the Regent . . . and to revive something of the atmosphere" in their times.

The first two chapters in particular will awaken many nostalgic memories, for those who knew them, of the earliest days: the simple informality of Faisal's court; the romantic enthusiasms of Gertrude Bell; a Minister of Education appointed to ensure Shi'a representation in the Cabinet though he wrote only Persian and no Arabic ("and nobody thought this strange"); the garden tea-parties of old Saiyid Ja'far at Kadhimain; the main thoroughfare where cars could not venture after rain and even horse-drawn *arabanas* would get bogged down; and other picturesque personalities and amusing circumstances.

All this is a useful and, it would seem, badly-wanted reminder of what Iraq was less than forty years ago, and as a background to the main purpose of the book.

The military *coup d'état* of July, 1958 was followed, even in certain circles in this country, by an unedifying scramble on to Qasim's band wagon and, in terms almost indistinguishable from the abusive propaganda of Moscow and its Cairo imitation, by a campaign of denigration of the Hashimite monarchy and Nuri, so often Chief Minister in the last thirty years, as "lackeys" and "stooges" of a British government that staggered from one blunder to another. Those who hailed the revolution as the natural, inevitable and proper bursting of the bonds of reactionary repression by the fermenting liberalism of a new generation must be feeling rather foolish now; but even so any book, and especially a book written with so much inside knowledge as this, that helps to correct such distortions is to be welcomed.

Each of the two world wars set in motion a great wave of Arab nationalism. The Amirs Faisal and Abdullah, with Generals Ja'far and Nuri, emerged as the undoubted leaders and champions of the first which, through its co-operation with the Western allies, eventually led to the foundation of the new independent Arab states of Iraq, Syria and Jordan. In regard to Iraq itself it may be reasonably held that British policy worked out about right: it ensured the rise of Iraq within a period of

forty years from the status of three forlorn provinces of a decaying empire to an honoured place among the nations, and by winning the trust of two generations of nationalists safeguarded all legitimate British interests and stood up to a crisis as grave as the Second World War.

If Iraq owes its existence as an independent state to Faisal I, it was under the Regent, with Nuri often at his side, that her feet were placed, firmly, it seemed, on the road of material prosperity and social advance. But Anglo-Arab relations in their wider aspects had been bedevilled from the outset by the three incompatible engagements entered into during the First World War: the McMahon promises to the Sharif Husain, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration. The new nationalists of the Second World War had been brought up on the burning grievances of Palestine and of the partition of the Arab territories detached from the Ottoman Empire in 1918; but, unlike their no-less-aggrieved predecessors, they knew or cared nothing about the other side of the picture. It was all rather like the *Ate* of early Greek tragedy, the curse inherited from an older generation which no subsequent virtue could counteract or ingenuity circumvent.

Colonel de Gaury for his part does not attempt to make plaster saints of his heroes. "The Regent and Nuri were humanly imperfect and being Arab were dissimilar in character to Europeans. If Arabs decry them, they decry themselves. History will amply prove, if it has not done so already, that the country was happier and better ruled in their day than it has been since the revolution. It was not their fault that, hard as they strove on behalf of their people, they and theirs were caught and destroyed 'in the gale of the world.'"

C. J. EDMONDS.

Orta Doğu. Siyasi, Ekonomik ve Sosyal Aylık Türk Dergisi. Yıl 1 Sayı 1, Nisan, Sayı 2, Mayıs, 1961. Begi Matbaası, Ankara. (The Middle East. A monthly Turkish political, economic, and social review. Year 1: No. 1, April; No. 2, May, 1961.) £T5.

This new review deserves to be welcomed both because of its own quality and as an indication of responsible and informed Turkish interest in the area with which it is concerned. The editor and chief contributor, Celâl Tevfik Karasapan, is an experienced diplomat who, after serving in several posts in Ankara and in consulates and embassies in the Balkans and the Middle East, became successively Minister to Syria, Minister, and then Ambassador to Libya, a country about which he has recently published a book, and Ambassador to Rumania. Four well-known writers are described as regular contributors to the journal, the distinguished novelist and former Ambassador to Persia and Switzerland, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, a former Deputy Prime Minister, Professor Nihat Erim, the historian, Professor Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, whose memoirs, entitled *Suyu arayan adam* (A man looking for water) are the subject of an appreciation translated from the German of Professor Annemarie Schimmel and published in the first number. The occasional contributors are of comparable standing. The phrase "Orta Doğu" has been interpreted very widely. There are articles on Algeria, Libya, the United Arab Republic, Cyprus, Iraq, Turkey herself, race relations in Soviet Central Asia (summarized and quoted from a recent publication of Colonel G. E. Wheeler), Pakistan, and the strategic situation in South-East Asia. Each number includes a chronicle of political and economic events in the Middle East during the previous month. The topics treated are even more varied than the sub-title would imply. They comprise geopolitical, military, and cultural, as well as political and economic questions. The desirability of better understanding between Turkey and the Arab countries is stressed and contributors emphasize not so much the former association of Arabs and Turks in the Ottoman empire as the applicability of Atatürk's principles to nations other than his own and the value of the Turkish Republic as an example to its neighbours in their struggles for independence and progress. The tone of the articles is restrained, comment is cautious and sensible, and a considerable amount of relevant and accurate factual information is included.

C. F. BECKINGHAM.

The Indus Civilization. By Sir Mortimer Wheeler. Published by Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. 103. Illus., maps and index. 22s. 6d.

Sir Mortimer Wheeler's monograph on the Indus civilization was first published in 1953 as a part of the Cambridge history of India. This second edition of 1960 was designed to incorporate inferences and probable conjectures arising from archaeological surveys and excavations carried out in Pakistan and Hindustan during the past ten years. As a *multum in parvo* manual of archaeological method and practice this book of little more than 100 pages will find few, if any, rivals. Its value is enhanced by an abundance of sketches, plans and diagrams which will be of immense interest and profit to all students of archaeological technique. And it is to be hoped that the clues and data herein given will attract many workers into this field of research where vast areas still await exploration. For instance, the script of the seals and graffiti is still undeciphered: the connection between the cities of the Indus civilization and the pre-Sargonic cities of Samaria indicated by Indus seals in their ruins, awaits exploration: likewise, the connection of the Indus culture with preceding and succeeding village cultures of Baluchistan.

What Sir Mortimer Wheeler and his brother archaeologists have established is, however, of great importance to all interested in the history of civilization. For instance, he has fixed beyond all reasonable doubt the date of the Indus culture as flourishing from about 2,500 B.C. or a little earlier, to about 1,500 B.C. or a little later. Likewise, he is probably right in his conjecture that survivals of the Indus culture are still to be traced in modern Brahmanism. Prototypes of Shiva both in contemplation and as Nata-Raja are already apparent; nature worship appears to be the prevailing cult; while the practice of ceremonial ablutions is evidenced by the tanks found everywhere, not only in the temples, but in private houses.

There are some astonishing phenomena, the explanation of which still seems far off—e.g., the amazing artistic perfection of the bronze figure of a dancing girl and the stone male figure of which every muscle is anatomically perfect, find no parallel in the other discoveries in these two cities where the sculptures are rigid and austere. Only the steatite seals show a perfect mastery of their medium and accuracy of artistic perception. So far it has not been possible to trace any connection between these achievements of art and the products of contemporary civilizations. Of particular interest is the abundant evidence of the bloody onslaught of Aryan invaders who, in or about the fifteenth century B.C., sacked and destroyed the walled citadels of the Indus culture and massacred their inhabitants.

The recent discovery of large settlements clearly connected with the Indus civilization from Sutkagen-dor near the Makran coast, to the gulf of Cambay and the vast area of village sites related to this culture stretching up through Bahawalpur to the foothills of the Himalayas show the general nature of the Indus civilization to have been a far-flung civil organization dominated by the two fortified centres of Harappa and Mahenjodaro.

It will be difficult for readers not personally acquainted with the climate and the terrain of the two main sites which form the subject of this monograph to appreciate the peculiar difficulties which Sir Mortimer and his fellow workers have had to combat. First, of course, the natural predatory instincts of the locals; then the callous exploitation of ready-made brick material by railway builders; but most of all the annual and gigantic floods of the Indus river, which have not only operated to hide the ancient buildings under varying depths of silt, but continually hamper the work of the modern excavator. Also, as pointed out by Sir Mortimer, account is to be taken of the great change of climate in the area during the past 5,000 years, as proved by the bones of fauna and the illustrations of them on the seals.

C. K.

Towards Universal Man. By Rabindranath Tagore. Asia Publishing House, London. Pp. 387. 30s.

This collection of speeches and essays, which owes its publication to the generosity of the Ford Foundation, has appeared simultaneously in Delhi, London and New York as part of the arrangements to celebrate the centenary of Rabindranath Tagore's

birth in May, 1861. Much loving care has been devoted to its preparation. Nearly one hundred of the best-known Indian students of Tagore's work were asked to select what they regarded as the pieces representing the most outstanding contributions which he made to social reform; some forty of them responded to the invitation. Out of the numerous essays which were suggested, a central committee selected thirty, and arranged for their translation into English. The final choice of the eighteen pieces here printed was reached after a number of prominent American and European admirers of Tagore had been consulted.

The main value of this book to Western readers lies in the light which it throws upon an aspect of Tagore's personality which has, until now, been known almost exclusively to his fellow-countrymen in general, and to Bengalis in particular. By the Western world, Tagore is looked upon mainly as a writer of genius, a gifted musician and an unexpectedly talented painter—he took up painting for the first time when he was almost 70, and produced some 3,000 pictures, most of them very highly esteemed, within the ensuing ten years. His literary output was phenomenal; 1,000 poems: 2,000 songs: short stories, novels, dramatic pieces, and essays in formidable numbers. This output won for him, it is hardly necessary to recall, an international reputation hall-marked by the award of a Nobel Prize. Such is the Tagore whom the West knows—a great man of letters who is also identified with other branches of artistic creation.

But to Indians, Rabindranath's reputation is based upon something which is even greater than his artistic achievements—he ranks as a kind of *Rajguru*, Counsellor and Teacher of the Nation, standing high above the hurly-burly of political life, and calling his countrymen to value their heritage, but in discriminating fashion; to take from the Western world that which is best for them in it, and to avoid at once slavish imitation and obstinacy in clinging to outmoded tradition. At a time when India, in the throes of the struggle for independence, showed signs of turning to a narrow chauvinism, it was the voice of Rabindranath which recalled her to the path of toleration, of humanism, of confidence in the continued validity of the teachings of her own history. It is because of this, rather than because of his greatness as an artist, that Tagore holds his honoured place among the few outstanding figures who gave to modern India the shape which we see today.

A considerable number of the pieces collected in this volume appear in English translation for the first time; and the translation has been so well done that most of them read like originals. From them it is possible to estimate something of the services which Rabindranath rendered to his countrymen in shaping their approach to the problems which India, in common with all newly-liberated nations, has found herself obliged to face. His ideas on education, at once more profound and more liberal than those of Gandhi—with which, indeed, they have a good deal in common—underlie all that India is now doing to bring up the generations of school-going age along sound lines. If these ideas have not as yet found fulfilment in the sphere of University and other higher instruction, they are at least recognized as setting the standard to which, in fullness of time, institutions of higher learning must aspire. As an economist, Rabindranath shares with Gandhi the credit for directing the attention of the new Government towards the key importance of the village as an element of national planning. His cardinal distinction between the function of the State and of Society as agencies of national regeneration remains valid today; but the Western reader will mark with some surprise the dictum that the people of England “are not burdened with communal duties.” It is curious that Tagore did not realize the extent to which English social organization depends upon voluntary, unpaid service; but such slips—and there are very few—do not dim his clear-sighted vision as a great social pioneer.

L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS.

The Yellow Scarf. By General Sir Francis Taker. Published by J. M. Dent and Sons. 1961. Pp. 211. Illus. and indexed. 25s.

This excellent and most readable book is much more than an account of the suppression of thuggee. The latter will, no doubt, be the most interesting part of the

book for the general reader, but the author has made a valuable contribution to the history of the old British India as a whole. Far and away the most enlightening contributions to our knowledge of the inception, growth, and achievements of the Raj are the life stories of those who made it and gave it its unique character. Sleeman was one of these. Not in the highest class of all with Clive, Hastings and the Lawrences, he is *proxime accessit* with Nicholson, Outram and Clyde, and the author has established him permanently in their company. His success encourages one to hope that others will rescue from obscurity some more of the *proxime accessit* class, James Abbott, for example, brother in arms and peer of Nicholson on the North West Frontier, a man forgotten by his own countrymen but revered to this day by the fighting Mishwanis of the Frontier.

Sleeman's service comprised the period which saw the annexation of much of British India, and ended just before the Mutiny, which would never have occurred had the advice been taken of him and others like Outram who held the same views. Its record takes us behind the scenes in "Indian" India—the Princes' States—as well as in British India, and adds interesting glosses to the works of Tod and Malcolm and Forbes.

Sleeman's anti-thuggee organization survived into my first days in India in the shape of the "Thuggi and Dacoity Department," being finally wound up in 1910. By then, the Thugs had long ago disappeared as an organized brotherhood of murder, but other dark and cruel manifestations of Kali worship survived, some until the end of the Raj. Still, Sleeman had not merely scotched the snake of Thuggee. He had killed it. Not only that. His example, his methods and the vast prestige which his success conferred on the British administration made the emergence of any similar India-wide criminal organization quite impossible. All this must be read in *The Yellow Scarf* itself. To quote telling extracts from the book would be like giving hints about the solution of the mystery in a modern "Who done it?" It would spoil the reader's enjoyment. May your reviewer vote a special "Thank you" to Miss P. M. Quin? It will be carried unanimously by all readers.

JOHN COATMAN.

India: Mirage and Reality. By Peter Schmid. Translated by E. Osers. Harrap and Co., 1961. Pp. 256. Illustrated. 25s.

This book is about the best value for money that can be imagined. The photography, some of it in colour, is exactly what might be expected from Peter Schmid by those who have read and enjoyed his *New Face of China*. The text is as frank and uninhibited as the author's camera—and his fearless use of the latter is amusingly illustrated by a picture on the dust-cover which displays him gaily operating his machine beneath a notice which displays in bold Hindi and English lettering: "Photography Prohibited: Cameras Forbidden."

He brings an astringent, but by no means supercilious, point of view to bear upon the India of today. In other words, while retaining his own standards and his own outlook, and using both as a touchstone, he refuses to be betrayed into either adulation or denigration. Thus it comes about that this book, though admittedly recording the necessarily surface impressions which even the best-trained observer will collect in the course of a visit limited in time, can make a useful contribution to the essential reading which those who contemplate a study of India today should undertake. When so much that is now written about India falls into two mutually exclusive categories because the authors can either see nothing that is bad, or, in the alternative, nothing that is good, Peter Schmid remains observant of everything, listening carefully to everyone, and in the end recording judgments that are at once judicious and judicial.

The result is a book that will shock many admirers of India and seriously annoy many Indians; but neither the one nor the other can accuse it of bias or enmity just because, if once Mr. Schmid's own standards are accepted—and they are those of a highly intelligent, eminently detached Swiss observer—no accusation can be brought against either his selection or his presentation of the facts which came under his

notice. If his exposure of the pretensions of the present-day saints and sages of India—with the exception of Vinobha Bhave—is devastating it is also transparently honest. His criticism of Nehru and of the Congress bites shrewdly, but he does full justice to the part which both have played in building up modern India. His treatment of the policy of neutralism, and the careful distinction between neutralism and neutrality which he insists upon drawing, are models of lucid thinking.

It is a pity that he did not write more fully about Pakistan, for he displays a sympathetic appreciation of what the Revolutionary Government is trying to do, of the difficulties that are being faced, and of the achievements already accomplished. He seems to have found the traditional Pakistani frankness a good deal more to his taste than the labyrinthine workings of the minds of those Indians whom he interviewed; it would be interesting to read his comparison between the community development system in India—which he found hidebound and bureaucratically administered—and Pakistan's new experiment of basic democracies. But his stay in Pakistan was incidental to his main task, which was to study India; and although he hits off the new spirit in Pakistan to a nicety, he does not pretend to do more than find out why Pakistan exists and why India looks upon her as she does. His treatment of the Kashmir issue, though summary, cuts to the root of the dispute, even if he seems to have visited the Valley only, and not Azad Kashmir nor the Northern Territories.

At the back of Mr. Schmid's mind the whole time is the comparison with China. He is quite certain that China will gain the hegemony of Asia if only because of the contrast between China's hard work and vibrant vitality, and India's (to quote his own expression) "lethargy which, despite all its aspirations, invariably shrinks from seeing things through to the end." At the same time, he thinks that this very quality may prove an effective bar to Bolshevism, since gradual evolutionary development, rather than revolutionary dynamism, is in line with the real temperament of the people. He is scathing on the subject of India's occasional claim to moral superiority over the rest of the world; nowhere else, he thinks, with the possible exceptions of Spain and Soviet Russia, is there such a harsh clash between good and evil.

L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS.

Britain in India. By R. P. Masani. Published by Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. 270. Illustrations. Index. 27s. 6d.

As a Parsee, Rustom Pestonji Masani is able to discuss the events which led up to the division of British India in a manner which is entirely free from pro-Hindu or pro-Moslem prejudice. He claims that the book is not history. It contains a factual statement of the development of British power in India and of events which preceded the final abandonment of that power.

It is important because it offers a refreshingly original treatment of the subject and it is written from the point of view of a warm-hearted Indian Nationalist, without the bias of the extremists.

The book has three heroes; Dadabhai Naoroji, the Parsee who was a pioneer of the Indian Nationalist movement of the mid-nineteenth century, the British people, and Lord Wavell, who sought against all odds to prevent the division into Hindu India and Moslem Pakistan. "When a complete picture of the political situation during the closing days of the British era is presented, Wavell's policy will perhaps be fully vindicated"—are Mr. Masani's closing words.

He has also, though he never even remotely suggests it, three tragic figures: Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah, whose lack of the highest qualities of statesmanship comes through his factual statements. Their attempts to develop Indian Nationalism finally resulted in the destruction of the unity of its spirit.

Finally, he has three mistaken friends of India; John Morley, who accepted the principle of separate communal electorates, Ramsay MacDonald, who was responsible for the communal award, and Attlee. The first, he says, by introducing separate electorates, initiated the Hindu-Moslem cleavage in the political structure, the second perpetuated it. He makes no charge against the third, but he says, "the voluntary abandonment of power by Britain unprecedented in the annals of subject nations,

was shorn of almost all its glory" by "the flight of thousands of panic-stricken people that followed the decision to partition the country, simultaneously with the declaration of independence, the pillage, the arson, the rapes and other atrocities. He does not assign any positive blame to Earl Attlee, or, in fact, distinguish between his responsibility for the tragedy and that of Viscount Mountbatten. He says in his introduction, "The histories of this last phase of the British rule in India which have been published, leave several questions unanswered. What efforts were made by Lord Wavell, one of the most conscientious and liberal-minded viceroys of India, to bring together the two warring political parties? What were the circumstances which impelled Attlee as Prime Minister of Britain, to change horses midstream and send out Lord Mountbatten to expedite the withdrawal? What endeavours were made to evolve a neighbourly policy between the Dominions of India and Pakistan? Why did they prove abortive? Why were adequate precautions not taken to avert the holocaust? The reasons remain to be told dispassionately. In this book, an attempt is made to fill some of the lacunæ, to recall some little-known facts concerning the early history of the Empire, to relate a few episodes concerning the protracted struggle for freedom which have not found a place in any extant history of the country; and to give, in the light of information gathered from various sources, as accurate and as dispassionate an account as possible of what took place during the struggle."

He states that in this absence of official records covering the last phase, he has obtained some first-hand information from the principal actors in the great drama, including Earl Attlee and Pandit Jawharlal Nehru who have favoured him with frank replies to several enquiries. In the main he gives facts without discussing them or analysing the motives of the actors.

He shows how the British in India established the Rule of Law and removed abuses such as "Thuggee" (the murder of travellers for gain), and "Suttee" (the burning of Hindu widows). Recognizing their virtues and their services to India, praising individuals among them for beneficent acts and generous policies, he yet refers to them as "an arrogant bureaucracy."

This raises an unfortunate question regarding the composition of this book. It is written in several different styles and from different angles. It would be very unfair and inaccurate to describe it as a "scrapbook," but it does, in places, give that impression. The explanation would seem to be that he has followed different authorities very closely and sometimes verbally. He has described events from the point of view of the extreme Nationalist in one paragraph and from that of a Royal Commission, or an official pronouncement in the next. He has followed reasoned statements of administrators like Sir Thomas Munro or Lord Irwin, as well as the arguments of excited demagogues, and put down their thoughts as if they were his own. Where he is setting out his own thoughts, the style is clear and good. The general effect of all this is to detract somewhat from the value of his own work, which is, however, a remarkable account for a man of 85, if we are to assume that the entry, "Rustom Pestonji Masani 1876" indicates his age. There are several matters relevant to the fatal division between Hindu and Moslems which Mr. Masani does not fully, if at all, discuss. There is the movement initiated by Sir Syed Ahmed in the mid-nineteenth century and its motives. There is the attempt by Hindu extremists under Gandhi's leadership to excite the Moslems against the British Government by stirring up their feelings about the Khilafat question in 1919, and the frightful "Nemesis" which befell those who did so in the Mapilla country in 1921 (to which Mr. Masani refers briefly, but apparently without realizing the far-reaching effect of these outbreaks on the future of Hindu-Moslem relations).

Many of the British who knew the power and effectiveness of "the Government established by Law in British India" have deeply regretted that the division into India and Pakistan was made without adequate planning and was accompanied by large-scale mutual slaughtering of Hindus, Sikhs and Mahomedans. No one seems to have foreseen the extent and the ferocity of the massacres and it is not irrelevant that, before the transfer of power, the Government of India largely rested in the hands of members of the warring factions. Mr. Masani's narrative makes clear their refusal to be reconciled or to work together. It would probably have been morally impossible for the British Government to resume complete and effective control in order to hand it over. The tragedy may be attributed to this dilemma. Terrible as

these massacres were, perhaps the verdict of history will not accept Mr. Masani's view that the establishment of self-governing institutions in India, which had been planned, initiated and developed during the preceding century, was "shorn of almost all its glory" by the failure adequately to organize the final division into India and Pakistan.

J. C. CURRY.

India and the United States. Edited and with an introduction by Selig S. Harrison. Published by the Macmillan Company, New York. 1961. Pp. 244. Appendix. 41s.

In May, 1959, a conference was staged in Washington in which leading American and Indian politicians concerned with international affairs participated. Journalists and well-known commentators joined them. Some of the prominent speeches and discussions have been collected and edited by Mr. Selig Harrison under the broad umbrella of the general concept of the United States relationship with India during the last fifteen formative years. The result is an uneven presentation, in that a number of spasmodic views, however adroitly expressed, hardly make for a balanced picture of the new and eager American interest in Indian affairs which is such a feature of the post-war era.

There are many interesting and shrewd reflections particularly in the analysis of India's behaviour at the United Nations and American puzzlement over Mr. Nehru's ambivalence in such episodes as Suez, Hungary and Kashmir. But in general terms the Americans avoid anything in the nature of positive criticism, and display an admirable humility in their desire to understand the Indian attitude, whether it be non-alignment in international affairs or five-year plans and "Community Development" in the economic and social concentration of the country.

There is, naturally, much concentration on United States economic aid, leaving the reader with the impression that a handful of Americans of the calibre of Professor Max Millikan of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Professor Arthur Smithies of Harvard University had studied their subject with an earnest intensity for which India must be grateful. Others such as Father James Berna and Mr. Kennard Weddell made complete reconnaissances of small industry on the ground; and the results of their experiences must obviously be of significance for the future. The general impression is that the Americans have left behind them the bad old days when economic aid was regarded as a kind of pump supplying the pressure to take the strain in face of the Communist facility to exploit poverty amidst concentrations of wealth.

Some of the separate essays, notably Mr. Harrison's own opening contribution, are packed with wisdom. There is also an original assessment of the effect of fate and geography on India's problem by Barbara Ward Jackson.

Mr. Chester Bowles, a former U.S. Ambassador in Delhi, overcomes certain anti-colonial obsessions which were noticeable way back in 1952.

Throughout the argument there is no reference to the British former interest in Indian affairs and one accepts that this is a book which assumes that history began in 1947.

BIRDWOOD.

Himalayan Pilgrimage. By David Snellgrove. Bruno Cassirer: Faber. Pp. 274. Plates and appendices. Index. Maps. 36s.

The author is Reader in Tibetan at the London School of Oriental and African studies and a leading authority on Tibetan Buddhism. He is also a notable explorer. The book sets out to be "a study of Tibetan religion by a traveller through western Nepal" and that is precisely what it is. That his journey took him and his two loyal companions, a Sherpa and a Magar, through country where very few Westerners have ever been before is to him secondary, however tantalizing that may be to botanists, explorers, mountaineers and other venturesome folk. However, of neces-

sity, his narrative at least provides them with a route report and with hints on the rather nastier type of mountain dwellers to avoid, if ever they are so lucky as to follow in his footsteps. He has stuck firmly to his object, pursued it with meticulous care and in his scientific zeal refused to be led aside by the magnificence of the scenery or the toils and irritations of the pilgrimage. Emotions have no part except where there is vexation at native indifference or hostility which stands in the way of his visiting what he feels he must visit and which he is assured will be of value to his single purpose.

Knowing ourselves how strenuous a trek in the Himalayas can be for even a fit man, one is amazed at the manner in which this citizen of London, after only a mild muscle flexing, could plunge through hundreds of miles of mountains, live for months at heights of over 10,000 feet and trudge across more than a dozen passes of over 15,000 feet. He had the usual squabbles over hiring coolie and yak transport, but one feels that his zeal will soon dim the memory of these inconveniences and it certainly enabled him to live off the country, for months a stranger to meat. He set out from Nepalganj at the Indo-Nepalese border, went east of north up the Bheri into the Dolpo country to the borders of Tibet, then, leaving Dhaulagiri on his right hand, eastwards across the huge spurs of the Himalaya, north up the Kali Gandaki and into Lo and remote Mustang; south to Mukhtinath; east again to Tsum and then at last south by east to Kathmandu.

The northern fringe of western Nepal is Tibetan Buddhist and it was this quite separate region of the country that he went to visit, there to study its Buddhism and carefully to describe its many monasteries, temples and their embellishments. There is a glimpse of the primitive religion, of the age-old deities, Masta and Jakri Babiro, on the borderland of the Hindu and Buddhist cultures. One would have liked to hear more of it but the author sticks to his last. He has in any case made a considerable contribution to our knowledge of these distant places and their ways of life, a contribution the more notable because the old ways are disappearing and pressure from the north may before long squeeze out all trace of them.

This is not a book for the general reader; it is for the specialist and the traveller.

The maps and plates are good and ample.

F. S. T.

The Indian-Chinese Boundary Dispute. Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1961. $9\frac{1}{2} \times 6$ in. Pp. 342 + Chinese report of 213 pages.

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It is not possible in a short space to cover an immense document of 555 closely printed pages, packed with comment upon comment, as Pelion piled on Ossa and Ossa on Olympus. What follows is best read as a postscript to my address given to the Society on May 2, 1960 (*Geogr. J.* 126 (1960) 298-309).

Considerably more than half this document is devoted to the Indian case, a feature easily explicable in terms of the much greater volume of evidence offered on the Indian side. Indeed an objective reading of the reports of both sides makes no other conclusion possible but that the Chinese have no precise or detailed on-the-ground or on-the-map knowledge of any sector into which they have been unable to effect physical penetration during the last ten years since their occupation of Tibet. Before that, outside Lhasa, they were in the main ignorant of all this part of Tibet. This is completely apparent on the eastern sector south of the McMahon line, where Chinese unacquaintance with topographical, historical and ethnological fact is evident at every point. Even where the Chinese are now in physical occupation beyond the boundary claimed by India, as where they have built a road across the Aksai Chin in the Western Sector, there too (though in a manner significantly different) the scantiness of geographical detail given by their officials suggests that China has her own reasons for withholding factual information.

But there is a wider and deeper significance which makes the reading of this dual

report a fascinating exercise. This is in its revelation of the contrasted intellectual approach to a dispute by the representatives of the two maturest civilizations in the world, each in the bloom of a renaissance. The expositions of both sides bear every mark of a trained ability, a calm confidence. Both are subtle. But the Chinese side relies for effect mainly on proud assertions that make mock of contradiction and disdain logic and even evidence. At times, too, the Chinese argument is shot through with a kind of sly mockery; the new idea cannot refrain from a dig at India for "benefiting from the fruits of British imperialism"—an echo of the Communist Manifesto. The Indian argument, on the other hand, is based on sifted evidence, and marshalled with a lucid clarity and respect for logic worthy of any Oxford cloister. Save perhaps on the ground of prolixity, a Socrates could hardly fault it. As for us imperialists, it is possible to deduce with satisfaction that in respect of frontiers we discharged a great trust not unworthily.

A powerful instance of Chinese disrespect for logic is to be found in an utter denial of Tibetan competence to negotiate the McMahon line with one breath, contrasted with a reliance with the next, on that very competence in the Middle Sector above the Ganges sources. An example of sustained Indian argument is the demolition of the Chinese case that "there has been no delimitation," and in a suggestion, well put, that Chinese argument alone is embarrassing to the Chinese and suffices to buttress the claims of India. A host of other instances could be quoted to sustain this impression.

There remains in my judgment one general consideration of the utmost import which has evaded the intellectual grasp of both combatants. As stated in my address, "the fact is that it is only recently that the Western notion of fixed boundaries up to which an organized state administers on either side has begun to correspond with realities in Asia." The boundaries previously were nebulous; it was as if the sun of the imperial power, whether shining from Peking or from Delhi, cast a shadow only in the frontier regions. In Manchu times such a vague shadow fell over Tibet, until in 1911 the Manchus fell, the clouds hid the sun, and the shadow disappeared. In British, Mughal and earlier Hindu times the shadow cast by the Indian sun fell as far as the crest of great mountain arcs of the Himalaya and the Kuenlun, and this was a shadow never obscured. It is only as time advanced that it gradually became necessary to define with precision the edges of the shadows cast.

To a Chinese objection that in respect of old and traditional claims India relies over-much on myth and epic there is a neat reply. The evidence in Homer's *Iliad* of Greek conquest of the Ionian coasts of Asia is found to be confirmed when history opens, and is referred to in the early pages of Herodotus, the father of history.

May I end with a suggestion for greater precision on one vital point? The Indian side makes much of the watershed principle on the Himalaya, though the writers are constrained to admit that, like others, this watershed is cut by many rivers. But, admitting that the Himalayan crest is, as it is, a subsidiary watershed, it is not always the highest range which is the water-parting or which adjoins the Tibetan plateau (thus Everest does adjoin the plateau; Kangchenjunga and the highest peaks near the Ganges sources do not, there is another lower range to the north). Subject to a few exceptions, e.g., the Chambi Valley and Kyerong on the Nepal frontier—the true boundary of the Indian world is on the crest of the northernmost—not always the highest—crinkle of the Himalaya where it overlooks and falls to the Tibetan plateau. As those who have seen it know, the transition from Himalaya to plateau is too obvious on the ground to be mistaken.

In these two reports there is no common ground. This is not surprising, given that China is seeking to assert a claim, never made before, to the Indian Olympus.

OLAF CAROE.

North from Kabul. By Andrew Wilson. G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1961. Pp. 190. Illus. Maps. 25s.

Many members of the Society will have enjoyed Mr. Wilson's lecture last year about his visit in 1959 to Afghanistan, or will have read of it in the *Journal*, and that brief account will surely have left a thirst for more. This book gives a lot of satis-

faction as a tale of an enthusiastic traveller in strange parts, but it must increase our uneasiness about the future of the country and her varied sons to whom we are sympathetically introduced.

It was not Mr. Wilson's first journey in Afghanistan and he started this time so as to see the remnants that Jenghiz Khan and the ravages of centuries had left of the architectural glories of Herat and of Balkh, styled the oldest city in the world. On that quest, however, he found the Soviet activity in the country to be most disturbing, and efforts to learn the extent of that infiltration became his main aim. On the other hand it worried him that the British, who should, from old connections, have known more than others about Afghanistan, showed very little sign of enterprise there.

Despite the surprisingly cheerful remark that "there is no way of travel in the world to compare for luxury with the top of an Afghan bus," this was a tough trip and one Briton at least was enterprising. The story tells of the local form of cup-tie at Buz-kashi and of other Afghan specialities, as well as of the double quest in search of antiquities and the truth concerning power politics, and though photography was often carried out under difficulties, good results were produced.

C. H. S.

Afghanistan Between East and West. By Peter G. Franck. National Planning Association. Washington. 1960. Pp. xvi + 86. \$2.

This book is one of a series called *The Economics of Competitive Coexistence*. It is a workmanlike and straightforward account of American and Soviet technical and financial aid operations in Afghanistan up to the middle of 1959. The author served from 1948 to 1951 as economic adviser to the Afghan Government, and as background for the present study made a special journey to Afghanistan. With commendable impartiality he weighs the relative objects, merits and achievements of the two countries' programmes, and examines the internal and external advantages enjoyed by each side.

The main difference between the American and Soviet aid programmes for Afghanistan is that while the Soviet bloc has "concentrated on industrial operations, power stations, and road building," United States aid is based on longer term projects including not only irrigation and land reclamation but the reform of school curricula and the modernization of vocational schools. As Dr. Franck rightly emphasizes, the former programme is not only the easier, but produces much quicker and more spectacular results. He points out more than once that there is room for both kinds of assistance (pp. 72 and 79) and says that "this suggests a complementary rather than competitive relationship." At the same time, he thinks that there are dangers in what he calls "complementarity." "As the Soviet bloc programme grows, and given the relatively limited areas in which projects are feasible, the probability of the West directly helping a bloc project increases."

Soviet aid consists mostly in low interest loans, while American aid is in the form of grants and somewhat higher interest loans. Dr. Franck finds that "if U.S. grants are included with loans, the effective interest burden of U.S. assistance is about the same as that on Soviet loans." He points out, however, that the Afghans are so obsessed with the superiority of United States economy that they are inclined to regard the American contribution as stingy by comparison with the Soviet.

Dr. Franck speaks of "the subtle strategy of the Soviet Embassy, which conspicuously refrains from doctrinal onslaughts on Islam and on corrupt bureaucracies" and of the strictness with which the Soviet bloc technicians have interpreted their instructions about refraining from any political or ideological contacts. It is to be hoped that Afghan readers of this book will appreciate its remarkable objectivity and honesty, an honesty which occasionally borders on naïvety. Thus on p. xiv he writes that "it was definitely in the interests of the United States to operate so as to preserve Afghan independence and to deflect Afghan policies from directions favourable to the Soviet interests." This hardly tallies with his statement on p. 72 that "Soviet political aims in Afghanistan do not seem very different from those of the United States."

The book is packed with information for the general reader and shows considerable understanding of and sympathy for the Afghan point of view.

G. E. W.

Bayonets to Lhasa. By Peter Fleming. Published by Rupert Hart-Davis. 1961. Pp. 309. Illus. and indexed. 30s.

Mr. Fleming has given us another good book on affairs in Asia. He has reviewed the early events, diplomatic moves and counter-moves with Russia and China, which led to the Younghusband Mission to Lhasa.

His studies were embellished by correspondence kept in official archives to which he succeeded in obtaining access. Perhaps more important than these are personal accounts from the few survivors who took part in this small war 57 years ago. Even at the time of the expedition, things were so interesting in this little-known land with its sacred capital, that much private correspondence written to Edwardian homes has been preserved. There were also several contemporary books by eyewitnesses, including two war correspondents (Landon and Candler), who were privileged to accompany the Mission. All these sources of information have been brought together with subsequent writings to give a clear outline of events.

It has become the fashion nowadays to disparage the Mission, although the real danger—that of Russian influence—was clear to all and especially to those responsible for the defence of India. Pre-eminent among these was the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, who had the task of convincing the Cabinet in London of the necessity for dealing with the Tibetan problem. There was never any suggestion that Russia might use Tibet as a stepping-stone to India. The distance alone, before the days of air action, made this impossible. There were, however, other dangers. Russian influence once established in Lhasa would be disturbing to the Frontier States of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Kashmir with its distant frontier in Ladakh. All these states have large Buddhist populations and look to Lhasa as the centre of their faith.

Dorjiev, a Buddhist subject of the Tsar had acquired great influence over the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. With his connivance, letters and presents were exchanged between the Tsar and the Dalai Lama, while such contacts with India were resolutely refused, and letters from Lord Curzon to the Dalai Lama were returned unopened. Chapter III of this book gives an excellent and convincing summary of the Russian threat and the necessity to deal with it.

Whatever may be said against the Younghusband Mission one important result was that, in place of a tiresome state of suspicion and unfriendliness on our northern border, we created a close and intimate harmony with the Tibetans through the officers who at various times conducted our relations with them for the next half century—and, in fact, up to the present day. An end was put to the ridiculous situation, of the Tibetans refusing to accept agreements made by their suzerain China, while the Chinese were unable or unwilling to take any steps to make their satellite conform to treaties concluded on their behalf.

The book deals firmly and not too leniently with the differences between Younghusband and Macdonald, who commanded the troops which were officially the escort to the Mission. An unusual state of affairs developed in that the civil authority was all for pressing on, while the military were for retirement or, at most, a slow, timid advance. General Macdonald was thoroughly unsuited for this command. Until this book, it was not generally known that similar conditions obtained some twelve years previously in East Africa between Macdonald and Lugard when, as Mr. Fleming writes: "By a mixture of paranoia and puerility he sought every occasion to assert a *de jure* supremacy over the senior officer," in this case the civilian, Lugard. Both Lugard and Younghusband were themselves soldiers acting in high civilian positions.

One of the most important clauses of the 1904 Lhasa treaty was No. 5, which allowed British and Tibetan officers to have the right of direct dealings with each other. Mr. Fleming quotes Sir Charles Bell as stating that "Tibetan officials were soon being ordered to seek Chinese permission before accepting social invitations from the British Trade Agent, who, for his part, was obliged to buy all his local supplies through Chinese middlemen." These orders were no doubt given to the

Tibetans by the Chinese but they were never obeyed. The 1910 Blue Book shows how this question was thrashed out and finally conceded by the Chinese in a note from the Wai-wu Pu (Chinese Foreign Office) in January, 1907.

The Mission while in Lhasa was not in telegraphic touch with the outer world. Messages were carried by men of the Mounted Infantry. The shortest time for a reply to come from Simla or London was twelve days. The Government of India had demanded an indemnity of 75 Lakhs (about £500,000). The Tibetans said they could not pay such a large sum. They suggested that they should pay the sum in seventy-five annual instalments, and it had already been agreed that the Chumbi Valley should be occupied as security for the indemnity. The Chumbi Valley lies south of the Himalayas and, as our communications ran through it, it was in our occupation during the time of the Mission. This occupation for seventy-five years had actually been proposed by the Tibetans* but incurred the strong disapproval of Mr. Brodrick (later Lord Middleton) who was Secretary of State for India. He was afraid of treading on Russian toes and censured Younghusband severely. It would seem that, as an act of grace we might have reduced the indemnity, as was indeed eventually done, without making such a fuss about it and censuring the man who had been obliged to act on his own owing to lack of telegraphic communication. In the end it was decided that Younghusband should receive a K.C.I.E., an honour far below his deserts. It was then realized that General Macdonald was to be given a K.C.B., a far higher honour. It would have been a travesty to grant a lower honour to the man who had pushed things through in spite of all difficulties. After the War Office order was actually in print the K.C.B. proposed for Macdonald was cancelled and he was given a K.C.I.E., the same honour as that awarded to Younghusband. This must surely have been somewhat unusual. Later it was realized that Younghusband's work under special difficulties deserved a higher reward and he was given a K.C.S.I., a much higher honour, some years later.

A few unimportant errors have crept in. There is a mistaken caption to the picture of a Bhutanese on page 152 which is entitled "The Lhasa General."

It is not possible to agree that the Tongsa Penlop was not a "valorous man." He must be the only ruler in this century who, as a young man, charged his rival among flights of arrows and made himself the leader of his country and, eventually, king.

At the last line on page 26 "Nepal" should read "Sikkim." This is clear from the last words of the sentence itself.

There is some confusion about the passes at page 141: the Natu La is not in Bhutan and is in fact further than the Jelep La from Bhutan.

There is a very good index. A word should be said in praise of the medal on the dust-cover. It looks as though you could pick it up!

F. M. B.

The Silent War in Tibet. By Lowell Thomas, Jnr. Secker and Warburg, London, 1960. Pp. 284. 16 illustrations, 2 maps. 25s. net.

Mr. Thomas went to Tibet with his father, by permission of the Dalai Lama, in the autumn of 1959: because, he says, they had become aware "that the mysterious hermit kingdom on the roof of the world had begun to react nervously to the tensions of international power politics." Soon after crossing the Indian frontier into Tibet by the trade route through Sikkim they were met by officials bearing the Dalai Lama's welcome. On their arrival in Lhasa they soon found themselves comfortably established in a villa and after a few days of wonderful sightseeing were given a ceremonious official reception by the "god-king" at a darbar specially summoned for the purpose. We may be sure, then, that after this happy start they became well informed about the general course of events and especially about the views of the Tibetan ruler and his advisers concerning them.

* The Tibetan approach was—if you overload a donkey he will not be able to carry your load over the pass. Younghusband replied that in this case we were giving the donkey a very light load and letting him make several journeys. This caused much amusement to the Tibetans.

One point about which they soon became convinced was, we are told, that Indian security needs at least dominating influence over the central region of the Himalayas, of which Tibet forms the central part. "British influence prevented other Powers from securing a foothold in Tibet. Today, British power in the area is gone; India is militarily weak and preoccupied with internal problems." China, Mr. Thomas believes, has become the dominant military Power in Asia and intends to subjugate all Asia, in which "India and the rest of the sub-continent are the richest prizes. . . ."

He tells the interesting story of how the Tibetans "mystically" discovered the Dalai Lama in his childhood, what reverence and loyalty they grew to feel for him as he reached maturity and with what religious piety and religious and social contentment they enjoyed life until the Chinese invasion developed and they "slowly came to realize, with dismay, that they were completely alone in their predicament." He retails how their appeals to "Westerners" for help were fruitless. He tells us how delegations which they organized to plead their case in several countries, including Britain and the U.S.A., those countries refused to receive. He then describes the murderous barbarities with which the Chinese crushed Tibetan defences and people, all highly illuminating.

Then, in a way that will spoil his book's reception by many readers, he indiscreetly repeats typically nonsensical hostile American opinions about the British raj in India.

A. H. B.

The Flight of the Dalai Lama. By Noel Barber. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1960. Pp. 160. 16 illustrations, 2 maps. 16s.

Mr. Barber is a British journalist with a wonderful flair for news of high importance and with tremendous energy and courage for securing it. Over the top of the world from Amsterdam to Tokyo was one of his news-gathering excursions. Another was a journey round the world in record time. He went to the South Pole and wrote a book about that adventure. He has paid news-gathering visits to Morocco, Indo-China, Oran, Aden, Syria, Algiers, Corsica—sometimes narrowly escaping death in such ventures. Hearing in London, in 1958, about heavy fighting in Tibet, he and a friend, after much trouble, obtained permission to go there and made the journey partly by air, partly on foot. He tells us how "the walk across the Himalayas was a fascinating experience" and contrasts it with his previous winter's experience about the South Pole, and his impressions of Africa. His news of what the Chinese were doing in Tibet in 1958 is a story of godless savagery and horror. They then had in the country, he says, an occupation army of three-quarters of a million and, behind that, nearly 4,000,000 Chinese colonizers. "One day there will be no more Tibet, for the Chinese are exterminating the Tibetans: they are doing so with terrible ferocity, like ants devouring everything in their path." He tells of whole families shot on the spot, of thousands of monks driven away for forced labour, of nuns forced into Chinese army brothels, of hundreds of people flogged daily in public, of Tibetans killing their wives so that they may escape the Chinese prescription that "all Tibetan women were being forced to bear at least one 'Chinese' child," of 20,000 Tibetan boys and girls having been drafted to schools in China, of Tibetan villagers being driven into the wilderness and their villages appropriated for the Chinese colonists, of the ancient and vitally important Tibetan granaries being looted by and for the invaders. Angrily, Mr. Barber condemns a frightened Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru not only for his government's failure to aid Tibetan defence against the Chinese invasion but also for his attitude of almost friendliness towards the Chinese—including the practical imprisonment of the Dalai Lama at Mussoorie.

All this is well told and brings home to one the comprehensive nature of the Chinese "absorption" of Tibet and its people.

A. H. B.

Tibet is my Country. The autobiography of Thubten Norbu, brother of the Dalai Lama, as told by Heinrich Harrer. Translated from the German by Edward Fitzgerald. Rupert Hart-Davies, London. 1960. Pp. 284. Good map and many photographs. 25s. net.

There have recently been so many books about Tibet, some much more authentic than others, that news of another may not be welcomed. But this one is special and as delightful a story by any man about his own country as one could wish to read. Its author is years older than the Dalai Lama, his brother. His descriptions of his country and of its people and affairs are natural, simple and fascinating. He was lucky to have the help of Heinrich Harrer in presenting them. Herr Harrer is famous as the author of his own *Seven Years in Tibet* and it is due to his persuasion that Thubten Norbu became author of this one. The two were friends since Harrer's days in Tibet. Norbu, says Harrer in a Preface, "would talk to me of his childhood, of his mother and of his brothers and sisters and of the Tibetan people, who are so much misunderstood in the West, where anyone who has grotesque stories to tell can be sure of eager listeners."

This was in 1954, while Norbu was in the West striving to arouse Western peoples and Governments to come to his country's rescue from destruction by the Chinese. Eventually, Harrer bought a sound recorder and took down upon it Norbu's story on about twenty recording tapes. After initial hesitation, Norbu, because of his memory training as a monk, talked fluently, was able to recall the slightest detail and poured out an astonishingly graphic and stirring account of his country and its people and their fortunes, from his childhood onwards. The story was given in Tibetan, Harrer translated it into German, translated the German manuscript back into Tibetan and had it corrected by Norbu in readiness for publication and only then sent it on to the printer. "Without adding anything and without suppressing anything, the book contains just what Norbu said."

We read of the author's childhood and home life, of his parents, brothers and sisters, of their friends through the years, of their pastimes and interests, then of the sacred mysteries through which Norbu became recognized as the reincarnation of a distinguished forerunner and was therefore given the title of Rimpoché and through which his brother was discovered to be the reincarnation of the preceding Dalai Lama, "supreme spiritual and temporal head" of Tibet. There is a homely touch about all this, about the author's love of his home and its surroundings, about his reactions to the general course of events which he describes, that produces a sense of understanding all that he writes and helps one to absorb the intimate news which he gives about recent and current Tibetan affairs.

A. H. B.

Tiger Trails in Assam. By Patrick Hanley. Robert Hale, Ltd., 1961. Pp. 174. Illustrated and with map. 18s.

This is an exciting book, the account of a tea planter in Assam told after thirty years of experience in the Indian jungles.

It is indeed reminiscent of the famous tales of tigers written after much experience by the late Jim Corbett of Kumaon, and it is well illustrated with excellent photographs and fascinating descriptions.

Like St. Hubert, the patron saint of hunting, the author has changed from the role of a big game hunter to that of a preserver of wild life and it is from this aspect that the book is written. His style is easy and he obviously enjoys relating his experiences and his personal observations of tigers, leopards, elephants, wild boar, wild dogs, and snakes.

As the author explains in the preface, his experiences here recorded relate particularly to Assam and he has derived special satisfaction and the hunter's thrill from entering the jungle alone, unarmed and on foot to study the different characteristics of all the inhabitants of the jungle and of their particular relationships towards each other. This is the unwritten "Law of the Jungle" which only the experienced naturalist can learn to appreciate and understand fully.

These exciting tales so simply told not only give a particular thrill to the reader

but also add to our understanding of the ways of the animals of the Assam jungles and of the superstitions and habits of the local tribes such as the Santals and Oraons. It is a book which students of wild life in Asia will read with particular interest.

E. H. C.

Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation. By W. Howard Wriggins. Princeton University Press. Pp. 505. Bibliography and index. \$10.

Ceylon used to be held up as a model of gentle and easy transition from colonial status to independence, and the communal disturbances of 1958 came as a great shock to those in the outside world who cherished the illusion that all was peaceful and free from tension in that delectable country.

But tensions there indeed were, and Mr. Wriggins' book is an excellent guide to their social, political and economic sources. Mr. Wriggins is Chief of the Legislative Reference Section of the Library of Congress, has spent some time in Ceylon, and clearly has a thorough and generally accurate grip on the Island's complicated politics.

Part I of his book paints in the geographical, historical, economic and social setting of the country under British rule, before examining the parties and personalities in politics.

Part II is a careful examination of five of the difficult issues with which, since independence, Ceylon has been confronted: the rise and exploitation of cultural and religious nationalism; the problem of national unity in view of communal cleavages widened by language policy; problems of economic development; problems concerned with elections, given society as it is in Ceylon; and issues of foreign policy, particularly those bound up with Asian solidarity.

The book is erudite but readable, and commendably free from jargon and jarring usages (though "reportorial" on p. 424 is an exception). Possibly, however, it is too charitable towards religious, political and other groups which, it is believed by some observers, were and are more concerned with sheer power than Mr. Wriggins seems willing to admit.

B. H. FARMER.

Eastern Windows. By F. D. Ommanney. Longmans. 1960. Pp. 245. Many illustrations. 25s. net.

Dr. Ommanney is a zoologist and a fishery expert. For ten years he was on the staff of the famous *Discovery* investigations and in that capacity laboured at whaling stations all about the South Atlantic. Twice he joined *Discovery II* for Antarctic researches. He was later similarly engaged in the Indian Ocean. He has written more than one book on his experiences. This new volume is based on long sojourns in and about Singapore, Tokyo and Hong Kong while he was engaged in fishery surveys in those parts. Not that the book is a long account of these official operations. Nothing of the kind. It is, on the contrary, a series of descriptive pictures of the countries he visited, of their scenery and character, and of their peoples and ways of life and customs.

To readers who have not lived in the East his verbal sketches and his stories should be highly entertaining. To those who know Eastern countries they will not, of course, appear profound, for he spent only seven years in Eastern countries and their seas and never troubled to learn any of their languages, but he found great interest in his surroundings and is an apt story-teller about his adventures. His impressions of Singapore were primarily of noise and disagreeable smells, but "though you hate all these things there is much that enters into your heart and never leaves it. . . ." Hence, he says, "that mysterious disease, which is very real and catching and compelling, called 'the Call of the East.'" His fancy is caught by "the beauty of the people," but he shrewdly comments also on the great changes that are sweeping over the East: "The old way of life has quite vanished for Europeans," though they may be none the worse off for that, a powerful force is "the tide of nation-

alism." And "of all the nationalisms, that which is likely to have the most profound effect . . . is the newest of them all, the awakening nationalism of the overseas Chinese."

In Tokyo he attended the conference of fisheries experts from all the nations of South-East Asia, which meets under the auspices of the United Nations every second year, and his comments upon it and upon the bearing of its delegates, including those from Britain and the U.S.A., are not confined to fisheries in the straight meaning of the term.

A. H. B.

Marco Polo's Asia. By Leonardo Olschki. Published by University of California Press and Cambridge University Press. Pp. 432. Illus. Indexed. Maps and biblio. \$10.

This is an imposing tome and covers the literary precursors of Marco Polo and the discovery of Asia to the historical and legendary figures in Marco Polo's book. It is an exhaustive (I had almost written exhausting) treatise and merits the attention particularly of students of the background of China and Mongolia. Marco Polo's account of the latter country's history is inaccurate and his dates pertaining to Chinggis Khan were often incorrect.

It is interesting to note when reading of the health of the peoples of Mongolia that they suffered from an endemic form of arthritis, a disease usually associated with cold and wet countries. To this day there are special clinics devoted to the care of this disease though one rarely sees the malformation of limbs mentioned in Marco Polo's writings.

Chapter seven is devoted to the religions of Asia and we read of Catholic Missionaries at the Court of Karakorum, of Nestorian Christians as well as Mahomedanism and Buddhism. We are not told anything of the antagonism between the Sunnis and the Shias though there is little doubt that such antagonism was bitter.

We are told of the diplomatic mission entrusted to Marco, his father and uncle, but it is not recorded if this mission was ever completed—this is a gap in history which we must accept. European countries were perhaps not impressed by the power and dignity of Far Eastern Rulers.

This book cannot be lightly taken up and browsed through, but requires careful study and attention. Such care will be amply rewarded.

H. ST. C. S.

Sources of Chinese Tradition. Edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary who had as fellow compilers Wing-Tsit Chan and Burton Watson and as contributors Yi-pao Mei, Leon Hurvitz, T'ung-tsu Ch'u, and John Meskill. Columbia University Press, New York, 1960, and Oxford University Press. Pp. 946. Bibliography and index. 60s.

This book is the fifty-fifth volume in a colossal work under the title of *Records of Civilizations, Sources and Studies* which is edited under the auspices of the Department of History, Columbia University. According to the Preface the book is the last of a three-volume section dealing with the civilizations of China, Japan and India, entitled *Introduction to Oriental Civilizations*.

In relation to Chinese civilization the book fully justifies the title and will be welcomed not only by scholars but by casual students as well. Nor should it be neglected by readers of limited time and opportunity who would like a more intimate knowledge of Chinese thought with its influence on Chinese history and institutions. No one need be deterred by the length of the book. It is easy to find one's way about because of its excellent arrangement.

Primarily it is divided into five main parts. Part I with the title, "The Classical Period," takes us from the beginning of recorded legend, about 2852 B.C., to the Chin Dynasty, a period of over 2,500 years. Part II covers the period of the short but active

and important dynasty of Chin and the 400 years of the Han Dynasty which takes us 200 years into the Christian era. To this is given as title "The Imperial Age: Chin and Han." It is an appropriate title since it was during this period that the conception of undivided rule took place and Chinese arms established a great empire. The last Chin Emperor was famous also as having pressed the building of the Great Wall to its completion but he is chiefly remembered in history with opprobrium for decreeing and enforcing with the utmost severity "the burning of the books." Han times were characterized by profound thought on the cultural material which went to make up the Han inheritance. It was during this period that Buddhism reached China and that the China end of the caravan route through Central Asia to the shores of the Mediterranean, which became known to the West in modern times as the "Silk Road," was improved into a great highway. Part III is devoted to Neo-Taoism and Buddhism and covers the first 1,000 years of the Christian era. Part IV necessarily covers much of the same period, for it was the time when the Confucian school of thought was in conflict with Buddhism, with which Taoism found much in common. But through centuries of difference Confucianism survived to achieve "The Confucian Revival" which is the title of this part.

At this point we have a picture of Chinese thought which in the sixteenth century confronted "The Men from Afar," to quote the pleasant Chinese phrase sometimes used to describe foreigners. The book also indicates something of the historical and institutional background but we have to look elsewhere to complete the picture of China at the time the early navigators appeared in the China seas.

Part V is entitled "China and the New World." This has a high value because of the translations it gives us of many Chinese documents reflecting the evolution of modern Chinese thought. The same may be said of many of the earlier documents outside the classical writings which original translations by scholars responsible for the volume have made available. These indeed reflect the trend of thought in what might be described as China's middle age.

These five main parts are sub-divided into numerous chapters which make for easy reading.

I have left for comment to the last those parts of the book which contain notes or essays, as they should rather be called, introducing the various chapters into which the periods covered by the book naturally fall. These are of high quality.

A comprehensive book showing the evolution of Chinese thought is most timely. There is great interest in China today and anxiety as to the future of her people and the true nature of the Communist régime with its threat as it seems to be to the rest of mankind. The soul of a people is in terrible conflict with an ideology. Can it survive? To answer this question or to form a reasoned conjecture it is essential to have an understanding of what went before.

Space does not permit extensive quotation. I am, therefore, limiting myself to a single selection from the introductions to the various chapters. It refers to a period of Chinese history which has not always been appreciated. For nearly a thousand years Buddhism and Taoism dominated thought in China, and Confucianism, in opposition as already noted, was hard put to it to maintain its place. Here then is my selection.

"If today Chinese civilization seems almost synonymous with Confucian culture, we need to be reminded of the long centuries in which China lay under the spell of Buddhism and Taoism. For nearly eight centuries from the fall of the Han (A.D. 220) to the rise of the Sung (960), Chinese culture was so closely identified with Buddhism that less civilized nations like the Japanese and the Koreans embraced the one with the other, and thought of great T'ang China, the cynosure of the civilized world, as perhaps more of a Buddha-land than the land of Confucius. . . .

"Indeed, it may be said that during this period, while there were Confucian scholars, there were virtually no Confucianists; that is, persons who adhered to the teachings of Confucius as a distinct creed which set them apart from others. . . .

"Still it is significant that, if Confucianism could not contend with its rivals in the religious sphere, neither were they able to displace it in the social or political sphere. Though in an attenuated and not very dynamic form, Confucianism remained the accepted political philosophy in addition to serving as a rather general code of ethics. The family system and the imperial bureaucracy kept Confucian teach-

ings alive during these times, until their validity and relevance to a wider sphere of thought could be asserted by more vigorous minds."

Not less penetrating appraisements are scattered throughout the book making it a veritable treasure house.

P. H. B. KENT.

China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: the Diplomatic Phase, 1858-

1880. By Immanuel C. Y. Hsü. Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press. Pp. 210. Bibliography, glossary and indexes. 46s.

Coming, as it does, at a time when the question of the re-entry of China into the Family of Nations—or U.N.O.—is one that is being hotly debated, this is a most interesting and valuable work and one that should be made compulsory reading by all politicians, journalists, officials or others who wish to express an opinion on the subject. For while it may be a fallacy that "History repeats itself" it is undoubtedly true that national characteristics, especially in a country with such a long and continuous history as the Chinese have behind them, do not change and, given similar circumstances, a people's reactions may be expected to follow on roughly the same lines.

The subject is a study of the manner in which China was "carried struggling and kicking into the modern world" and of the attitude of the other Powers—Russia, France and the U.S.A.—towards British efforts to do this. The author, a Chinese who has had the advantage of studying a great number of authorities of every nationality then interested, shows how the first obstacle was the Chinese inability to understand that any other civilization than their own existed; for geographical and historical reasons they were convinced that there were not, and could not be, any other comparable states—there was The Middle Kingdom and a number of petty barbarian states like Japan, Siam, Burma, Nepal, etc., who were permitted to enjoy some of the advantages of Chinese civilization (if they behaved themselves properly and paid tribute if required) and they were prepared to believe that other such states—Portugal, Holland, France, Russia and England—similarly existed and could be tolerated on similar terms, if they comported themselves suitably. They were encouraged in this belief by the behaviour of earlier visitors to their shores. It is recorded, for instance, that up to the end of the eighteenth century there had been eighteen embassies sent to China (from Russia, Portugal, Holland and the Papacy) and it was not until the last of these, that under Lord Macartney in 1793, that the envoy refused to obey the rules and especially to perform the "kowtow" to the Emperor.

It is, however, an over-simplification of the case to say (p. 5) that after the Napoleonic Wars and with vastly increased surplus energy resulting from the Industrial Revolution, the Western Nations, notably Britain, resolved to alter the situation by force. In his final report, after the failure of his mission, Lord Macartney dispassionately discussed whether it would be possible to force the issue and came to the conclusion that, while Great Britain could, no doubt, have crushed all opposition easily, it would have meant too much dislocation of the valuable trade of the East India Company in whose interests it would have been attempted; and the idea was abandoned for nearly fifty years, by which time the whole situation had been altered by the cancellation of the Company's monopoly of the trade and the substitution of a number of merchants competing among themselves and with those of other nationalities.

The result of the First War and the Treaty of Nanking was a considerable easing of the situation by the opening up of five "Treaty Ports" to the permanent residence of foreign merchants and the stationing therein of Consuls who had the right to deal direct with local officials. But it was soon found that this was not enough: efficient as were the members of that remarkable body of men, H.B.M.'s Consular Service in China, and great as was their influence on the course of events in the Far East throughout the century after its formation, they could not get beyond a certain point so long as they had to deal with local officials without strong support, when necessary, by a Minister at Peking.

By the middle '50s, too, there were other influences at work. As a result of the

introduction of steam navigation and the growing volume of products from the Industrial Revolution, imports to China rather than the export of the classic tea and silk became the chief object of British trade; and the "maritime" Powers, especially Britain and France, feared that Russia, having been prevented from expanding into the Middle East by the Crimean War, would turn all her energies towards the Far East. Russia, for her part, while not unwilling to benefit at the expense of China, was afraid that the Western Powers might bring about the downfall of the Manchu Dynasty and so damage her position by moving the centre of gravity of China from Peking to some more southern city.

The main part of the book is, then, the tracing of the course of the struggle between Britain, sometimes assisted and sometimes much handicapped by the other three Powers, to effect representation in Peking. Here it is interesting to note that in the course of a debate in the House of Commons in December, 1960, on the question of the admission of (Red) China to U.N.O., Mr. Donnelly quoted a well-known paragraph from the speech of Lord Elgin in the same place a hundred years before (p. 96), including the words: "If we intend to maintain permanent pacific relations with some 400,000,000 persons . . . if we intend that our merchants shall conduct their trade . . . in peace . . . we must establish direct relations with the Imperial Government of Peking," and went on to argue that the problem was the same today. But surely the superficial similarity is misleading: then we were trying to force her to behave like all other civilized nations and exchange diplomatic representatives: now China, having again cut herself off from normal diplomatic relations even with those who have accorded her full recognition, is trying to force herself into another international body which was formed for other purposes.

Not the least interesting part of the book is the latter part which shows how the Chinese gradually came to realize that their weakness arose in great part from their ignorance of what was happening in foreign countries, first by a study of International Law, then by accepting the services of foreigners (pre-eminently, of course, Sir Robert Hart, the creator of the Customs Service), and finally by sending Chinese representatives abroad. But for some time now this process has been reversed and it is said that the present rulers of China, who are the direct descendants of the old "literati," a clique of hide-bound scholars basing themselves on a Chinese version of Marxism instead of the fossilized Confucianism of last century, see in the present world situation a chance to revert to the old position of the "Middle Kingdom," cut off from the rest of the world by a cordon of satellites. Whether it would be possible to secure such detachment under modern conditions, time alone will show; but, if it is, the lesson of this book appears that it would be a retrograde step and, cut off from the general stream of human progress, China would revert to the powerless state in which she found herself a hundred years ago.

A. G. N. O.

The Anthill: The Human Condition in Communist China. By Suzanne Labin. Translated from the French by Edward Fitzgerald. Stevens and Sons, Ltd., London. 1960. Pp. 443. Chronology. 37s. 6d.

The sub-title of this book—"The Human Condition of Communist China"—is the answer to the question which we are all asking ourselves. Mademoiselle Labin's answer is a massive indictment of the treatment of the Chinese people by the Communist régime. She had gone to Hong Kong, where there were some million and a half refugees from Communist China, for the reason that of the many books already published not one, so far as she knew, had "fully utilized the richest mine available—the most cogent: the evidence of the refugees themselves." This was an omission she set herself to remedy. "There," in Hong Kong, as she writes in her preface, "I questioned fifty-four of them, of all ages and both sexes, of a variety of trades and occupations and coming from all parts of China. This book presents the evidence of these first-hand witnesses as to the truth about Chinese Communism." This does not mean that no ex-Communist was interrogated. On the contrary, Mademoiselle Labin believed that "if you want to find out something about a Communist régime, it's as well to start off by questioning one of its former supporters

who has become cured of his illusions," and such evidence in fact "supplied the central core . . . the spine, as it were, of all the evidence which was to follow."

Her conclusion is set out on pp. 368 and 369 of her book, of which I quote her last words:

"More even than from the detailed replies to my questions, the real atmosphere of China under Communism was provided by the same few words which came again and again like a litany in the memories of all of them, simple words which evoked the same nightmare: terror, rationing, compulsory political lectures, public confessions, shortage, twenty-four catties of rice, requisitions, queues, arrests, no medicaments, forced labour, brain washing, moral bombardments, punishments, hunger, fear. . . .

"Terrible words, summed up for me in the gallows humour of a couple of refugees:

"'I used to wonder,' said one, 'why they made us all so thin. If we had been fat their police could have seen us better.'

"'True,' said the other, 'but then they could not get so many of us into one prison cell.'

"All thin, all candidates for prison cells: those two succinct propositions sum up the whole picture, the whole essence of Communist 'People's China' as it affects the lives of the Chinese people."

It is the task of the reviewer to assess the value of the evidence which the author took and the validity of her conclusion.

It may be taken that Mademoiselle Labin's good faith and high ability as a commentator are unimpeachable. No reader could doubt this even without the information given of her background on the dust-cover.

The publishers claim for the book that "as the refugees talk, the author creates a brilliant kaleidoscope of the realities of life in Communist China."

"A brilliant kaleidoscope" certainly, but how near do "the realities" come to the truth? In other words how far, if at all, has this claim to be discounted? There are, of course, weak spots.

In the first place the refugees are slightly on the defensive. After all they have left China leaving families behind them. Secondly, a sympathetic enquirer is likely to be told the sort of things he or she is looking for, however open the approach. Thirdly, so far as appears, the author has never been in China and was not in a position to assess the tendency of unreliability and the Chinese sense of drama. With no knowledge of the language she had to work through interpreters who were presumably Chinese and would find it difficult perhaps to avoid giving their particular slant to the stories.

But if some allowance has to be made for the difficulties inherent in the investigation, on the other hand Mademoiselle Labin, though often terribly shocked, shows herself alive to the necessity of exercising calm judgment. Moreover, there is a hard core of truth which is the basis of every one of the stories told by the fifty-four Chinese men and women who were encouraged to tell their stories in their own way. The stories told represent many aspects of life in Communist China and afford an element of mutual corroboration which cannot be ignored.

A million and a half refugees is a trifling number compared with the population of China. But there are an estimated three and a half million besides these: a few hundred thousand in Formosa, and the rest scattered through what was formerly French Indo-China, Siam and the Malayan Peninsula. This is still less than 1 per cent. of China's ever-increasing population, but why such a substantial refugee population at all? And there is the evidence of two other facts. The first of these is that when 22,000 Chinese prisoners of war were to be repatriated after the Korean war, all but 15 per cent. refused to return to China and of these latter there is reason to suppose they were not volunteers but yielded to threats against their families. The other is the result of what became known as the episode of the "Hundred Flowers." At first there was little response to a call for suggestions and criticisms supposedly for the assistance of the Government. But no one thought it sincere. When pressure was exerted to secure a response and it began to be thought the Government was acting in good faith, there was a stream of outspoken criticism and complaints with the result that a halt was soon called: the critics were treated

as subversionists and subjected to severe penalties. Government reaction indeed was so repressive that what might have been intended originally as a liberal gesture took on itself the appearance of a trap.

Finally, it is not unworthy of note that the stories told by ex-Communist witnesses of the framework and history of the movement are generally confirmed by foreign observers who were in China at its inception or later on, and were in a position to follow it through the subsequent phases. As regards the stories of the ordinary people, they are confirmed broadly by one of the best qualified of recent observers, Mr. Karl Eskelund, who, in his book, *The Red Mandarins*, describes the Chinese people as being "in a strait-jacket of fear."

Mademoiselle Labin's book concludes with three chapters with the suggestive titles—"Refugees v. Visitors," "Are the Chinese working for themselves" and "Yellow Peril or Red." They take the form of a symposium, mostly between a French journalist, who had just returned from a visit to China, a Chinese Professor at a University who had taken his degree at the Sorbonne, and the author. They deserve a review in themselves which, unfortunately, space does not permit.

P. H. B. KENT.

Japan. By Sir Esler Denning. Published by Ernest Benn. Pp. 263. Appendices, index, map. 27s.

When speaking with friends about Japan two questions seem to crop up almost inevitably: (a) How can one explain the fact that the same people who have developed, and love, something so highly spiritual as a tea ceremony should also be capable of such atrocious deeds in war? (b) Why do the Japanese persist in swamping foreign markets with goods obtained at low price by treating their workers as slaves?

Let me leave question (a) unanswered (it offers the same difficulties as the similar one about Beethoven and Buchenwald!). As for question (b), this cannot be put in Western terms without leading to false conclusions. It is true the Japanese can produce goods which are very often comparable, and sometimes better, than those produced in the West, and at much lower prices. It must, however, be remembered that the Japanese have developed a system of life which is not only ingenious and well adapted to their own surroundings, but is at the same time much cheaper than anything we know in the West. Houses are made of wood, mud and paper, and if they last less than buildings of stone, brick or concrete, they also cost much less, hence rents are lower. The main items of a healthy and thrifty diet are rice, fish and vegetables, which cost only a fraction of the prices demanded for meat, bread, milk and butter. Clothing is simpler because the climate on the whole is good and because there are fewer social requirements for elegance; and as for footwear, nothing could be more convenient than geta and zori of wood and straw. Japanese workers can live quite as comfortably as their Western colleagues on much lower salaries. It is hence true that the Japanese are hard industrial and commercial rivals to beat, but for reasons (at least in part) which are quite different from those normally alleged.

It is a great pleasure to see this important fact treated most clearly in Sir Esler Denning's new book *Japan*, one of Benn's series *Nations of the Modern World*. Japan, says Sir Esler, though much poorer than Great Britain, does enjoy "certain advantages which are not to be measured entirely in terms with which the West is familiar." Sir Esler illustrates this point with many examples. A normal family "occupies less space because, in the traditional style of living, there is virtually no furniture in a Japanese house, so that one room can serve both as living-room and bedroom. Cushions take the place of chairs, and there are no beds because the quilted bedding is spread upon the straw matting floor, while anything which is not in use by day or night is stored away. The economy thus effected when compared with even the most sparsely furnished Western accommodation is considerable, and the governing factor is not poverty but custom." "The Japanese people (the author concludes) live more simply and, therefore, more cheaply than the peoples of the West" without being conscious of any special hardship in so doing (page 127).

This is but one of the many passages in a book which will delight the reader

who knows Japan, because he will find here a true portrait of a very complicated society, and will be most illuminating for those who approach the country, or the subject, for the first time. The author has grown up with Japan as part of his earliest experiences. His father, an authority on Japanese history, wrote what is still today the standard English biography of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Sir Esler has lived in Japan for many years, has acted as Chief Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, S.E. Asia, and has been lately H.M. Ambassador to Japan. His credentials could not be higher.

The book starts with an Historical Background to Modern Japan which telescopes very ably, in 55 pages, over twenty centuries of political life, from Mythology to Occupation. Then it fans out to review every facet of modern Japan with chapters ranging from "Monarchy and Peerage" to "Labour," and to "the Changing Social System" (excellent!); special excursions take the reader into the fields of Education and of the Arts. Japan's post-war international relations are treated with the detachment of a scholar, though written by someone who has been active in the very shaping of them. There are two useful appendixes, one giving a list of books in English on Japan, the other giving in full the new Constitution.

Only on one point the reviewer feels compelled to qualify his admiration, and this is regarding the author's style. From the very first pages the reader feels himself confronted by a rather reserved and cautious diplomat. One can even detect a certain Japanese way of thinking in which every statement has its inevitable qualification.

This is not so much a criticism (of what is an essay and does not pretend to be literature) as a warning to those readers who might find the book uninspiring. It would be a real pity to lose the substance of this excellent work because of what is, after all, a minor shortcoming.

FOSCO MARAINI.

A Curse of Blossom. By Quentin Crewe. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1960. Pp. 176. Illus. 21s.

In 1905 there was published *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*, by Miss Isabella Bird. Though that intrepid lady went to Japan in 1878 and covered 1,400 miles at a time when roads were few and modern transport did not exist, she thought fit to say, at the outset of her book: "I am painfully conscious of the defects of this volume, but I venture to present it to the public in the hope that, in spite of its demerits, it may be accepted as an honest attempt to describe things as I saw them in Japan. . . ." Mr. Quentin Crewe, who rather boasts about following the unbeaten track (which proves not to have been so unbeaten after all), is assailed by none of the modesty which afflicted Miss Bird though, given the difference in period and in conditions, he has rather less to tell us about Japan than that lady. He left the staff of the *Evening Standard* because he and his wife felt they needed "some new, totally different experience." They went to Japan with their small son and spent a year there, living as far as possible in Japanese fashion and travelling fairly widely. Mr. Crewe seems also to have made some effort to learn the language. All this was entirely praiseworthy, and though Mr. Crewe and his wife were by no means the first to do it, one can sympathize with the pioneer spirit with which they appear to have been animated, and even admire the zeal with which Mr. Crewe pursued his determination to discover what made the Japanese tick. But though he concedes that they do tick, they appear to him to tick the wrong way and for the wrong reasons, and that, to Mr. Crewe, seems to be insufferable. Though a good piece of journalistic reporting (as one might expect from a writer on the *Evening Standard*), *A Curse of Blossom* is, on the whole, an unkind book, and Mr. Crewe seems to be more intent upon condemning the shortcomings of Japan and the Japanese than on discovering where virtue lies. Though he is good at describing his personal contacts, one feels the picture to be rather false because he has clearly not penetrated beneath the surface. When he generalizes he is often astray and his knowledge of Japanese history appears to be tenuous. It is, in fact, a book by an author without a background, and as such it is rather pretentious; a simple narrative would have been more

readable and less open to criticism. One cannot help wondering what the Japanese must have thought of Mr. Crewe, but they are, of course, a tolerant people and would in any case be too polite to say.

It is curious that both the intolerant Mr. Crewe and the equally intolerant Mr. Arthur Koestler (who visited Japan at about the same time and gave vent to his views in *The Lotus and the Robot*) should have confessed, at the end of their respective books, to a faint nostalgia for Japan. Can it be that the Japanese have something after all? One thing many of them have which is sadly lacking in Mr. Crewe and Mr. Koestler, and that is humility.

A Study of History. By Arnold Toynbee. Abridgment by D. C. Somervell. Published under the auspices of Chatham House, O.U.P. 1960. Pp. 951. Indexed. 45s.

The reviewer of this considerable work is faced not only with a complex task, namely that of commenting on a review running to about a thousand pages, but is obliged to discover to his own satisfaction the category into which the book falls. This is not easy. Significantly, while it calls itself *A Study of History*, it quite rightly makes no direct claim to be a historical work *per se*. This is just as well because it is certainly not historical writing in the usual sense of the term. It is indeed much more than an interpretation of history.

Instead, it is a penetrating and almost always interesting study of what might be called the comparative ecology of civilizations and cultures and a deep analysis of their ideas, values and destinies.

It is an attempt on an almost cosmic scale to set out the dynamics as well as the ethics which lie at the root of the endurance and the prosperity or alternatively the decline and death of any system of human society within the context of its historical environment. Besides this it is an inimitable essay on the effects of such systems on one another, and also the exposition of an urgent warning to our own form of civilization, namely, "Respond or die." This anxious question is being asked with great insistence today, and so far there is no clear indication that either our own nation or Europe are responding adequately to the immemorial and fateful challenge. Unfortunately, this sort of failure so far has only been required in one way.

The author quotes, interestingly, on p. 362 a letter from Dr. Edwyn Bevan.

"I do not think the danger before us is anarchy, but despotism: the loss of spiritual freedom, the totalitarian state, perhaps a world totalitarian state. As a consequence of strife between nations or classes there might be local and temporary anarchy, a passing phase. Anarchy is essentially weak and in an anarchic world any firmly organized group with rational organization and scientific knowledge could spread its domination over the rest and as an alternative to anarchy the world would welcome the despotic state. Then the world might enter again a period of spiritual 'petrification,' a terrible order which for the high activities of the human spirit would be death. The petrification of the Roman Empire and the petrification of China would appear less rigid because [in our case] the ruling group would have much greater scientific means of power. (Do you know Macaulay's *Essay on History*? He argues that the barbarian invasions were a blessing in the long run because they broke up the petrification. 'It cost Europe a thousand years of barbarism to escape the fate of China.' There would be no barbarian races to break up a future world totalitarian state.)"

He returns to this vital and topical theme. "Can we at all foresee the outcome of the second and still more violent bout of warfare into which our Western world has fallen as a result of the spiritual inadequacy of the eighteenth-century 'enlightenment.' If we are to try to look into the future we may begin by reminding ourselves that though all the other civilizations whose history is known to us may be dead or dying, a civilization is not like an animal organism condemned by an inexorable destiny to die after traversing a predestined life course. Even if all the other civilizations that have come into existence so far were to prove in fact to have followed this path, there is no known law of historical determinism that compels us

to leap out of the intolerable frying pan of our time and troubles into the slow and steady fire of a universal state where we shall in due course be reduced to dust and ashes."

That the author and his interpreter understand this issue completely is shown by their analysis of the many great and oppressive systems which have borne down on human integrity and individuality through the ages. Equally they understand the means of defence against the threat.

In Chapter XXXVIII, "The Law of God," we have an encouraging exposition of the most important part of this remarkable contribution to the study of human affairs. This is an examination of the relationship between Law and Freedom in history. P. 857 does much to offset the prevailing pessimism of the book.

"How is freedom related to Law? Our evidence declares that Man does not live under one law only. He lives under two laws and one of these two is a law of God which is Freedom itself under another and more illuminating name."

A. H. S. CANDLIN.

The following back numbers of the Society's Journal are urgently wanted :

1914 Part 3.	1931 Parts 3 & 4
1916 Parts 2 & 3.	1932 Parts 1, 2 & 3.
1917 Part 4.	1934 Parts 1 & 3.
1918 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1935 Parts 1 & 3.
1919 Parts 1, 2 & 4.	1936 Part 3.
1920 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1937 Part 1.
1921 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1938 Parts 2, 3 & 4.
1922 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1940 Part 3.
1923 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1942 Part 2.
1924 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1944 Parts 2, 3 & 4.
1925 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1945 Part 1.
1926 Parts 3 & 4.	1947 Parts 1, 3 & 4.
1927 Parts 1, 3 & 4.	1948 Part 1.
1928 Parts 1 & 3.	1951 Parts 2 & 3.
1929 Part 1.	1952 Part 2.
1930 Part 1.	1957 Part 1.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Council acknowledges with gratitude :

The voluntary work of Mrs. S. A. H. Ryle Hodges in the library.

The receipt of the following books, journals, magazines and pamphlets :

- Afghanistan*. April-December, 1960; No. 1, 1961.
Al Kuwaiti. No. 1.
Arab Bank, Ltd. Annual Report, 1960.
Arab World, The. April, 1961.
Aramco Handbook. 1960.
Asian Perspectives. Winter, 1958; Summer, 1959.
Asian Survey. March, 1961.
Associations International—Brussels. January, 1961.
Aswal. No. 1.
Beaver, The. Summer, 1961.
Bulgaria Today. February-May, 1961.
Bulletin of the Republic of Iraq. March-June, 1961.
Bulletin of the School of Education, Okayama University. December, 1960.
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. 1961.
Caucasian Review. No. 10.
Central Asian Review. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1961.
Commonwealth Challenge. March, 1961.
Commonwealth Digest. March-July, 1961.
Current History. March-June, 1961.
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Eastern World. April-July, 1961.
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Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. Central Asian Research Centre.
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Foreign Affairs. April-July, 1961.
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Geographical Journal. March-June, 1961.
Geographical Review. April-July, 1961.
Hebrew and the Jewish Renaissance. By Eliahu Elath.

- Historical Abstracts Bulletin*. December, 1960.
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Journal Asiatique. 1960, Fas. 3 and 4.
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 and 1958.
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Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko. No. 15.
Meridianos Brasileros. 1960.
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Qantas Empire Airways. Vol. 27, 3-6.
Report on the Boundary Question, concluding chapter (Ministry of Ex-
 ternal Affairs, Government of India).
Risalat al Naft. February-May, 1961.
Scottish Geographical Magazine. April, 1961.
South Africa. April, 1961.
South Moluccas (six issues).
Tercentenary Celebrations of the Royal Society of London. 1960.
Time. May, 1961.
Tropical Diseases Bulletin. April-May, 1961.
Ultramar Investigations. Nos. 27, 30, 36, 37.

The following books have been added to the library:

- Allen, W. E. D. *The Poet and the Spae Wife*.
 Attlee, Earl. *Empire into Commonwealth*.
 Blacker, L. V. S. *On Secret Patrol in High Asia*.
 Blanch, Lesley. *The Sabres of Paradise*.
 Bustani, Emile. *March Arabesque*.
 Caignart de Sautey, L. F. *Carnets de Voyage en Orient, 1845-69*.
 Fleming, Peter. *Bayonets to Lhasa*.
 Hanley, Patrick. *Tiger Trails in Assam*.
 Kimche, John and David. *Both Sides of the Hill*.
 Lamb, Alistair. *Britain and Chinese Central Asia*.
 Longhurst, Henry. *Adventure in Oil*.

- Masani, R. P. *Britain in India*.
Middleton, K. W. B. *Britain and Russia*.
Partner, Peter. *A Short Political Guide to the Arab World*.
Payne, Robert. *The Holy Sword*.
St. Antony's Papers. *Soviet Affairs*, No. 2 (Edited by David Footman).
Shah of Iran. *Mission for my Country*.
Tagore, Rabindranath. *Towards Universal Man*.
Watt, W. M. *Mohammed, Prophet and Statesman*.
Watt, W. M. *Islam and the Integration of Society*.
Wheeler, G. E. *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia*.
Wilson, Andrew. *North from Kabul*.
Wriggins, Howard. *Ceylon, Dilemmas of a New Nation*.

Offers of assistance in cataloguing and re-arranging the library would be greatly appreciated.

NOTICE TO MEMBERS

THE Council is especially grateful to those Members who have signed seven-year Covenants. The increased revenue received by the recovery of tax has materially helped to maintain our income, and with the present Standard Rate of tax at 7s. 9d. in the £ the value to the Society of a subscription of £2 made under Covenant is £3 5s. 4d. The corresponding value to the Society of a subscription of £1 10s. made under Covenant is £2 9s. In expressing thanks to those who have conferred this very substantial benefit on the funds of the Society, the Council ventures to hope that among the great majority of Members who have not yet entered into seven-year Covenants there may still be many who could see their way to adopt this method of strengthening the finances of the Society *without extra cost to themselves*. Accordingly, it should be understood that under the Deed of Covenant used by the Society—

- (1) The Member undertakes no additional liability whatever except to continue to pay his subscription for seven years.
- (2) *In the event of death, the liability would cease* and would not fall on the Member's estate.
- (3) *While the annual payment by the Member remains the same*, the amount recovered by the Society varies in proportion to the rate of income tax, being the difference between the sum paid by the Member and the gross amount that would furnish that sum after deduction of income tax (e.g., a gross amount of £3 5s. 4d. would, after deduction of tax at 7s. 9d. in the £, leave £2, the sum paid by the Member; the Society, therefore, recovers the difference of £1 5s. 4d. because it is in the legal sense a "charity" exempt from tax. Similarly, in the case of a gross amount of £2 9s. the Society would recover 19s., the balance of £1 10s. being the sum paid by the Member).
- (4) The only extra trouble caused to the Member is the signing of the Deed in the first instance and of an annual certificate that the subscription has been paid out of taxed income, both of which will be made out and submitted by the Society.
- (5) The gross amount (£3 5s. 4d. or £2 9s. in the example) may be deducted from the Member's income assessable to Surtax.

In the light of this explanation the Council earnestly invites Members who have not yet responded to previous appeals to reconsider this expedient for doubling the subscription-income of the Society.

FORM OF COVENANT

I
of
hereby covenant with the Royal Central Asian Society that for a period of seven years from the date of this Deed or during my lifetime (whichever shall be the shorter period) I will pay to the said Society from my general fund of taxed income such an amount annually as after deduction of income tax at the Standard Rate yields the net sum of
The first payment is to be made on the
Dated this.....day of.....19.....
Signed, sealed and delivered by the said.....
In the presence of: